discussing. It is chiefly valuable as an X-ray into the present crisis. It illuminates and confirms Mr. Kipling's diagnosis that if the red blood is required to flow, "bloodshed on an extensive scale," to borrow the approved phrase—to save Ministerial salaries, blood will be made to flow by hook or by crook. If we may credit Rumour, which is frequently accurate as regards the present Cabinet, some of his Majesty's Ministers, judging by their conversation, are little better than epileptics who have periodic attacks of homicidal lunacy. Their friends should take care of them. They are unfit to be at large. They are worse than the Suffragettes and ten times more dangerous because they are virtually uncontrolled heads of great executive Departments from which positions they can give effect to their bloodthirsty obsessions.

A Helpless Community

WHAT can the public do? We talk of government by public opinion but we are perfectly helpless, and Parliament seems equally powerless. The Upper House has become a mere debating society with functions comparable, however great the talents of individual members, to those of the Putney Parliament. The Lower House *is not even a debating society* because *no serious debating is* allowed. Voting is the only thing that counts, and every spurious discussion is closed by an eruption of salaried automata who troop into the lobby to secure a renewal of their "screw," if it be permissible to apply a homely phrase to great personages. The constituencies can do nothing except reject Ministerial nominees whose bribery and corruption leave them cold, but so long as there is a majority of one paid Member of Parliament, the Government can prosecute their programme however outrageous and alarming. The Lords, as we know committed hari-kari two years ago; the Commons, as we can see, have been squared and the constituencies are impotent. It is indeed a deadlock fraught with peril. The Home Rule Bill, alias the Civil War Bill, is now in its last lap, and the Molly Maguires are gloating over its impending passage to the Statute Book because they feel that with such a weapon in their hands they are not only masters of the situation at Westminster but masters of Ireland, and just as they have compelled our dirt-loving Prime

which is the pivot of the plot to establish the absolutism of the Caucus in the United Kingdom, does not permit any alteration of its legislative bantlings, this preposterous Home Rule Bill recognised as unworkable by the responsible Government, is actually being hustled through the House of Commons, to be rejected by the peers for the third and final time of asking, and then to be impudently presented to the King for signature, though condemned by its own authors—within a few days of the appearance of these pages. Needless to say Ministers realise that this madcap procedure is a challenge to armed Ulster. Its adoption can only be interpreted as signifying that once more homicidal mania in the shape of the Pogrom Party has regained ascendancy in the Cabinet and in all probability some further dastardly coup is contemplated while Ministers are once more prating of peace and hypocritically pretending to be ready to make sacrifices in order to secure a settlement by consent. If any Unionist boobies, federal or otherwise, or members of the great party of Mesopotamia are taken in by the transparent trickery which is a second part of Mr. Asquith's nature we are sorry for them, and even sorrier for the unfortunate constituents whose opinions they misrepresent and whose interests they are apparently prepared to betray.

Premier's Personality

We have done our utmost to make our readers appreciate the real character of the Prime Minister, not from any personal or Party prejudice but because it is essential for the formation of correct opinion that our public men should be seen as they really are rather than as journalistic henchmen with an axe to grind would have them appear. Mr. Asquith's character affords the key to the situation. Not only is he the responsible head of the Government which has engineered this appalling crisis as the only means of retaining office. His personality has alone made it possible. We are aware that some of our readers once held the view that we exaggerated Mr. Asquith's defects: argument on the subject occasionally ended with the not unnatural observation, "At any rate Asquith is better than Lloyd George or Churchill." This we venture to say is a delusion. He isn't any better. There can be nothing worse at the head of affairs in critical times than a hand-to-mouth time-

serving lawyer, content to drift from day to day along the line of least resistance, who never does one hour's honest work from one week-end to another, and who relies entirely upon his gift of the gab to pull him through parliamentary difficulties. Mr. George is a foul-mouthed demagogue whose frenzied finance is ruining an ever-increasing number of people. There are no illusions about the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. Churchill is one of Max Nordau's egomaniacs, so taken up with himself and so gratuitously offensive to every one he comes across outside the journalistic profession that he cuts his own throat. Mr. Asquith, on the other hand, is a real peril to the State for the reason that Don't Care came to grief. He does not care one brass farthing what happens so long as he remains in office—in this most of his colleagues resemble him—but he has a veneer of statesmanship, a spurious sense of responsibility, and makes the kind of heavy-father speeches that hocus the average easygoing Englishman, of whom there are far too many, into taking him at his own valuation as "a Minister of the Crown." Mr. George would have broken up the Coalition years ago. Mr. Churchill's temporary leadership of the House of Commons made him a common laughing-stock. He can never be anything but a Harmsworth hero. The Prime Minister has, however, in his day, taken in a much larger public, though we gladly note that during the past year the scales have fallen from many eyes and to-day any number of former victims of the form and substance of his parliamentary orations say: "I agree with you, Asquith is about the worst of the lot."

Ulster "Bluff"

He is the very worst of the lot because he is the first of the lot. He is responsible for colleagues who depise him while paying a certain amount of public homage for public consumption. The Premier has brought this country to the edge of catastrophe. He will be primarily responsible for anything that may occur. No man has been more contemptuous of the Ulster movement. Carsonism has been Mr. Asquith's favourite butt. Carson, after all, is a barrister like himself, making a very much larger income. Carson is a delicate man. It was inconceivable that a prosperous invalid, a "dyspeptic" as Sir Edward was politely termed in Radical forensic circles, should be willing to sacrifice

his income and to jeopardise his health for Ulster, or indeed for any cause. No Asquith would be such a fool. Why should Carson? Carson would no doubt make a few fiery speeches, being an excitable Irishman, after which, in spite of the expostulation of a few heated Orangemen, the so-called Provisional Government would "peter out." The suggestion that Carson was in earnest was laughed to scorn in the entourage of the Premier, where no one is in earnest. Lord Haldane split his sides on the subject. It was a first-class joke. And those who tried to enlighten our Asquiths and Haldanes as to the truth about Ulster were only laughed at for their pains. Then came the sudden panic, when it was grasped that Ulster was in earnest, and that unlike Asquith, Carson said what he meant and meant what he said. In their bewildered fury Ministers, as all the world knows, resolved on a Pogrom the execution of which was entrusted to the Pinchbeck Napoleon at the Admiralty and his fellow Rat at the War Office, with the brilliant consequences at which the world is still laughing. The Pogrom having proved a fiasco, thanks to the refusal of the British Army and the British Navy—on whose little known role we publish an illuminating article by "Dreadnought"—to act as agent provocateur in executing unlawful because unauthorised orders—if for once we may believe Mr. Asquith—it was resolved to try another tack. Mr. Churchill of all people, who had just been caught red-handed in the Pogrom, for which he ought to have been impeached and hung, ended a truculent speech at the end of April by whining to the Opposition to help Ministers out of their impasse.

"Conversations"

There ensued a most unedifying scene in the House of Commons, over which we prefer to draw a veil, when the Front Benches wept over one another—though we are bound to admit that the Unionists did most of the weeping—and refused to be comforted. Whether this manœuvre on the part of the First Lord of the Admiralty was to be a mere cloak for another Pogrom, to be organised during the Whitsuntide Recess, we cannot say. We can only guess. We should strongly advise Ulster to remain on the qui vive, to sleep neither by day nor by night and to be prepared for every contingency that cowardice and treachery can prompt. The

Premier began by repudiating the overtures of the Bradford Bounder who "spoke only for himself," and Unionists looked foolish for jumping off before the flag fell. Then Mr. Asquith decided to take a hand in the new game of Peace and suggested further "conversations." How far the Opposition walked into the trap we have no means of knowing, but if there were further "conversations" they apparently shared the fate of their abortive predecessors. Mr. Asquith was now in the unwonted position of having to do something, than which there is nothing more odious to your drifter with a gift for the gab who imagines the world to be governed by words because he is a master of words. A period of general restiveness, uncertainty and alarm was followed by Mr. Asquith's announcement that as soon as the Home Rule Bill was on the Statute Book an Amending Bill would be introduced and passed immediately. This was another palpable trick because no such Bill could pass without the approval of the Opposition, who were to have no voice in its provisions! The single value of this concession was its recognition, as we have previously pointed out, that the vaunted Home Rule Bill is so hopelessly unsuited for its purpose that it must be accompanied to the Statute Book by drastic amendment. The single object of this manœuvre is to trick the King, paralyse the Opposition, confuse the country and tide over another crisis dangerous to the Government. It would be impossible, even for the most charitable—and there are many charitable persons in the Unionist Party—to credit Mr. Asquith with good faith. We are always brought up by the fact that there is no room for good faith on the part of the head of a Government holding office on Nationalist suffrance. Were Mr. Asquith an honest man he is not a free man, and cannot make any serious proposals for the settlement of the Irish question because the parliamentary situation, fortified by a written document dating from 1910, which Mr. Redmond presumably possesses, places Ministers permanently at the mercy of the Dollar Dictator. They must "toe the line" every day as a condition of their Ministerial existence. Otherwise nothing could be simpler than to withdraw the Home Rule Bill, now at last acknowledged to be unworkable, with a view to hammering out something practical at a Joint Conference of the Parties.

We frankly regard the Irish problem as insoluble on any Home Rule lines and would not touch any form of Home Rule with a barge pole, whether for Ulster, for Leinster, for Munster, or for Connaught, though possibly provincial councils might be relatively harmless.

Beware of Asquith

But at any rate such a proceeding on the part of the Premier would be bona fide, and there are probably sufficient Mugs and Mugwumps on our side to secure its acceptance. But there is nothing bona fide about Mr. Asquith. The only other alternative —indeed the only rational course—would be for the Government, if it be unable, as is self-evident, to resist its Irish blackmailers and must go through the tragic farce of placing an unenforceable Home Rule Bill on the Statute Book, to lay on the table of both Houses of Parliament simultaneously the text of the amending measure so that our legislators might know what they were voting for and against. Mr. Asquith cannot run straight with anybody and is universally distrusted, even by those who have him safely in their pocket. We suspect that the Nationalists regard him much as we do. A few years ago it would have seemed incredible that any head of a British Government should one day promise an Amending Bill vitally altering a measure not yet passed, and then a few days later demand that the latter should be passed without disclosing a single cause of the former. But this is the situation at the time of writing, and only a Lewis Carroll could deal with it. Optimists aver that it is in process of transformation under the healing influence of the usual week-end, and if any change takes place while these pages are in the Press the reader will be in a better position to judge than we are. "Beware of Mr. Asquith" should nevertheless remain the password of Ulstermen and Unionists until the end of this critical chapter.

We feel that we ought to give chapter and verse for Mr. Asquith' "latest," as this review reaches many people beyond the orbi of the British daily press, dependent for the home news upon cablegrams which are generall sketchy and frequently misleading, emanati as they do from journalists deriving their inspiration from t' National Liberal Club. It would be scarcely an exaggerati to say that the entire civilised world is poisoned against t

Mr. Asquith's "Latest"

Unionist Party, the dissemination of news being largely in the hands of rabid radicals who hate their country (with a small c) as they love their Party (with a big P). Happily there is a growing distrust of "news" everywhere and no one is nowadays heard to say, "I believe that white is black because I saw it in the newspaper." It will be noted that within a very short space of time Mr. Asquith tried to trick both sides though he failed miserably. On May 12 what was ironically described by the extreme Radical *Nation* as "a new advance in conciliatory tactics" was made by the Government. It was on a procedure resolution developing the gag by abolishing "the suggestion stage" which was supposed to be an important feature of the Parliament Act. Turning to the Irish question Mr. Asquith declared, "if there is to be, as I hope there may be, something in the nature of an agreed settlement in regard to this matter, the proper, the only proper way of carrying out that purpose is by means of an Amending Bill." This recalled one of his pacific declarations while the Pogrom was being hatched. He added:

> The House knows very well that I myself, not only speaking for myself, but speaking for my colleagues, and I believe for my friends, have said we shall never close any door to the possibility of a settlement, and I am going a step further now, I think, than I have ever gone before, when I say as I do say, on behalf of his Majesty's Government, that while we shall ask the House to give this Bill, this Government of Ireland Bill (*i.e.* the Home Rule or Civil War Bill) a third reading before we separate for the Whitsuntide Recess, we shall make ourselves responsible for introducing an amending proposal in the hope that a settlement by agreement may be arrived at in regard to the points which have immediate and oustanding importance.

A Farce

To the initiated this was a new farce because ex hypothesi the Government statement had been viséd by Mr. Redmond, and no one was taken in by the Dollar Dictator's subsequent mock heroic protest. In his best "heavy style" Mr. Asquith continued, "I do not say more for the moment—*I hope I shall not be pressed*—than that the Government will make themselves responsible for such proposals. Our object is that if, as we hope and believe, that the Amending Bill, possibly not in the shape in which it is originally introduced, by the result of concerted and co-operative action by persons in all quarters of the House, who desire a settlement of this matter, if that Amending Bill can be brought into shape so as to pass this

House, the two Bills shall become law practically at the same time. Now I have stated quite frankly our position in regard to this matter." After the countless tricks played upon them by Mr. Asquith and the many lessons in duplicity they had had, if not always learnt, even a confiding Opposition could only adopt an attitude of critical reserve. While acknowledging that this speech was "a distinct advance" Mr. Bonar Law opined, and he proved as usual to be right in judging Mr. Asquith, that the Government were "still drifting."

> The real crux of the question is between the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Asquith) and the hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. John Redmond.) This is the point I should wish to put to the House and to the right hon. gentleman. He has told us that he is going to introduce an amending Bill. Surely from every point of view, not only of Parliamentary convenience, but of national interest, it is essential that before the House of Commons parts with this Bill (the Home Rule Bill) for the third and last time, it should know and should have an opportunity of discussing what the real proposals are that the Government have in view. That is the only natural course—it is the obvious course, and it is the proper course. Why have they not adopted it? The right hon. gentleman (Mr. Asquith) has not told us, but I think I can guess. The hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Redmond) has made it a point that the Bill has to go through as it stands, and the Government obey him. That is the only explanation.

Mr. Bonar Law ended by solemnly warning Ministers that this continued trifling with Ulster was playing with fire. Mr. Asquith's position was on the face of it so preposterous that even Unionists willing and anxious to sell the pass were perturbed, but they consoled themselves and tried to bamboozle others by pretending that it was "all right underneath," that the Peace Party were conquering the Cabinet, and that the Prime Ministe[r] was in favour of the complete and permanent exclusion of Ulste[r] at her option, the Amending Bill which would be produced forth with would be found to embody this policy, etc. As usual M[r.] Asquith cut the ground from under the feet of the Union Jacks who is determined to miss the point of every phase of the crisis.

"Manchester Guardian's" Disclosures

MATTERS came to a head some days after the Prime Ministe[r's] announcement of an Amending Bill, *i.e.* on May 21, but meanwh[ile] the suspicions of the least suspicious Union[ists] had been aroused by the tone of the Radical P[ress] and the insolence of the Molly Maguires. [The] possibilities of trickery in connection with [the] Amending Bill were disclosed by the *Manchester Guardian*, w[hich]

evidently shares our opinion of the Premier. It obligingly pointed out in a leading article (March 18) "the fate of the Home Rule Bill may be taken as already sealed. It may be regarded as certain that the Peers will reject it on Second Reading, as they have twice rejected it before and that it must, therefore, become law as it stands, without any amendment of any kind." So that is what "settlement by consent" means. The Prime Minister is the hypocrite we have long taken him for. With the Home Rule Bill on the Statute Book the Government could laugh at the Opposition who would be discredited in the eyes of the country by a resistance from which the heart was to be taken out by the promise of an Amending Bill. Similarly the King was to be tricked out of his signature to the Home Rule Bill, which would then be the law of the land without any possibility of alteration. That the Amending Bill is a mere manœuvre is demonstrated by the *Manchester Guardian*, which proceeds to observe and we beg our readers' attention to this pretty little plot.

> If there is to be any possibility of an agreed settlement, or if, failing such agreement, the Government are to give effect to the offer they have made for the temporary exclusion of part of Ulster, or for any modification of that offer, it can only be by means of an amending Bill to be passed side by side with the original Bill. Such an amending Bill could, of course, not be passed under the Parliament Act, and could only become law by consent of the House of Lords. *There is yet another possibility, remote we should suppose but conceivable, which is that, as under the Standing Orders two Bills dealing with the same subject matter cannot be introduced in the same session, the Government may fail, as they failed last session in the case of their Franchise and Registration Bill including women's suffrage in its scope, to pass the ordeal of the Speaker's criticism, and that the amending Bill may have to wait for a new session or a new Parliament.* [Our italics].

A Nationalist Smoking Room

So the Government have two strings to their bow. Having converted the Home Rule Bill into an Act, they demand the surrender of the Opposition at discretion under pain of provoking the Civil War towards which Ministers have been drifting for two years, or alternatively the Speaker may be expected to veto the Amending Bill, and we are left with the Civil War Bill as the law of the land. Mr. Asquith confirmed the worst impressions of his attitude and intentions. He reiterated his previous demand that the House of Commons should pass the Home Rule Bill without being given any inkling as to the character

and scope of the Amending Bill now declared by the Government to be vital to the success of their own measure. The pretext given aggravated the outrage on the House of Commons. It had been decided as essential to the success of the trick that the Amending Bill should make its first appearance in the Lords, and it would not be respectful to the Upper House to produce it elsewhere meanwhile! This was more than a long-suffering Opposition could endure and the House became a pandemonium, in the course of which the Speaker—whose demeanour excites less admiration outside than inside the House—came into gratuitous collision with Mr. Bonar Law, for whom he apparently tried to set a trap which fortunately the Opposition leader refused to walk into. The House was suspended. If it could only remain permanently suspended the country might have a chance. According to so Ministerial an organ as the *Times* this is the condition to which its favourite statesman, Mr. Asquith, has brought the mother of Parliaments: "It may be noted as an indication of how men may act in moments of stress and excitement, that as Mr. Hazleton and Mr. W. Archer Redmond, two members of the Nationalist Party, walked down the floor of the House after they had joined in the send-off to the Prime Minister, both were smoking —the one a cigarette, the other a briar pipe." It is many a long day since the House of Commons has been put to so useful and harmless a purpose. Smoke, after all, is less noxious than gas.

Ministerial Disasters

THERE the matter rests at the moment of going to Press (midday May 25). Meanwhile Ulster is not resting, and a situation is developing fraught with the utmost peril. Ministers have failed ignominiously in their cowardly attempt to turn the Army and Navy into *agents provocateurs*. They are understood to be practising on the Irish Constabulary, who are believed to be anything but responsive. Failing all three, the Pogrom Party will fall back on the Nationalist Volunteers who are only fit for such a job. "Bloodshed on an extensive scale" is deemed essential to the success of the Coalition by the epileptic section of the Cabinet. We have the edifying spectacle of a disappointed and embittered scion of Liberal Imperialism peramubulating the country, shrieking for blood with only a shade less gusto than Sir William

Byles and other vicarious heroes. Meanwhile the constituencies are speaking out with no uncertain voice, pronouncing a crushing condemnation on a Government of which Mexico would be ashamed, and though it is always easy to explain away a single reverse at by-elections no explanation of these cumulative reverses is possible except the obvious one that the country is sick to death of Messrs. Asquith and Co. and detests their measures. Unless Popular Government is an empty phrase there is no moral sanction behind any of the Bills now approaching the Statute Book, especially the Civil War Bill, which it would appear to be impossible for his Majesty to sign on any tenable theory of Constitutional Sovereignty. It would be a *coup d'état* conducted in the interests of a discredited caucus involving inevitable Civil War. After all, in a Democracy we people may count for nothing, but we think we ought to count for something. Three representative constituencies have been afforded golden opportunities by Providence of expressing their views at this grave juncture. No Unionist would have picked any of them for choice as ground favourable for a trial of strength. Grimsby was a Unionist seat held by the incomparable Sir George Doughty. If anything happened to him we expected to lose the seat. On his death, the Radicals selected a particularly popular candidate, "Alf. Bannister," to everybody. He was nevertheless defeated after a strenuous contest by Mr. Tickler, the Unionist. The second vacancy occurred in Derbyshire, an impregnable Radical stronghold, where we should have seen a great Coalition of "Progressive forces" but for the disgust with which the Government is regarded in Labour circles outside Parliament. In a three-cornered contest, Major Harland Bowden, an excellent Unionist candidate, captured the seat. The total poll being: Against the Government 10,138; For the Government 6155.

The Crowning Mercy

THEN came the crowning mercy of Ipswich—a famous citadel of Radicalism and Dissent—which the Coalition were so confident of holding that they sent down the rejected of Bethnal Green, Mr. Masterman, a Cabinet Minister still in search of a seat, while to make assurance doubly sure Mr. Lloyd George went to Ipswich and Limehouse on the eve of the poll as he had done at Manchester in 1908 for

Mr. Churchill, and with equally lamentable results to his colleague, the figures being:

Mr. F. J. G. Ganzoni (U.)	6406
Mr. C. F. G. Masterman (R.)	5874
Mr. John Scurr (Socialist)	395
Unionist majority over Ministerialist ..	532
Anti-Government majority	927

Lest we be accused of exaggerating the importance of this Coalition catastrophe underlined by the intervention of Mr. Lloyd George, who in a frenzied appeal summoned the electors to "deliver a verdict which would resound throughout the ages as a great blow for freedom," we also quote the *Daily News* on the morning of the poll (May 23): "To-day Ipswich goes to the poll and it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the issue that may be affected by its decision. It was Ipswich which gave the cue to the memorable triumph of 1906 and foreshadowed the great struggle which has now reached its climax." The *Daily Chronicle* was no less confident and the *Westminster Gazette* for once plucked up courage to prophesy before the event, "the appeal is not only to Ipswich but to the whole country, and must be answered eventually by all the constituencies." We ask for nothing better. If the country follows Ipswich's lead there will be no Radicals left in the House of Commons. We feel it our duty openly to ask the question which all men are privately asking one another. Is it possible for King George to ignore such signs of the times, such manifest disapproval of a sinister Government and their sinister measures by affixing his signature to a Bill which its own authors acknowledge to be so defective as to require drastic amendment, an Act which would precipitate civil war in Ireland, which is odious to the people of Great Britain, which is equally desired by our enemies and dreaded by our friends, because both can see even more clearly than we can that it means our downfall as a nation? Could the dynasty hope to survive the nation? We have never believed that King George would be a party to such a calamity especially when an easy, open, Constitutional way out of the dilemma lies before him, viz. of throwing on the Democracy the responsibility of deciding for or against Civil War.

The King's Part

We stated the case as clearly as we could nine months ago, before anybody began thinking of the crisis which was advancing upon the Monarchy by leaps and bounds. We have nothing to retract. Many events have combined to strengthen the case for his Majesty's demand, that before uttering the fateful and fatal words *Le Roy le veult*, it shall be conclusively demonstrated, either by General Election or Poll of the People, that Civil War in Ireland (which could not be confined to Ireland) is really wanted by the United Kingdom.

It is somewhat remarkable that so far no one has ventured to raise the problem of the duty of a Constitutional Sovereign in the absence of a Constitution, though it is becoming plain to the plain man that events are so shaping themselves as to cast as grave responsibility upon the King next year as has fallen to the lot of any of his Majesty's predecessors. Is anything gained by ignoring facts which stare us in the face? What is the present position and what is the outlook? A detested because detestable and despicable gang of political adventurers, whose true character at last stands revealed, have momentarily succeeded in capturing the government of the country, which they are transforming into a Single Chamber autocracy. In a constitutional sense Great Britain is a Costa Rica. Morally we are becoming a Panama. To a vast and ever increasing number of his Majesty's subjects the objects, the methods, the persons of these Tammany Hall politicians are all equally odious. But they happen to be in possession, and the people have no peaceable means of ejecting them. Every time a constituency is consulted it registers its hatred of the Coalition in no uncertain fashion, in spite of all the dirty tricks practised for the purpose of falsifying public opinion. At such a crisis the thoughts of serious people automatically turn towards the Throne as standing outside and above the strife of party and as being the one great Imperial factor in this part of the British Dominions. The position of a constitutional King would be difficult enough in all conscience, but what of a King whose Constitution has been violated and destroyed by the demagogues? The next item on their preposterous programme is a civil war in Ireland without a General Election in England. Those are the orders of the Molly Maguires, and "toe the line" Asquith has no option but to obey them. It is surely not asking too much of the Throne to throw on the people the responsibility of this civil war by granting a General Election before this impossible measure is placed on the Statute Book and the accursed dual system planted in the heart of the kingdom. King George and Queen Mary have recently had exceptional opportunities of realising the profound and abiding attachment of the British people towards the Monarchy. Politicians may be interested in discounting these impressive demonstrations, but the permanent interests of the nation and the Empire demand that they shall be interpreted in the proper quarter at their true value. They are eloquent signs of the times. Never can the Crown risk becoming the creature of the disorganised hypocrisy of detected frauds which bullies, humiliates and afflicts this unfortunate community. (*National Review*, September 1913.)

The crux of the matter is surely this that if the King were tricked into giving the Royal Assent to the Civil War Bill, the Crown would be "taking a side" against the People. There can be no partisanship in consulting the People. If they vote Aye, the King would be entitled to sign the Bill on constitutional theories. If they vote No, the situation would be saved. We cannot

conceive of there being any alternative. Should the King sign the Bill without some form of reference to the People, his crafty and corrupt counsellors would assuredly throw the blame on him, and just as George III is held responsible for the loss of the American colonies, so George V would be held responsible for the ensuing tragedy.

Obstructing the Murray Enquiry

THE Coalition have never been able to conceal their horror and terror at any mention of the word Marconi—a subject upon which we should never forget his Majesty's Ministers possess infinitely more information than the most conscientious, acute, and industrious student of this sinister affair, for the simple reason that between them they know all the facts at which intelligent outsiders can at the best make shrewd surmises. That we are far from having reached the end of the chapter was demonstrated by the furious indignation of Ministerial organs—which had probably received a hint as to the nature of further dreaded disclosures—when, thanks to the initiative and determination of Lord Ampthill, the House of Lords decided to hold a Murray Enquiry with a view to ascertaining the precise part played in the mystery by Mr. Asquith's former Chief Whip, now Lord Murray of Elibank, and a member of the hereditary Legislature, though a sworn enemy of hereditary legislators. On the failure to snuff out Lord Ampthill's motion strenuous efforts were made to prevent any peers of standing from serving upon the Committee, and day by day the success of one or other intrigue was triumphantly paraded by Ministerial newspapers, which were encouraged by the unusual delay in constituting the Committee to declare that it would never come into being. The *Westminster Gazette* (always foremost in sacrificing the larger public interests to paltry Party exigencies) demanded, if we remember aright, the publication of a list of "refusals" to serve, as though such a list would be any credit to the "refusers." It is alleged, and is probably true, that a leading member of the Government, notorious even in the Ministry of Mendacity, made it his business to prevent the Law Lords from participating. His conduct was anything but surprising, as he knows all the facts about the Marconi scandal and realises that the Government could not survive the whole truth for a single day. But it would be sur-

prising that any Law Lord should allow himself to be influenced by a shameless political intriguer with an obvious axe to grind as regards the discharge of a plain duty. In fact it would be so surprising and so damaging to the prestige of our Judiciary as to be incredible. In view of the organised obloquy against anybody and everybody who might join the Committee by interested and terrified partisans, from Mr. Illingworth, the Chief Ministerial Whip—who can always be relied upon to make an ass of himself—to the malignant Cocoa broadsheet which violently upbraided Lord Loreburn, the thanks of the entire community—or at any rate of that part of it which values our good name, which has been dragged in the mud by the Asquiths, the Isaacses, and the Georges—are due to the five peers, Lord Halsbury, Lord Loreburn, Lord Desart, Lord Sanderson, and Lord Charnwood, who ultimately undertook a disagreeable and thankless, but none the less priceless, public duty.

A Contrast in Committees

As our readers are aware this small and highly competent Committee contained no less than two ex-Lord Chancellors and another acute and distinguished lawyer in the person of Lord Desart, formerly Director of Public Prosecutions. Lord Sanderson was for many years the permanent Chief of the Foreign Office, while Lord Charnwood was created a peer by Mr. Asquith for Party services. The House of Lords is habitually accused by its enemies of being a Party body, but had it proceeded on partisan lines the Murray Committee would have consisted of four avowed Unionists and one Radical, instead of two Radicals, two Cross Bench men not specially identified, we believe, with any Party, the only active Unionist being Lord Halsbury, who is admittedly a great Judge before he is anything else. There was consequently no Unionist partisan on the Murray Committee or any one who could be colourably described as a Unionist partisan, though the Unionist party in the Upper House outnumbers the other side by eight or possibly ten to one. We do not say this by way of discounting its decisions, on the contrary, its constitution reflected the utmost credit on the fair-mindedness and chivalry of the august assembly from which it proceeded. It offered a contrast so striking as to be almost laughable to the conduct of the Commons over the same business. The Lower House—in every sense of the term—

entrusted its honour to a Committee dominated by Messrs. Falconer and Handel Booth, packed with a permanent working Falconer and Handel Booth majority who could be relied upon to vote that white was black and black was white whenever they received their marching orders. The Upper House, on the other hand, went out of its way to select men of a judicial temperament, and formed a Committee which represented anything except its own political complexion. The Murray Committee have placed the country under the deepest obligations for the manner in which they acquitted themselves, even though it be permissible to express regret that none of the great business magnates in the House of Lords could spare the necessary time to assist the Committee with their knowledge and experience of matters peculiarly within their province. The difference in the atmosphere of the two Committees, *i.e.* the Marconi Select Committee and the Murray Enquiry, was all that might have been expected. The Commons Committee was little better than a bear garden in which any one who wished to be heard had to shout at the top of his voice as several of its members made it their business to bellow, partly in order to say their say, chiefly in order to prevent anybody else from being heard. It was the most scandalous episode in recent politics, though it was invaluable as giving the public the measure of our first paid Legislature, which is generally recognised as the very worst of the many bad investments for which Mr. Lloyd George is responsible.

A Lightning Conductor?

THE Murray Enquiry, though perhaps unduly restricted, was like the Court of Chancery. It sat during the storm aroused by the Ulster Pogrom, which some Ministerial cynic suggested was organised as a lightning conductor to possible Marconi revelations. But never for a single instant was there the slightest trace on the part of any member of the Tribunal of any political prejudice or predilection, and no spectator of the proceedings could have gathered the faintest idea as to its politics. Frankly we should have liked to see the Enquiry carried somewhat further afield, but it was worth paying a big price for such a lesson in conduct in these decadent days. There was some perplexity at the outset as to the probable procedure as there were no precedents

though with the legal element in the ascendant strictness of proof would presumably be the order of the day. At the first sitting the Coalition Press were enchanted by Lord Halsbury's dictum that it would be "quite outrageous" to begin by asking Lord Murray to make a statement upon which he might subsequently be cross-examined, as had been the procedure elsewhere. The alternative now favoured, which was by far the more satisfactory course, was that the Accusers (the *Morning Post* and the *National Review*) should formulate and establish their charges. This pointed to protracted proceedings, and the proving of many matters of common knowledge, but it would likewise involve the appearance of witnesses in person, and hopes were cherished by laymen involved in the case that besides Lord Murray, whose story had not yet been told, Sir Rufus Isaacs, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Herbert Samuel, Mr. Godfrey Isaacs, and other notabilities, including possibly Mr. Asquith who, ex hypothesi, would desire to seize this tardy opportunity of making a statement upon oath, would appear and submit themselves to serious cross-examination which hitherto all Marconi Ministers had been so fortunate as to escape. These hopes were disappointed because Counsel on both sides, who conducted their respective cases with much ability, being men of common sense, were able to agree as to the large area of common ground, and it was accordingly decided to treat the sworn evidence given before the Commons Committee as valid to the present Enquiry. Thus was circumvented the appalling problem of summoning the late Attorney-General, Sir Rufus Isaacs, now the Lord Chief Justice of England (Lord Reading of Earley), though an ignoramus might have imagined that a man of his fastidious nicety would have demanded to be allowed to explain to a Committee of his peers how he came to involve another peer in the famous "flutter."

"National Review" Charges and Allegations

WE are prepared to discuss the wider aspects of the Marconi scandal in all its bearings at any time with anybody, and to vindicate the attitude of the *National Review*, which, though not infallible, appears to us to have made singularly few mistakes on matters of fact throughout the prolonged campaign for Clean Government. Or alternatively we are prepared to discuss the issues to which the Murray Enquiry was confined

for good reasons, but we are not prepared to combine the two operations as it would be fighting with one hand tied behind one's back. The demand of the Committee that the charges against Lord Murray should be duly formulated by the Accusers, *i.e.* by Counsel for the Accusers, resulted in the delivery to the Defendant of the following document on behalf of the *National Review* (*see* Blue-Book containing the Report and Evidence in the Murray Enquiry, Appendix B):

STATEMENT by the *National Review* and Mr. L. J. Maxse of the charges and allegations against Lord Murray of Elibank.

(1) That on April 17th, 1912, Lord Murray, with knowledge of the facts hereinafter stated in this paragraph, and being then a Member of the Government, availed himself of valuable information not accessible to the public, derived from one Godfrey Isaacs—who was then Managing Director of an English Company known as the Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company, Limited, and as such was in treaty with the Government to obtain a Government contract—to make a purchase of shares in a Company closely associated with the said Company, and known as The Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America, on more favourable terms than those on which the public could acquire the same, and that, immediately upon the said information becoming public, Lord Murray sold nearly all the shares so acquired at a large profit.

(2) That on the 18th April, 1912, Lord Murray, on the strength of such information, through one Fenner, a member of the Stock Exchange, purchased with Liberal Party Funds, of which he was trustee, shares in the said American Marconi Company, and thereby gave the Liberal Party a pecuniary interest in the success of the said English Marconi Company, and its Managing Director in obtaining the said Contract and in its ratification by the House of Commons. On the 14th May, 1912, Lord Murray made a further purchase of shares in the said American Marconi Company with funds of the Liberal Party.

(3) That on the 22nd May, 1912, while the said Contract was still awaiting the decision of the Government and the House of Commons, Lord Murray bought for himself another block of the said shares. This purchase was a speculation likely to be materially affected by such decision.

(4) That after the Government had undertaken, on the 6th of August, 1912, not to attempt to get the said Contract ratified by the House of Commons until after the adjournment of the House, Lord Murray used his position as Chief Government Whip to try to get the Contract ratified that night before the adjournment and without any real discussion. If he had succeeded, the fact that he had had dealings in the shares of the American Marconi Company would never have been disclosed. Further, Lord Murray concealed from the House of Commons his private and trust holdings of the said shares.

(5) That Lord Murray endeavoured to conceal from the House of Commons Committee appointed to investigate the circumstances connected with the negotiation and completion of the said contract, and so from the public, his transactions in the said shares.

(6) That on the 6th March, 1912, when the Government, of which he was a Member, was negotiating for the settlement of the coal strike, Lord Murray, through the said

Fenner, invested a large sum of the Liberal Party Funds in Home Railway Ordinary and Deferred Stocks, the price of which to his knowledge might be expected to be materially affected by the success or failure of the said negotiations. Through the defalcation of the said Fenner a large sum of the said Party Funds, including the payment for the said Railway Stocks, was lost, and in order to conceal such loss and to prevent the transactions effected through the said Fenner from being made known, Lord Murray, after becoming aware of Fenner's position, allowed him to continue to carry on business.

(7) That Lord Murray did not disclose to the Prime Minister the transactions and matters hereinbefore mentioned, either when he was created a Baron on his retirement from the office of Chief Government Whip and Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury in the month of August, 1912, or on the occasion of the debate in the House of Commons on the 11th October, 1912, when the question of the participation of Members of the Government in dealings in Marconi shares was under discussion.

(8) That Lord Murray concealed from his successor in the office of Chief Government Whip and Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury and Trustee of the Liberal Party Funds, the purchases of the said shares in the American Marconi Company with such funds, and the existence of the banking account through which the said shares had been paid for.

Dated the 16th day of March, 1914.

Condemnation of Ministerial Speculation

THE unanimous Report of the Lords Committee (which disposed of the case in seven sittings as compared with the seven months mainly wasted by the House of Commons Committee and then adjourned for some weeks to consider their judgment—a formality to which the Commons gave little consideration) is printed textually elsewhere. We trust that our readers will take the foregoing "Charges and Allegations" as presented on behalf of the *National Review*, for which alone we are responsible, one by one and compare them with the findings of the Court, three-quarters of which according to our arithmetic are in favour of the case set up by the *National Review*. Their lordships' judgment was emphasised by a strong and uncompromising condemnation of what we have termed throughout the controversy the Unlimited Right of Ministers to Speculate which had recently become part and parcel of the accepted creed of the Coalition. Lord Halsbury, Lord Loreburn, and their colleagues refused to bow to the new and strange gods erected by the Asquith cabal with the sanction of the House of Commons and the enthusiastic approval of the National Liberal Club and the Party of Progress and Pogroms generally. Needless to say our Panama politicians show no signs of acting on the

advice of the Lords Committee, which cannot be reproduced too often, and the Prime Minister's refusal to endorse it gives us the measure of his character, his record, and his ideals. It runs as follows, and will, we trust, be recited from every platform by every politician of every Party who has any regard for Clean Government to which the present gang have given such a tremendous shock to the intense disgust of all decent self-respecting people throughout the country, whatever their political complexion. Here are the *verba ipsissima* of the unanimous pronouncement of the Lords Committee in which Radicalism and impartiality were both strongly represented. "*In conclusion, we think it is within our province to express our strong opinion that there should be henceforth an inflexible rule to preclude those who hold any public office from entering upon any speculative transaction in stocks or shares in any circumstances whatsoever, and that this rule should be by them inculcated on their subordinates both by precept and example. The evils that may arise from a violation of this principle are incalculable.*" The Committee appear to have regarded the former Master of Elibank, now Lord Murray, as a comparatively minor actor in the famous transactions in which he participated, upon which they passed a measured but severe condemnation, adding, "Upon the whole matter we have to say that Lord Murray committed errors which we have described, as he himself acknowledged in general terms in your Lordships' House and admitted in detail at the hearing before us. We further report that nothing in his conduct reflects upon his personal honour." Again, as regards the transaction of April 17 described as "a grave error on Lord Murray's part," their lordships add, "But we acquit him of any dishonourable conduct." This verdict could not, we imagine, be stretched to cover the conduct of those of Lord Murray's colleagues, who added to the "grave error" of the original gamble a series of ignoble manœuvres and prevarications to which the Chief Whip was no party, while his candour as a witness contrasted favourably with theirs. We need not discuss the Judgment in any detail here, as it is dealt with in an article following the Report.

WE desire to take this opportunity of expressing our unalloyed regret as regards one matter on which we unwittingly did an injustice to Lord Murray, namely, in regard to his supposed action as Chief Whip in "hustling" the Marconi Contract through the House of Commons in August 1912, from which we drew certain inferences which would have been not merely legitimate but inevitable had the charge been well-founded. It is No. 4 in the "Charges and Allegations" of the *National Review*, and runs as follows :

An Apology

That after the Government had undertaken, on the 6th August, 1912, not to attempt to get the said contract ratified by the House of Commons until after the adjournment of the House, Lord Murray used his position as Chief Government Whip to try to get the Contract ratified that night before the adjournment and without any real discussion. If he had succeeded, the fact that he had had dealings in the shares of the American Marconi Company would never have been disclosed.

This charge was withdrawn by our Counsel at the Enquiry, and the Lords Committee thus expressed themselves with regard to it, "It is a grave accusation and was advanced without any evidence to support it. We report that it is wholly unfounded, and should never have been made. It was, in fact, withdrawn by the Accusers' Counsel in view of the independent evidence which was produced showing that Lord Murray had been actively instrumental in negotiating and carrying through the arrangements for referring the Contract to a Select Committee." No one regrets more than ourselves that any unfounded charge should be made against anybody by any one connected with the *National Review*, and we regret even more having misled our great contemporary, the *Morning Post*, which has made a splendid fight for Clean Government, on this particular allegation. The Coalition Press are entitled to make what capital they please out of its breakdown, and we make no complaint that it should be attributed exclusively to political malice, an affliction from which every Radical journalist is immune. We have not minced matters on the Marconi scandal, but as a matter of fact this charge was due neither to carelessness nor to prejudice, but simply to a misreading of Mr. Herbert Samuel's evidence before the Marconi Select Committee. We don't care a brass farthing what any supporter of the present Government thinks of the *National Review*, but we greatly value the good opinion

of our readers, and they shall judge for themselves whether this charge was made in good faith or not. Not the least striking revelation before the Commons Committee was the disclosure on the strength of evidence which originated in the office of the *Daily News* (a member of whose staff warned the Solicitors of the Poulsen Company), reluctantly confirmed by the Postmaster-General, that in spite of the Prime Minister's statement on August 6, 1912, that the Marconi Contract would not be taken before the adjournment the following day but would stand over until the Autumn, the Government, as represented by the Postmaster-General, made a shameless effort *after* that statement to get the opposition to the contract withdrawn and thus secure its immediate ratification without serious discussion.

Genesis of Error

It was a matter of common knowledge in the House of Commons at that time, which is confirmed by the recollection of many Members of Parliament that the Government were desperately anxious to get the contract through and bury the whole business despite the promise of the Prime Minister, and we know how lightly Ministerial pledges sit upon the present Ministry. The Chief Whip had as strong a motive as any man to hush up the whole business, indeed stronger. Our mistake consisted in assuming that he was a party to this particular intrigue in which Mr. Herbert Samuel was the leading spirit, and in our ignorance of the ways of Parliament it seemed to us inconceivable that the Postmaster-General could be engaged in such an operation so to speak "on his own" without the knowledge and approval of the Chief Whip. They both knew at the time, as did Mr. Asquith, of the "grave error" of April 17, which would be finally hushed up in the event of the opposition to the Marconi contract being jockeyed into withdrawal and the contract ratified then and there. Mr. Herbert Samuel certainly diffused the idea, which has been a general impression since he gave his evidence (April 2, 1913) that the Master of Elibank was acting in conjunction with the Post Office. This turns out to be untrue, and therefore we repeat our previous expression of regret that we should have given currency to an unfounded allegation. We think our readers will share our

surprise that Mr. Herbert Samuel should not have appeared before the Lords Committee to explain his unwarrantable aspersion on a former colleague. Indeed, the further one penetrates into the Marconi mystery the worst would appear to be the role of the last Postmaster-General, who is regarded by not a few experts as the "villain of the piece." We make no apology for reproducing his evidence before the Commons Committee which is responsible for the false impression.

2185. (*Question by* Lord ROBERT CECIL) Of course, the Chief Whip is the official who controls the allotment of the time of the House? (*Answer:* Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL) Yes, under the authority of the Prime Minister.

Q. But he is the person who is most concerned in it?—*A.* Yes.

Q. You continued to the very end anxious that this agreement should be ratified before the adjournment?—*A.* Very much so, simply because I wanted to get the stations. I think the public interest has suffered, and is suffering very greatly at this moment by the delay.

Q. So I understood you to say. After you had heard of all these American transactions, that did not alter your view that it would be right to get the agreement ratified?—*A.* No, not at all. To this moment I do not see the smallest reason.

Q. Without an enquiry before a Committee?—*A.* Certainly. I do not see anything in any way dishonourable or corrupt in anything my colleagues have done, or the smallest reason from anything they have done why this contract should not have been ratified straightway by the House of Commons without any enquiry whatsoever.

Q. That probably explains what I am about to put to you. On the 6th, I think it was, of August, the Prime Minister made a statement that the contract would not be ratified until after the adjournment. Do you remember that?—*A.* Well, it could not be. It had not the sanction of the House of Commons.

Q. I know; but the Government would not attempt to obtain its ratification until after August 6?—*A.* That is so, because by then, much to my regret, it had been pushed off and postponed so long that it was thought improper that a matter of this importance, in which so many members of the Opposition took an interest, should be decided in a debate on the last day, or even the last day but one, of the Session.

Q. Do you remember meeting Major Archer-Shee in the Lobby late that night—about 12 o'clock; or perhaps I might say do you remember sending for him some time in the afternoon, and asking him to withdraw his notice of opposition?—*A.* Yes, I put it to him in this way. I told him what so far as I remember I do not think was known before, that the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Admiralty attached great importance to this being done soon—and I put it to him as a Member of Parliament whether, unless his opposition was a very strong one, he could see his way to allow the contract to be ratified in order that the Empire could get these wireless stations. I put it to him that the strategic importance of them was regarded by the Government as being very great, and I think I said to him—I am not quite sure—that if we were involved in war and had not got any long-range wireless stations at all, and if our cables were out, it would be very greatly to the discredit of the Empire generally.

and that the Government could not take that responsibility, or words to that effect. That was what was in my mind, and I thought it my duty to use my utmost efforts to get the contract through for that reason.

Q. Did he tell you that his objection was so great that he was afraid he could not?—*A.* Certainly.

Q. Did you meet him late that night and tell him notwithstanding that, the Government proposed to try and obtain the ratification before the adjournment?—*A.* What date was that?

Q. That was August 6?—*A.* Well, I was very anxious to get it myself.

Q. It was after a statement by the Prime Minister?—*A.* I held very strongly the view that we ought to have had a full day's debate before the adjournment, and the Master of Elibank indeed undertook that the matter should be discussed before the adjournment, and I quite understood from him that it would have been settled. I had raised the point on one or two occasions with my colleagues immediately after the contract had been signed, and pressed again and again that there should be an opportunity for discussion. *I rather wished not to have a Committee of Enquiry* [our italics]—not in the smallest degree because I thought there was anything to be concealed, but because I thought these rumours about shares were utterly unfounded, and that it was my business as Postmaster-General to get the stations as soon as I could, and I foresaw if there was a Committee it would probably take months before the matter could be settled, though I did not think it would be so many months as it has been.

Q. Then the answer really is that you did say to Major Archer-Shee that you did propose to get the contract through?—*A.* I do not remember the conversation, but I very likely had it, because I was very anxious, and in fact until the day before the adjournment I still had hopes of a full debate, and ultimately I said: "If I cannot have that full debate and a decision, at any rate I must insist on making a statement on the facts so far as I was concerned to remove some of the misapprehensions that that were abroad," *and, as the Opposition still objected to the matter being taken—the Chief Whip was in negotiation with the Opposition to see if we could not settle the matter then and there* [our italics]—it was ultimately decided on those lines, and an opportunity was given to me to make a statement on the contract generally, the facts of which had never previously been laid fully before the House, and it was arranged that there should be no debate or division, and the matter held over until the autumn.

Q. The question that I am anxious to put to you is whether you met Major Archer-Shee and told him: "Notwithstanding all that the Prime Minister said this afternoon, I still hope or intend to get the contract ratified to-morrow"?—*A.* I do not recollect the conversation, but certainly it was my hope up to the last moment that I should have got a debate, and, if necessary, a Division on it.

The Breach of Faith

WHILE every one will be delighted that the Master of Elibank has been cleared of this "grave charge," Mr. Samuel's reputation has suffered somewhat in the process. Sir Henry Norman, a Radical Member of Parliament, appeared before the Lords Committee as one of Lord Murray's witnesses, to explain that so far from seeking to

"hustle" the Marconi contract through the House in August 1912 the then Chief Whip sought him (Sir Henry Norman) out on August 6 to offer a Select Committee on behalf of the Prime Minister, on the faith of which promise Sir Henry Norman undertook to get his friends to withdraw their opposition, and on behalf of the Master of Elibank arranged matters with Lord Balcarres, the then Chief Opposition Whip. We quote Sir Henry Norman:

The arrangement was then come to between the Master of Elibank and myself that, at the conclusion of his speech defending the ratification of the contract, the then Postmaster-General, Mr. Samuel, should state publicly the fact that the Prime Minister would consent to have the whole matter referred to a Select Committee. I accordingly saw Lord Belcarres, told him what the Master of Elibank had said to me, asked him if he could see his way to ask members on his side of the House to withdraw their opposition at that stage, and he expressed to me his willingness to do so.

All this happened on August 6. Observe the sequel, our authority being still the Radical Member of Parliament, Sir Henry Norman. On August 7 Mr. Herbert Samuel made his speech containing no announcement of the promised Select Committee: "I (Sir Henry Norman) must tell you first that I was sitting immediately behind the Postmaster-General when he spoke, and he sat down without having mentioned the Select Committee, although he said the Government were willing to have the matter postponed then. I leant forward from the bench, and said to him, 'What about the Select Committee?'" In answer to Lord Desart, Sir Henry Norman explained that he then went to hunt for the Master of Elibank and, failing to find him, wrote an indignant letter complaining that Mr. Herbert Samuel's conduct "was something in the nature of a breach of our understanding, and that it placed me in a very embarrassing position, *vis-à-vis* Lord Balcarres. It rather made it appear that I had exceeded any possible authority I could have in suggesting to Lord Balcarres an arrangement of this kind. I wrote that letter to the Master of Elibank, sent it into the Whip's Room, and was leaving the House when the Master of Elibank saw me and came running after me. He said: 'I have seen your letter. I quite understand your feelings, and I fully sympathise with them.'" It was then decided that the Master of Elibank should write a letter for publication to Sir Henry Norman announcing the Prime Minister's willingness to set up the Select Committee,

which, when drafted, was taken for approval to the Prime Minister, who suggested some alterations, after which it was further edited by Mr. Herbert Samuel, who conceived his *amour propre* to be wounded by one passage in the original.

This collective epistle was published in this form: "Sir Henry Norman has received the following letter from the Master of Elibank, M.P., August 7, 1912:

Party Funds

My dear Norman,—With reference to our conversation in the House of Commons this afternoon on the subject of the future procedure to be adopted in respect of the Marconi Agreement Debate, I have the Prime Minister's authority for informing you that the adjourned Debate will be resumed shortly after the reassembling of Parliament in the Autumn, *and that if after discussion* [our italics] the House desires a Select Committee to enquire into the Agreement the Government will be quite willing to assent to that course.

Yours sincerely,
Alexander Murray.

While the Master of Elibank has been exonerated, Mr. Herbert Samuel's performance remains more obscure than ever, and he would be well advised to supplement his misleading evidence. Sir Henry Norman was asked in cross-examination, "Did you hear either from the Master of Elibank or from any of the gentlemen who were interested with you in having a full discussion that there had been any negotiation between the two Whips—the Ministerial and the Opposition Whips—to settle the matter then and there." To which the witness replied, "I have no recollection of anything of the kind." In fact the whole thing would appear to have been a figment of Mr. Herbert Samuel's imagination, and we can only reiterate for the third time our sincere regret at having been misled by him—a not uncommon fate. The Lords Committee seemed somewhat chary of probing the fascinating problem of Party funds—a subject on which the man in the street does not always see eye to eye with the man in Parliament. They contented themselves with observing on one part of the case. "We are not concerned to deal with the way in which Lord Murray, as Trustee, exercised his discretion in investing the Trust Funds. That is a matter exclusively for those to whom the funds belong." We should have thought, however, that the lofty and exacting standard imposed upon Trustees would apply to a Party Trustee as to any other, and that the Master of Elibank was called upon to exercise meticulous

care in husbanding the resources of his *cestui qui trust* because, as he informed the House of Lords, he had definitely made up his mind so long ago as February 1912 to relinquish his official position at the end of the session and to retire from public life. His acquiescence in "keeping alive" the Party Broker Fenner, after being aware of the Party losses, is also apparently approved by their lordships, who were somewhat contemptuous of a charge to which, as our readers are aware, we have attached considerable importance, namely, the notorious investment of Party funds in British Railways, while the Government, of which the Master of Elibank was a member, was engaged in settling the Coal Strikes. After pointing out that the lines in question have "a large mineral traffic," the Committee report:

> The suggestion of the Accusers unmistakably was that this was done during the great Coal Strike, while the Government was endeavouring to procure a settlement of the Strike and with a view to obtaining some advantage by reason of the private knowledge which members of the Government might possess, of the probability of the Strike being either prolonged or terminated. This interpretation was disclaimed at the Bar, but no other intelligible interpretation of the charge was offered. In fact, Lord Murray knew no more than the public knew about these negotiations, and bought in the ordinary way. There is no ground for any accusation on this head.

Regrettable Precedent

Nevertheless we cannot help regarding the Party investment in Home Rails likely to be affected by the course of the negotiations as a regrettable precedent and as opening a dangerous door. In this case the amount was trifling, and it would be absurd to suggest that under any circumstances Ministers would allow such an investment to colour their conduct. At the same time we venture to think it would be a sound and salutary rule that under no circumstances should Party funds be invested by any member of the Government in stocks or shares likely to be affected by negotiations in which the Government were engaged. If it were right for Party funds to be so invested it would ex hypothesi be right for Trade Union funds to be similarly dealt with, while the miners' representatives were negotiating a settlement of a strike calculated to affect those funds, and yet there would be a general feeling both on the part of the miners and of the general public that under the circumstances almost any other investment would be preferable. We confess to being unable to see the difference between the rules governing Party funds and those

governing Trade Union funds, about which it would be impossible to be too careful so as to prevent anybody from conceiving that the Party or the Trade Union might be financially interested in a particular kind of settlement. With great deference to their Lordships' Committee we remain of opinion that the purchase of British Home Rails by the Master of Elibank on March 6, 1912, was unfortunate, all the more so because it was one of the very few Home Investments made for the Party out of the large sum of money dealt with by Fenner during the Master of Elibank's trusteeship 1910–1912. Although Lord Murray was admittedly an unlucky investor and the Party funds suffered grievous losses, chiefly through the default of the Party broker, which the Trustee has magnanimously announced his intention to make good at great personal sacrifice, in one respect he was exceptionally lucky. As the reader is aware, he bought 2500 American Marconis on April 18, 1912, at a time when the ordinary public could only obtain about one-sixth of their applications, whence the inference was drawn by ourselves that either Lord Murray applied for six times 2500 shares, *i.e.* 15,000 shares, costing nearly £50,000, or he was a privileged applicant who, unlike other people, obtained all the shares he asked for. The subject is thus dealt with in the Report. "The inference suggested was that Lord Murray must have procured the shares from some privileged quarter which might be willing to oblige him or the Liberal Party fund with shares not obtainable elsewhere. In support of this suggestion our attention was pointedly drawn to the fact that on the following day, April 19, 1912, when the American shares belonging to the English Company were put on the market, the dealers disposing of them were unable to satisfy 15 per cent. of the applications to buy them."

Disposing of a Dilemma

THE Committee dispose of a dilemma which we confess had puzzled us, though we had never made it a subject of any imputation on the Master of Elibank, whom we did not accuse of being engaged in market rigging, though we thought in all probability he might be a privileged applicant, and in any case there would be no difference in principle to pledging £50,000 of Liberal Party funds to American Marconis and investing £8000 in the same security. The Committee's explanation is as follows:

As soon as the facts and documents were examined it became apparent that there was no foundation for this suggestion (*i.e.* of his being a privileged applicant). American shares could be bought in London and were bought in large numbers on April 18, 1912, though they were not dealt in on the Stock Exchange itself till the following day. Lord Murray simply instructed his broker on the 18th to buy 2500 at the best price he could obtain and had no knowledge of the quarter from which they were procured. It is therefore unimportant to ascertain that source, but the fact that the shares were bought, as the counterfoil of the Contract Note showed, for "coming out" and not for "special settlement" is evidence that they were to be obtained from sellers in the United States. It is fairly certain that they were not bought from any one representing the English Company, and quite certain that even if it were so it was not within Lord Murray's knowledge. They were bought in the open market.

On this transaction Lord Murray was lucky, because it was established before the Commons Committee that several of those who took much trouble to get American Marconi shares, and who one might have thought would have been in a position to secure them, could only obtain 15 per cent. of their demand. That Ministerial interest in Marconis was liable to be exploited is evident from an interesting piece of evidence given in the recent proceedings against Fenner by Mr. Smith Bosanquet, one of his clients, who explained how he came to buy American Marconis during the boom.

Q. Do you remember in the month of April 1912 being at the defendant's office (*i.e.* Fenner's office) and seeing him ?—*A.* Yes, as far as I can remember.

Q. With reference to certain American Marconi shares ?—*A.* Yes.

Q. Would you tell us what passed between you and him with regard to them ?—*A.* He said that he had good advice that Marconis were good to buy at that time.

Q. Anything more ?—*A.* I instructed him . . .

Q. Did he say anything more about them ? Did he say what the good advice was ?—*A.* He said that the Master of Elibank thought that they were good to buy at that time. I instructed him to buy me 200 American Marconi shares.

We have naturally always imagined, like other people, that Ministerial Marconi speculations had been used in this way, but this is the first piece of direct evidence to which the attention of Mr. Lloyd George and others may be usefully directed. Hitherto it has always been convenient to represent the suggestion that Ministers were speculating in Marconis as the malignant offspring of a diseased imagination to which "foul lips" alone could give currency. As we now see, the much-contested "rumours" were founded on the bed-rock of fact and were set on foot in good faith by persons without any ill-will either against Ministers or against Marconis. On the contrary.

THE NAVY AND THE PLOT

It may be that before these lines appear the Royal Navy will have been put to a sterner test than the test of the great Civil War of 1642; for the Navy is placed under the domination of a violent and reckless political adventurer. His plot to employ the Navy for purposes of party politics, involving the use of naval armed force against the citizens of a province of the United Kingdom may be forgotten by the public, but it will never be forgotten or forgiven by the Navy. The whole of his Majesty's Government are responsible for the premeditation of that crime. The full details are known only to Ministers and to the Service itself. A debauch of Ministerial falsehood and equivocation has bewildered the public, which is ever prone to believe the best. The main facts have already been set forth in this Review; but they may briefly be recapitulated, and some new facts added. The Prime Minister has stated that at a Cabinet Meeting held on March 11, it was decided that the Third Battle Squadron, which was then cruising off the coast of Spain, should be ordered to Lamlash, to be "within convenient and easy distance of the north-east coast of Ireland, in the event of serious disturbance at any time arising." (The First Lord of the Admiralty had previously told the House of Commons that the Third Battle Squadron had been sent to Lamlash in the ordinary routine.) We also learn from the Prime Minister that the time when the orders should be given and the manner in which the movement "should be carried out," were left "entirely in the discretion of the Admiralty." It should here be observed that the Board of Admiralty had not been consulted in any way. Totally disregarding the Board, the Cabinet settled among themselves to move a battle squadron to Ulster. The actual issuing of the orders were (according to Mr. Asquith) to be left to the Admiralty.

Here the word "Admiralty," which most people take to mean the Board of Admiralty, means simply the First Lord, and (presumably) the First Sea Lord, who is responsible for movements of ships. *The Board as a whole were not consulted.*

The First Lord. thus unconstitutionally armed with plenary powers, proceeded to use them in his own inimitable manner. Instead of employing the ordinary method of conveying orders, Mr. Churchill telegraphed in code to the Consul at Arosa Bay in Spain, orders to the Vice-Admiral commanding the Third Battle Squadron; the Consul misread the code, and a delay of twelve or eighteen hours was the result. The orders were to proceed to Lamlash. The Vice-Admiral was to land at Plymouth on the way and to go to the Admiralty. Vice-Admiral Lewis Bayly immediately carried his orders into execution. Mr. Asquith has said that he knew nothing of the orders given until Saturday, March 21, when he "suggested" that they should be countermanded, and countermanded they were. But something else had happened in the meantime. The Board of Admiralty had learned what orders had been issued, either by Mr. Churchill or by the First Sea Lord at Mr. Churchill's dictation, without the knowledge of the rest of the Sea Lords, and they intervened. In the meantime, *also, two divisions of the Fourth Flotilla of* destroyers, on Friday, March 20, had been ordered at six hours' notice to proceed at full speed to Ulster. They had reached the Eddystone when they received their recall. Mr. Asquith says he knew nothing about the destroyers.

The *Firedrake* destroyer had already been sent at full speed to Ireland, to serve as a kind of flagship for the use of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Dublin; two cruisers were detailed to transport troops, and two scouts, having conveyed troops north, were in Belfast Lough. Mr. Asquith stated in the *Times* on Monday, March 23, one day after the orders to the Third Battle Squadron and to the destroyers had been countermanded, that these two scouts had been the only vessels moved, a statement which he afterwards described as "the strict truth."

Omitting the whole degrading tissue of Ministerial falsehoods and equivocations,* the order of events, so clearly described by

* As for instance: the Prime Minister, on March 25, "the only ships that were moved were two cruisers"; and on April 23, "the movement of the Battle Squadron

Lord Percy in the *National Review* for May, was as follows. A Cabinet Meeting, authorising, without the concurrence of the Board of Admiralty, the use of a battle squadron to coerce Ulster, the issue of the orders to the Third Battle Squadron and to a destroyer flotilla, without the knowledge of the whole Board; the subsequent intervention of the Board and the cancelling of the orders. Incidentally, Vice-Admiral Lewis Bayly had shipped field-guns, for what purpose he can explain. The explanation given was of course false. The whole operation was timed to coincide with the projected military operations. Mr. Asquith said it was not so timed; also that it was. Here are his two statements, both made on Wednesday, April 29. The Third Battle Squadron, he said, were to be ordered to Lamlash, "within convenient and easy distance of the north-east coast of Ireland, in the event of serious disturbance at any time arising." That is one statement. The other is, "it was never contemplated or intended at any time that this battle squadron should have anything to do with these operations"—the military operations.

Now for the sequel. On Tuesday, April 28, ten destroyers of the Fourth Flotilla, all powerful and swift modern boats, and the destroyer flagship, were off Belfast, presumably having been instructed to stop gun-running. They were engaged in that occupation when Mr. Churchill made his appeal for conciliation in the House of Commons; an appeal which apparently threw the Front Opposition Bench, whose duty it was to insist upon an explanation of the presence of the destroyers off Belfast, completely off their balance. At that moment, the destroyers of the Royal Navy were under orders to exercise the right of search, which belongs to a belligerent in time of war. It is virtually an act of war. And this time the whole Board of Admiralty must have been responsible for the orders given. At the time of

with its attendant ships to Lamlash was decided upon by the Cabinet on March 11"; and on April 22, "I became aware that these orders had been given on the morning of March 21." Again, on March 25, the Prime Minister said, "Nor were any battleships engaged in the operation at all"; and on the same date, "I said there were no movements of ships in connection with these movements of troops in Ulster." And a month later, Mr. Churchill, on April 29, "There was the question of a large naval force, in principle a battle squadron . . . with a view to being at hand should intervention in Irish disorders become necessary or desirable." And so on.

writing, one vessel has already been stopped and searched by the flotilla.

All these things may be very amusing to the newspaper reader, but they are death to the Navy. The news of the original plot ran round the world. Officers and men in the ships at Gibraltar, at Malta, in the East Indies, in China, were asking, What next? What exactly happened among officers and men in the Third Battle Squadron is very well known in the Service, but cannot be told in this place. It is frequently remarked that civil war is imminent, and that civil war would split the Navy from top to bottom. What is not understood is that the harm has been done already; all that remains is to make it (if possible) worse. Subsequent events can merely demonstrate in action the psychological conditions already present.

The character of the officers and men of the Navy is not understood on shore. They are a race apart. They inherit a tradition of ethics which is alien to the conceptions of the civilian population. They enter the Service at an age when the character is still plastic; and it receives an ineffaceable stamp. As boys they learn that they are chosen and set apart for a single purpose, to which all else is subordinated. To them is given in charge to guard the country against her enemies. That high task can only be fulfilled. first, by means of a complete subservience to discipline. Discipline enjoins instant and unquestioning obedience to orders. It is the first essential condition of effective service.

But a fighting service differs so extremely from civilian conditions, that its principles can only be made clear by a process of comparison. The master-motive of civilian affairs is monetary gain. In the Navy or the Army there can be no monetary gain. A livelihood, although reckoned upon a very ungenerous scale, is assured, and the subject, except for the constant anxiety caused by the inadequacy of pay, is dismissed. Here, at the outset, is a sharp distinction to be drawn between civilian life and Service life. Money has no more influence than it has (or should have) in the priesthood. And when parasitic little politicians, whose whole existence consists in offering or in pocketing bribes of one sort or another, talk of "influencing" or "seducing" the Navy and Army, they are so ignorant that they do not know that

the first essential of corruption, which is something to offer, does not exist. To tell them that even if there were anything to offer it would not be accepted, is of course to suggest an elementary ethical proposition which they do not understand.

The Naval Service thus from the beginning renounces material gain. But the Naval Service man does more. He renounces the comforts, amenities, pleasures of a life on shore. In most cases he renounces marriage, a home, wife and children; for his country does not pay him enough to enable him to marry. His work is hard, often monotonous, frequently dangerous. He may work as hard as he likes; he will gain no material profit, and very likely not even recognition. He is on duty twenty-four hours in the day, and the utmost he can do is no more than his duty. He makes no complaint, for these are the conditions upon which the task of guarding the country must be discharged.

The Naval Service man renounces certain good things in order that others may enjoy them. The swift and smooth operation of the vast mechanism of money-making; the punctual feeding of the whole population; the enjoyment of leisured, orderly and pleasant life; the safety of the home, the security of the ocean routes of the world; all these depend upon the Service man. In him inheres the true patriotism; that for which much is sacrificed, and which therefore becomes by the operation of a natural law, the object of an habitual and a profound devotion.

That devotion is the essential part of the naval heritage. It is the legacy of a thousand years of valour, self-sacrifice and hardihood. Outside the records of religion it is unparalleled in the history of the world. They are not only the lives of the great Admirals and Captains, whose names illumine history, but the character and the deeds of generation after generation of officers and men, an unbroken succession, that inspire the naval tradition. It is the tradition of a trust honourably discharged, the unspoken, perhaps unconscious, trust of millions of men and women, whose safety and happiness are confided to the keeping of the Royal Navy. It is a thing altogether beyond and above Parliament. It is totally removed from politics, inasmuch as politics have long ceased to represent the wishes or the welfare of the nation. And it is not without significance that the Sovereign is the head of the Navy.

The allegiance of the Naval Service is paid to the trust they have in charge from the people of their country, and is expressed to the Sovereign as their representative in the terms of enrolment. It has nothing whatever to do with Parliament, except in so far as Ministers are the King's representatives, whom he has the power to dismiss at will. The Ministerial arrangement is merely a piece of machinery, clumsy enough in its working, devised for the practical details of the fulfilment of the national trust. And in order that civilian ignorance, partisan foolishness, or personal ambition should not misuse or abuse the machinery, the governance of the Navy is vested in the Board of Admiralty, which is the office of Lord High Admiral put into commission, and whose heads are themselves naval officers, the repositories of the tradition and of the honour of the Service.

Until a few years ago the system, cumbrous and illogical as it is, worked tolerably well. There was a deal of conservatism, there were defects in administration, there was stupid political interference, there were the mistakes inseparable from the conduct of human affairs. But in spite of all, the trust was fulfilled, the honour of the Service was maintained, because the political member of the Board of Admiralty, the First Lord, although invariably swayed by partisan influences, was ultimately a gentleman imbued with a sense of public service. And he had to deal with a Board of Admiralty composed of loyal, upright and indomitable officers.

Then came a change. It is not now necessary to revive one of the most painful episodes in British naval administration. It is sufficient to note that the evil of to-day began some years ago. The way was then opened, so that existing conditions became possible. The confidence of the Navy in the probity of the Board of Admiralty was destroyed. The Board itself became the creature of unscrupulous and dishonest politicians. It was not the first time that the Navy had been compelled to suffer injustice and to submit to hindrance in its work on the part of the very persons whose business—for whose discharge they were highly paid—it was to maintain justice and to provide for requirements. But surely never before, at such a pass, had the Navy such a man as Mr. Churchill inflicted upon it. For that cynical outrage the Prime Minister is responsible, and it is

not the least culpable of the deeds for which he will one day be made to answer.

The duty of a First Lord may be briefly defined. It is his business to represent to the Board of Admiralty the policy of the Cabinet; to represent to the Cabinet what, in the opinion of the Sea Lords, is required in order to carry that policy into effect; and, in the event of the refusal of the Cabinet to grant the requisite money, to represent the views of the Sea Lords to the Cabinet. Should these prove irreconcilable with the intentions of the Government, the legal power of the First Lord to overrule the rest of the Board should only be exercised by him in accordance with the public interest—not the party interest. In practice, the views of the Sea Lords are based upon the public interest; and the First Lord finds his duty to consist in supporting them. The First Lord has many other matters in his discretion; but the most of these are not properly his business; nor should the Sea Lords ever have permitted them to be withdrawn from the purview of the whole Board.

But Mr. Churchill had quite other views. Entirely oblivious of all naval tradition and sentiment, regarding the public service as nothing but a convenient field for his personal aggrandisement, truculent, headstrong, and of a colossal egotism, Mr. Churchill immediately began to deal with the Royal Navy as though he owned it. He dismissed Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson with rather less notice than is commonly accorded to a housemaid. He dismissed Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman because the First Sea Lord dared to differ from him upon an essential point of administration. He used the Admiralty official vessel as his private yacht, in which he embarked the Prime Minister and other friends for long pleasure cruises. He interfered with the discipline of the Fleet to so disastrous an extent, that after a particularly flagrant instance the Sea Lords threatened to resign unless he undertook to mend his ways, and at the present moment there is not a captain on active service who does not feel that his authority is undermined. Details of Mr. Churchill's interference are known throughout the Service. They are not made public for the simple reason that, if they were, the officers who have suffered under these injuries would be broken at once by the vindictive dictator at the Admiralty. It is more important

to keep good officers in the Service than even to get rid of Mr. Churchill. A long indulgence in the abuse of office, and the subservience of a weak Board of Admiralty, brought Mr. Churchill by easy stages to the catastrophe.

With the concurrence of the Government he dared to employ the armed force of the Navy as a menace to a peaceable and loyal province of his Majesty's dominions; a menace which "in case of serious disturbance" was to be made effective. The main scheme of the plot has been described. Its details are still to be made known. The scheme is still in process of execution. Eleven destroyers are patrolling the coasts of Ulster, and the officers and men are forbidden to converse with their compatriots on shore. More insolent and childish orders were never issued to naval officers.

What, now, has been the effect of Mr. Churchill's administration up to the present date? Not only has he sown discontent, aroused bitter indignation, impaired discipline, but he has deliberately outraged the sacred trust of the Navy. Virtually, his Majesty's officers and men have been ordered to fire upon the very people who trust them to defend their homes. It is not enough to say that the Navy has been split from top to bottom. The phrase implies a division of opinion. There is no division of opinion with regard to the wickedness of the orders given. They destroy the whole foundation of naval loyalty. That loyalty is not to Parliament or to treacherous Ministers, from whom the Navy has suffered enough, and whom it only suffers at all by reason of the greater trust they have in charge. The question burning in the minds of officers and men is: Ought they to forfeit their trust? Or ought they to break discipline by disobeying constituted authority? It is a choice between two great evils; it is a choice forced upon them by traitors, who have not yet reflected what will happen to them personally if the Navy decides that its duty lies in disobeying constituted authority. Ministers are very clever, but there are some things they do not know, because they are incapable of perceiving them, and among those things is the honour of a great Service.

The injury already done is unpardonable; its effects will remain long after Mr. Churchill's final dishonour is complete. But the point to remember is that worse may yet befall. The

Government, with the collusion, as usual, of the Opposition, are gaining time. At any moment they may strike again, and next time there will be no mistake about the orders. There is no help in Parliament. The only hope resides in the Board of Admiralty. The Sea Lords can, if they choose, control the wild adventurer who is still allowed to hold his office. The achievement would no doubt involve the sacrifice of their professional career. But, on the other hand, what will become of their professional career—and reputation—if Mr. Churchill be allowed to go on?

Many excellent people are trying to console themselves with the reflection that things have been at their worst and all will yet be well. They are mistaken. We are only at the beginning. The country is already paying pretty high for its sins; but the price is nothing to what it will be. It will include the complete demoralisation of the fighting Navy. Once the guns open upon Ulster the great trust is violated. Or, if orders are disobeyed—if the men refuse to fire—how will the men (already under weakened discipline) distinguish between those orders and orders to fire upon a foreign enemy?

There remains what may be called the political aspect of the question. The view of Home Rulers, Radicals and the large mass of persons whose political opinions are indeterminate, is that if Ireland wants Home Rule she ought to have it; that having expressed such a desire by a majority of Irish members in Parliament, supported by a majority in Parliament, the Bill ought to become law, and that when it has become law, Ulster, in resisting its operation, will be guilty of an act of rebellion against the State, and must be treated as a rebel. These assumptions happen to be based upon fallacies. Ireland does not want Home Rule. The Nationalist members in Parliament are elected upon a system which has been invented for the express purpose of destroying representative government in favour of the professional politician. Ulster cannot possibly be a rebel against a State with regard to which her sole desire is to remain an integral part, as by law established. There is here the contradiction between fact and theory which inevitably exists under a corrupt electoral system and a corrupt Government. In a word, the whole Home Rule agitation is a colossal imposture.

But let it be assumed that the fallacies are facts; that Ireland is thirsting for Home Rule; that Ireland is honestly represented; that Ulster is a declared rebel. Still it does not follow that to force her to submit to the decree of Parliament is right. And for this reason: The opposition of Ulster is inspired by religion. The Home Rule Bill, in the view of Ulster, is a blow directed at her religion. You may decline to believe in Ulster's religious sincerity; you may deride Ulstermen as bigots or fanatics; you may find it incredible that any body of men in the United Kingdom still believe in anything for which they are prepared to fight; and still the fact remains. The theory that a majority has the right to impose its will upon the minority is profoundly immoral in itself; yet it underlies the whole system of party government, upon which (we are told) the Constitution depends. It is nothing but a political theory. It has no moral sanction. It is an expedient invented for convenience; when it ceases to be convenient it becomes criminal. In practice, when a minority—though it be only a minority of one—declares that the dictates of the majority are contrary to the demands of conscience, the majority may proceed to use force at the peril of committing crime. That crime the Government have already committed.

The Navy, being accustomed to regard facts as they are, totally disregards political theory and political chicanery. The Navy plainly perceives the central fact: that his Majesty's officers and men have been ordered by a majority in Parliament to fire upon their fellow subjects who are defending their religious faith. No amount of Parliamentary lying will induce the Navy to disbelieve the evidence of its senses. Nor will any Government threaten or cajole the Royal Navy into becoming the instrument of murder.

DREADNOUGHT

THE FIGHT FOR CLEAN GOVERNMENT

I. REPORT

BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE * appointed to enquire and report with respect to certain Charges and Allegations made in the public Press against Lord Murray of Elibank and into all matters relating thereto.

Ordered to Report—

That on the 19th February 1914, your Lordships' House agreed to the following Resolution :

> "That a Select Committee be appointed to enquire
> "into certain charges and allegations made in the public
> "Press against a member of this House, namely, the Lord
> "Murray of Elibank, and into all matters relating thereto ;
> "and that the said Committee be authorized to hear
> "Counsel and to examine witnesses on oath ; and that
> "the evidence taken from time to time before the said
> "Committee be printed for the use of members of the
> "House."

We were appointed to form the Select Committee.

At our first meeting on March 13, 1914, the Proprietors of the *Morning Post* and Mr. Maxse, the Editor and Proprietor of the *National Review*, appeared by Counsel in support of charges and allegations against Lord Murray, which we required to be formulated. They were accordingly formulated in print and will be found in the Appendix. No one else asked either to appear before us or to furnish evidence. It is unnecessary to notice

* The members of the Committee were: The Earl of Halsbury, Earl Loreburn, the Earl of Desart, Lord Charnwood, and Lord Sanderson.

letters which we received making allegations against Lord Murray which no one attempted to substantiate. We understand the direction to enquire "into all matters relating to" the charges and allegations as meaning all matters which affect Lord Murray himself. Accordingly we have regarded it as outside our duty to consider anything except in relation to him. We have no authority to consider the conduct of any other person, and what we have to say relates to Lord Murray alone.

The principal charge made against Lord Murray had reference to a purchase of 1000 shares in Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company of America, which for brevity we will call the American Company, made from Sir Rufus Isaacs at £2 a share on April 17, 1912. In order to understand the nature of this charge it is desirable to state a few preliminary facts. A company was formed as long ago as 1897, entitled Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company, Limited, which we will call the English Company, to acquire and work M. Marconi's Patents for his well-known development in wireless telegraphy. These patents were taken out in England and also in many other countries. All of them, so far as is material, were originally assigned to the English Company, and the English Company formed other companies in different parts of the world so as to enable the patents to be worked abroad. The only foreign company of which we have to speak is the American. It was incorporated in 1899 to acquire and work the American patents. More than half of its shares belonged to the English Company and three of its directors were also directors of the English Company, under whose influence and control it largely lay. Its sphere of operations was limited to the United States. In these circumstances two important affairs arose, or rather came to a head, in 1912, for consideration by the English Company.

One of them was a negotiation with the British Postmaster-General with a view to the erection and working of Marconi stations at various places in the British Dominions, so as to establish a chain of wireless telegraphic communication for Imperial purposes. M. Marconi's system had rivals, and, apart from the profit which would presumably result, there can be no question that a contract with the British Government in which this system was adopted must be very advantageous as a testi-

monial to those interested in that particular method of telegraphy. Obviously the English Company was very anxious to procure such a contract, and its negotiations with the Postmaster-General lasted through 1910 and 1911. Ultimately the tender of the English Company was accepted by the British Government on March 7, 1912. The acceptance of this tender was not equivalent to a completed contract, for it left some matters unsettled, and in any case ratification by the House of Commons was required before either party could be contractually bound. But as a matter of business the acceptance was of great value to the English Company, and others interested in the same patents. It was immediately made public, and, to complete the story, a definite contract between the English Company and the British Government on the lines of the tender was signed on July 19, 1912, and with some modifications, immaterial for our present purpose, received final ratification by the House of Commons on August 8, 1913.

The other affair which demanded close attention from the English Company in 1912 related to its American interests. The American Company was in an unsatisfactory, not to say critical, position. It had been compelled to institute legal proceedings for infringement of its patents against a rival company (the United Wireless Company). It was paying no dividends, its shares were quoted at a heavy discount, and were practically unsaleable. As soon as the tender of the English Company had been accepted by the British Government, the Chairman of the Company, M. Marconi, and their Managing Director, Mr. Godfrey Isaacs, proceeded to New York, in order to put matters in a more satisfactory condition. Mr. Godfrey Isaacs settled the litigation with the competing United Wireless Company (which was in liquidation) by buying up the whole undertaking on behalf of the English Company. This arrangement was embodied in an agreement signed on March 21, 1912.

By a second agreement between the English and American Companies, dated March 29, 1912, the former re-sold to the latter the assets of the United Wireless Company. This agreement further provided that the English Company should erect a high-power station in or near London, and that the American Company should erect a similar station in or near New York, for the trans-

mission of messages across the Atlantic. For the purpose of these and other developments of its business, the capital of the American Company was to be increased from $1,622,500 to $10,000,000, in shares of $5 each.

By a third agreement, dated April 1, 1912, the English and American Companies jointly obtained valuable privileges over two important land telegraph systems on the North American continent. Of these privileges it is not necessary to say more than that they secured for the wireless Marconi messages a right of transmission by overland wire, and facilities which, so far as the law permitted, were to be refused to other wireless competitors.

A resolution of a meeting of the shareholders of the American Company was required to sanction the new issue of stock, and a notice summoning this meeting, to be held in Jersey City on April 18, following, was issued on March 26, 1912, and was accompanied by an explanatory letter of the same date from the Board of Directors. In this letter information was given of the arrangement for the acquisition of the assets of the United Wireless Company, of the intended erection of high-power stations in London and New York, and of another high-power station in the latter city for the purpose of communication with Central and South America. The shareholders were further informed that they would have the privilege of subscribing to the new stock at par in proportion to the number of shares held by each. But it is asserted, and the assertion does not appear to be disputed, that the arrangement embodied six days later in the third agreement of April 1 was not divulged to the shareholders or the public until April 18.

It is at this point that the course of conduct commenced which the accusers allege to have been followed with the knowledge and complicity of Lord Murray, and to have been reprehensible in a high degree. They say that Mr. Godfrey Isaacs and others arranged to have the disposal of a large number of shares in the new issue and to introduce the new issue upon the London Stock Exchange as soon as the American shareholders had sanctioned it, and further arranged that there should be no dealings on the London Stock Exchange in reference to such shares until then, and that until then all information as to the

existence of the valuable third agreement should be withheld from the public. The accusers also say that financial arrangements were made by the same persons to make a market in the shares of the new issue upon the London Stock Exchange, and to put them on the market at a price to be fixed by Mr. Godfrey Isaacs and others, and that these financial arrangements also were to be kept secret. The financial arrangements said to have been devised are not at all clearly explained in the printed charges which have been formulated by the accusers. It was stated by their counsel that they did not suggest any fictitious transaction or any fraudulent design. But there is no doubt of what is meant. It is that certain persons obtained control of shares which they knew would come into being at a particular day, and kept secret some important information as to their value, intending that as soon as the shares came into being they would publish the secret information, and by that means, together with the making of a market on the Stock Exchange, get rid of their shares at a profit. The accusers charge that all this was known to Lord Murray, and that he profited by it in buying and selling shares.

If it had been necessary, for the purposes of our present enquiry, to decide whether or not there was such a design and whether the charges formulated by the accusers furnish an accurate presentment of the way in which the new issue of shares by the American Marconi Company was arranged and the market prepared to suit the alleged schemes of individuals, we should have been obliged to summon more witnesses. For the persons said to have been concerned in these transactions were not before us, and no conclusion could have been justly reached without first giving them an opportunity of offering evidence. It is not, however, necessary for us, and would therefore be improper, to express any opinion in regard to these matters which affect other persons, because we are satisfied that Lord Murray had no share in and no knowledge of what is said to have been done in regard either to the issue or the making of a market or the withholding of information. We accept his statement, which was in substance as follows:

Lord Murray was absent from the House of Commons and from London (owing to illness) for the whole of March and the first nine days of April 1912. He had heard of some pending

negotiations between the Government and a company for the erection of an Imperial system of wireless telegraphy, and that it was a Marconi Company. But he had at that time no knowledge of the company or the persons concerned in it, or of the nature of the tender accepted by the British Government. His official duties would not bring him into any relation with the business until the time should arrive when a contract of this kind would come before the House of Commons for ratification. It would then become his duty as Chief Whip to make arrangements for securing the support of members of the House of Commons. Till then he was in no way officially concerned in it. Till his return to the House of Commons on April 10, 1912, he knew very little about any Marconi Company or any negotiations with such a company, and had given no thought to any such matters.

Upon April 10, 1912, Lord Murray returned to the House of Commons. Between that date and April 17, Sir Rufus Isaacs, then Attorney-General, mentioned to him something about his having been offered shares in a Marconi Company. What was said does not clearly appear. It was not of importance and it throws no light upon the questions referred to this Committee. Upon April 17, however, a conversation took place between Sir Rufus Isaacs, Mr. Lloyd George, and Lord Murray, who were all on terms of close intimacy. Sir Rufus Isaacs had at that time purchased a right to 10,000 shares in the American Company from his brother, Mr. Harry Isaacs, who had acquired them from Mr. Godfrey Isaacs. These shares had not yet been issued, but the resolution authorising the issue of a great number of shares, of which these would form a part, was confidently expected to be passed in America by the shareholders of that Company upon April 18, and was in fact duly passed on that day. Meanwhile, in this conversation on April 17 Sir Rufus Isaacs told Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Murray that he had acquired 10,000 shares from a brother, that he believed they were a good purchase and would rise in value, and that the American Company had profitable contracts in America with certain inland cable companies. He offered to let each of these gentlemen have 1000 of these shares at the price at which he had himself acquired them, namely, £2 a share. He assured them that he had considered the matter very carefully, and was satisfied there was no objection to their making

this purchase by reason of their position as Ministers, and that the American Company was wholly distinct from the English Company which had been negotiating a contract with the British Government. It was mentioned that the tender of the English Company to the British Government had already been accepted, as was the case. The probability of all the money to pay for the shares not being required was contemplated, for it was agreed between them that Sir Rufus Isaacs should take charge of the business and be at liberty to resell some of the shares which he had sold to the others if they rose to a high price. The figure of £3 a share, or some such figure, was mentioned. Lord Murray agreed to buy the 1000 shares on these terms.

We entertain no doubt, nor did Lord Murray in the least deny, that upon his own part this transaction was essentially a speculative transaction, and that he hoped to make a profit by selling some of the shares soon at a higher price than £2. Lord Murray was at the time a member of his Majesty's Government. The accusers urged that additional blame must rest upon him in that he possessed private information not possessed by the public as to the keeping secret of the third agreement till the eve of the market being opened, and as to the proposed arrangements on the Stock Exchange. They also said that Lord Murray knew this information emanated from Mr. Godfrey Isaacs, the Managing Director of the English Company. We think upon the evidence that Lord Murray knew on April 17, 1912, that the American Company had good contracts, but knew very little about them and knew nothing at all of any intention, if there was any, to conceal any contract or any projected Stock Exchange operations from the public. He did not know from which of his brothers Sir Rufus Isaacs had bought his shares, though he probably heard that one of the brothers was Managing Director of the English Company. The question whether it was improper for a Minister to deal in the shares of the American Company was brought to his mind and mentioned at this interview, on whose initiative does not appear. Any misgiving he may have felt was removed by the assurances already referred to. These assurances were intended, we do not doubt, sincerely and in friendship for Lord Murray. Unfortunately they had the effect of making him disregard what he ought to have remembered, that he might have

to procure as Chief Whip the ratification of the contract between the British Government and the English Company, which would favourably affect the value of the American and all other Marconi shares. He now recognises that he ought not to have bought these shares.

It is necessary now to state what happened to the 1000 shares bought by Lord Murray on April 17, 1912. It had been arranged that Sir Rufus should be at liberty to sell on behalf of Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Murray, as well as on his own behalf, any part of the 10,000 shares of which they had each bought from him 1000, and that if there were sales any profit made should be divided in proportion to the number of shares each of them owned out of the 10,000. We were told that a similar arrangement was made to bring sales of these 10,000 shares into joint account with sales of 46,000 shares owned by Mr. Harry Isaacs, from whom the 10,000 had been originally bought. But of this arrangement Lord Murray was not aware.

Lord Murray's purchase of 1000 shares was made on April 17. On April 19 the shares of the American Company were introduced on the Stock Exchange at an opening price of £3 5s. per share. On the evening of the previous day, April 18, the undisclosed third agreement was sent to the Press. When the market opened on April 19 this agreement was publicly known, as also was the fact that the American Company had passed the resolution to issue the new capital. There was at once wild speculation on the Stock Exchange in the new issue and the selling prices rose far above the price at which Lord Murray had purchased. Sir Rufus sold a number of shares on that day and 357 of them were treated as sold on behalf of Lord Murray at the price of £3 6s. 6d. per share. Accordingly, Lord Murray realised a profit of £1 6s. 6d. on each of 357 shares, being the difference between the price at which he bought and the price at which he sold.

On the following day Lord Murray sold 500 more of his 1000 shares at a price of 3 5-32, thus realising a profit of £1 3s. on each share. He continued to hold the remaining 143 shares.

The gist of the charges in relation to these transactions is that Lord Murray acted in a way which was in his position dishonourable. It is certainly conveyed in the charges, both that he accepted information of pecuniary value from a person interested

in procuring a Government contract, and that by taking these shares he acquired an interest in the completion of the contract and so caused his private interest to be in conflict with his public duty. Had he done so he would have violated well-understood rules. We think Lord Murray's fault was that he did not give sufficient thought to what he was doing and to the propriety of making further enquiry.

We think the transaction in regard to the purchase of 1000 shares on April 17, which we have now explained, was a speculative transaction and was a grave error on Lord Murray's part, but we acquit him of any dishonourable conduct.

We say the same in regard to another charge made by the accusers, namely, that Lord Murray bought on his own account 1500 more shares in the American Company on May 22, 1912, at 2 5-32 per share, which was a speculative transaction on his part, but made on the open market in the ordinary way.

We say the same also in regard to the shares which he bought in his character of Chief Whip and sole manager of the Liberal Party Fund, in the same American Company, of which 2500 were bought on April 18 at 3¼ and 500 on May 14, 1912, at 2 7-16. In regard to the 2500 shares, the purchase is open to the same criticism as Lord Murray's original purchase of 1000 shares. As regards the 500 shares, the market was then established, and all information was available to the public.

In regard, however, to these purchases on behalf of the Party Fund the accusers made certain special criticisms, to which we must refer more at length.

It was urged, to begin with, that the date (April 18) at which the 2500 shares were bought was a date when the public was unable to buy such shares in London. The inference suggested was that Lord Murray must have procured the shares from some privileged quarter which might be willing to oblige him or the Liberal Party Fund with shares not obtainable elsewhere. In support of this suggestion our attention was pointedly drawn to the fact that on the following day, April 19, 1912, when the American shares belonging to the English Company were put on the market, the dealers disposing of them were unable to satisfy more than 15 per cent. of the applications to buy them.

As soon as the facts and documents were examined it became

apparent that there was no *foundation* for this suggestion. American shares could be bought in London, and were bought in large numbers on April 18, 1912, though they were not dealt in on the Stock Exchange itself till the following day. Lord Murray simply instructed his broker on the 18th to buy 2500 at the best price he could obtain, and had no knowledge of the quarter from which they were procured. It is therefore unimportant to ascertain that source, but the fact that the shares were bought, as the counterfoil of the contract note shows, for "coming out" and not for "special settlement" is evidence that they were to be obtained from sellers in the United States.

It is fairly certain that they were not bought from any one representing the English Company, and quite certain that even if it were so it was not within Lord Murray's knowledge. They were bought in the open market.

Another and quite distinct criticism was levelled against the purchase of these shares out of the Liberal Party Funds, namely, that Lord Murray, as a trustee, had no right to choose shares of so speculative a kind for his Trust investments. We are not concerned to deal with the way in which Lord Murray, as trustee, exercised his discretion in investing the Trust Funds. That is a matter exclusively for those to whom the Funds belong.

The last special criticism made in reference to these Trust purchases rested upon the grounds following. When Lord Murray ceased to be Chief Whip in August 1912, in order to enter a commercial firm, he handed over to his successor, Mr. Illingworth, the funds and the books which contained entries about them. But he did not hand over these 3000 American shares, which he had bought for the Party on April 18 and May 14, or enter them on the list of securities, nor did he hand over the pass book of the bank at which had been kept the account out of which these 3000 shares had been paid for. It was not apparently an ordinary account, but one used on a special occasion or for a special class of occasions. It was not necessary to elucidate further the nature of this account, which was kept and drawn upon for Party purposes. As already stated, Lord Murray did not enter these shares on his list or hand over the pass book containing these entries or the 3000 shares. He did, however, hand over the shares to his brother, Captain Murray, to hold them for the Party.

and he also communicated the fact of their purchase to Sir Frank Crisp, and to another gentleman who was not named, so that there was a record of what he had done, and the shares were secured for their true owners. He told Captain Murray and Sir Frank Crisp that he wished to keep the shares and not to tell any one about them till the Marconi affair was cleaned up, so that the responsibility should fall on no one but himself.

When asked before us why he acted in this way he said that by the month of August, at which date he ceased to be Chief Whip, attacks had been made in political circles and rumours had been circulated to the effect that Ministers had been dabbling in Marconi shares, and he told us that he deliberately resolved to keep the purchase secret in order that it should not become the subject of further attack by political opponents and bring the Party Funds into discussion. Lord Murray was perfectly candid throughout our enquiry in all that related to his own action and freely blamed himself for this most unwise reticence. He also showed throughout a desire to avert blame from others and to refrain from entering upon matters that concerned others. We believe that in thus withholding information Lord Murray acted from a misplaced zeal for his Party and in the desire not to embarrass his friends. He intended to take upon his own shoulders, and has taken upon his own shoulders, the loss upon the American shares which he bought on behalf of the Party. But we feel bound to say that he ought to have recognised it as his plain duty not to withhold this information from his successor in the trust.

Lord Murray is further charged by the accusers with having also on other occasions refrained from making public his dealings, both for himself and his Party, in American Marconi shares.

He did not at any time deny or misrepresent what he had done. What is charged by the accusers is that he withheld information as to his dealings in these shares when he ought to have disclosed it. In October 1912, he said nothing when the subject of Ministerial investments was discussed in the House of Commons and no mention was made of American shares. He had then ceased to be a member of the House. He did not offer to come as a witness before the Committee of the House of Commons appointed to consider the contract with the English Marconi Company, which was charged with investigating Minis-

terial purchases of shares, though he was in England for two months while it was sitting. On January 1, 1913, he sailed for America on important business of his firm, and was detained there for more than a year. The Chairman of the House of Commons Committee applied to him with respect to his returning in order to give evidence. He did not return. No doubt it would have most seriously interfered with his business duties and he was advised by his brother and brother-in-law, who were on the spot in England, that his return was not necessary. His not giving evidence before that Committee naturally exposed him to suspicion. His secrets were not wholly his own, but we think he ought to have arranged for the information to be laid before the House of Commons Committee.

The accusers further charged Lord Murray with attempting to settle the controversy about the ratification of the Marconi contract between the English Company and the British Government by private negotiation in the House of Commons in July 1912. This charge means, as its language conveys, that he used his position as Chief Whip to avoid discussion of the subject in Parliament with a view to preventing his own dealings in these shares from ever becoming known. This would have been an abuse of his public duty in order to screen himself from censure. It is a grave accusation and was advanced without any evidence to support it. We report that it is wholly unfounded, and should never have been made. It was, in fact, withdrawn by the accusers' counsel in view of the independent evidence which was produced showing that Lord Murray had been actively instrumental in negotiating and carrying through the arrangements for referring the contract to a Select Committee.

Another charge against Lord Murray is that in March 1912 he purchased as Chief Whip through his broker Mr. Fenner and on behalf of the Liberal Party Fund about £21,000 worth of stock in British Railways, all of which have a large mineral traffic. The suggestion of the accusers unmistakably was that this was done during the great coal strike, while the Government was endeavouring to procure a settlement of the strike, and with a view to obtaining some advantage by reason of the private knowledge, which members of the Government might possess, of the probability of the strike being either prolonged or terminated. This

interpretation was disclaimed at the Bar, but no other intelligible interpretation of the charge was offered. In fact, Lord Murray knew no more than the public knew about these negotiations, and bought in the ordinary way. There is no ground for any accusation on this head.

The only remaining charge formulated by the accusers was as follows: In July 1912, it became known to Lord Murray that Mr. Fenner, the broker whom he had employed in the transactions of which we have spoken, was unable to meet his engagements. He owed nearly £39,000 to Lord Murray as Chief Whip and manager of the Party Funds. Thereupon, Lord Murray, on the advice of his solicitor, took security for this debt in the shape of a second charge upon certain assets of Mr. Fenner, and at the same time paid him some money, about £2300 in all, which he owed on his own private account to Mr. Fenner. He did this because he thought that the best course in the interest of the Fund of which he was trustee would be to "keep alive" Mr. Fenner in the hope that he would be able to retrieve his position and pay the debt in whole or in part. Lord Murray told us that he acted in this on the advice of his solicitor, and we see no reason whatever to doubt that he acted as he thought for the best in a very difficult situation. The accusers suggested that he ought to have at once driven Mr. Fenner into bankruptcy in order to prevent him from further obtaining credit from others, and that this was not done for fear of the disclosures which might ensue from Mr. Fenner being declared bankrupt. There is little doubt that Lord Murray desired these transactions to remain undisclosed, as we have already said. But in giving time to Mr. Fenner we believe he was actuated by the hope of recovering some of the money which was owing to the Party Fund. This charge appears to us to be devoid of foundation.

It is proper to state the course which Lord Murray has taken in dealing with the various securities which have been enumerated. He has taken over and paid for the American shares which he bought on behalf of the Party Fund, accepting the loss thereon as his own. Apart from that, the Party Fund lost about £39,000 by reason of the failure of Mr. Fenner. It is undesirable to say anything about Mr. Fenner beyond what is necessary, for he is now under examination on certain criminal charges. But it is

necessary to state that, according to the evidence before us, he became debtor for this large sum, and, upon his bankruptcy, it became a debt due to the Party Fund. Lord Murray has taken upon himself personally the burden of replacing this money. No suggestion was made either that the investments were improperly chosen or that Lord Murray was responsible for Mr. Fenner's acts or omissions in regard to them. In all, his losses, including this sum, if he is allowed to replace it, will amount to more than £40,000.

We have now dealt with all the charges and allegations that were brought before us.

Upon the whole matter we have to say that Lord Murray committed errors which we have described, as he himself acknowledged in general terms in your Lordships' House and admitted in detail at the hearing before us. We further report that nothing in his conduct reflects upon his personal honour.

In conclusion, we think it is within our province to express our strong opinion that there should be henceforth an inflexible rule to preclude those who hold any public office from entering upon any speculative transactions in stocks or shares in any circumstances whatsoever, and that this rule should be by them inculcated on their subordinates both by precept and example. The evils that may arise from a violation of this principle are incalculable.

We submit the foregoing as our unanimous Report to Your Lordships.

We have directed the Minutes of their Proceedings, together with the Evidence and Appendices, to be laid before your Lordships.

II. PROGRESS OF THE FIGHT

A CURSORY comparison of the Report of the Lords Committee with the shameless document issued by the Marconi Select Committee of the House of Commons exactly a year ago gives us the measure of the immense progress of the campaign for Clean Government. The Commons Committee which took its cue from Messrs. Falconer and Handel Booth, who were doubtless appointed by the Government for the express purpose of doing the dirty work over which they came so hopelessly to grief, was consciously and deliberately dishonest. This is admittedly a very strong statement and, of course, does not apply either to the Chairman, Sir Albert Spicer, who was too amiable to govern a bear garden, nor to the permanent minority of the Committee who found themselves out-voted regardless of truth and justice whenever the exigences of the Coalition demanded. Such an offensive observation applies exclusively to the majority of the Committee whose main care was to evade the truth. To understand its proceedings the reader must remember that it was appointed immediately after, and in consequence of, the debate of October 11, 1912, generally known as the Festival of Truth, when certain Ministers made certain declarations which the world would not willingly let die. Lord Murray of Elibank, whose recent efforts to protect his former colleagues and Marconi associates bordered on the pathetic, has, as will be seen, unwittingly provided us with a standard by which to judge them. Curiously enough it is the identical standard set up and maintained in season and out of season by the *National Review*. It is indeed the standard of common sense and the only possible standard against which Postmasters-General, Attorneys-General, Chancellors of the Exchequer, partisan Committees, Cocoa newspapers, National Liberal Clubs, wriggle in vain.

As our readers are only too well aware, we have insisted from the outset on treating the Marconi Companies as forming one group. "Rumours" concerning Ministerial speculations in Marconis applied to all, and casuistical efforts to distinguish between "investors" in British, Canadian, Spanish, American,

or any associated Companies could only recoil on those who attempted to set them up. Denials of Marconi speculations were necessarily and universally interpreted as embracing all Marconi Companies. This was common ground at the date of the debate in October 1912, when outraged Ministers placed their hands on the place where their hearts should have been and poured scornful indignation on the suspicions propagated from one set of "foul lips" to another. It was likewise common ground *ab initio* in the Marconi Select Committee which had interpreted Ministerial denials like the man in the street. It only ceased to be common ground when the *Matin* bombshell exploded (March 19, 1913), and our parliamentary prevaricators were seen to have bamboozled their colleagues in the Commons, the Press, and the public by an ingenious combination of *suppressio veri et suggestio falsi*—their elaborate insistence on "this" Company. From that moment the life of the Party of Progress and Panama depended on impossible distinctions between the British Marconi Company—the solicitous parent—and its undutiful American offspring. The mother was admitted to have an interest in her daughter, but the daughter had no interest in the mother. In this hypothesis the entire Coalition, from the sea-green incorruptible *Westminster Gazette* down to *Reynolds's* rag, found abundant salvation. The immortal Ministerial disclaimers which played so great a part in their day, and cut such a pitiable figure now, are worth reproducing and preserving :

The Postmaster-General :

Neither I myself nor any of my colleagues have at any time held one shilling's worth of shares in this Company, directly or indirectly, or have derived one penny profit from the fluctuations in their prices. It seems shameful that political feeling can carry so far, that lying tongues can be found to speak and ears found to listen to such wicked and utterly baseless slanders such as these. This Committee (i.e. the Marconi Committee) which will be appointed, will enquire into every aspect of this question, and members of the Government will be most ready to appear before it. Every member of the House may have full confidence that while every part of this transaction will come under the searchlight of examination, it will be shown that there is no uncleanliness in any quarter.

The Attorney-General :

Let me go to the next charge, which is, I think, a worse charge. It is that some member of the Government not named, but hinted at—some member or members of the

Cabinet—knowing that these negotiations were taking place, knowing that there was a contract in contemplation, and thinking the shares would go up when the announcement of the contract came to be made—the price of the shares being then 14s. or 15s. and eventually rose to £9 after the announcement of the contract was made—thereupon, and in consequence of the information which some member of the Government had got, bought shares in this Company at a low price, in order to sell them at the higher price when the contract was announced. I desire to say frankly, on behalf of myself, that that is absolutely untrue. Never from the beginning, when the shares were 14s. or £9, have I had one single transaction with the shares of that Company. I am not only speaking for myself, but I am also speaking on behalf, I know, of both my right hon. friend the Postmaster-General, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, in some way or other, in some of the articles, have been brought into this matter.

Mr. Lloyd George :

The hon. member said something about the Government, and he has talked about "rumours." I want to know what these rumours are. If the hon. gentleman has any charge to make against the Government as a whole or against individual members of it, I think it ought to be stated openly. The reason why the Government wanted a frank discussion before going to Committee was because we wanted to bring here these rumours, these sinister rumours, that have been passed from one foul lip to another behind the backs of the House. . . . I came here this afternoon because I had heard what was said outside. I have waited carefully, and not a single member on the other side of the House, or anybody else who has taken part in this debate, has ever hinted at anything. The only member who has hinted completely dissociated himself from the rumours. The hon. member (Mr. Lansbury) is the first one who has said so: I demand that his charge shall be *formulated*.

Between the Report of the Commons Committee and the Report of the Lords Committee the Coalition lived on this distinction without a difference. Beyond the common name there was no connection between the British and the American Marconi Companies, and though ex hypothesi it would have been unspeakable for Ministers to have speculated in the parent Company, it was nothing less than an act of virtue deserving of the Order of Merit to "invest" in the American Company, and the enthusiasm of the Party for the operators was only surpassed by their rage with everybody who resisted this new and strange doctrine and insisted that for Ministers to take any kind of tip from a Government Contractor for exploitation on the Stock Exchange was incompatible with Clean Government as hitherto understood and believed to be practised, and that the original offence was made infinitely worse by the unscrupulous attempts to conceal it. At one time Messrs. Falconer and Handel Booth were

parliamentary heroes, and the former's cross-examination of Mr. Lawson was daily extolled as worthy of Sir Charles Russell at his best by Radical newspapers blissfully ignorant of the fact that the cross-examiner, together with his unconscionable colleague Mr. Handel Booth, had been privately primed by the Attorney-General, Sir Rufus Isaacs, in order that the enquiry might be kept off ground dangerous to Ministers.

Even this precious couple had their salad days. At one moment, indeed for several weeks and months, they were as innocent of Ministerial Marconi speculations as the rest of their colleagues on the Select Committee. It was only on January 22, 1913, that they were tempted and fell when they became Sir Rufus Isaacs' confidants of the American transactions and the recipients of information which by every obligation of honour should have been instantly communicated to the Chairman of the Committee. The days of their virgin innocence are pleasant to contemplate, and happily they remain on record. From the moment the Committee began to sit at the end of October 1912, under the shadow and influence of the Debate, and before it became corrupted by partisanship, information was invited from all and sundry concerning the negotiation of the Marconi Contract, and so as to leave no shadow of doubt that in their minds Marconi speculations meant speculations in any Marconi shares the Committee commenced to ply successive witnesses with comprehensive questions such as the following: "Have you or any members of your family now, or have they at any time, had any financial interest, directly or indirectly, *in a Marconi Syndicate or Company or any Company or Syndicate in this country or elsewhere in any way connected therewith?*" [My italics.] This question was addressed to Sir David de Villiers Graaff (South African Minister of Posts and Telegraphs) so long ago as November 18, 1912—needless to say, months before the *Matin* revelations. A similar question was addressed by the Marconi Select Committee to Mr. Madge, the Admiralty expert (November 28), while Mr. Wilkins, of the Treasury, was also asked (December 18): "Have you or any members of your family now, or have you or they at any time, *had any financial interest, direct or indirect, in the Marconi Syndicate or Company, or any Company or Syndicate in this country or elsewhere in any way connected therewith?*" [My italics.]

Members of Parliament were similarly interrogated. The incident was stamped upon my memory because so late as February 12, 1913, the Chairman, Sir Albert Spicer, asked me, "Have you any letters or copies of letters bearing on the rumours *that Ministers were financially interested in any of the Marconi Companies?*" [My italics.] Do not these questions, which might be multiplied ad nauseam, prove to demonstration that the Committee (Radicals, Labour men and Nationalists, as well as Unionists) had interpreted the Ministerial repudiations of the previous October, like almost everybody else, as covering speculations in all Marconi Companies? Is it not obvious that the Ministerial majority would never have assented to the framing of questions to witnesses week after week and month after month had they the smallest inkling that they were thereby cutting the throats of Mr. George and Sir Rufus Isaacs, who in spite of their emphatic denials were involved in Marconi speculations?

The Chancellor of the Exchequer gave a sympathetic audience a graphic picture of his miserable winter, which he attributed to malignant attacks and unworthy suspicions, whereas it was simply the misery caused by a guilty conscience combined with the terror of being found out. Lord Murray's evidence before the Lords Committee was another of many refreshing contrasts to the proceedings elsewhere. Sir Rufus Isaacs and Mr. George displayed excessive indignation at the bare suggestion that the rumours concerning Ministerial Marconi speculations could be held to embrace the American Company. They had misled the public by their comprehensive denials even though in some cases those denials were verbally accurate—an observation which scarcely applies to Mr. George with whom verbal accuracy is not a strong point any more than any other form of accuracy. Our Marconi Ministers clung with the tenacity of drowning men to their vital distinction without a difference. Their *obiter dicta* would be worth preserving given the necessary space. I can only give a few samples, asking the reader to agree with me that the manner in which those utterances were swallowed by the Commons Committee which, as I have shown, had previously cross-examined witnesses as to speculations in any Marconi Company, stamps the majority of that body as deliberately dishonest.

Sir Rufus Isaacs, to the surprise of all spectators, proved to be a much better actor than his colleague at the Exchequer, who at intervals took refuge in sighs, while Sir Rufus was always voluble if rarely impressive. The straits to which he was reduced in explaining the inexplicable and in defending the indefensible may be gathered by comparing his rash statements to the Select Committee—remembering always that he was once a member of the Stock Exchange and no tyro as regards Companies—with the dispassionate review of the relations between the British and American Marconi Companies in the Lords Report. Thus Sir Rufus was asked (March 27, 1913):

"*Q*. 691. As to this connection between the two companies, . . . your view was that the American Company had no real connection with the English Company?" To which the witness replied "Yes."

"*Q*. That is to say no connection which made it improper for a member of the Government to hold shares in the American Company. That is what you meant?—*A*. Certainly."

"*Q*. There was a considerable connection between the two Companies—that, of course, is admitted?—*A*. *I did not think so*." [My italics.]

Later on he was asked, and again his answer is worth comparing with the Report of the Lords Committee.

"*Q*. 711. Under these circumstances, supposing at any time the Government had arrived at the conclusion that some other system of telegraphy was better than the Marconi, and had abandoned or declined to ratify the English contract, would not that have been a great blow to the American Company?—*A*. Not the slightest, I should have thought."

Sir Rufus Isaacs was equally infelicitous in endeavouring to explain away his deplorable disclaimer in the House of Commons, where, it will be remembered, he took upon himself the facile task of framing an indictment he could meet and then meeting it. He was asked by Lord Robert Cecil about the "Rumours."

"*Q*. 743. And it was with the view to the disposal of those rumours that this debate took place?"

SIR RUFUS ISAACS: "I did not think so. I thought that it offered an opportunity for me to get up and deny in the House of Commons, the first time that I had the opportunity, the stories

which so far as I knew were in circulation. If there was any other surely somebody would have stated it in the House of Commons to me at the time to have given me the opportunity of denying it."

"*Q*. Surely it is not a question of denying the particular rumours. The question which really the House was discussing—or so I gather from reading the debate—was what was the foundation, if any, for this kind of general rumours of corruption, suspicion, or what not?—*A*. I thought that was what the Committee was to enquire into."

"*Q*. But the House was talking about it too, and it was directed to that subject, as I read it, that the debate took place?—*A*. That is not quite my view."

Lord Robert Cecil gave the witness every opportunity of trying to put himself right with the public, however tardily, but your Ministerial infallible can never own that he has been wrong.

"*Q*. 746. But surely the debate was also with the view of calming and disabusing the public mind. That was the real purpose?—*A*. Certainly; and in so far as there were statements of this character made, I thought I had disabused it; at any rate I dealt with them."

"*Q*. Surely the object of your speech was generally to disabuse the public mind and satisfy them that there was no kind of ground for any suspicion as to the conduct of any Minister in the matter?—*A*. I think so now."

This was the perpetual burden of the Attorney-General's song, that he had nothing to reproach himself with, and that all the trouble arose from the vindictive imagination of political opponents.

Mr. Macmaster was equally unsuccessful in trying to save Sir Rufus Isaacs from himself.

Q. 836. You also stated this: "All I have been anxious to do is to make my statement to the House, in order that the House might understand exactly how matters stand?" *A*. Certainly.

Q. Now do you think that it was taking the House into your full confidence to make only this limited statement you did make, and leave out of account these other transactions in the shares of an allied company? *A*. Certainly, in an allied company, which not only I thought had no reference, but which had no relevance at all to the transactions with which I was dealing. Of course, you have taken a sentence out of the speech. If you read on I think you will see quite clearly what I formulated, and

what I was dealing with from beginning to end were the charges which had been appearing.

Mr. Macmaster had another try.

"*Q.* 841. You did not consider that while answering these (the charges selected by Sir Rufus Isaacs) you were under any obligation at that time to make any disclosure in regard to those American shares?"

To this the Attorney-General, whose life has been spent in cross-examining other people, replied: "It was not a question of making a disclosure; I had no objection to anybody knowing about the American shares. I have never made a secret of the American shares. It was not an objection, but I did not consider that it arose. My point was to deny the statement which had been made which affected my honour." According to his own code he owed no obligation to the House of Commons, though he admitted an obligation to the Committee and had taken the trouble to inform the Prime Minister of this perfectly innocent investment in American Marconis. In those days Ministers were always engaged in "telling" somebody—always excepting the public who were entitled to know the truth—although, as we know, there was nothing to tell.

Mr. George never fails to come off as a "sob artist" when everything else fails him. He presented a truly piteous spectacle, and outsiders ignorant of the personal equation at Westminster could scarcely credit their senses when they were informed by awe-stricken parliamentary friends that this was the mighty Tribune of the People at whose lightest word the British aristocracy was expected to collapse, the arch Demagogue, the Lord of Limehouse, or, as he prefers to regard himself, a happy combination of St. Sebastian and Florence Nightingale. One saw a mean, shifty, shuffling poltroon equally terrified of every question and of his own answers. That such a person should be regarded as a great Member of Parliament shows how low our public life has fallen. Mr. George's most available weapon appeared to be weeping, to which he had frequent recourse whenever cornered. After all the nasty things he has said of other people one might have expected some readiness to take as well as give, but your swashbuckler is not infrequently sensitive about what he is pleased to term his "personal honour"—usually conspicuous by its

absence. Like the Attorney-General he had never heard any Marconi rumours except those which it had suited him to hear, and he could not conceive how any sane person could imagine that his onslaught on the "foul lips" was lacking in candour. How could any honest man suggest that there was any connection whatsoever between two such remote concerns as the British and the American Marconi Companies? "How?" echoed the Packed Majority of the Marconi Committee which had previously declined to distinguish between them. "How?" echoed the Coalition Press. "How?" repeated the House of Commons, which gloried in having been fooled. "How?" vociferated the National Liberal Club, and, greatly daring—lunched.

The leading organs of the Party of Progress are always worth filing because however irritating at the moment they make better reading than *Punch* a few months later. Like the rest of the world faithful Radical journalists had interpreted the Ministerial speeches of October as a conclusive and crushing vindication of Ministers against Rumour, but when exposure came they were as ready as the Committee to do the right-about under the lead of the semi-official *Westminster Gazette*, which is usually primed by Ministers in a tight place, and doubtless had its explanation already in type before the hearing of the *Matin* case. Unless I am mistaken, to the *Westminster Gazette* belongs the honour of starting the legend, now finally shattered by the Report of the Lords Committee, that "except that the American Marconi Company happened to share with the British the quite honourable name of Signor Marconi, the transaction (*i.e.* the Ministerial flutter in American Marconis) would call for no comment on public grounds." (See *Westminster Gazette*, March 19, 1913.) While the *Manchester Guardian*, which loves to sin against the light, thus committed itself:

Sir Rufus Isaacs, in his statement (in the *Matin* case) also went far beyond what was necessary to refute the particular libel before the Court. He knew nothing of the negotiations between his brother and the Post Office, until a few days before *the contract was signed* [my italics], was never consulted about it, and never had a conversation on the subject with Mr. Samuel or any other member or official of the Government. He had never had a share in the Marconi Company at any time. . . . We commend the frankness with which the Attorney-General has taken the public into his confidence with regard to *the only share transaction* [my italics] which might by ignorance or perversity be held to afford some warrant for the suggestion that he or either of the Ministers

to whom he sold a part of his shares had sought a personal profit in connection with this much-debated Marconi contract.

Needless to remind the reader, these congratulations (March 29, 1913) proved premature, as several other share transactions in which Ministers were involved were drawn out tooth by tooth, during the next three months. When the *Manchester Guardian* runs amuck it does it thoroughly. "It is a hateful thing for a man of honour to have to explain that he is not a rogue. Even as things stand it will, we suppose, be possible for people without any sense of justice or common decency to say in private : 'Oh, yes ; the contract was made with the British Company, and the shares were in the American Company, but these Marconi Companies are all mixed up with one another, and they did buy Marconi shares after all.'" After some more of the same comic stuff the conscience keeper of the Manchester school could find nothing in the conduct of Ministers "of which the most honourable man need be in the slightest degree ashamed."

The *Daily Chronicle*, never to be outdone in such a contest, informed its readers that though the Ministerial shares had been bought "in 'a' Marconi Company, it was an independent American enterprise with which the British Government Contract had nothing to do directly or indirectly, and upon whose fortunes the British Government could exercise no influence. *It is difficult to find any reason why the three statesmen should not have bought them.*" [My italics.]

It would be still more difficult to find any reason why the three statesmen should have concealed this irreproachable investment.

The *Daily News and Leader*, voicing the conscience of Cocoa, was of the same opinion: "But the American Company had no interest in the English Company, could not enter into a contract with the British Government, and could not profit by the contract or any contract which the English Company made. It was an ordinary transaction which had involved the purchasers in a loss." There would appear to be much virtue in that loss, out of which rather more capital has been made than it can conveniently carry.

It was all most comforting to the Nonconformist conscience, but to-day we are back where we were when the Select Committee

was appointed in October 1912, and it was common ground that the "Rumours" applied to all Marconi Companies, and that only professional prevaricators would have pretended to the House of Commons that they had no interest in the shares of "the" Marconi Company, when, as a matter of fact, they had invested in the shares of "a" Marconi Company—a performance which, needless to say, commended itself to that prince of prevaricators, the Prime Minister, who months afterwards, in cold blood, informed the House of Commons, in reference to the October disclaimers of his colleagues, that "When I read the declarations, which I did, of my right hon. friends, they seemed to me to be *perfectly natural, proper, and full.*" [My italics.]

The impudent and barefaced suggestion that the American Company had no interest in the parent Company's contract with the British Government and could not be affected by it, receives its quietus from their lordships' Report:

"Two important affairs arose, or rather came to a head, in 1912 for consideration by the English Company.

"One of them was a negotiation with the British Postmaster-General with a view to the erection and working of Marconi stations at various places in the British Dominions so as to establish a chain of wireless telegraphic communication for Imperial purposes. *M. Marconi's system had rivals, and, apart from the profit which would presumably result, there can be no question that a contract with the British Government in which this system was adopted must be very advantageous as a testimonial to those interested in that particular method of telegraphy.* [My italics.] Obviously, the English Company was very anxious to procure such a contract, and its negotiations with the Postmaster-General lasted through 1910 and 1911. Ultimately the tender of the English Company was accepted by the British Government on March 7, 1912. The acceptance of this tender was not equivalent to a completed contract, for it left some matters unsettled, and in any case ratification by the House of Commons was required before either party could be contractually bound. *But as a matter of business the acceptance was of great value to the English Company and others interested in the same patents.*" [My italics.]

Exit the case for the Coalition. In the face of this pronouncement even the *Westminster Gazette* and the *Manchester Guardia*

can scarcely have the hardihood to maintain the fiction that associated Marconi Companies had nothing in common but their name, but for which unfortunate coincidence nothing would have been heard of these innocuous American investments. Nor shall we again be told that the American Company had no interest in the success of the negotiations between the British Company and the British Government for an Imperial Wireless Chain, upon which Sir Rufus Isaacs and Mr. Lloyd George staked their reputation. As regards " Rumours " Lord Murray was candour itself and incidentally swept away the last fig-leaf covering his colleagues —naked, if not ashamed. The Lords Committee would have made short shift of the plausible casuistry so greedily swallowed by the Commons Committee, and subtle distinctions concerning " the " Marconi Company and " a " Marconi Company would have fared badly at their hands. Lord Murray's evidence on this head might be usefully commended to the quondam Attorney-General and the ever-present Chancellor of the Exchequer. To him, as to everybody else except these two plus Mr. Samuel and the Prime Minister, " Marconis " meant Marconis as a whole, and rumours about Marconis involved the entire group. This, let me repeat, has been the case of the *National Review* throughout the entire controversy. It was everybody's case until the *Matin* disclosures drove the Coalition into an impossible position. It has apparently always been Lord Murray's case and it is his case to-day—he rightly and wisely refused to budge under cross-examination and was completely successful in holding his ground. He repeated in varying forms in reply to varying questions that in his mind " Marconis " meant all Marconis.

In his own words (in answer to Q. 715): " I would like to submit that there were rumours about Marconis as a whole."

" *Q.* Let me have a plain answer to this, or, rather let my Lords have an answer to it. Did you understand that to refer to American Marconis or to include American Marconis ? "

Chairman (Lord Halsbury): " I think the witness has said once or twice that there was a confusion between the two, and that he spoke of Marconis as a whole, which would naturally include American."

Witness: " Yes."

Counsel reminded Lord Murray: " The rumours were as

he made special enquiry and was satisfied that the American Company had no interest on the Agreement between the Postmaster-General and the English Company, and that there was no ground on which the purchase of its shares by a British Minister would be open to objection. [My italics.] He informed the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Lord Murray of the result of his enquiries when offering shares to them.

(2) That the Ministers concerned, when entering into the purchases were all bona fide convinced that the American Company had no interest in the Agreement, and that there was no ground on which the purchase of shares in the American Company would be open to objection.

(3) That the American Company . . . *has no interest, direct or indirect, in the proposed agreement with the British Government* [my italics], and no interest, direct or indirect, in any profits which might be derived therefrom.

(4) That neither the English Company nor its Managing Director, Mr. Godfrey Isaacs, was a party to any of the transactions in question, or in any way directly or indirectly interested in them.

This is what may be termed "going the whole hog," and as the Commons Committee likewise found that Ministers secured no advantage whatsoever in obtaining shares at £2 on April 17 for which the common herd had to pay £3 5s. the following day, it is not surprising that they should have rounded off their verdict with the declaration, "On the whole matters relating to the conduct of Ministers which have come before the Committee, the Committee find that all the Ministers concerned have acted throughout in the sincere belief that there was nothing in their action which would in any way conflict with their duty as Ministers of the Crown." Upon which the plain man is tempted to observe, "Then why make such stupendous efforts and stoop to such mean artifices in concealing conduct beyond criticism." The public will prefer the less heroic but more creditable attitude of Lord Murray, which may be thus paraphrased: "I said nothing about these things, because I hoped that they might never come out. I made grave errors for which I am sorry, and so far as material losses go for which I am responsible I will make reparation to those who trusted me."

One word in conclusion. Not that the Marconi scandal is closed. Far from it. We have not yet reached the beginning of the end, but only the end of the beginning. It would be idle to disguise the fact that to many enthusiasts, the Report of the Lords Committee has been something of a disappointment, as they anticipated a wider enquiry and more comprehensive results. The field of investigation admittedly became some-

what narrower than that foreshadowed in the Debates in the House on the appointment of the Committee. But for this there are considerable compensations. It was worth while making substantial sacrifices, to get a unanimous Report from a body, which even such rabid Radicals as the *Westminster Gazette* and the *Manchester Guardian* could not describe as "partisan"; while the service rendered to our public life, by a Report from such a quarter condemning the malpractices which, judging by Ministerial speeches and Ministerial articles, were to become the accepted creed of British Governments, is simply incalculable. We are, admittedly, very far from having probed the Marconi mystery to the bottom. There remain vast unexplored fields of potential delinquencies—to be tapped with renewed zest—but, at any rate, the country is now provided with a serious standard of conduct, and one may safely predict that it will be many a long day before Ministers take valuable tips from Government contractors, though he would be a bold man who, in the face of what is happening hourly, should venture to affirm that his Majesty's Ministers will cease to lie for their party and themselves.

L. J. MAXSE

GERMANY AND OURSELVES

A DOMESTIC crisis unfortunately always draws public attention from the wider aspects of an imperial policy—the defence of the Empire and the upholding for all our people of great principles.

Many people do not seem to realise that strong defensive Services are the only bulwark of our freedom, and of legal justice throughout this kingdom and the Dominions. It is because these imperial interests are concerned and, I hold, threatened in the no distant future by Germany that I am now led to some extent to break my silence.

First of all, let us understand Germany's position. She has learnt that the policy of open hostility to England at all times does not pay, because it keeps us too much on the *qui vive*, and because it strengthens the hands of those who urge that full preparations should be made to meet any German act of aggression. Hence a show of friendliness has been assumed in the hope that she may obtain concessions from us, and that the British nation, with its proverbially short memory, will be lulled into a feeling of false security. But what is really her present position as regards ourselves? There have been pleasant speeches by Fürst Lichnowsky, meetings in London of influential men interested in Peace, and besides these a direction to the Press Bureau to cease for the moment actively hostile articles concerning Great Britain. But has there been a reduction of one soldier or one sailor as a proof of this friendliness? On the contrary! Her army has lately been greatly augmented, and her navy is steadily increasing as the result largely of wilfully fictitious and misleading propaganda, and an agitation has now been begun for still more ships.

If Germany answers us that these are maintained against France and Russia, we may reply that that danger existed before her change of attitude towards us. If the change of attitude

indicated a real change of feeling towards England, it should have been accompanied by at least a decrease in the German navy. The real attitude and the real aims of the German Government remain the same, however much many excellent and high-minded men in Germany, as well as many leading financiers, may be opposed to their policy. Those men wield a certain influence, but that influence has not been strong enough to secure for the country constitutional government, or even strong enough to prevent the triumph of the army at Zabern. It is the policy of the Government which rules, not the wishes of these peace-loving gentlemen. The Government fosters the great Leagues, and these are used to educate the people to their views. In Germany the Government also spreads its propaganda by means of thousands of articles communicated to the Press, every one of which is obviously designed for the same end. The propaganda of the Navy League is so well known that it is needless to mention it here. The policy of the so-called "Defence League" was recently stated at a great meeting in Breslau as being "the Development of the Land Hunger of the masses into the clear and resolute determination to secure for the nation that which it needs." Land appeals to the upper class because they hunger after more territory to rule. In addition the acquisition of territories would create more openings for the bureaucracy, and more places to which they could induce their emigrants to go instead of to foreign lands. To the commercial and working classes it would mean more supplies of raw material, more markets open to Germany and closed to us.

We must not imagine for a moment that our consenting to a deal over colonies which Portugal may relinquish will satisfy the ruling and bureaucratic classes of Germany. v. Bernhardi in his outspoken—and at present rather inconvenient—manner, voices the opinion of the ruling class when he tells us that it is from Great Britain that the most suitable land can be most readily obtained, not by arbitration, as he explains, but by threats of war and war.

Besides land and money there are things of at least equal value to our people which we should sacrifice were we to give Germany her longed-for opportunity. Those are freedom and the right to justice on all occasions. For scores of years statesmen and thousands of men and women throughout our Empire, [illegible]

been building up a system under which all subjects of the King have freedom and justice. Are we to exchange that for the state of affairs so long existing, but only now publicly exposed at Zabern, for Sabre Law, for "Agents Provocateurs" of all ranks, for secret trials and sentences ruled only by the political exigencies of the moment, and for legal processes savouring of the Inquisition?

Let us compare our administration of justice with theirs. Here a man is brought into open court within twenty-four hours, and his trial held within a month or two of his arrest, not delayed by any political exigencies. A definite charge is at once formulated which the prisoner can communicate to his friends. Witnesses must give their evidence openly in Court and be at once cross-examined. There are no private communications between magistrate and witnesses. A witness is discredited if he repeatedly changes his evidence. An "Agent Provocateur" is absolutely barred as a witness, and a witness cannot receive high pay for giving his evidence, and if he is proved to have been guilty of perjury he is practically disqualified. The witness on whose evidence the prosecution relies must have at least a clean record as regards the criminal courts. Every witness must give his evidence before the prisoner. To his trial a prisoner can bring any lawyer. A complete record of the proceedings can be kept, and what is of immense importance, the Press can be present, and thus ensure that the true facts are known. Applications for bail are considered in open Court and granted whenever possible. Then the trial is in open Court—a matter of absolutely vital importance, and the decison is given on the merits. The reasons for that decision are open to all the world.

In Germany, on the other hand, a prisoner may be kept for six months in a cell without bringing him into open court waiting for a trial timed to suit the political exigencies of the moment. For weeks no definite charge may be communicated to him, and then he may for long be forbidden to communicate it to his friends. For six months a prisoner may be forbidden to cross-examine a lying and perjured Government witness, whose evidence is taken privately by the magistrate, who permits and assists him to make continual alterations of it in most material particulars. A penniless "Agent Provocateur" may try, but fail, to provoke

the commission of some act against the law and yet be the only witness. He may receive a large sum for the arrest of a prisoner and for months be lavishly supplied with money to live a life of drunken dissipation. As an inducement to him to continue his so-called evidence he may be given good Government employment, and that after he has admitted committing perjury in the very case. To secure him as a witness, the Government may, though the prisoner calls on them, refuse to prosecute him for perjury, blackmailing, or any other crime. The only witness may be a man convicted of half the crimes in the Calendar, and the magistrate may "forget" to ask him any questions likely to bring this to the knowledge of the prisoner. A lawyer of the highest standing, and of German nationality may, if sometimes employed by the Embassy of the prisoner's nation, be refused admission to the secret trial. The Press may be absolutely excluded from a trial, and lying statements may be circulated ad infinitum for political purposes, and the prisoner advisedly given no chance of denying them. Bail for the highest sums, which would allow the prisoner to come out and tell his friends the true facts and thus prevent conviction, may be refused on some pretext. Then, worst of all, a prisoner may be tried behind closed doors, despite all his protests, and a judgment given by the highest Court absolutely contrary to the evidence and the admissions of the Prosecution solely because it may be politically useful or the bureaucracy may wish it, or an agitation may be in progress for more ships. Any protest against his unjust sentence may be totally ignored. And then—as though to crown the whole—the prosecution may in their written judgment, to give some ground for conviction, put into the prisoner's mouth statements which he never made. Then the reason for refusing to allow the prisoner to have any record of the trial becomes doubly apparent. When he protests that he never made such statements, his protest falls on deaf ears, and he is absolutely forbidden to send that judgment —though it contains nothing secret—to his friends and to his country. Year after year he passes in solitary confinement, and no one cares. All this, according to their standard, is justice, and according to their view is right.

Is this, and the "Sabre Law" exemplified at Zabern, the treatment of their conquered provinces, and the prohibition in

other provinces of the right to teach their old language, a system which the most callous amongst us would wish to see imposed on any of our people whatever their race? Is not the preservation of the priceless blessings of freedom and justice for the millions under the King's sway a sacred trust which lies on all of us men and women. If it is, we must realise that it depends, and depends only, on keeping ourselves strong enough to prevent Germany defeating us and then forcing her system and her "justice" on our people as she forces them on unprotected foreigners in her hands and on her conquered provinces. She hopes at the most suitable moment to array against us in support of her demands, as she did against Russia in 1908, so formidable a force, naval and military, as will by its mere threat impel us to ignoble acceptance of her terms. Failing that, her forces will be ready to attack.

A corresponding preparedness in our military, as well as in our naval forces, is absolutely essential. When Germany increases her armaments we must do likewise. When Germany reduces her armaments we can think of doing likewise, but not till then. Let us do what we reasonably can to promote good relations, but never abandon any of our rights or advantages; we cannot afford to do so. And never must we by any show of friendliness or by any soft words, whoever may be the spokesman, be lulled into a feeling of security. The methods of the ruling class in Germany change, but behind it all, with their ever-increasing naval and military forces, they always pursue their unaltered aim. Co-operation throughout our Empire, real efficiency in all branches of our defensive Services, and the readiness of every one to take his share in the defence of the Mother Country and the great Dominions can alone bring us security.

BERTRAND STEWART

THE TERRITORIAL ARMY IN HISTORY

THE fundamental idea of the Territorial Army scheme was as follows: In case of war the duty of Home defence would be assumed by a force of amateur or partially trained soldiers. These men would not be fit at once for this duty, but by the time that the country was practically denuded of Regular troops they would be capable of defending it against any force which could invade these shores. The time it would take them to acquire the necessary efficiency was originally estimated at six months, but this estimate was subsequently reduced. Thus Sir Ian Hamilton has informed us that even if they were to fight to-morrow, "were they in a superiority of three to one they would fight well enough to give the best of enemies a bellyful," and after six months they would with a 25 per cent. superiority in numbers have a "fair fighting chance" and with a superiority of half as many again they ought to have a "good chance of the victory." He makes, however, one condition: "The fate of England must not be staked upon one great battle fought over open ground."

The success, therefore, of the Territorial Force over an invader depends upon two things, first, superiority in numbers, secondly, a theatre of war offering facilities for defence and the avoidance of a pitched battle.

As regards the first condition it can only be remarked that it is directly contrary to all the teaching of history. To the civilian mind, no doubt, it calls up a vision of two armies drawn up in battle array opposite one another, one, two or three times as large as the other. Under such circumstances victory must surely rest with numbers. Unfortunately this is not what happens in war: what does happen will be shown in the course of this article.

The second condition is an even greater fallacy, due to the strangest confusion of thought. England, it is true, is to a great extent a country of hedgerows, rolling hills, streams, small enclosures and woods, offering great facilities for defence. There are countries where the physical features, if judiciously used, are such as to give the amateur soldier—the word is used for want of a better—an advantage over the professional, but this only holds good where the amateur is the natural product of the country. The qualities of the Boer, the Arab or the Afridi, are the results of the life they have led for generations. You cannot teach men these qualities unless they have for years been living under the conditions which produce initiative, resource, endurance and self-reliance. Failing that you can only inculcate such qualities by the sternest discipline and prolonged training. If this is impossible, your only chance is to keep your troops as closely concentrated as possible in order to ensure control over them and facilitate inter-communication and supply. But hedgerow fighting means exactly the reverse; it means the occupation of an enormous extent of frontage where all control vanishes, where inter-communication is difficult or impossible, where orders are transmitted with difficulty, and where all depends upon individual initiative. And the avoidance of a pitched battle means rear-guard fighting carried on day after day, the severest strain that men can be asked to endure, and in an enclosed country entailing the loss of all cohesion, the capture of isolated bodies, discouragement, confusion, and finally panic. So far from avoiding open ground, the only chance for a force so constituted would be to select as open a position as possible, give up all thought of manœuvring and dig itself in. Sir Ian Hamilton says he assumes "that the force will be commanded by some one who understands them; a freshly embodied militia may not be marched off their legs." It is painfully evident that he at any rate does not understand the functions of a freshly embodied militia. But indeed when one reflects that there is no point on the Essex coast more than fifty-five miles from London and that an invading or raiding force landing there would be only three days march from the capital, and that only a few days more would place them astride the main railway lines connecting the industrial centres of the Midlands with London this proposal

of an indefinite retirement coming from a General Officer of the British Army would be incredible were it not expressed in black and white.

In considering the value of such a force for war there are two other points to bear in mind on both of which there is a lack of clear thinking. The defects of raw troops can to some extent be counteracted by cadres composed of Regular officers and non-commissioned officers. One of Napoleon's most brilliant campaigns, that of 1814, was fought with totally untrained conscripts, but they were commanded by veterans. "I would rather," he said, "have an army of deer led by lions than an army of lions led by deer." There are 628 Regular officers serving in the Territorials, but they are bound to be withdrawn in time of war. What the exact shortage in officers of the Expeditionary force will be is uncertain. The question has been avoided in Parliament on the plea that it is undesirable for foreign nations to know what our mobilisation arrangements are, but a simple calculation of the number of officers serving in the country reveals the fact that we shall be faced with a staggering shortage of something like 3000. To make up this number the Special Reserve of Officers and the Unattached List are to be drawn upon. The former number about 700, the latter, who practically all belong to the Officers' Training Corps and therefore have never had the training of Regular officers at all number something over 1000. The average wastage in war is officially estimated at 70 per cent. per annum, the first reserves supplying 10 per cent. The Expeditionary Force will, therefore, have an initial shortage of more than 1000 officers and will require 600 officers after the first engagements.* Every one of the officers serving with the Territorials must, therefore, be withdrawn on the outbreak of war. Let it be remembered that there is a shortage of over 1200 officers as well in the Special Reserve, but in order to deceive the public the Special Reserve of Officers which is designed to complete the complement of the Expeditionary Force is purposely confused with the Special Reserve, an entirely distinct organisation, intended to supply reinforcements as time goes on. This enabled Colonel Seely, in the recent Army Debate, to

* This is calculating on a basis of 10 per cent., but it would really be more, for the loss in officers is always proportionately greater than the loss in men.

represent the shortage of officers in the Special Reserve as being only between 400 and 500. Thus the Special Reserve of Officers is one of those elastic corps which can be in two places at the same time; it goes abroad with the striking force and stays at home to supply the later reinforcements! And yet this shameless trickery passed unrebuked in the House!

The other point to bear in mind is this. There is little doubt that in the case of a raid or invasion where the number of invaders must be limited and their communications precarious, a determined resistance on the part of the whole population, a national rising, in fact, might, even if the people lacked training, be successful. But this presupposes conditions which do not prevail among us. It presupposes that the public know something of the meaning of war, are intensely patriotic and prepared to undergo all the horrors of a war of reprisals in order to achieve their object. Unfortunately, as the standard of comfort grows higher and the gospel of ease becomes more fashionable, nations become less fitted for such trials. In any case such results cannot be attained without previous preparation; failing this they are only produced by the hatred born of widespread misery. National service might achieve this by giving the whole population the elements of military training, affording them an insight into war conditions and preparing them for the sacrifices that such a struggle would involve.

The closer the Territorial Army is examined the more evident it becomes that it has no compensating advantages to outweigh its obvious defects and that in fact it differs in no essential from all those other improvised armies of which history relates. Now of all these the one that bears the closest resemblance to it is undoubtedly the force raised by the Government of National Defence in France after the disaster of Sedan in 1870. Its record is of intense interest as showing what may be expected in a contest between trained and untrained troops under modern conditions, and is therefore more useful than the history of the American Civil War, where both sides were equally lacking in training. It throws, too, a flood of light upon the folly of many current ideas and phrases, their reappearance among us expressed in almost exactly similar terms being a remarkable instance of the endless but apparently vain repetitions of history. The Franco-

German War is known to most Englishmen as a series of brilliant German victories, culminating in the siege and capitulation of Paris. Their ideas of it are probably gained mainly from the pages of Zola or the canvases of de Neuville and Détaille. It recalls stirring incidents known even to the proverbial schoolboy, the last stand in the cemetery of Saint-Privat, the death-ride of von Bredow at Rezonville, the desperate charges of Margueritte's cavalry across the storm-swept plateau of Illy—all these belong to the first and better known phase of the war, but of that long-drawn-out agony when Paris was starving, when vast armies sprang up as if by magic to relieve it, and when instead of being a contest between rival armies, the war became a national struggle, the French people themselves taking up the burden of national defence, of all this the average Englishman knows little. The French had relied on a professional army, recruited from exactly the same sources as is ours to-day, that is, generally speaking, from the poorest and most uneducated classes, for the system of conscription in force allowed for the provision of substitutes, thus exempting the well-to-do from the burden of service. The result was that at first the people simply looked on. The war was not their affair; the Army was paid to do the work. Although naturally patriotic this entire detachment from military life and thought actually led them in some cases to welcome the invaders. At Nancy the citizens prepared a repast in the market-place for the Germans, who were waited on by the ladies of the town. Now the French had suffered invasion only fifty-five years before. They knew what it meant, and yet the civil population hardly displayed any animosity against the invaders. We have never known it, and yet we are told that the British will rise as one man the moment an enemy lands on these shores. On the contrary, we shall make the invaders very comfortable in our towns and villages. This attitude was certainly not due to any lack of patriotism on the part of the French, as results were shortly to show. Sedan was not merely a crushing defeat, it was not a Jena or an Austerlitz, it was the complete extinction of the last army France possessed, the capture of 100,000 men in the open field; and yet the nation, deprived of all resources, met the blow by hurling defiance at the conqueror and proclaiming a *levée-en-masse* of the population.

Compare this answer to those made by other nations in similar circumstances and it must be admitted that few have attained such heroism. Unfortunately they had not the means of achieving ultimate success. The only force lying ready to their hands was the Garde Mobile. At first sight it may seem unfair to compare this force with our own Territorials, but, when we take all the factors into account, we shall see that by the time it actually came to fight it was in fact a force similarly constituted, having about the same degree of training that ours would have after two or three months embodiment and possessing, indeed, certain advantages denied to the Territorials.

The original project of Marshal Niel in organising the Garde Mobile was to make every citizen serve in the ranks either of the Army or of the Army Reserve, after which they would pass into another reserve termed the Garde Mobile. This would have meant universal service and ensured a considerable degree of training for all. But in its passage through the legislature the measure was watered down to such an extent that the result, regarded as a military organisation, was an entire farce. It merely enacted that all those who did not serve in the ranks of the Regular Army should enter the Garde Mobile, that they should receive fifteen days training in the year, but that this should not be continuous, and the men should return to their homes every night after their instruction was finished. The effect of this was to render training in the country districts practically impossible, as the men had such distances to go that they could not get to their headquarters and back in the course of the day. But an even greater defect was a clause allowing the revision boards in each district to exempt on their own initiative to the extent of four per cent. of the total numbers enrolled those whom they considered to be the supporters of their families. This seems to have been inserted for political purposes, for it placed a weapon in the hands of the local authorities which they did not fail to use in order to bribe the electors. The debates in the Chamber are interesting, since the heresies expressed by those who opposed the Bill are repeated every day by our own politicians, notably the idea that as the whole Regular Army could not be employed at once there would be time to train the Mobiles after war had broken out. Probably this was where Lord Haldane got his

notion of a similar training for the Territorials. We also find these Heaven-sent legislators enunciating the doctrine that "every Frenchman is born a soldier" and therefore requires no training, whence perhaps the same doctrine among us. It is so convenient.

The cadres were the best part of the system. Instructors were provided from the Regular Army and the higher commands were filled by retired officers. The commanding officers of battalions had in the great majority of cases also served in the Army, as had also many of the captains. For the rest men were nominated according to their standing in the various districts, and this was certainly the best course to adopt, as they generally earned the respect of the men. It was found that ex-noncommissioned officers were not suitable for commissions owing to the class in life from which they were drawn. We are at the present time spending large sums in order to foster promotion from the ranks, but history shows that an army recruited from the poorest and most uneducated classes cannot provide men suitable for such promotion, and it is useless to expect it. It was an invariable rule that those regiments fought best which were led by the gentlemen of the districts. The folly of trying to "democratise" an army was shown by what occurred after the Garde Mobile were called up. The indiscipline prevailing among the Paris Mobiles induced the Government of National Defence to order that throughout the whole force the men should be allowed to elect their own officers. This act of incredible folly, committed literally under the very guns of the enemy, of course resulted in reducing the Paris Mobiles to a mutinous mob commanded by the worst characters, whom the authorities were subsequently forced to degrade. Speaking generally, however, where they were commanded by gentlemen the men elected the existing staff of officers and showed no desire whatever to promote those of their own social standing. Where they did so the results were always fatal, and showed the complete inability of the soldier to judge of the merits of an officer. The mere fact of election, however, had disastrous consequences and undermined discipline at the very moment when some semblance of order and military bearing was being instilled into them.

That the force did not fulfil the first function of a home defence

army is proved by the fact that two whole Regular divisions, besides nine battalions in the South of France, had to be retained to preserve internal order until the first battles were over, the very service which should have fallen to the Mobiles. What might not these extra divisions have effected in the critical hours of Rezonville or Gravelotte? It is worth while to note that our Government has expressed its intention of not sending more than four divisions of our Expeditionary Force abroad until the Territorials have acquired some training. It is thus intended to retain two Regular divisions at Home until the decisive battles have been fought and won; exactly what the French did.

When war broke out only about half the force had received its cadres. This portion was called out on July 17, but the remainder had to wait until the cadres had been nominated. They were finally called out on August 10, twenty-four days after the declaration of war. What they lacked in previous training, however, they made up for in the provision of a superior class of officer to those appointed before the war. The national crisis brought a host of retired officers to offer their services, besides old non-commissioned officers serving in the police, in the customs, as forest wardens or in fire brigades. The chief cause of weakness in such a force is its inequality. An army is like a chain, its value must be judged by its weakest link. Certain corps possessing a large number of Regular officers and a superior class in the rank and file attained a certain degree of solidity and efficiency in a remarkably short time, such corps would be given all the most dangerous and difficult work to do, while the remainder were kept in reserve This is the story of all such armies, and it explains much. The commander of a homogeneous Regular Force knows that his units are within certain limits of equal value. He must, of course, spare men who have undergone any severe strain of marching and fighting, but he knows that his whole command is capable of standing a certain strain and can calculate accordingly. Not so the commander of an untrained force. He is hampered at every turn, for he never knows when demoralisation, panic or sheer ignorance and stupidity may not ruin all his plans. The civilian never understands this. He points with pride to certain superior battalions of Territorials as representative of the Force. Those

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ADVICE TO INVESTORS

Sir,—May we trespass upon your valuable space to give a word of warning on a subject of considerable importance to a very large body of investors?

There are millions of pounds invested by the British Public upon the security of land and houses in the United Kingdom, and particularly in London and its suburbs, and, speaking generally, there is no better form of security for the investment of capital than by way of mortgage. The interest obtainable is good, the transaction involves absolutely no trouble or expense to an investor, and he has the satisfaction of knowing that the form his capital has taken for the moment is at least a *visible* quantity and cannot vanish in the night like some other forms of investment have a bad habit of doing.

And yet, notwithstanding the solid advantages offered by land and houses for the investment of trust and other funds, owing to the want of a little foresight instances are constantly occuring where serious and unexpected loss has been sustained. On an examination into the cause of the loss, it is invariably found it has been sustained simply and solely through the neglect of having such investments reviewed at judicious intervals.

It is surprising how general it is for a capitalist (trustee or otherwise) to advance a sum of money by mortgage on a property, and so long as he receives his interest to trouble no more as to the adequacy of the security, but to lock up the deeds in his safe for a long and indefinite term of years.

Owing to the ever-changing character of residential localities and trade centres, it stands to reason a good security at one time may be a bad one some years hence (or vice versa), and therefore in the interests of prudence and caution, investors and particularly Trustees and Mortgagees, should make a point of having all their securities independently reviewed once at least in every five years. Such a step would enable the investor to balance his investments according to requirements, and would practically put an end to the frequent cases entailing disastrous losses that one so often hears of.

Investors in stocks and shares take the precaution of looking at the market prices now and again, and why should investors in land and houses be less prudent?

Yours &c.

GODDARD AND SMITH.

196 PICCADILLY, W.

Messrs. Goddard and Smith would be pleased to see any readers interested in the above matter and give them any information and advice they might like to have.

OFFICES: 196 PICCADILLY, W. (NEXT TO PRINCES)

battalions might conceivably be capable of standing a loss of 20 per cent. in action, but of what use would their sacrifice be if the neighbouring battalion broke at the first shot? Troops cannot be valued either as individuals or as units. They must be valued as armies.

The Territorials certainly have the advantage over the Garde Mobile in being armed, equipped and clothed in time of peace. As to their organisation, however, it must be remembered that it will be broken up altogether in war-time as a very large number will be required for garrisons and coast defence. In fact, so large a portion must be employed in this capacity that it is difficult to see how "the swiftly moving central field force" will be composed. In any case it will involve the complete regrouping of units. In the matter of the rank and file, the Garde Mobile had a decided advantage, for the system was founded on universal obligation to service and the best elements of the manhood of the nation were included in it, besides a large number of men who had received training in the Army. It had a much higher level of intelligence. Generally speaking, however, the old soldier was not a success. In a most interesting study of the Garde Mobile, written by a Belgian officer, M. Thiriaux, it is stated that the war "dealt the final blow to the absurd legend of the old re-engaged man, ignorant and drunken, but always victorious." The truth is the old professional soldier, even if the above description of him is rather unfair, is not a valuable factor when he is not subject to the same stern discipline as he has been used to and when he has undergone the demoralising effects of several years of civil life. The National Reservist is unlikely to prove any more efficient than his counterpart on the other side of the Channel. With regard to officers "the regiments were worth what their cadres were worth." The appointment of officers according to their social position and education was an entire success, and it was solely due to this that the regiments remained loyal to their officers through the critical period of the Revolution following the news of Sedan, as well as the severe trials of a winter campaign. This is an interesting commentary on the present cry for an army "more democratically controlled." It is unfortunate for the Territorials that so many of the junior officers do not possess the necessary qualities to inspire

respect among the men, and in this they are immensely inferior to the Garde Mobile, as well as in the lack of Regular officers.

With the sole exceptions, therefore, of clothing and equipment, which to a great extent had to be improvised after war broke out, it is impossible to doubt that the Garde Mobile were far superior in quality to our Territorials. The armament also had to be provided in a hurry, but before fighting actually took place they were armed for the most part with serviceable rifles not inferior to those of the enemy, though they were of all sorts of patterns. In the matter of training they obtained, generally speaking, two clear months, although their organisation was not fully completed until September 25, but the individual companies and battalions had been drilling hard since August 10, and there was no serious fighting until the latter half of October. Animated by intense excitement and patriotic ardour, the instruction was carried on for nine hours a day in the towns and villages, and by the time they were grouped in divisions and corps, the men had a far more intimate knowledge of the elements of drill, the handling of arms and of musketry than our Territorials, nor did the closer formations of those days take so much time to learn as do the more extended ones of to-day. It may be thought perhaps by some that the Territorials will also be strengthened with old non-commissioned officers and officers as were the Garde Mobile, and that all such advantages may be made good after embodiment. But circumstances are different. The war we shall be conducting will be abroad, there will not be any apparently imminent danger of invasion, no immediate need for great efforts, while the needs of our forces oversea, both in the theatre of war and in our numerous garrisons, will be so great that recruiting for the Territorials will be stopped and every effort diverted from them to our more pressing needs. There can, therefore, be no doubt that, if they take the field under the circumstances sketched by Lord Haldane and Sir Ian Hamilton, whether at once or after a few months' embodiment, they will do so in much less favourable conditions even than the Garde Mobile.

Now let us examine what actually happened to these improvised armies, about two millions in all, including the remnants

of Regulars, depôt troops, National Guards* and Garde Mobile, but of which the last, numbering 623,000, was the mainstay. But first one word as to the Government. The men who constituted it, who were responsible for the employment of these masses of men, are described by the Swiss historian, Colonel Leconte, as being "eloquent lawyers and brilliant literary men, under the presidency of a general officer, himself more of a 'littérateur' and more of a lawyer than all his colleagues together." He adds that "they were more fit to adorn the French Academy than to mount the breach." The general was Trochu, appointed Governor of Paris and provisional President of the Republic. Although undoubtedly a man of ability, he imagined himself peculiarly fitted for the position of dictator owing to his skill in drawing up proclamations and his powers of oratory, accomplishments considered particularly valuable in inspiring undisciplined troops and restraining the most turbulent population in the world. Paris was quick to discover his defects, the soldiers nicknamed him "General Trop-lu," and he soon became an object of ridicule, of all crimes the worst in French eyes. Of the rest it is unnecessary to speak, for, with one exception, they counted for nothing. Their exact counterparts may be seen to-day among our professional politicians, our "eloquent lawyers and brilliant literary men." By a strange retribution of justice, they were the very men who before the war had urged the policy of disarmament, had accused those who warned them of German designs of trying to provoke war, had opposed Marshal Niel, the only man who tried to avert the danger, and had asserted that preparation was unnecessary as "every Frenchman was a born soldier." If we imagine a Government hastily gathered together in an emergency and composed of the members of the present Cabinet with a few Pacifists and Little Navyites thrown in, and with a popularity-hunting General, devoted to playing to the gallery, at their head, we shall get an almost exact idea of what the Government of National Defence was like. They had, however, one man who, although he was a lawyer and had been as guilty as any of his colleagues in rendering France powerless in a war with Germany, was yet incomparably superior to any of these

* The National Guards were merely a sort of town militia. They never took the [illegible] and were not included in the field armies.

gentlemen in having some real elements of greatness. Gambetta combined high gifts of oratory with tremendous energy and zeal and the most devoted and disinterested patriotism. In spite of all his mistakes, and he committed many, without him the magnificent spirit displayed by the people would have subsided into helpless inactivity. He was the life and soul of the national defence; he breathed his own fire into it, he gave coherence, direction and purpose to the efforts of the armies, he inspired confidence and hope where all had been listlessness and despair.

How fatal it is to allow civilians to have any influence in time of war was at once seen.

At the very outset, the Government committed a fatal blunder in remaining at Paris. It was evident that the City must be invested and every soldier advised them to establish their head-quarters in the Provinces. The civilians, however, carried the day, but this fundamental error led to another which proved irretrievable. Acting on the motto that "Paris is France," they concentrated there not only 80,000 men of the Regular Army, who were mostly Regulars only in name, for they were practically all recruits and had no more training than the Garde Mobile, but also 110,000 of these latter from the provinces. These added to the National Guards in Paris, a force three-fourths of which was wholly worthless and little better than a mob, made a total of 400,000 men who allowed themselves to be invested by 120,000 Germans. It must be admitted that the fear of the Paris mob and the indiscipline of the National Guard was so great that this step was taken partly to ensure order in the capital, but there was also an idea that no investment of such a wide perimeter would be possible with this number of men inside the fortress. It was the old fault of making the retention of a fortress the principal objective of a campaign instead of considering the fortress as merely a support for the field armies. This number was far in excess of the requirements of defence and they would have been of real use in some other part of the theatre of war. Once having imprisoned them in Paris, the relief of the city became the sole objective. Thenceforth all freedom of action was gone. Instead of striking at the German line of communications all efforts were concentrated on a direct attack on the investing army. Civilian management was thus responsible for basing the plan of cam-

paign on faulty strategy incapable of offering great results. The politicians had already committed the blunder of trying to relieve Metz and so bringing about the disaster of Sedan. They were now to commit a similar blunder in trying to relieve Paris.

These improvised troops should have been at their best in Paris where they were supported by the powerful artillery of the forts and where some time elapsed before they were asked to fight in the open. Those fought best who were early placed in the outpost line and had to finish their instruction in presence of the enemy; it must, however, be remembered that this presence did not at first involve anything more than skirmishing and small affairs of outposts. Some of these Garde Mobile regiments distinguished themselves greatly in these affairs, but their efforts were always marred by the unreliability of certain units. Thus, for instance, we read that at the affair of La Malmaison "it was found impossible to get the Bretons of Morbihan out of their trenches. This regiment, without ever coming in contact with the enemy, had some men missing." General Ducrot described them as possessing "élan but not solidity." What this meant was seen on the occasion of the great sorties undertaken later on. Thus at the attack on Coeuilly during the battle of Champigny, the regiment of La Vendée, after carrying out a gallant attack and driving back the enemy for a considerable distance, sees most of its superior officers killed and is assailed in flank by the enemy. The regiment dissolves in confusion, losing 280 prisoners. Now this might have occurred even to trained men submitted to a high trial, but they would have rallied quickly and order would have been restored. A few days afterwards they would again have been burning to retrieve their reverse. The regiment of La Vendée never appeared again in line.

Sir Ian Hamilton says that the Territorials "if defeated would go absolutely to pieces for a time." He is wrong. Like the regiment of La Vendée, they would never again appear in line. To endure repeated reverses like those of Buller's troops in Natal during the South African War, and yet to remain as ready as ever to fight again, is utterly impossible for raw troops. Colenso to them would have meant total demoralisation.

On this same day in the attack on Villiers we read of certain regiments displaying real dash and stubbornness. But what

happens? "The troops of the third corps were already enervated by half a day of expectation, by the sight of the losses of the second corps, by the defeat which they felt in the air." Nevertheless, they advance to the attack, and are greeted by a hail of shells. The Bretons of Morbihan are panic-struck and run away. The Mobiles of the Seine see them run, hear cries of "retire," and, what is worse, the bugles also sound the call; they abandon the crest in groups, leaving the greater portion of the regiment isolated but holding firm. These, however, are inadequate and have to be withdrawn. This whole account is significant, for it explains what has been said above as to the inequality of such troops and the useless sacrifice of the braver elements to retrieve the weakness of the others. These troops who ran away could not again be trusted even as garrisons for outpost positions. The next day the same thing happens. The Germans attack at dawn. The third battalion of the Côte-d'Or holds its ground, but shells bursting in the camp of the Ile-et-Vilaine and of the rest of the Côte-d'Or, the men suddenly awakened and not seeing their officers, flee in all directions. Now there are situations where officers who cannot be everywhere are unable to exert influence on their men, but good non-commissioned officers would have nipped such a panic in the bud. Unfortunately, they did not exist.

It is an entire mistake to suppose such incidents are due to lack of courage. Trained soldiers are no braver than untrained ones. What makes men break is not the extent of the danger, but the unexpectedness and uncertainty, the unknown and incalculable elements of a situation for which they are not prepared. Now the professional soldier has no refuge but the regiment: men who live together in barracks year in and year out, accustomed to look for orders to certain individuals, instinctively rally to their comrades and to their leaders. Safety appears to them to lie in this course. This habit or instinct induced by discipline takes a long time to acquire. "With a young army," said Napoleon, "one can storm a position, but one cannot carry through to the end a plan or a protracted design;" and when he said this he was thinking not so much of the defects of youth as of the want of discipline in the conscripts with whom he had to fight his later campaigns. "In newly levied armies," says

Lord Wolseley, "the instinct of self-preservation comes to view at every turn."

The battle of Champigny marks the turning-point in the Garde Mobile. A few battalions are occasionally attached to Regulars and do good service in sorties, but they can never be employed again to any extent. They went hopelessly to pieces under the influence of cold, privations and the discouragement of unsuccessful engagements. So much for those who were employed under the most favourable conditions for untrained troops.

There were three main theatres of war in the provinces, in the north, the south-east and on the Loire.

In the north the Mobiles were of inferior quality owing to the fact that the aristocracy of the district would not come forward to lead them, and they were largely recruited from the industrial population. At Villers-Bretonneux three battalions behaved well. Of the others, the 1st Battalion of the North starts by firing into the ranks of the 20th Chasseurs à pied. With two other battalions it is then ordered to attack the German position. They never get beyond the first French line, all efforts to move them are futile, and one battalion lies down. The colonel, at length, induces it to advance. It rises and starts bravely, but it has only gone 200 yards when flinching under the hail of shells, it hesitates. "I judged it prudent," says the colonel, "to avoid a debacle and withdrew them slowly to Gentelles where the captains restored order." The regiment had lost besides four killed and 25 wounded no less than 200 missing, although only two companies had been closely engaged. And yet these men had had some three months' training!

After this a whole month had to be spent in reorganising the Army. At Pont Noyelles "their attitude is very unequal." One battalion is steady, another retires in disorder at the first encounter, another resists cavalry but dissolves on the bursting of a few shells in its neighbourhood. "The Mobiles of Lille," says M. Thiriaux, "behaved well, but the casualty list spoils it all, one officer killed, five taken, twenty men killed, five wounded, 231 missing!"

After this they deteriorate hopelessly. At Bapaume "two battalions retire before the hourras signalling the approach of a Prussian battalion." At St. Quentin the death blow is struck. The

Army is commanded by an able General, Faidherbe, but it melts away under the defective organisation of the marches, the terrible weather, the irregular distribution of food and "the incoherent orders of an improvised staff." There were any number of Regular officers with this army who had escaped from Metz, but a staff does not only require Regulars but specially trained Regulars. The battle ended in a rout, though the reputation of the Mobiles was retrieved to some extent by the gallantry of individual companies and detachments. The collapse of this army was due largely to its lack of homogeneity, being composed of men of unequal social status who had not had time to acquire cohesion. "My army," said Faidherbe, "numbers 35,000 men, of whom only half fight; the rest is only useful to make a show on the field of battle." It was never capable of remaining in the field, and after every action had to be withdrawn inside the area of the fortresses to recoup.

There are two reasons why numbers cannot compensate for efficiency. One is that owing to the inability of raw troops to manœuvre their superiority in numbers is never brought to bear on the actual point of attack. They cannot combine, they do not arrive on the battlefield in time. "In war," says Admiral Mahan, "two and two do not make four unless they are brought into concerted action." The other reason is a weakness inherent in such armies. Improvised staffs and general inexperience lead to confusion, marching and counter-marching, fatigue uselessly imposed, long waits in inclement weather at railway stations and rendezvous; all this wears out men both physically and morally, impairs their confidence and depresses their "moral." When the emergency arises they are not prepared for it.

If we want to see the Mobiles at their best we must turn to the Army of the Loire. It was on them that all hopes rested for the relief of Paris. They formed the centre and core of the national defence after the escape of Gambetta from Paris and the establishment of the headquarters of the Provisional Government at Tours.

At the outset the French troops had been driven back beyond Orleans and that city was captured. Early in October the position seemed desperate. There were hundreds of thousands of men available, but it was necessary to equip, to bring them together

and to organise them. All direction was lacking till Gambetta appeared on the scene, literally dropping from the sky in a balloon on October 7. The Army had dissolved into a drunken band of marauders when the command was taken over by General d'Aurelle de Paladines, who at once restored order by shooting without mercy any men convicted of insubordination. Fortunately Gambetta and de Freycinet, the acting Minister of War, had a clear month before them in which to prepare and organise the new levies, owing to the fact that every German soldier was required for the investment of Paris and of Metz. The result of their almost incredible exertions was that by October 24 they had assembled 120,000 men. Till then the civilians had ruined every military movement by urging the generals "to do something," a policy which with raw troops was, of course, disastrous. Now, however, a real plan of campaign was formulated.

The Germans were to be overwhelmed by a force six times their strength and Orleans was to be relieved. Now observe what happens. The French corps with any combination should have annihilated the enemy. Out of 120,000 men, however, only some 80,000 actually arrived on the scene of action. Von der Thann, the Bavarian General, holds his ground all day at Coulmiers and could probably have continued to hold it on the next were it not that he is isolated and his line of communications is endangered. He therefore retreats, the French gain their one victory of the war and Orleans is retaken. It must be remembered that this success is only gained owing to the necessity of the Germans keeping open their communications. Had Von der Thann's corps been in the position of a force raiding these shores, he would have had absolute freedom of movement and would have attacked the French corps in process of carrying out their manœuvre and probably would have beaten them in detail.

Let it be noted that the Mobiles had had three months' training by this time, November 9, and required a superiority of six to one in the open field. And our Territorials will, according to Sir Ian Hamilton, if they fight to-morrow, require a superiority of three to one. Why? This was the most critical period of the war for the Germans and it is evident the general staff had grave misgivings. The "fog of war" had descended densely on the

scene of operations; the conflict had assumed a national character, every hedge and wall concealed a hidden marksman, the woods swarmed with francs-tireurs, German patrols were murdered, their detachments cut up, their trains wrecked, the roads were blocked, the bridges blown up, their communications in perpetual danger. But this situation did not arise until there was universal suffering among the population. However, the surrender of Metz enabled the Germans to dispose of another army for operations on the Loire. Towards the end of November Gambetta had collected no less than 300,000 men, but he now attempted to conduct the operations himself with fatal consequences. What happens again explains the folly of thinking that numbers can compensate for efficiency. The higher leading was marked by hesitation, for D'Aurelle wished to assume a defensive position in front of Orleans while the civilians urged him to advance for the relief of Paris, it being arranged that 60,000 men should break out of the capital and combine with the Army of the Loire. Now D'Aurelle knew perfectly well that his troops could not be trusted for offensive operations owing to the inability of forces so constituted to manœuvre and to co-ordinate their movements. But his authority was superseded by Gambetta, who issued orders direct to the subordinate commanders, with the result that the forces were engaged piecemeal and were defeated in detail. The German armies were separated from one another by a distance of 30 miles, one of their corps, only 9000 strong, being completely isolated. This corps is attacked by 55,000 French at Beaune-la-Rolande, but of these only one corps bears the real brunt of the action and is of course repulsed though it fights with great gallantry. Thus a superiority of six to one is whittled down to equal numbers on the actual field of battle, because the corps do not offer one another mutual support. The Germans lost about 800, the French between 8000 and 10,000.

Three days later, on December 1, the Government again order a partial attack at Villepion which meets with some success. But at the commencement 13,000 French are contending against only 3500 Germans. Subsequently the Germans are reinforced by another brigade, and finally the numbers on each side are approximately equal, but the Bavarian troops are utterly exhausted

by previous fighting. Under cover of night, the French attack the Bavarians and drive them out of Villepion. This partial success is however, followed on the next day by a crushing defeat at Loigny in which 34,000 Germans beat 94,000 French. Now all through this fighting the French troops on the whole behaved splendidly. They were the pick of the Garde Mobile, the peasantry of Touraine led by the aristocracy of the district, "of whom," says Colonel Lonsdale Hale, "it has been said 'The whole of the young nobility of Touraine lie buried before the walls of Beaune-la-Rolande.'" One of their deeds of valour, the forlorn hope led by de Sonis to cover the retreat after the battle of Loigny, will be inscribed for ever in the annals of French heroism, but again the inequality of the units ruined all, some sacrificing themselves with supreme devotion, others refusing to budge at the order of their officers, and lying down weary and despairing. Elan there is in plenty, but of solidity there is none. This is the turning-point of the Army of the Loire. They were still to do much to retrieve their country's honour, but all chance of saving it was gone.

Orleans being retaken by the Germans, the French forces were cut in two, one remaining the Second Army of the Loire, the other subsequently assuming the name of the Army of the East. The Mobiles had now had four months' training under war conditions and were acquiring real value. Fortunately the Second Army of the Loire had in its commander, Chanzy, not only by far the ablest general produced by the French during the whole war, but also a man of real greatness of character, high moral courage and iron determination. The retreat carried out by him during December and January stands as an enduring example of the most brilliant generalship under the most adverse circumstances. He took up one position after another, from Beaugency to Le Mans and Laval, holding each as long as he could and then retiring to another. The Germans, it is true, were inferior to him in numbers, and he accomplished nothing beyond delay, the diversion of the enemy from Paris and creating fears for the safety of the investing lines, but to have kept the field for two months with a heterogeneous, ill-trained army, and in the most fearful weather, without ever suffering a crushing defeat, is a sufficiently remarkable performance. This fighting is, however, marked by the same characteristics mentioned above: every position

is lost owing to the giving way of some portion of the line or the indiscipline of certain units. Retreats are always accompanied by hopeless confusion. But even more than the defects of the men the responsibility for failure rests on the staffs and administrative services, which it is even more impossible to improvise. Rations often cannot be obtained, the men starving and frozen fall out of the ranks, disperse into the towns and villages, or lie down by the roadside to be captured by the Germans. As the discouragement increases the horrors multiply: feeling themselves mishandled the men get mutinous; we read of officers drawing revolvers and shooting drunken and abusive soldiers, of deserters and stragglers being executed wholesale by summary courts-martial. And through it all we get glimpses of the pathetic and indomitable, if rather ludicrous, figure of the lawyer, Gambetta, tramping through the mud of the bivouacs, addressing stirring harangues to the soldiers, some paying no attention, while others of his Southern countrymen cheer him vociferously.

The campaign on the Loire was at least brightened by real heroism and generalship. The campaign in the East can only be described as a long and weary Calvary of horrors and gross mismanagement. The strategical conception of the campaign would only have been sound had it been intended to carry it out after minute preparation, with veteran troops and trained staffs. 150,000 men under General Bourbaki were to be thrown at a distance of 125 miles from their base against the German line of communications and relieve the fortress of Belfort which protects the so-called "trouée" between the Vosges mountains and the Swiss frontier. Had it been successful this movement would have cut the Germans from their base and placed them in the most perilous situation, but in conducting it with raw troops the Government were inviting disaster. The men were dispirited owing to the recent defeats and the moral of such troops cannot be restored as with Regulars. The cold was intense and the clothing and boots of the soldiers being of inferior quality were ragged and worn. In the middle of December there were 15 degrees of frost and yet the troops were made to bivouac in the open instead of being billeted in the towns, either because the generals and staff were too inexperienced to know how billeting should be carried out or because they feared that

their men once dispersed in the houses could not again be collected. The suffering thus entailed was ghastly, every morning found several frozen to death around the burnt-out fires; others, sick and incapable of rising, lay still on the hot embers, some in their efforts to get warm allowed themselves to be blinded by the smoke, they crowded into the hospitals and dispersed into the farms and hamlets on the route. Some in their misery committed suicide. But when it came to entraining them for the scene of operations, the tale of incompetence is almost incredible. The fifteenth corps was practically destroyed in transit. Those who suffered least passed three nights in railway trucks. Herded into cattle or goods trucks, ill-clothed and ill-fed, suffering from frost-bite, pneumonia, dysentery and typhus, they were carted like cattle from place to place, leaving a trail of sick and dying behind them. A campaign so begun could only have one ending. At the battle of the Lisaine the Germans held a position 12½ miles in extent, with only 42,000 men for three days against the attacks of at least three times that number. After this the French Army simply broke up in utter demoralisation and were driven over the Swiss frontier and disarmed. The last few weeks of the retreat form one of the most appalling pictures in all the annals of war. The rabble on arrival at their halting-places crowded into the houses. "If you tried to enter one of those rooms a fearful stench drove you back; there they were heaped one on top of another like sheep;" as new arrivals kept coming in, "those who had lain down were forced to rise in order to avoid being trampled on; they stood upright, pressed one against the other, breathing with difficulty in that vitiated atmosphere, but at least having warmth." The officers could not rouse the men in the morning, "threats, insults, blows were alike unavailing; they were no longer men but inert masses that nothing could stir from their coma." Food for men and beasts failed altogether. "The horses," says Lehautcourt, "gnawed anything within their reach, branches of trees, the wood of ammunition waggons and carriages, the manes and tails of neighbouring horses. The little town of Pontarlier was literally choked with men, horses and carriages. The majority of the men, haggard and ghastly, trembled with cold or fever; nearly all were torn by a hacking hoarse cough, to which the Swiss gave

the name of 'le poux de Bourbaki.'" In the immensity of the disaster every bond of discipline, of duty and of honour was snapped. The men became mutinous, the officers indifferent. Poor Bourbaki, hopeless from the very first, tried to blow out his brains, but only succeeded in wounding himself. Men's nerves gave way at the sight of so much suffering. General Durrieu commanding the fifteenth corps, a man of dauntless courage, went mad. "We met him," says a surgeon of the 1st Zouaves, "in a carriage which was bringing him to Besançon. He wept and demanded bread for his soldiers. This was the touching characteristic of his madness." Of the casualties only 3300 were due to the enemy's fire; 50,000, a third of the whole army, had succumbed to cold, hunger and disease. And yet, as always throughout the war, the failure of the many is retrieved by the magnificent devotion of a few. A gallant remnant, 6800 officers and men, broke through the German lines. "The arrondissement of Montauban may well be proud of its children," says Colonel de Layrolles, "when they were no more than the shadow of their former selves, they kept themselves pure from all shame. They never crossed the frontier, though they knew that beyond it lay safety and repose, which was already for many a matter of life and death, and many a man fell by the roadside who might have lived had he not believed himself wanting in giving up his arms when his country might still have need of them."

This is the plain, unvarnished tale of the Territitorial Army of France in the years 1870 and 1871. "It was," says a French officer, Captain de Tarlé, "something like the English Territorial Army of Lord Haldane. Moreover, England to-day, with its people out of touch with the national greatness and relying for its security on a small army of professionals, evokes the memory of France before 1870." The Garde Mobile was in many respects a better army than our Territorial Force. It fought under conditions for which ours is supposed to be prepared. It was organised and used by exactly the same type of politician as those who have the destinies of our country in their hands to-day; it broke in their hands as ours will break because, for the sake of party purposes, or to illustrate illusive theories, they had reduced it to a sham. They had betrayed their country. Providence ordained that they should guide it in its defeat, that

they should be held responsible for the disaster they had prepared, and that all the shame should rest on them. Those very men who opposed the original proposals of Marshal Niel were those who were called to power in the hour of trial. Olivier it was who declared war, Simon, Favre, Garnier Pagés and the other demagogues, who formed the Government of National Defence. And they drained the cup of degradation to the very dregs. It was Simon who, in the bitterness of his humiliation, confessed that he had been deceived and that his tears were as drops of blood. But after all the miserable man only shed tears, while others shed their blood. It was Favre who had to conduct the negotiations with Bismarck, and wept like a child in the great man's presence. The former self-satisfied theorist, the man of words and phrases, saw his whole world crumble around him and, face to face with the naked truth, cried out "that he had not known what he was doing, and that for these things he asked pardon of God and of men."

There is in the Musée Wiertz at Brussels a picture by that eccentric genius representing Napoleon in *hell*. Round him rises a circle of fire, while across the flames the ghosts of women and children and murdered men hurl curses at him and shake their fists in his face. It is curious that painters and authors who never tire of depicting the great conquerors of the world as criminals and murderers, should be silent as to the crimes of politicians. No picture has ever been painted representing a sleek, smooth-spoken lawyer or literary gentleman in that uncomfortable situation. No historian has ever classed the Sackvilles, the Oliviers, the Favres and the Alexeieffs of history with such enemies of the human species as they would have us believe Alexander or Napoleon to have been. The world at least finds something to admire in the careers of those men, there is a grandeur and heroism even in their crimes. But who shall measure the guilt of the lawyer, the professional politician, the philosopher and the theorist, who, having no redeeming personal quality in themselves, sacrifice not the trained warrior, but the humble artisan and peasant in a hopeless cause ? Shall it not be as tolerable for the Attilas and Tamerlanes in the day of judgment as for these ? And yet it is such men who in this country to-day are following point for point the example of those Frenchmen. Faced with a

most threatening foreign situation they have manufactured another Garde Mobile; while they have not moved a finger themselves to assist it, they are now stirring up popular hatred against the very class on whom they have fawned to administer it. Not content with this they have in the name of democracy divided the nation into two hostile camps, and a pinchbeck Napoleon, mentally obsessed with his imagined resemblance to that individual, but forgetting that "he is more fit to adorn an Academy than to mount the breach," has by one of the most ludicrous but bloodthirsty *coups d'état* ever attempted, tried to precipitate civil war. In this he has failed ignominiously but has succeeded in striking a blow at the last bulwark of the State, the Regular Army, which is to be dragged into the party arena as the villain of the new piece, the aristocratic foe of the democracy.

There is, of course, nothing new in all this; it is the well-worn path to anarchy and tyranny trod by every democracy in the past under the guidance of the demagogue. When a nation has reached this stage it can only be saved by passing through a trial that shall restore it to a sense of reality and shall prove its worth by its capability of sacrifice. The price of demagogy was paid not only in the blood of French soldiers but of the whole people, and since the worth of a nation can only be judged by the willingness of men to die in its cause, the sacrifice was not in vain; the second instalment of the price was paid afterwards in the horrors of the Commune and the degradation that followed it. We, too, shall pay the price and in the same coin. And history shall pronounce the same verdict on our Ministers as it has already pronounced on those Frenchmen. "These men betrayed their country."

PERCY

LORD LLANDAFF AT THE HOME OFFICE

A SKETCH

> Et versate diu, quid ferre recusent,
> Quid valeant humeri

Lord Salisbury's Cabinet, announced in July 1886, was, with one exception, practically a replica of that which had been displaced earlier in the year. That exception was Mr. Henry Matthews, Member for East Birmingham. The new name was much canvassed. As a politician he was little known: as a member of the Bar he was famous. His return to the political arena—he had been member for Dungarvan in 1868—was coincident with his brilliant conduct of a *cause célèbre.* In that case a penetrating cross-examination was only equalled by a speech, which for eloquence and versatility will always rank among the best models of forensic oratory. Lord Randolph Churchill had made acquaintance with Birmingham in the election of 1885, and his friends of that city had informed him of the effective appearance of Matthews on an English political platform. Lord Randolph in his contempt of "the old gang" saw, as he thought, a chance of strengthening his fighting line in the House of Commons. He believed that abilities which age had only matured and attainments which commanded the admiration of the Law Courts would readily gain for the new recruit the attentive ear of Parliament. He persuaded Lord Salisbury to make an experiment, and Henry Matthews arrived at Whitehall as Secretary of State.

In the short space of twelve months three Ministers had presided over the destinies of the Home Office. Sir William Harcourt had ruled during the stormy period which ended in the summer of 1885. A lawyer in little more than name, though a jurist of

pretensions, he had been a vigorous and bustling politician in Parliament and in the country. He rejoiced in the public advertisement of his office which he filled with some measure of success. In private he blustered: in public he yielded. The Department was familiar with his occasional outbursts of temper and with his railing against the estimable gentlemen of the Establishment. Peace, however, was usually restored by the entrance of Sir Adolphus Liddell, then Permanent Under Secretary of State, who with a happy *bonhomie* denoting the easy terms of social equality, would laugh the irritated statesman into good-humour and oblige him to admit that an offending clerk was, after all, only doing his duty.

Of a wholly different stamp was Sir Richard Cross. He was a deft, if unsympathetic, head of an office whose name will always be associated with more than one useful measure of domestic reform. He had an instinct for a Parliamentary difficulty and some ability in avoiding it. Combining a fair knowledge of Quarter Sessions law with the general decorum of a family solicitor, he not only secured the affection and admiration of his Sovereign by an unremitting and obsequious correspondence concerning the progress of official business, but also proved that the possession of moderate talents, prudently and industriously employed, is at certain epochs a sufficient equipment for a respectable Secretary of State.

Matthews' immediate predecessor was Mr. Childers—recognised as an appointment by a Prime Minister in difficulties. Childers had grown weary under the demands of Mr. Gladstone that he should occupy at intervals nearly every office in a Liberal Administration, and had sunk at last into the rôle of an amiable caretaker. His principal achievements during the few months of his term at the Home Department had been to reduce for party purposes the purchase price of British nationality to a nominal sum and to make some enquiries into the conduct of the police, who had suffered a riotous mob to pillage the West End of London. He realised, however, that he had reached his last official milestone, and wisely determined that no unnecessary business should disturb the tranquil end of his political journey.

Such were the statesmen whom Matthews followed. Unlike

him they were of the orthodox pattern. They understood every move in the political game and the occult science of political values. To them the advance of a colleague in public favour was only less interesting than his decline. They were adepts in all the mysteries of the House of Commons, and were as familiar with the work and methods of a Government Office as he was with the law and practice of the Courts of Justice. Politicians and Civil Servants alike awaited the advent of the new Minister with interest and curiosity.

Without any previous initiation into the work of a State Department, Matthews had necessarily to learn even the rudimentary parts of the machinery of his new post. Very wisely he retained the services of a Private Secretary whom he found ready to his hand. This gentleman* was an admirable mentor. He had won his spurs on the staff of Sir William Harcourt—a Chief always attracted by scholarship, good breeding and social claims—and with Cross and Childers had acquired an influence at once powerful and sagacious. Nevertheless, Matthews *in statu pupillari* was not easy. He listened patiently enough to instructions as to the correct formula for addressing the Queen, and as to the formalities to be observed in dealing with routine business. He saw, however, no reason why he should attach his signature to a file of papers which he had not read. If a painstaking clerk had recorded a statement of the law according to the Home Office, Matthews in peremptory tones would call for the Statute. Some Ministers find the preparation of Parliamentary answers to questions anxious and embarrassing. Goschen at the Admiralty used to complain that in the Session his whole morning was wasted over this work. On the other hand, an adroit and confident Minister has been known on arriving at the House of Commons to glance at his questions for the first time on the Order paper, and then to parry his questioners with dexterous ease and to disarm them with exquisite humour. At the Home Office it was the custom for the Private Secretary to prepare the draft answers to questions and to submit them to the Secretary of State. Matthews would seize upon these drafts. Rapidly reading all the official data on which they were

* Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise, K.C.B., since 1895 the distinguished and enlightened Chairman of the Prisons Commission.

ounded he would set to work to arrange the replies with as much verbal precision as if he were settling a set of answers to interrogatories in his Chambers at the Temple. Hardly anything would remain of the Private Secretary's original labours, and the proud and competent author would find himself turned into a mere copyist, racing to finish his appointed task in time for the meeting of the House of Commons.

No record, however brief, of Matthews in office can omit the name of the man who during his term held the post of Permanent Under Secretary of State. Sir Godfrey Lushington * was a Civil Servant of remarkable parts. He was a scholar and a thinker: a man of finished tastes and erudition. And yet he so bestowed himself upon the work of the Department that the threads of all current business were in his hands. The officer of each branch knew well that any error of substance would certainly be corrected by Lushington before the file of papers reached the Secretary of State. His capacity for work was enormous. In criminal cases of importance and complexity, he would write with his own hand the most exhaustive summaries and analyses of vast masses of evidence. In the preparation of departmental bills the draughtsmen would have their labours reduced to the mere technical exercise of their barbarous craft owing to the wealth of material provided by Lushington. Notwithstanding, he was never in arrears with the day to day work for which the permanent head of an office is responsible. In a crisis he was invaluable. He wrote, he enquired, he suggested: he called all the resources of the Office to the Minister's aid. It is true that Matthews and he had but little in common, and except in official hours they rarely met. But the Home Secretary fully recognised the value of Lushington's encyclopædic work and his untiring and unselfish devotion to the service of the Office and its representative in Parliament.

The internal economy of the Home Office was a sealed book to Matthews. The apparatus of a Civil Establishment did not interest him. He had constantly to be reminded even of the names of the heads of departments and the initials of the mute inglorious clerks which were appended to laborious memoranda or perfunctory minutes conveyed nothing to his

* Sir Godfrey Lushington, G.C.M.G., Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Home [illegible]

mind. Nor did he understand the aspirations and expectations of official gentlemen who, having persevered in the regular exercise of obscure virtues, look forward with a personal interest to the celebration of the Royal birthday; and, therefore, when the Prime Minister occasionally ignored his formal recommendation of appointments to the Order of the Bath, he would submit without protest.

No Minister was more punctual in his daily attendance nor spent more hours in that spacious and gloomy room overlooking the melancholy quadrangle—a room which Harcourt once described as like a waiting room at a railway station. He very rarely ordered despatch boxes to his own house. "A nice quiet gentleman," observed the old office keeper, "but not so nice as Mr. Lowe: * *he* never rang his bell!"

Matthews was no less attentive to the claims of the House of Commons. He was always in his place on the Bench in ample time for Questions or for any debate in which he was personally concerned. Those were anxious times for the Government. The birth of the Unionist alliance had not then been followed by the baptism of office and the required majority was often precarious. In contrast to the slack habits of Ministers in these degenerate days of shorter sittings and earlier hours, members of the Administration were obliged to be in unbroken attendance whenever Government business was on the Order paper, and to dine within hearing of the Division bells, unless they were specially excused. Matthews had a good record with the Whips.

His first speech was not a success. He failed to gain the interest or the attention of the House. Indeed, Mr. Gladstone left the Opposition Bench while he was speaking, though Matthews with a dramatic movement and a personal reference vainly endeavoured to stay his departing steps. It must be confessed that the Home Secretary's manner in debates was not always felicitous. His gestures seemed studied: his demeanour elaborate. Although possessed of a copious and effective vocabulary, his style was judged to be artificial and pedantic, and his pose in speaking affected and foppish. While he had qualities distinguished in their separate merits they were seldom combined in his Parliamentary speeches. His great deficiency was a want of simplicity. He would overload a plain case with reasoning too subtle and

* Mr. Lowe, afterwards Viscount Sherbrooke, Home Secretary, 1873–74.

arguments too specious, diverting enough to his critics, but often disconcerting to his friends. He would attract an admirer below the gangway, but he was an anxiety to the Whip.

At the same time there were occasions when his real ability as a speaker shone out. His defence of his decision to accept the resignation of the Commissioner of Metropolitan Police was a conspicuous success. He met a House deeply prejudiced against himself and he knew the result of the debate was anticipated with some alarm. Sir William Harcourt led the attack with all the pomp and circumstance of a vote of censure. But Matthews was at his best. He marshalled his facts and arranged his arguments with the skill of the consummate advocate that he was. Avoiding the error of attacking the intractable officer, he enabled his audience to see for themselves that the Commissioner's contention could not possibly be sustained. "These adamantine natures," he flung out with a gesture in his closing sentences, "find it difficult to obey the will of Parliament." When he sat down he had convinced his friends and overthrown his enemies.

Again, on a Private Member's day when, as a member of the Government, he had been deputed to take charge of a debate on some more or less academic subject, he would deliver a speech abounding in the happiest analogies and most refined distinctions. In a thin House—the Press are not interested in these discussions—drawing upon the stores of his varied learning, he would quote Tacitus with the complete approval of an Assembly which always professes enjoyment of a language it does not understand, and he would indulge in a *plaisanterie* which his professional friends had long learnt to suffer and admire.

He was curiously ineffective in a set debate, exhibiting almost the inexperience of an amateur. He seemed unable to arm himself with the materials for general controversy or with the weapons of confident and reckless assertion which are thought necessary for the defence of a Government under fire.* H

* There is a passage in one of Gibbon's letters to his father (1760) which conveys the same idea. He writes in regard to his disinclination to adopt a Parliamentary career: "I even want the necessary prejudices of party and of nation. In popular Assemblies it is often necessary to inspire them; and never orator inspired well a passion which he did not feel himself."

when it came to the task of exegesis, when the particulars of a long and complicated departmental measure had to be expounded to the House, no Minister was more lucid, none more accurate. In Committee he was adroit; his legal eye at once saw the flaw in an improvised amendment; he could always maintain his ground by reason of his mastery of his subject and his command of detail.

In any criticism of Matthews' official career it must be remembered that from the earliest days of his appointment he was the target of gross political attack. While Mr. Gladstone and the leading members of the Opposition concentrated all their powers on wrecking the Irish Administration, gentlemen of less authority but of equal perversity, led by Labouchere and inspired by Stead, devoted themselves to the overthrow of the Secretary of State. On the most frivolous grounds they challenged the conduct of the Metropolitan Police; they questioned the authority of the Courts of Law, they impugned the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. In all these encounters Matthews was the defendant. Over the case of Miss Cass * he was worsted. The Government was defeated and he resigned. Rightly measuring the circumstances which accounted for the defeat, the Prime Minister maintained his colleague in office. Matthews had failed because he had no experience of the House of Commons in a sentimental mood. When members of that Chamber masquerade as champions in the cause of injured innocence, party ties are wont to relax and the position of the executive becomes endangered. Nor was Matthews aware that the House is always at its worst when it is vainly endeavouring to assume judicial functions. He opposed the motion with a correct statement of the magistrate's discretion and his own powers. He declined to be a passenger on the line of least resistance. As a lawyer he knew that his legal and official contention was well founded, and therefore he refused to bend

* In July 1887 a young woman, Miss Cass, was arrested by a Metropolitan Police constable. The magistrate, although he expressed his belief in the constable's evidence, decided to discharge her. The case was brought before the House of Commons on a motion for the adjournment, and the Home Secretary was pressed to order an inquiry. This he refused to do, and the motion was carried against the Government by 173 to 97.

to the passions of his opponents or the suggestions of his friends. It would have been well had he been heeded, for the House of Commons did but little service to its client and still less to its own reputation. Matthews was blamed for obstinacy and pedantic scrupulosity. It may be that his management of the affair was neither contrived with dexterity nor conducted with tact; but the impartial historian of the future will pass on him a lighter judgment than he will on the present Secretary of State who recently * despatched to a northern city a Metropolitan Police Magistrate of pliant mind and slight experience—there to re-try without semblance of judicial authority a case which had been adequately and properly dealt with by the local magistrates, but whose decision, unimpeachable though it was, involved consequences inconvenient to his Majesty's Government and their political connection.

In the days before the establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal the responsibility of advising the Crown on the exercise of the prerogative of mercy was of peculiar gravity, and in capital cases the burden pressed heavily upon the Secretary of State. It was the fashion among his more unscrupulous political opponents to represent Matthews as being as callously indifferent to the fate of a prisoner lying under sentence of death as a hanging judge of the seventeenth century and "as hard as the marble chimney pieces of Whitehall." Questions poised with malignant and plausible precision were directed against him and the powers of a shameless Press were employed to inflame public opinion to his detriment and embarrassment. Little did his detractors know—little, perhaps, they cared. The true character and disposition of the Minister are revealed in such sentences as these: "The . . . case has already caused me much mental agony. It is dreadful to hang both these men and yet I see no ground for mercy."†

To the close examination of all the circumstances of these criminal cases Matthews applied his time and abilities unsparingly. It is the custom for the Home Secretary to invite the aid and counsel of the learned judge by whom the offender has been tried. At these conferences the Minister seemed to rival, if not to surpass

* December 1912. Case of Knox and the North Eastern Railway.

† Extract from a letter to an official at the Home Office in [illegible].

the judge in his minute acquaintance with every incident of the trial and in his acute reflections upon the bearing of the evidence. Probably no one in his situation has ever shown a greater familiarity with the esoteric parts of the science of criminal jurisprudence or with the practice of the law administered in the Crown Courts.

In the last years of the Government the tide certainly turned in Matthews' favour. The clamour of Opposition critics died down. Public confidence in his ability and judicial fairness was confirmed, and even those who had displayed the utmost prejudice against him gave belated testimony to the impartiality and soundness of his recommendations in matters of clemency, the granting of which, in the language of Blackstone, is the most amiable prerogative of the Sovereign.

It is well to record that Matthews never abused his powers as a Minister of the Crown. Patronage was distasteful to him. He would groan over a long list of applicants for place. He would complain bitterly of the immodesty of personal applications and of the insincerity of multiplied testimonials. At the same time he always exercised his duties of appointment after a most careful examination of individual claims and with a scrupulous regard to the interests of the public service. Having but formal reverence for party ties, he had none of the instincts or temptations of a jobber. Any reference to political merits was more calculated to prejudice than to advance the fortunes of a candidate. He had, of course, special opportunities for ascertaining the professional qualifications of gentlemen eligible for those legal appointments which fall to the Secretary of State, and London owes to him the distinguished names of Sir John Dickinson, Mr. Horace Smith and Mr. George Denman, who still have jurisdiction on the Metropolitan Bench of Magistrates.

If Matthews was indisposed to yield to party pressure in regard to matters of patronage, still less did he allow his official conduct to be influenced by such considerations. This inflexibility, doubtless, did not add to his popularity with Parliamentary personages who consider that a Minister is merely the trustee of their personal and transient interests in their constituencies. On one occasion Matthews was persuaded by his colleagues to sanction a respite in a case about which the public mind was at

the moment deeply perturbed. The original sentence, however, was ultimately carried out and his decision was amply vindicated. Grave and correct indeed does his official behaviour appear beside a recent transaction. A Chancellor of the Exchequer in search of a peroration for a platform speech obtained from the Home Secretary the release of a notorious gaol bird.* Not a fraction of excuse existed for the exercise of clemency. Of course, the Minister turned to the cheapest political account the material so graciously supplied for his shallow rhetoric, while the astonished prisoner, having served his purpose, soon afterwards resumed his career of crime and his life in prison. It is not easy to imagine such an overture being made to Matthews by a colleague, however distinguished, or indeed by any one else. If *per impossibile* he had entertained the idea of thus prostituting his high office and violating the traditions of the most ancient department of the State he would have done so at the cost of the Permanent Under Secretary of the day. Sir Godfrey Lushington would have instantly resigned. That distinguished official had a due conception of his position in the public service and never confused his functions with those of a Chief Clerk.

Examples might be quoted of Ministers whose office labours are small compared with their output of speech. Occupied with the affairs of their party or with the study of some new propaganda, they are content to leave to their staff a large discretion in dealing with questions, even the most serious, which have to pass through the departmental machine. In an office thus administered decisions of moment are promulgated with little more than the hasty signature of the Parliamentary Chief. On the other hand, there are Ministers who take a different view of their responsibilities and whose influence is felt and whose opinions are stated in regard to all the more important subjects which engage the activities of their subordinates. Matthews belonged

* Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Lloyd George visited Dartmoor in 1910. There they found an old man—David Davies—who had spent thirty-three years of his life in prison, and was then undergoing a sentence for the mean offence of robbing a church. He was at once released in order that he might figure in a speech which Mr. George had to deliver at Mile End. Shortly after his release he was again convicted of stealing, but by that time he had ceased to interest the Chancellor of the Exchequer or to be anything but a Parliamentary embarrassment to the Secretary of State.

to the latter category. He was a rapid reader and an indefatigable worker. His daily tasks might be uncongenial to him; he might at times deplore the methods of office business or the artless efforts of clerks endeavouring to construe a statute or to state a proposition of law. But the end of the day saw his pile of boxes ready for the messenger. Few Ministers have dealt more ably or more exhaustively with the papers of an office, or have with their own hand addressed more informing memoranda to their colleagues of the Cabinet. Matthews wrote fully yet without prolixity. He never attempted the colloquial brevity of Palmerston's famous minute, "Sorry I can't," but he left among the records of the department a body of opinions and decisions which are admirable specimens of luminous and effective composition.

Of Matthews in office little more remains to be said. Let it be repeated that he joined the Government with a reputation already made. Although in years he was well past the *mezzo termine* of life, he was known to be brilliant, ingenious, versatile and ardent. To a cultivation extending over a wide field of English and foreign literature, he united a familiarity with several of the spoken languages of Europe, a gift as rare as veracity among the Ministers of to-day. "Where is the Home Secretary?" enquired an illustrious person; "he was talking French at dinner like a Parisian." "Sir," replied the equerry, "I heard him a moment ago discoursing on the roots of the Roumanian language with the Roumanian Minister."

The emoluments of office were nothing to him. He had an ample fortune, and as a bachelor he was not embarrassed by domestic anxieties or the ambitions of a family circle.

How then is it that Matthews, although his tenure of office was honourable and meritorious and maintained under conditions of exceptional difficulty, has never been accounted a successful Minister of the Crown? The answer is two-fold. In the first place, it soon became evident that he had no political *flair*. He was never in touch with the active spirits of his party in the lobby or with its organisation outside. He was a secluded figure. His ability was known; his integrity respected; but to the party at large he seemed cold and indifferent. His speech in the House might be to the point and an admirable presentment of the official case; but it never rang with a note that

encouraged or an intensity that inspired. The gift of political popularity is subtle. He failed to acquire it.

In the second place, there is no doubt but that the animation of his natural gifts and the energy which had distinguished him in his profession were gradually stifled in the oppressive atmosphere of official life. He once observed to a friend that he had been much disappointed with the occupation of a Minister. He had believed that having accepted office he would find himself at a Council table debating important affairs of State and issues affecting the permanent welfare of the Empire. He never thought that the time of a British Cabinet would often be taken up with meticulous questions and trifling controversies. He would recall the boredom of listening to a colleague explaining the details of some Parliamentary project which had been imperfectly collected from the draughtsman. He would report with unaffected indifference, though to the chagrin of his staff, a decision to prefer the claims of a Department, less qualified than his own, to be responsible for some useful but dreary domestic measure; while he professed no interest in discussions in which the apprehensions of a Whip were allowed to prevail over the merits of a considerable proposal. Again, he had not conjectured that the working day of a Secretary of State might be spent in reviewing the irregularities of a Police Officer, the proceedings of a Court of Summary Jurisdiction, or some trivial and stupid difference with a subordinate department.

Hence there were occasions when he would fain contrast the attractions and the importance of the profession he had abandoned with the tedium of official business and the treadmill of the House of Commons. He sighed for his triumphs at *Nisi Prius* and the lively causerie of the Circuit Mess. And so as time went on he sorrowfully realised that he had unwisely cast in his lot with those who are content to relinquish liberal studies and the pleasures of polite society in order that they may endure that official and Parliamentary servitude which is the price of power, place and patronage.

The Prime Minister was not wise in proposing office, nor was Matthews in accepting it. He was in his sixty-first year when he received the seals. The experiment of transplanting a man of that age from the pursuit of a life-time to a calling in which

he had served no apprenticeship was hardly likely to be successful. In political service discouragement follows at regular intervals and labour seems often fruitless; but a flagging spirit may be cheered if there be some hope of harvest from daily exertion. To Matthews no such consolation ever came to soothe his hour of solitude and reverie or to calm the reflections of his despondent mind.

Once in the early days of office he was informed of the result of a by-election which involved the loss of a seat to the Government. "Ah, well," he observed, looking up from a set of papers, "that hastens the blessed day of my *nunc dimittis*." He was not, however, destined to see that day until the full term of Lord Salisbury's Administration had expired, and then his departure was in peace. He had reached "port after stormie seas." He left the Home Office one August afternoon knowing well that he would never again be called upon to join a Government and wear its livery. Nor did he repine. He had indeed no wish to renew the trials and vexations of public life. Three years later, when the Queen once more had recourse to Lord Salisbury, his services were recognised with a peerage, and he accepted the conventional Viscounty with the title which now obscures his name.

A. P. S.

FORTY YEARS OF DISESTABLISHMENT

The Bill for the Disestablishment of the Church in Wales is very likely, we are told, to be placed on the Statute Book within a short period. The moment, then, is one at which it may be worth while to consider what the effects of Disestablishment and Disendowment have been in Ireland, where the Church was separated from the State in 1869. History is easier to write than prophecy, or at any rate it is easier to test its accuracy. And a brief historical survey of what has actually happened in Ireland may be more useful than a prediction of what will probably happen in Wales.

Many changes have come over the Church in Ireland during the last forty years, both for the better and for the worse, for which the Act of Disestablishment cannot be held responsible. For instance, the standard of ministerial efficiency is certainly higher than it used to be. The easygoing ways of the sixties would not be tolerated now by clergy or laity. Organisations have been multiplied; parochial machinery, at any rate in the towns, has become more complex; the number of church services has been increased, and a clergyman is expected to play a principal part in many laudable enterprises, philanthropic and missionary, which he might have neglected without comment from his neighbours in the middle of Queen Victoria's reign. But this increased bustle and stir is not due to Disestablishment. It may be observed even more readily in the Church of England, which is still established. It may be observed among Nonconformists, who have never been "established." It is due to a quickening of the ecclesiastical conscience, of which there are many other indications. So when we are told, as we Irish folk often are, that the Church displays more vigorous signs of life than it used to do before Disestablishment, we are glad to hear it, but we know that the change was not caused by the Act of 1869.

So, on the other hand, it would be quite unreasonable to charge that momentous piece of legislation with the lamentable fact that candidates for the sacred ministry are not quite of the same social position as they used to be. The same thing may be noticed, I believe, on the eastern side of St. George's Channel. Nor is it the fault of Disestablishment that the members of the Irish Church are fewer in number than formerly. The whole population of Ireland has been rapidly diminishing, for economic reasons, during the last seventy years, and Disestablishment has not affected at all the rate of diminution. In 1871 the total population of the country was 5,400,000; in 1911 it was only 4,390,000. It had diminished by one-fifth, and it is still diminishing. Nearly 31,000 emigrants left our shores in 1913, and they were mainly young and enterprising men and women whom we could ill afford to spare. In this loss, the Church of Ireland has shared. We had 668,000 souls in 1871; we had only 576,600 in 1911. Not quite so many of our people have emigrated as of our Roman Catholic fellow countrymen, partly because the land-owning and well-to-do classes have less temptation to go away, but the proportional difference is very small. This is the saddest feature in Irish life at the present moment, but the leakage is not due to Disestablishment.

What then are the gains and losses which Disestablishment has brought us? To begin with the gains. I believe that they are to be reckoned under two heads.

First, we have been able to enlist the co-operation of our lay members in active Church work, after a fashion that has not yet been exhibited on any large scale in England. The blow which fell upon the Church of Ireland in 1869 called forth, in a remarkable degree, the latent affection of our people for the Church of their fathers, and in drawing up our new constitution, a large place was wisely given to the lay people, who are members of the Church equally with the clergy. Our financial administration is mainly in the hands of laymen, who spare neither time nor labour to husband the Church's funds, to invest them safely and to encourage others to give, by generous example, no less than by personal appeal. The moneys contributed from voluntary sources, that is the free will offerings of Church folk since 1870 exclusive altogether of the capital provided in the Act to com-

orders of chivalry which has no Christian sanctions. The orders of the Garter and the Thistle, of the Bath, and of St. Michael and St. George have their chapels, and the formal installation of the Knights is a Christian ceremony. So it used to be with the Order of St. Patrick, and no Roman Catholic Knight found that his conscience was hurt by the placing of his banner in St. Patrick's Cathedral. Yet it was ordered as a corollary of the Act of Disestablishment, that this should cease in 1871, and we are now presented with the curious anomaly of a non-Christian order of chivalry in a Christian country. It is not a *necessary* consequence of Disestablishment, and there does not seem to be any good reason why the Christian sanctions of the Order should not be revived. But the point is that in the minds of the statesmen of 1871 they were abandoned, to the detriment of the public dignity of the Christian religion in Ireland. That is certainly a loss—not to the Church, but to the nation.

Or, again. The great Christian service of the Hallowing and Coronation of the King is recognised throughout England and the Empire as a national act, although the Established Church does not command the allegiance of multitudes of the King's subjects. It is good for the nation that it should, at such a moment, be able to join unitedly in the prayer, "God save the King." Nothing of the kind is possible where the Church is disestablished, as it is in Ireland. Nor is it adequate to say, in reply, as has been said in papers like the *Liberator*, that the nation in Ireland could not be expected to join collectively in the services of a church only representing a fraction of the population. It is not because the Irish Church is small in numbers that it cannot organise a national service of rejoicing on the day of Coronation or a national service of penitence and grief when the nation is in sorrow. It is because it is disestablished. When "religious equality" has been secured after the Irish fashion, no religious body, great or small, can claim to speak for the whole, with the result that there can be no national worship of any kind. And if the evil day (*absit omen!*) should come when the Church of England is disestablished, then the Coronation of the King—if precedents have any meaning or history any significance—must cease to be a Christian rite.

Or, once more, and now I only put a question. The Imperial Parliament is opened at Westminster every day with Christian

prayers. Will anybody doubt that it is good for the nation that this should be so, although many members of the House of Commons and also of the House of Lords do not belong to the Church of England? It looks as if an effort were to be made to set up a Parliament in Dublin. Would its proceedings be opened with prayers? If so, who is to be the officiating minister? And if not opened with prayers, is it not clear that the tendency would be to divorce public business from Christian sanctions, more completely than before? When religion is put into a corner, or only taken out on Sundays, the ordinary man is apt to think that it is not really of very much consequence, in relation to the important affairs of daily life.

Such considerations are often overlooked by those who have no practical experience of public life in a country where there is no Established Church. The amount of vital religion that is represented by public, official, acts of worship such as I have mentioned, may not be very great. I do not know, nor could I measure it. But I am sure that the elimination of all recognition of the Christian Faith from the corporate life of the nation makes for secularism. This is a grave thing, and it is inevitable when the Church is "disestablished."

In regard to the Church itself, Disestablishment has brought some serious dangers with it. One of the most obvious is the danger of narrowing the horizon of the Church's sympathies. I call it a danger, although I am aware that some people think it to be an advantage. At any rate, the point is that a "Free" Church is by no means as free, in regard to the liberty accorded to its ministers, as the Established Church of England is at this moment. It is just because the Church of England is not "free" that it can afford to be so comprehensive. Archbishop Temple once said that "the connection with the State compels an amount of toleration which could not otherwise be maintained." That is a maxim which experience has abundantly verified in Ireland. The discipline of a "Free Church" must be stricter than the discipline of a Church upon which every citizen has a claim. It is not merely in regard to matters of ceremonial, or what is erroneously called "ritual," that this holds, although even in matters of ceremonial it is not wise to insist on a too rigid uniformity, if the Church is to embrace men of different temperaments and sympathies. But the tendency of a too closely defined system

of formularies is to limit freedom of speech, and in the end to check freedom of thought among the Church's ministers. I have no sympathy with the claim that an officer of the Church is entitled to interpret its creeds in any way that he pleases—a claim, I may add, that has not been put forward by our Irish clergy; but it is plain matter of fact that the limits of "loyalty" are much more strictly defined with us than under the Establishment. And there is always a danger that the bonds of discipline may be made so tight that they may choke the individuality and stifle the independence of faithful men. It is not a good thing that all clergymen should be forced into one mould, and turned out as like each to the other, as two peas. Yet that is the tendency—although happily it has not yet prevailed with us—of democratic discipline in a "Free" Church.

What I have in my mind, in short, is the fact that in Ireland under Disestablishment we could not possibly have such divergences of opinion among the members of the Church as is to be observed in England. I have often said this to English friends, and added that if Disestablishment came upon them, they would find it very difficult to maintain the coherence in one body of such widely different schools of thought. But my friends have always been confident that *their* school of thought, whatever it was, would prevail and oust the others, which seemed to be a comforting reflection. Yet that would involve the narrowing of the sympathies of the Church of England.

Another matter which will have to be pondered, if Disestablishment comes in Wales or in England will be the matter of patronage. Opinions differ as to the success of the canons which regulate this in the Irish Church. Ours is a democratic system, and if it has the advantages which democracy enjoys, it has also the defects of its qualities. It tends to give the control of patronage, sometimes, to men whose horizon is extremely limited, and who have little knowledge of Church life beyond the borders of their own parish. But a more serious defect is that it is increasingly difficult to provide for clergy who have not got "popular" gifts. A quiet, scholarly, man, with a love for pastoral work, may do excellent work in a rural parish, even though he be a dull preacher and unable to play golf. Yet the uniformity of our system of patronage, by which all the power is put into the hands of a Board [illegible], gives him little chance of preferment. With a

the anomalies of patronage under the Establishment, it is not certain that it does not work better than our rigid democratic system. And if the Church in Wales has to formulate new rules for appointment to benefices in the future, it will be worth considering whether some patronage should not be reserved for Cathedral Chapters, and even for the Bishops who are not less likely to appreciate duly the merits of their clergy than popular Boards of Nomination are. *Variety* of patronage is good for the Church, and this we have lost in Ireland.

Closely connected with this, is the importance of preserving the independence of the clergy. The tendency of democracy is to cripple this independence, and although we have still among us brave and strong men who are not afraid to speak their minds and to espouse unpopular causes, the task of leadership is made harder for a parish clergyman, when to provoke the hostility even of a small faction may bar his advancement and injure his work. A "Free" Church is not as "free" for the clergy as a national church is.

So much for Disestablishment, and I go on to consider Disendowment, the effects of which are easier to measure. The Act of 1869 secured the existing life interests of all ecclesiastical persons, and was not ungenerous in its terms. Nearly all the annuitants have passed away, and out of the seven and a half millions handed over to secure their incomes, there remain a couple of millions. In other words, the State secured fully the interests of all the clergy who were serving in 1869, and by prudent husbandry of the capital sum handed over for this purpose, the Church has saved something over £2,000,000. But all through these forty years our people have been making gifts for the Church's support, and, as I said on an earlier page, the savings from these gifts amounts to nearly £7,000,000. That is not State money. It is our own money, and this should be understood. Altogether the capital of the Church of Ireland now amounts to about nine millions, a large part of which is held on special trusts for special localities. That is, of course, quite a small sum, and inadequate for its purpose, although it is matter for thankfulness that we have been able to gather so much during years of prosperity. The financial consequences of the Disendowment of 1869 have been so gravely misrepresented, that some plain figures may be useful. In 1871 we had 2082 clergy serving in Ireland. That was

an unnecessarily large number for the population, and a small reduction would have done no harm. But, in fact, we have been obliged to dispense with the services of too many of them. In 1911 we were only able to support 1463 clergy, which means that for every three parochial clergy at work in 1871 we have only two at work now. Is not that quite enough, some one may ask? The Church population is small, and one priest to every 400 people ought to be sufficient. But those who speak thus forget that the area which a clergyman can effectively supervise cannot be increased in size indefinitely. We have had to create many parochial unions by uniting parishes to neighbouring parishes. But that process cannot be continued beyond a certain point. I know of a case (it is not singular) where a clergyman has to travel twenty miles every Sunday, and to hold service in four different places, there being one service in each place. It is true that the congregations are small, but that does not make his work any lighter. And most of the rural clergy have to serve two churches, situated some miles apart. That is what is necessitated by the diminution of the number of the clergy and the consequent amalgamation of parishes. A church which maintains the parochial system and has a spiritual agent in every parish in the land needs a larger number of ministers than a church which is content with sending agents wherever they are specially needed and there only. And so the first effect of Disendowment has been that many of our parochial districts are now too large, except for strong young men, and that it is often exceedingly difficult for the aged and the infirm to attend public worship in country places, the distances which they have to travel being prohibitive.

A second consequence of Disendowment is the inevitable reduction of clerical incomes, and the corresponding impoverishment of the clergy. I see that a statement has been made in a Liberationist paper to the effect that in Ireland "the clergy are better paid to-day than ever they were." One rubs one's eyes to make sure that there is no misprint. Presumably the writer means that we have taken care, in our modest financial arrangements, to secure a living wage for every beneficed clergyman. We have no "livings" of £80 or £60 a year, such as there were before Disestablishment. The cases are rare in which an incumbent does not receive £200 a year, although there may be heavy de-

[illegible] for glebe charges from this. But then, the cases are also rare where an incumbent receives more than £300. There are very few "good" livings. And to assert that the clergy, on the average, are better off than before 1871 is to assert what is, unhappily, not in accordance with the facts. The "dignified" clergy are often very poor, and it is not in the interests of the Church that it should be so. But this really need not be laboured. The effect of the Act of 1869 upon the incomes of the clergy has been that they have been, necessarily, very much diminished.

If the case of the Irish Church, then, is to be taken as illustrating what will probably happen should the Church be disestablished and disendowed in Wales or in England, it is likely that its spoliation would elicit a generous measure of practical sympathy from many lay people who do not, at present, show any special interest in the Church's progress. Their co-operation would be indispensable. The Church will be impoverished in even a more serious fashion than the Church of Ireland has been, because the provisions of the Bill for guarding vested interests are not so complete. And there is reason to fear that the Disendowment of the Church in Wales will bring greater disaster than in Ireland, because in Wales the population is increasing, whereas in Ireland it is diminishing. This is a point which has not received adequate attention, as it seems to me, in the forecasts that have been made.

The case of Ireland really provides no parallel. We were able to reduce the number of our clergy to a considerable extent ([illegible] have, in fact, been obliged to reduce the number too far), because we had to do with a dwindling population. Had the population of Ireland been increasing ever since 1871, and the number of members of the Church increasing in proportion, [illegible] disaster caused by disendowment would have been of a most [illegible] kind. We could not have maintained a sufficient number [illegible] clergy to provide for the needs of the people. What saved [illegible] situation, humanly speaking, was that our numbers were [illegible] less.

[illegible] me forestall a possible reply to these considerations. It [illegible] said that had there been no emigration, we should have [illegible] people and therefore would have had a larger number [illegible] to our Church funds, so that we would have had [illegible]

nger resources at our disposal. It is forgotten by those who se such an argument that the members whom we lost by emigration were generally the poorest of our people, who could never in any circumstances have contributed substantially to the Church's support. We should gladly and thankfully have undertaken the burden of providing the ministrations of religion for these, and have rejoiced to be permitted to do our best for them, but it is a plain matter of fact that their departure made the financial problem easier for those who were left, grievous as it was to us all as Irishmen and as Churchmen to know that so many were leaving our ranks. Now, in this aspect of the matter, there is no parallel between the Irish Church of 1871 and the Welsh Church of 1914.

The Welsh Church is increasing in the number of its adherents, as the great coal-fields of Wales are providing employment for a larger population than formerly. The demands upon the ministers of the Welsh Church may be expected to be greater and more numerous in the future than they have been in the past, and to suppose that in these circumstances the reduction in the number of the Welsh clergy (inevitable if the Irish case is to be taken as providing a precedent) will not be attended by a diminished spiritual efficiency, is to show oneself very ignorant of the conditions of parochial work in country districts.

I have written this plain statement because some who are wholly unacquainted with the conditions of our Church life in Ireland have taken upon themselves to represent the effects, not only of Disestablishment but of Disendowment in Ireland as altogether admirable and beneficial to our spiritual efficiency. We do not complain about Disestablishment or Disendowment now. We have long ceased to complain. We are prepared to do our own work for God and the Church as best we can by the aid of the free will offerings of our own people. But to say that we could not do it better, if we could pay our clergy better is absurd, and to predict that the growing and thriving Welsh Church will not suffer by the sudden withdrawal of its ancient endowments is to predict something that our forty years experience forbids us to believe.

JOHN OSSORY

DEMOCRACY'S DANCING DERVISHES

There is a kind of political affectation which is as hard to bear with patience as the snuffling piety of the Stiggins School. And yet it is not entirely an affectation either. There are many who believe honestly that the decision of all matters by the counting of votes is a divine ordinance, fit to be applied to all people, and not to be resisted without mortal sin.

Each age has its own superstitions. We look back now with disdainful pity upon the belief in the divine right of kings. A future age will smile with equal contempt upon the belief in the unfailing rightness of majorities. We point out with superior wisdom the flaws in government by an hereditary caste (aristocracy). Our descendants will see no less clearly the weakness and deceptions of Democracy. When President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, and the present Liberal party in England, come to be judged by History, they will be considered strangely credulous. The President's enslavement by the fetish of representative government, and the Party's bigoted insistence that a smaller number ought always to submit to whatever a greater number desire, will be quoted as examples of the power of words [illegible] formulæ to fetter the free play of the mind.

Happily both of these degrading superstitions are in process [illegible] receiving heavy blows. Let us take our home event first. [illegible] smart shocks have been lately given to the somnambulists [illegible] held, or affected to hold, that the nature of man had been [illegible] in the direction of docility and social self-repression. [illegible] becoming difficult to suppose, so thick was the poisonous [illegible] democratic theory, that any part of the community would [illegible] take up arms against what it conceived to be an in[illegible] upon its liberties by another part. We were slipping [illegible] pusillanimous acceptance of the notion that the smaller

number must in all circumstances submit to the greater number, no matter how it might fear for its material welfare, no matter how it shrank from changes which the greater number desired.

To that notion Ulster has opposed a far older and far healthier conception of polity. Out of the slumber of flabby idealism we have awakened to realities. We have learnt that there are interests deemed so vital as to cause men to decline surrendering them, even though they should be forced to fight for their preservation. To most of us, to Liberals especially, that appeared at first (we are now grown accustomed to it) an impossibility. The Ulster arming was derided. We refused to be "frighted by false fire." When the fire was found to be not false but true, the Liberal cry was one of anger. These good Liberals know that men in the past have died for their opinions, and they praise them for it—but that was in the past. "Besides," they say, "it was noble and just to resist the pretensions of kings." Speak to them of the pretensions of majorities and they stiffen with horror. That is blasphemy against their faith. Their minds are so warped by the superstition of Democracy that they cannot conceive of a majority being wrong.

Tell them that the machinery of franchise, elections, Parliament, law-making, is merely an expedient; a means, more or less clumsy, towards the regulation of existence as smoothly as may be. They fail to grasp the import of your words. They hold the system, stock, lock and barrel, to be a revelation. They regard it as an unfailing panacea, a universal Pink Pill to be prescribed in all cases of social disturbance, no matter what may be the patient's condition or antecedents. The author of the Eikon Basilike was not more deaf to reason than these Dancing Dervishes of Democracy.

All modes of government are makeshift. It is in the nature of man that they must be so. Ants and bees have systems perfectly adapted to their aims, and so might Man, if he could ever decide what his aims should be. When a community is fighting for existence, or when it lives in a simple state, compelled to produce or find all that it needs, the problem of government settles itself. In the one case the most cunning fighters come to the top and all willingly obey them. In the other case the law that "he who will not work neither shall he eat" suffices.

But as life becomes more complicated, as nations increase in numbers and cities in size, as groups composed of different races agree together for common ends of defence, so the adjustment of relations between man and man becomes more difficult. What ideals do men cherish in common? What creed could they recite in unison? What object are they agreed to pursue, as the bees their honey-making or the beavers the building of their dams? Now and again some shadowy sentiment unites them, but for the most part they are divided as much in thought as in action, no less by temperament than by differences of birth.

That form of government, then, is likely to be most lightly borne which leaves the rein loose upon the subject's neck. All doctrinal bindings, all schoolmasterly efforts to apply the same hard-and-fast system, willy-nilly, to all alike, are bound to cause fretting. The ruler, whether elected or born, who attempts to pass vast numbers through one machine, hoping that it will fit them all alike, is sure to fail, as Mr. Lloyd George failed with his hastily constructed giant of an Insurance Act, smooth and shiny on the outside, but rickety on its feet, and revealing amid the shoddy of its stuffing the ominous label "Made in Germany." A politician in a hurry will always incline towards measures of mechanical conformity, just as a regimental tailor would like to have all recruits cut down to an identical stature. The wise ruler will, on the contrary, look to the ends of ruling. He will consider the means unimportant save as they serve his purpose, that purpose being to secure to all the right of living as nearly as may be in the manner they would choose, and thereby to base the State upon a solid foundation of content. This can never be accomplished by trusting blindly that the smaller number, being out-voted, will always submit.

A Unionist Government (which should have known better) fell into that error when it provoked Free Churchmen into refusing to pay for the teaching in schools of a form of religion which they [illegible]. Their passive resistance was in my opinion entirely justified. No body of men have the right (no more than any one man has the right) to compel another body, or a single individual, to do something which they dislike doing, unless the doing of it be [illegible] for the security of all. No one can argue that the com-[illegible]y's existence depended then upon Free Churchmen paying

t Established Church teaching in schools, or that it depends ow upon Ulster submitting to the rule of a Dublin Parliament. t may be argued that it would be better for Ulster herself to let Home Rule be passed, but that is from the point. Even if you eel certain that a black draught would do me good, you must not force it down my throat. Even though you be convinced that it will benefit me to insure against sickness, you have no right to compel my employer to dock my wages every week. No, not even though it will benefit the community as well as me. For you cannot plead that the security of all is threatened if I go uninsured.

Whether Ulster is, whether the Free Churchmen were, reasonable in their objection to what the majority favoured (or appeared under our representative system to favour) does not matter. It is not reason which is in question, but liberty. Whenever you press men too hard in curtailment of their liberty they will, if they have any manliness left, appeal to force, which is the final sanction of all social arrangements. I dare say it may make very little difference in a hundred years time, so far as people's lives are affected, whether there is set up now one form of government, or two, in Ireland. But it would make a difference for thousands of years to the spirit of Man if a million Ulster folk consented to a change which they fear and detest just because three millions of Celtic Irish have voted for it. Every now and then there is reached a point in human relations at which the machinery set up to govern those relations breaks down. We then discover the makeshift character of that machinery. We then see the bare bones of the social structure. To many eyes the sight is so unexpected as to bewilder and alarm.

Wrapped in the soft, warm illusion that all violence was unlawful and impolite, soothed by the fable that Representative Government is the ideal, flawless system for which creation has groaned and travailed until now, all but a few had come to believe that there was in "the Government" some mysterious virtue (akin to that which once was claimed for kings) against which no resistance could be undertaken. Now it has been revealed by one of the vivid flashes of the Ulster storm that all government ultimately depend, for the ability to carry out their enactments upon the Army, and that if the Army declines to back them u

they have no power. One who knows well the people of Poplar and Canning Town (he is of them and among them) has told me that they were startled and puzzled by this revelation of the Army at the back of all political action, by this picture of the statesman relying in the last resort upon the soldier. My friend (a Socialist, by the way) did not discover any resentment against the Army for its unwillingness to be used in Ulster. But he said that the episode caused the whole situation, and the whole process of government, to appear in a new light.

A like *illumination* has come to thoughtful Americans. Their President, being a book-man, rather than one who has gained experience from the study of men at close range, propounded a theory. His theory was that revolutions in South and Central America could be cured by Democracy. No ruler in any Latin-American country will be recognised by the United States, said Mr. Wilson, unless he has been elected freely by the people in accordance with the principles of constitutional government. A system which works well in the United States must of necessity be good everywhere! He admitted no difference between Indians of Asiatic origin, untrained to conceive of any rule save such as imposed itself upon them by force, and Americans of European stock in whom centuries of striving after popular government have implanted the resolve to submit only to rulers chosen by themselves.

As well expect a plant that flourishes in rich soil and bracing air to grow on sand under tropical sunshine, as look for the same qualities in Eastern and Western races. In China, in Turkey, in Persia, the machinery of elections and free assemblies has been erected. (Loud Liberal cheers.) In each of these lands it has collapsed. Nowhere are more perfect paper constitutions to [illegible] found than in South and Central America. Lord Bryce, [illegible]ped in the superstition of Democracy, praised that of Chili [illegible] the model of all acts of government. It has one vice which [illegible] Bryce did not discover. It does not work. Mexico has a [illegible] constitution. But its wheels are moveless; and even were [illegible] set in motion, the result would not bring Mexico out of her [illegible]. If an honest election could be held, it would give the [illegible] Party by far the greatest number of seats in Parliament. [illegible] villages, in nearly all small towns, the priest is the only

instructed person—the only person, therefore, of authority among the uninstructed. What would be the effect? Even if the Catholic Party used its power well and governed peaceably, that issue would scarcely please American opinion. But this is a consummation scarcely to be hoped. Protest though they may that they are not "clerical," the Catholic leaders could not resist the weight of clerical influence behind them. Once more Mexico would be torn by religious struggles, worse than those of former days by reason of the new artisan middle class which has grown up, impatient of authority, hating the Church because it always takes the rich man's side. The civil war which has devastated a few districts would be as nothing to the religious war that would rage through all the land.

This was one of the sides of the Mexican problem which escaped President Wilson and his Foreign Minister, the portentous Mr. Bryan. I call him portentous, but he is not to my thinking a portent of ill. Intelligent Americans have, since Mr. Wilson went to the White House, perceived the illusion of believing representative government a growth which can be rapidly forced by the sprinkling of seed from above, instead of being produced, as it was in France and England, by slow under-the-surface spreading of roots and fibres through ages of preparation. But they have perceived not only this; they have learnt something beside the lesson that nations in varying stages of development require varying forms of rule. They have also begun to question another article of the Mob-ocratic Faith—the article which denies that the task of governing calls for a specially trained aptitude, which maintains that any one of fair ability can take part in the management of a nation's affairs, and which decrees that a man gifted with an unusual flow of wordy platitude or vituperation shall be promoted to high office.

In Washington a short while ago I talked on this topic with many thinking Americans. Some still hold that Mr. Bryan's good intentions outweigh his lack of expert knowledge. But several of them spoke in this wise: "Men like Bryan, though they may 'draw big money' on vaudeville circuits as golden-tongued orators, giving the half-educated a comfortable sense of mental repletion, are ridiculous and may be disastrous in charge of national interests. No captain of industry in

United States would put Mr. Bryan in any post of responsibility. No controller of a big business would hand over to him the conduct of difficult negotiations. Yet he was elevated, without audible protest from anybody, to a situation which calls for the widest knowledge, the nicest tact, the wariest walking, with national catastrophe as the penalty for mistaken judgment or feeble grasp. A headstrong President with a set of bookish maxims to guide him, and a Foreign Minister lacking not merely experience of his own, but also the modest willingness to benefit by that of others, have between them convinced us that there is some art and mystery in government after all." In that sense Mr. Bryan is a portent of better things.

All faiths, all principles, become dangerous when they are elevated to the rank of absolute truth. So soon as we forget that there cannot be anything stronger for us than comparative truth, we lose the balance of sane judgment. Religion is beautiful and consoling and valuable so long as people do not really believe in it. If ever they become as certain of Hell and Heaven as they are of Hyde Park or the Bank of England in Threadneedle Street, they are liable at any moment to turn religion into a maniac's dream. They will persecute with the best intentions. They will kill and torture in the firm belief that they are doing both God and their victims a service.

So with Democracy and all that it implies. Regard it as one of the methods by which men try to manage the difficult business of adjusting human relations, and it will work as well probably as any of the others. Turn it into a superstition, reverence it as the ark of the covenant, treat it as a perfect system with which there must be no tampering—allow it, in short, to become an end in itself instead of a means to an end, and you are certain to provoke a spirit which will lead to bloodletting. Why cannot we have suits of political colour cut more easily? Why must political arrangements be so rigid, so mechanical? We need more elasticity, flexibility, more experimenting, more imagination.

If Protestant Ireland objects to Home Rule, why not cheerfully leave Ulster out? At some time or another she will, I am convinced, take her place in an Irish Parliament, and then let Nationalists look to themselves. Then there will be a real

Protestant ascendancy" in Ireland such as no one dreams of -day. Ulstermen by force of their Scottish brains and consistency will rule Ireland. I can look forward to a day when e Celtic Irish will be wailing for a return to the Union under hich they had nearly everything given to them and paid far ss than their share. But in that day the Ulstermen will grimly eply: "You asked for it and you have got it. We will never o back to the old system. We will have Home Rule, for it has given us just the power we wanted. We shall go on ruling Ireland ill the end of time." That I firmly believe will happen, but in the meantime if Ulster says "No," why not leave her to do as she pleases? Strange if "government of the people by the people for the people" should result in a million people being threatened with sword and fire because they dare to think they know what is best for themselves!

All due to that political affectation of which I complain. Our hot-Gospellers of Democracy need to be reminded that the constitution was made for man and not man for the constitution. It is forgetfulness of simple truths like this which makes bigots, and bigotry ends in bloodshed. Let men of good-will pay heed.

H. Hamilton Fyfe

POND INSECTS

To many people a pond is only a pond, and nothing more, like Wordsworth's "Primrose by the river's brim!" But to some it is a world containing a wonderful population, from the birds and animals that live round its margins and upon its surface, to the fish, newts, pond insects, snails, and other molluscs, the many wee things and the wonderful microscopical creatures that swarm in its depths.

To describe all these would take volumes, but there is one section of the inhabitants of which something can be said in a short article, and that is the insects. There are many of them. Some live in the mud at the bottom, others crawl about the water plants, another company swim free in the middle depths, there are more which live at or on the surface, and yet others to which all parts are alike, they dive, swim on the surface, and take flight and explore the air above. Another section of the insect inhabitants live at the sides, but the most interesting are those which actually live on or in the water itself—and what strange creatures some of them are!

Take the "whirligig" beetles for example, scientifically called *Gyrinidæ*, most people would take them for tiny shining bubbles skimming in circles on the surface of the water. Half a dozen of these shining atoms will circle madly round each other, turning, twisting, and twirling, in wonderful patterns, so that their polished wing cases shine like silver in the light, but when one of them is caught it is nothing but a little black [illegible]. As a matter of fact it is by no means easy to catch one, [illegible] soon as the net approaches—every "pond-grubber" must [illegible] a net—they are all gone! When anything dangerous [illegible] the whirligig dives, for it is one of the water insects which [illegible] for a life above and below, as well as on the water. [illegible]

is really a wonderful little thing, as a minute examination will show. Its very shape is an adaptation, as it is the one which offers the least resistance to the medium in which it swims. Then take its legs, two pairs have become much shortened and flattened, like the fins of a fish, though the first pair, used for clasping its prey, are of the normal length and shape. The result is that the insect is an expert swimmer, though helpless on land, where it can only spin round and round on its back. Then take its eyes, of which it has four (or rather masses of compound eyes arranged in four groups) so that when it is swimming on the surface it has two above and two below, and can see what is happening in the air above it and the water under it. Beneath its shining black wing cases are hidden the gauzy wings by means of which it can take excursions into the upper world and explore fresh ponds, and beneath these same elytra is also space for a supply of air. Most water-beetles breath by sticking their "tails" above water and drawing air into the space beneath the wing cases, whence it can easily reach the spiracles, as the holes are called, through which the air is breathed.

Before going further, and describing some of the other insects it will be better to mention how they can be caught. The "pond grubber's" outfit is simple, only a long-handled net of fairly stron material, and a jam-jar or two. If you are very grand you ma carry a few nests of chip-boxes in your pocket, as they are usef for some of the insects which are not hurt by being out of wat for a time, but a warning, never put anything damp into o of them, or when you get home there will only be a heap of wo shavings in your pocket, as the pieces of each box are glu together so, of course, a little water soon brings them all to bits

Another point of which one must be careful is not to pu lot of small captives in the same jar with a big carnivorous o otherwise there may be only the big creature left by the time jar reaches home! This was the reason that I advised carry more than one jar; with two or three there is less fear of a particularly treasured insect being eaten by its friends on journey.

Arrived at the pond the first thing that strikes one is number of insects that there are on the surface, water-meas [illegible] rushing hither and thither, as if in a hur

measure the area of the pond with their long black legs, whirligigs go round and round, and if there is any disturbed water, say where a little stream feeds the pond, you will be certain to find a party of water crickets running about. These crickets—*Velia currens* is the Latin name of the species—the water measurers, and some thin, little black insects, like sticks, which live on the margins under the shelter of the rushes and other water-side plants, belong to an order in which the insects do not change much in appearance throughout their life, they have no stage which corresponds to the caterpillar of butterflies and moths, but their wings do not appear until they are full grown. As they prey on other small insects and tiny grubs they must kill a great number of these in the course of their life.

The general rule of life in the pond seems to be, " Eat and be eaten ! " More than half the population preys on the other half. The most formidable of these predacious insects are to be found among the beetles, in particular the great water-beetle, sometimes called the tiger-beetle, otherwise known as *Dytiscus marginalis*. It is not called the " tiger " for nothing, it is about an inch and a half long, broad, and powerful, with strong legs for clasping and a pair shaped as oars for swimming with, and even little fish have good cause to fear its deadly grasp. I kept one, a male—distinguished from the female by circular discs on the fore legs—for some time in company with four little roach about two inches or more in length, but it caught and ate them all ! It would also capture and eat big worms that I dropped into the water. It was a curious sight to see the unfortunate worm kicking and squirming while the relentless beetle calmly went on with its meal. These big beetles have wings, like the [illegible] whirligig, so they, too, can migrate from one pond to another, [illegible] during their early life they are confined to the home pond. [illegible] larva of the great water-beetle is a strange looking grub, [illegible] no one ignorant of natural history would ever dream could [illegible] a beetle. In shape it is something like the letter "S." [illegible] comes at the bottom and its tail at the top of the letter, [illegible] is through this tail that it breathes, for like the perfect [illegible] it is an air breather. Its tail terminates in two delicate [illegible], edged with hairs, which pass through the surface of [illegible] water, and rest on the film, so that the grub is supported

ile taking in air. In this attitude it will hang head downwards for half an hour at a time, but it is not idle, the great jaws, each like a sickle in shape, which jut out from either side of its head, are held open ready to "Welcome little fishes in, With gently smiling jaws!" as Alice said of the crocodile, for the water beetle larva when full grown is quite capable of catching and eating small fish. Indeed it is surprising what it can capture and hold. The juices are sucked from the victim, after which the useless body is thrown away, and the ever hungry insect looks out for another.

Like most young insects the water beetle larva has to cast its skin several times in the course of its life. Its old coat grows dull and dark-looking, and its owner seems less active and less hungry than usual, but one day it splits down the back of the thorax, or down the shoulders as many people would say, and with some struggling the grub pulls itself out, a pale transparent creature, which soon hardens, and becomes more furiously hungry than ever. The old skin floats away in the water, and is so perfect in every detail that one might imagine that the grub has been duplicated.

At last there comes a time when the water-beetle larva is full grown, it makes for the edge of the pond, crawls out, burrows into the bank, makes itself a chamber, and there undergoes the change to the pupa, in which form it will await the time when it can emerge as a beetle, fly away into the world, mate, lay eggs, and die. In due time another generation of grubs will hatch out to terrorise the peace-loving inhabitants of the pond, and thus the cycle of life goes on.

Another big water-beetle, *Hydrophilus piceus*, is of a very different disposition to Dytiscus, if the latter is a tiger the former is only a cow! For when adult it grazes on the water plants and is of a peaceful and amiable disposition.

Some of the most ferocious of young insects are the dragon-fly grubs. The handsome dragon-flies have a very good reason for spending so much of their time near ponds, turning and twisting in the air, and catching the flies that hover over the water, for it was their nursery, and it is where their own young will live. There is but little likeness between parent and child. The larva of Æschna cyanea—that great handsome green and blue dragon-

fly which is one of the commonest species—may be taken as an example of one type of grub. It in no way resembles the slender creature that emerges from it. It certainly has six legs, and a fairly long body, but it is inclined to stoutness, breathes through its tail, and has most peculiar mouth organs. At first glance it does not appear to be well armed, it has no visible jaws like those of the young water-beetle, but it has an apparatus which is just as effective, this is "the mask," which can be extended and used for the capture of insects a little way off. It is a development of the lower lip or labium, and the real jaws are in the usual place. The dragon-fly larva does not alter much in appearance during its under-water life, traces of wings appear after the first moult or two, and the pupal stage is merged into the larval. When it is full grown the nymph, as it is called at this stage, climbs up the stem of some water plant into the air above, clasps the stalk firmly with its feet, while its skin splits down the back of the thorax, and the perfect insect gradually emerges. It is now a pale and flabby dragon-fly with but the stumps of wings, but every second sees a change, the wings gradually expand, the body hardens, and it is not long before the insect can fly away to hunt the flies that hover around, for the perfect dragon-fly is just as keen a hunter as were its grubs in the water.

Another type of dragon-fly larva is much shorter in the body, and altogether more stumpy in build, and is fond of lurking about at the bottom of the pond. The stout-bodied dragon-flies are the parents of these kind of grubs.

Among the insects found in the mud at the bottom of the pond (which, by the way, is not the tenantless slime it often looks) is one fat ugly thing that is often brought up when the net is pulled along the margins. It comes heaving and crawling out of the mud, it is broad, flat, and has a tail, in other words it is a water-scorpion, *Nepa cinerea*. Unlike some of the other insects we have been considering it passes nearly all its life in the pond. It can take flight, for it possesses wings, but most of its time is spent resting on the mud or among the stems of the water plants at the bottom of the pool, where it is very difficult to see, for it closely resembles the mud in colour, and the deception is often heightened by a coating of dirt. This resemblance is most useful, for many of the unwary inhabitants of the pond are deceived

come too close, and before they know that they are in danger, are seized, hugged firmly in its strong fore legs, and only released when their bodies have been sucked dry. The long pointed apparatus at the end of its body is not really a tail, though it looks like one, but it is a breathing tube, for this insect follows the general custom of the insects of the pool and obtains its supply of air from above.

A creature which does not do this, but which obtains its oxygen from the water, is the Caddis "worm." Perhaps in speaking of caddis grubs I had better use the plural, as there are many species, which all live under water, some in ponds, and others in streams, but as they are all vegetarians the amateur pond-grabber is sure to bring a number to the surface whenever he plunges the net into a bed of pond-weeds, though unless he knows what the creatures are like he will never take them for anything but little bundles of sticks or leaves. They make cases to protect their soft and easily injured bodies from the numerous enemies that are always glad to eat such a tempting morsel as a fat white grub. Those species which live on the bottom use grains of sand, snail-shells, or sticks, or all three combined, while those that liv among the plants make their dwellings of fragments of the leave they have bitten off. The general plan of the case differs wit the species, but they all fasten the bits together with silk, whic they also use as a lining. It is not so easy as one might expe to pull a caddis grub out of its house, for it has hooks on the e of its body which it entangles in the silken lining, and is thus al to resist a considerable pull. As a matter of fact a caddis wo is fairly safe, for on the approach of danger it draws in its h and shoulders which are hard and well armoured and thus blo up the doorway. The alarm past, out comes its head and its legs, and away it crawls, carrying its heavy house with it. W full fed it weaves a silken curtain across its doorway, and becc a pupa, which after a time gives rise to the moth-like ir that we know as a caddis-fly.

A curious looking insect that is sure to be found among contents of the net is the water-boatman (Notonecta gl so called because when swimming it looks like a boat w rowing and propelled by a pair of long oars. Besides t the oars are a pair (the hinder pair) of legs. They are al ... form the blades, which are also fur

with a broad fringe of hairs. The insect lies on its back, the silvery keel, and rows rapidly about in search of food, for like so many of the pond creatures, it preys on its fellows, grasping them with its front legs and draining their juices. When it wishes to leave the water it swims to the surface, turns right away about, spreads out its wings, and flies away.

Among the numerous small creatures which form food for these larger and more powerful insects is the larva of the gnat, and a wonderful little thing it is, too. It is present in great numbers throughout the summer in every piece of still or stagnant water, but it does not like that which is much agitated, and so it is no good looking for it in running water. The life-history of the common gnat is peculiarly interesting. Most people know a gnat when they see it, but it is not so generally known that it is the female, distinguished from the male by her plain insignificant antennæ, which sometimes makes herself a nuisance by biting human beings. The male has exquisite feathery antennæ which entomologists believe are the organs by which he hears and is able to locate the female, whose high-pitched hum as she hovers with rapidly vibrating wings is a kind of love song. Having mated, the female repairs to the water to deposit her eggs, which she does on the surface to the number of two or three hundred. They are glued together in an upright position until a boat-shaped mass is formed; the blunt ends from which the gnat grubs will eventually hatch resting on the water. For a time the little boat floats about at the mercy of wind and waves, but at last a kind of trap-door in the floor of each egg opens, and the gnat larvæ escape into the great watery world. Each grub is a strange top-heavy little thing, with a big head and thorax, and a slender body, near the end of which is a tube for breathing purposes. When the grub feels the need of air it lets itself rise to the surface and takes in a supply, the rest of its time it spends wriggling about and downwards in the water, for it too feeds on lesser creatures, though it often in turn makes the food of bigger ones which [illegible] only too glad to eat it. In fact out of the two or three hundred [illegible] but a few will reach maturity, and probably only two will [illegible] in reproducing their kind; but I am going too fast, my [illegible] is only just hatched, and before the final stage is reached [illegible] eat, grow, moult several times, and change into a pupa;

This pupa, which emerges at the last moult but one, is indeed a strange-looking creature, it has a great head, or what looks like a head, for it is really head and thorax in one, and a slender, tapering body. Its breathing apparatus is now on the top of its head, where two little horns jut out, and by means of these it takes in air, for among other changes it now swims right end up, instead of upside down as has been its custom hitherto. Though quite active it no longer feeds, indeed it takes no nourishment at all, though a marvellous transformation is being prepared in that hunch-backed body which becomes apparent at the last moult. One day it rises to the surface, the skin splits down the thorax, and the perfect gnat begins to emerge. This is the most critical time of its life, for during those moments when it is drawing its legs out it is perfectly helpless, a breath of wind, or any other slight interruption, may overturn and drown it, but if all goes well the gnat gradually draws itself out, then using the discarded skin as a raft it waits until its wings have expanded and its body dried and hardened, when it is able to fly away.

There are many other insects which are allied to the common gnat whose larvæ spend their lives in ponds and stagnant water. In most the life-history is somewhat similar, but in a distant connection of the gnat, namely the chameleon fly—*Stratiomys chameleon*—the life-story has been greatly modified. The larvæ of this fly are called rat-tailed grubs in allusion to their long tails. Their form is that of a legless grey maggot tapering gradually to this tail, which is again connected with breathing. When one of them wants air it wriggles to the top, pushes the end of its tail through the water film, and spreads out a star of hairs, which serves as a float while it breathes. When it has taken in enough air the creature closes its circle of hairs and goes down to the bottom again. When the time arrives for becoming a pupa the maggot does not throw off its larval skin, but makes the transformation inside. This it is able to do because as a pupa it is smaller than it was as a larva, and so it retains the old skin as a protection. A certain amount of air is held in the empty tail and in the crevices of the skin, so the pupa is able to manage with the usual breathing apparatus of an insect, namely spiracles down its sides.

An insect which must be mentioned is the may-fly, though it is really rather a stream than a pond-dweller, yet it is so essentially [illegible] creature that it deserves a word or two, especially as it

is remarkable for moulting after it has reached the winged state. It is a general rule among insects that wings denote maturity, yet the may-fly, whose aerial life is so short, finds time to change its clothes. It emerges in the two forms known to fishermen as the grey drake and the green drake, these moult, become a trifle smaller and darker, and are then truly adult males and females, who mate, after which the female deposits her eggs, when the career of both is finished, for their lives in the air are very short, being only a few hours, though they have spent many months under water. The larva lives in burrows in the banks of the stream or pond, eventually becoming a pupa which shows rudiments of wings. When the moment arrives for the winged insect to emerge, the pupa leaves the burrow, and wriggles its way to the top of the water, where its skin splits and the perfect may-fly emerges. It uses its skin as a raft until it is fit to fly away, but its history often ends at this point, for there is no delicacy more highly esteemed by a hungry fish, and at the time of the great hatching, at the end of May or beginning of June, the trout have a splendid time and gorge themselves on the tempting morsels which float about in such abundance.

There are many other most interesting insects which only considerations of space prevent my mentioning, from the bugs of the family *Corixidæ*, that are so plentiful in nearly every pond, to numberless beetles, the alder fly, the stone-fly, and many others, and if one over-stepped the limits of the class Insecta there would be such an abundance of species that it would be impossible to know which to mention first—whether fish, frogs, toads, newts, snails, the little fresh-water hydras, water spiders, and so on, and so on—it is not what to mention, but what to leave out! In short I heartily recommend any one who is bored to take a jam-jar and a net and go out and grub in the first pond he or she comes to, though if it is tenanted by ducks it will not yield as rich a harvest as one which is not. The best ponds are usually those where ducks do not go and there are no cattle to wade in and make them muddy and dirty. The ideal pond is a nice clear water one, full of weeds and overhung with bushes. There sport should be of the best, and I defy any one to remain uninterested when each sweep of the net brings to the surface some new and fascinating creature!

FRANCES PITT.

AMERICAN AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, *May* 8, 1914.

MORE than a year ago readers of this Review were told that "Mexico was Mr. Wilson's Cuba," and it was more than likely a quite unexpected incident would compel the United States to send its troops across the border. What was anticipated has happened. The United States has invaded Mexico and holds Vera Cruz, the most important port of the southern republic. American ships of war are on both of its coasts. American troops are ready to be sent south. The country expects war, but up to the present time the country is not at war, although lives have been lost and Mexico, at least that part represented by the Huerta Government, is no longer master in its own house but is a tenant by sufferance.

The situation at the present moment is anomalous and somewhat bewildering; almost as difficult to define precisely as it is to justify what has been done for the provocation assigned. If a nation is warranted in going to war to protect the lives of its subjects and their property, or to bring about peace and order and stability in an adjoining country which the people of that country are unable to do, then for more than a year past President Wilson would have been amply justified in making war. Mr. Wilson ignored the graver wrongs and thought proper to make a very minor incident *casus belli*, although officially the United States is at peace with all the world, Mexico included.

A boat from the *Dolphin*, under the command of a paymaster, went into Tampico to purchase supplies. When her crew landed they were arrested and taken to a police station, held in detention there for about an hour and a half, treated while under arrest with due consideration, subjected neither to physical pain nor mental indignities (unless to be under arrest in the circumstances

can be considered an indignity), and then released and permitted to return to their vessel. When the affair was reported to Rear-Admiral Mayo, the Commander-in-Chief, he demanded an apology and reparation in the form of a salute to the American flag, and put his demand in the form of an ultimatum, fixing a time at which the salute must be fired. The local federal authorities investigated the affair, found that the Americans had been arrested for a purely technical offence, no doubt committed unintentionally, in having made a landing at a wharf at which they were prohibited from tying up, and expressed their regret. Not being satisfied with this apology Admiral Mayo pressed his demand, he was supported by his Government and Mr. O'Shaughnessy, the American *chargé d'affaires*, was instructed to notify President Huerta that nothing less than full compliance with the demands of Admiral Mayo would be accepted. Huerta was willing to apologise and to punish the officer who had ordered the arrest of the American sailors but he protested at being required to fire a salute, which he considered was to give the affair more importance than it deserved. While negotiations were pending the Washington Government was informed that a German ship carrying a cargo of French arms and ammunition for Huerta was about to enter the port of Vera Cruz. The President then ordered the occupation of Vera Cruz and the seizure of the custom house so as to prevent the cargo being discharged and reaching Huerta. As Vera Cruz is not fortified and General Maas, the commander of the federal garrison, had only a few hundred troops, he was unable to offer any real defence against the powerful American fleet and the overwhelming force the United States was able to land. The Mexicans made only a show of resistance, and after a brief engagement evacuated the city and retired to the outskirts, losing, it is believed, some 200 men. The American loss was 19 killed and about seventy wounded.

It has been carefully explained officially that the United States is not at war with Huerta and that the occupation of Vera Cruz was forced by two compelling reasons. One was to prevent the arms and ammunition from reaching Huerta, the other was to assert the dignity of the United States and secure reparation for the insult offered to the flag by the arrest of the officer and crew of the *Dolphin*. The irregularity of the proceeding

need not be considered—it is a matter for authorities on international law to consider—but this flaming resentment over an affair of little consequence when for more than a year no notice has been taken of wanton murder and unparalleled atrocities is bewildering to the public. These murders and atrocities have been committed by both sides, the federals under Huerta as well as the constitutionalists under Carranza and Villa. Mr. Benton, a British subject, it will be recalled, was killed in cold blood by Villa, Americans have been killed in the same way, but their deaths were allowed to pass almost unnoticed. The flag is, of course, a sacred object and all nations have a right to demand that it shall be treated with respect, but to make unjust demands is to make the flag ridiculous.

President Wilson has been quite sincere in not wanting to make war on Mexico, but in his desire to preserve peace he chilled the enthusiasm that ought to stir the blood of a people when they are about to go to war. The American Constitution prohibiting the President from declaring war and placing that power solely in the hands of Congress (although the President being charged with the conduct of foreign relations has it in his power always to force the country into war), Mr. Wilson felt it his duty in view of eventualities to inform Congress of the demand made upon Huerta. Mr. Wilson did not advise that Congress declare war. In his desire not to arouse jingo sentiment, the President I am compelled to say with reluctance, erred in the other direction He did not want the country set aflame, but wisdom would hav required that he should not have smothered it under a wet blanket He had the material to make a strong presentation, calmly an dispassionately to have told of the patience exercised by tl United States, of the provocation and defiance it had been offere of the Americans killed, of their property destroyed, of the interes of all the world affected, and after having recited these thin to urge the Congress to continue to be patient and generous war would demand a heavy toll in life, and yet to be prepar to make war if there was no alternative.

The President did not do this. He told Congress of the ar of the *Dolphin's* men. He told of two other equally insignific occurrences, one of the arrest of a marine orderly at Vera C [illegible] the interference with the delivery of one of Mr. O'Shau [illegible] to the Presi

dazed. It seemed so out of all proportion to make such trivial incidents the cause for war, and of course every one realised that war was imminent. Huerta having defied the United States it was not likely he would yield, the only way to make him yield was to use force. Congress was in a mood to give the President unlimited support and to vote him all the men and money needed. There has never been any passionate feeling of resentment against Huerta, although there has been a very pronounced feeling of disgust and irritation, and that feeling is directed not solely against Huerta but includes Carranza and Villa. The average American has the same feeling against all the so-called Mexican leaders and patriots as a decent working man has whose bad luck makes him neighbour to a man who gets drunk and beats his wife and neglects his children. He can't interfere, but his hands itch to punch the brute's head. Members of Congress well understood if war came it would not be because half a dozen sailors had been arrested or there was a delay in the delivery of a telegram, but because there is a limit to all forbearance and a long series of crimes to be avenged. This every one knew and did not have to be told, and yet Congress would like to have spread it upon the record. It would have given a certain dignity to the war. It would not have put the United States in the position of being willing to go to war on a pretext and to risk the danger of being accused of making war without justification.

When Congress passed the resolution authorising the President to intervene in Mexico—which was war no matter how much it might be sugar-coated by subtle distinctions too fine for the ordinary mind to grasp—Congress was not stirred nor was the country moved. I do not venture to say the country felt it was embarked on an unjust war, but undoubtedly there was a very strong feeling that it was about to engage in an unnecessary war. The New York *Evening Post*, which has been a strong supporter and a sincere admirer of Mr. Wilson, described him as "blundering into war," a series of mistakes culminating in "insisting upon reading an insult to our flag in a petty incident," and thought that both he and Mr. Bryan had been very badly advised. That is a view very generally shared and it was strengthened by the surprise shown by the President and Mr. Bryan when news was received of the resistance offered at Vera Cruz

and the disapproval of the American course expressed by Carranza, the revolutionary chief. Intervention, the seizure of Vera Cruz, the killing of Mexicans, Americans as well as Mexicans were told were not to be regarded as acts unfriendly to the Mexican people; for the Mexican people the Americans and their Government had only the most friendly feelings, although they had their own peculiar way of showing their affection. It was true there was a little account to be settled with Huerta, but Huerta was playing off his own bat and nobody need care what happened to him.

But Carranza did care, he cared so much that he sent a very stiff note to the President and hinted at being under the unpleasant necessity of having to fight the United States unless its forces were speedily withdrawn, a challenge promptly met by the President restoring the embargo on the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States. One reason for the chill over the thought of war against Huerta is the public appreciation that Huerta's defeat means the success of Carranza and Villa, and neither commands the confidence of the public, although both have the support of the President. Carranza is regarded as a weak and stubborn man without any appreciation of the services the United States has rendered him. Villa is a man of such villainous character that it is inconceivable civilised nations can countenance him. "It must not be forgotten," the Philadelphia *Press* observes, "that Villa and Carranza have shown themselves more vindictive and bloodthirsty and disregardful of the rights of Americans and Europeans in Mexico than Huerta has done. To destroy Huerta in order to aid these bandits of the North to obtain control in Mexico would be a crime against civilisation."

It was noticed by all competent observers in Washington that, as one of them wrote, "what is being done in Congress by way of response to the President's message is being done without elation and in no spirit of war fervour," and newspaper comments in various parts of the country showed the disappointment felt because the President had not "given us something to shout for, to fight for, to die for, if need be." The Republicans in Congress thought they better understood the sentiment of the country than the President, and as the country would not support the President they could turn the adventure to party advantage.

Mr. Wilson asked Congress to authorise him to use the armed forces of the United States to bring Huerta to terms and it was necessary to pass a resolution to that effect. In the House the resolution was opposed by the Republicans, one of them picturesquely observing, "the honour of our flag is no more in the keeping of Mr. Huerta than it is in the keeping of a Papuan cannibal who might have eaten an American missionary who had a flag in his valise;" in the Senate the Republicans were even more vigorous in their opposition. War may ruin the hopes of a political party or may so fortify it that nothing more is to be feared.

The country, it is true, displayed no enthusiasm over the thought of war with Mexico, but having become involved felt it could do nothing less than go through with it, and its first duty was to stand by the President. Right or wrong, the President must be sustained; to desert him or criticise him would be to give encouragement to the enemy and disgrace the United States in the eyes of the world. Quotations from a few representative papers picked at random indicate this very clearly. "We have crossed the Rubicon," says the Boston *Herald*. "A long sacrifice in lives and in our resources seemingly lies ahead. Nor does it behove us now to ask why such a sacrifice should be necessary." The thing which sober men have feared has come upon us, the Baltimore *Sun* declares. "American blood has been shed and must be avenged. And all that remains to be done is to finish the work as quickly as possible." In the opinion of the Pittsburgh *Post*, "there is no justification for attempting to minimise the task imposed upon the United States. It is war, and as such must be waged to a finish." The Philadelphia *Inquirer* says: "Let us have done with theories. The country must sustain him (the President) although it be led into a long and costly war involving tens of thousands of troops and millions upon millions of dollars. The appeal is now to patriotism, and from border to border there will be a response to any call that may issue for sufficient troops to see the war to a finish, no matter where it may lead." "The job is laid out for us, and the American people are going to see it through," is the comment of the New York Sun. "They are going to stand behind the President and the flag. There may be much less enthusiasm manifested for the President than for the flag, but there is no use in looking back.

ward just now or in discussing past blunders of policy, theory, or action." Some of these newspapers quoted are opposed to the President, others think the war unnecessary, but having got into it there is only one way out.

It is ironical that Mr. Wilson should be compelled to bring war on the country and that Mr. Bryan must give his assent to the President's action. It would be impossible to find two men with a greater abhorrence of war than the President and his Secretary of State. Mr. Bryan is the owner of the *Commoner* published in his home town of Lincoln, and he finds time in the midst of his other and more pressing duties to write for his periodical. In the copy that reached me on the day that Admiral Badger's bluejackets and marines took Vera Cruz and the guns of the fleet had thrown shells into the city there is an article signed by Mr. Bryan concluding in these words:

> If our nation desires to be measured by intellectual and ethical standards, how unworthy to brag of our strength and threaten to use that strength. "We are ready to fight" does not arouse the enthusiasm it did a few centuries ago. Brute force is not the level upon which this nation settles controversies to-day; the question is not what we can do, but what we ought to do.
>
> The path of history is strewn with the wreck of nations that boasted that they were all-powerful; they went down under JEHOVAH'S inexorable law—and the "God who ruled over Babylon is the God who is ruling yet." This question must be decided on moral principles and not by the counting of our regiments and battleships.
>
> What shall it profit a nation if it conquers the whole world and loses its faith in the doctrine that "righteousness exalteth a nation"?
>
> W. J. BRYAN

There are a great many people who refuse to believe in Mr. Bryan's sincerity and who see in everything he does or says the politician playing for votes or applause, but I feel quite certain in what he wrote he was expressing his honest convictions, even though the New York *Sun* contemptuously describes it as a "mess of apocalyptic rhetoric and ecstatic exhortation." He hates war and loves peace. Some of his predecessors have won a place in history by the vigour of their foreign policy, by either having been instrumental in the making of war or at least threatening war; Mr. Bryan no doubt hoped history would think him worthy of recognition because he had neither made war nor encouraged it. Since Mr. Bryan entered the State Department he has so ... talked peace that the diplomats accredited to Wash

ington—by inclination somewhat cynical and by training scoffers of the apostles of universal peace—have been scornfully amused by what some of them have described as his "obsession for pacificism." He began with his comprehensive scheme for universal peace treaties, to which the diplomats have been forced to give polite attention and some of them perfunctory consideration, although not one of them has taken them seriously, and there is, of course, no reason why they should. Peace treaties have never prevented any nation from making war, least of all the United States, which is notorious among nations for disregarding its treaties when they are inconvenient. But undeterred by the past and undaunted by the cold reception given to his treaties, abroad as well as at home, Mr. Bryan, filled with the zeal of the zealot, has lived in an atmosphere of peace and seen in everything only fresh evidence of the world's detestation of war. Diplomats have said on every other subject Mr. Bryan displayed lukewarm interest, it was only when he was arguing his peace treaties that he became eloquent and showed how dear the subject is to him. After the occupation of Vera Cruz, when the South American plenipotentiaries came forward with their offer of mediation, Mr. Bryan accepted it as another proof of the triumph of peace over war. So repulsive was war that South America rushed forward to stop it before it had begun, so opposed is the conscience of the United States to war that it welcomes mediation rather than be compelled to fight.

It is the paradox of the Presidency that its pacific occupants have made war and the men who were naturally belligerent or were soldiers by profession kept the country at peace. The war of 1812 against Great Britain took place in Madison's Presidency, and Madison was a statesman and not a soldier. Polk was also no soldier, but he fought the war against Mexico. Lincoln knew nothing of war, but he took the country through its greatest conflict. McKinley had served in that struggle, but the service was forced upon him even as accident forced him to make war on Spain. On the other hand the men who perhaps would not have been averse to war, Jackson, Grant, Cleveland and Roosevelt, all of them except Cleveland men with military experience, fired never a shot. Mr. Wilson having no liking for war finds himself a maker of war. Diplomats stationed in Washington who are familiar

with the history of the United States believe that war with Mexico means another extension of the territory of the United States, and in view of the past they are justified in holding this belief. Every war in which the United States has engaged has ended by an enlargement of the boundaries of the country, and Mexico has been the greatest sufferer. Nearly a million square miles once belonged to Mexico have now come under the American flag. If history is repeated Mexico will again have to pay the bill for having provoked hostilities.

Not many Americans would consider Mr. Wilson one of the most ardent of Imperialists, yet curiously enough that is the opinion nearly all the European diplomats have of him, and it is an opinion shared by their colleagues of Latin America. This belief is based not only on what Mr. Wilson has said but also on what he has done, and joining his words with his deeds they look for no modification or weakening of the Monroe Doctrine during his Presidency, but, on the contrary, they expect not only that the Doctrine will be enlarged but the power of the United States will be increased if the opportunity is offered or can be found. Personally I should doubt the correctness of terming Mr. Wilson an Imperialist, although he is undoubtedly a very stout believer in and upholder of the Monroe Doctrine and all that it implies, but my personal opinion is of less importance than the diplomatic view, as the European governmental estimate of Mr. Wilson's character is founded on the diplomatic reports. Probably Mr. Wilson little appreciates the impression Europe has formed or the influence this impression exercises on the foreign relations of the United States. Although Americans have officially and formally shown how great an importance they attach to "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," as they phrased it in their Declaration of Independence, this austere regard for the world's opinion is more theoretical than real. As a matter of fact, Americans, not only the masses but including those in places of responsibility and entrusted with the direction of affairs, care very little for the opinion of the world, otherwise we should not now have some of the leading newspapers of the country and some of the leading members of the House and Senate denouncing the President for attempting to observe the provisions of a treaty. Nor is the present case exceptional. Treaty violation and a disregard for the opinion of the world is an old and sorry story.

Apropos of treaties and the punctilious insistence upon the respect for national honour, as seen in the demand made upon Huerta to salute the flag, it is at least amusing that Congress should refuse to express even mild regret when the United States is the offender. The treaty recently negotiated with Colombia declares that the "Government of the United States of America wishing to put at rest all controversies and differences with the Republic of Colombia arising out of the events from which the present situation on the isthmus of Panama resulted, expresses, in its own name and in the name of the people of the United States, sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations." I shall not discuss the vexed question whether Mr. Roosevelt was justified or not in encouraging the Panama revolution which made it possible for the United States to build the Panama Canal on its own terms, but the fact remains that Colombia was despoiled of the most valuable part of its territory, and while Panama was compensated for granting a lease of the canal zone to the United States, Colombia received nothing. Under the circumstances a mild expression of regret and the payment of five millions sterling does not seem to be either excessive humiliation or excessive generosity on the part of the United States, but a great many members of Congress oppose the treaty on the ground that to express regret would be to admit having done wrong, which is repugnant to American ideas, and to pay Colombia for having taken her property is absurd, for Colombia is really better off now that she is the poorer by the loss of Panama. The process of reasoning by which this conclusion is reached is too intricate for the average mind to follow, but it is sufficient to those members of Congress who have been able to convince themselves that it would be quixotic either to apologise or to compensate. So determined is the opposition in the Senate to the ratification of the treaty that the President has not deemed it advisable to submit it to that body for ratification and is waiting in the hope that something may arise to make the Senate take a more favourable view of the convention.

An unexpected but important outcome of the "pacific coercion" put upon Huerta by the United States has been the prominence

given to Argentina, Brazil and Chile by their offer of mediation and the attempt not only to compose the differences between President Wilson and General Huerta but to bring about a settlement of the entire Mexican question. In the opinion of European diplomats this is one of the most significant events that has happened in the western hemisphere in a great many years. No matter what the outcome of the negotiations may be, by the offer of mediation and its acceptance by the United States a recognition has been given to the leading republics of South America never before accorded to them, and they have gained a standing they have not heretofore possessed.

Opinions differ as to the motives of the Argentina, Brazil and Chile Powers in offering their good offices and the effect it may have in the future. Officially Argentina, Brazil and Chile were inspired solely by the highest motives of humanity. They could not be unmoved spectators while men of their own race engaged in a fratricidal war and were in danger of being crushed by the United States. As Latin Americans they felt it to be their duty, as friends of Mexico as well as friends of the United States, to proffer their services to bring about peace in Mexico and save Mexico from dismemberment. Perhaps it will not be doing the Argentina, Brazil and Chile Republics an injustice to believe that it was this fear more than any other that showed them the necessity of doing everything to bring about peace. Mexico, as I have already written, has been bled by the United States and every South American diplomat knows that. South America is too far from the United States to fear the fate of Mexico, but it is not so remote as not to be affected by any political or other movement on this continent. To stand by and watch the United States despoil Mexico, or if not take territory assert the right to manage the internal affairs of Mexico, would be tacit sanction on the part of Latin America of the course of the United States, an admission either that the United States was right or that the great republics of South America were too feeble even to dare to protest. Undoubtedly South America did not desire to be put in the position either of approving what the United States had done or admitting its own impotence. Perhaps it saw the wisdom of reminding the United States that it was not the only Power on the western continent.

Nothing so excites a certain type of American as the thought

that the Monroe Doctrine is in danger. Certain public men took alarm when they heard that the offer of mediation by the Argentina, Brazil and Chile Powers had been accepted by President Wilson. They saw in it a blow at the integrity of what has come to be known as the "American policy" and a recognition on the part of the President that the United States had not the sole right to regulate the affairs of this hemisphere. Mr. Olney when Secretary of State laid down that comfortable doctrine. On this continent American fiat is law, he calmly observed, and a great many Americans agreed with him. The Monroe Doctrine is a policy of America for the United States and not America for the Americans, North, South, and Central. To allow South America to interfere in a dispute between the United States and Mexico was as dangerous as to allow Great Britain or Germany, it was tantamount to abandoning the Monroe Doctrine and inviting the "good offices" of any Power jealous of the supremacy of the United States.

An attempt has been made to convince the American public that the acceptance of the friendly offices of South America opens the door to European intrigue. In case of a dispute between the United States and a European Power affecting Latin America, some of the newspapers have said, the United States would be at a disadvantage if Latin America supported the European contention against the United States. If, for instance, a Latin American Power should see no menace to its national safety by granting a lease or concession to Europeans, and the United States should choose to regard that lease or concession as an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States would find itself in an awkward position if a combination of the Latin American Powers told the United States they were able to manage their own affairs and were not to be dictated to by Washington. What would happen in that case? Would the United States fight Europe plus a Latin American coalition or find that on further examination of the Monroe Doctrine Europe as well as Latin America were acting strictly within their rights? There are a great many people who think that the Monroe Doctrine is only formidable so long as all the world is afraid of it.

A. MAURICE LOW

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS

The belief, so prevalent towards the end of 1912, that the downfall of Ottoman rule in Europe would open for the Balkan countries an era of peaceful progress, has shared the fate of most prophecies concerning those wayward regions. Barely a month after the conclusion of the war with Turkey, the victors were in the grip of internecine strife, and the alliance that had wrought such momentous results lay in ashes. This melancholy chapter closed with the Treaty of Bukarest, but whatever hopes of a permanent settlement in the Balkans may have once existed were buried on the battlefields in Macedonia. The peace restored last August resembles that which, in the memorable phrase, once reigned in Poland, concealing under the guise of outward order vast stores of restlessness and disaffection. Atmospheric conditions throughout the Peninsula remain highly disturbed, and no one can say whether the rumblings heard in some parts are the dying echo of the recent storm or the first signs of one approaching.

Few of the problems which precipitated the original conflict have been solved, while some of the gravest are in a worse muddle than before. In the struggle against Turkey the motive power was supplied by the desire to end chronic misrule and to advance the cause of national unification. As regards the first of these objects, time may be expected to do much, although at present there is little to choose between the old régime and the new. But it is with respect to the second one that the experiment has proved a lamentable failure. In the final reconstruction, the principle of nationality was trampled under foot and entire populations were handed as if they had been chattels. What is worse, people who for more than three decades had enjoyed the boon of a

national government were handed over to alien rule. These are, briefly stated, the net results of the two most devastating wars in modern times. History records no more tragic instance of human futility.

It is a pure misnomer to describe as lasting peace a scheme of things based on such shaky foundations and manifestly intended to gratify momentary passions. Whatever respite there may be in store for the Balkan peoples will not be the merit of the so-called Peace of Bukarest, but an effect of their physical and financial exhaustion. This last fact forms an important element of the new situation and must be taken into consideration when prognosticating future developments in that part of the world. But its value as a calming influence is to a large extent neutralised by the recuperative faculties of those young political organisms, and these border on the miraculous. Had their economic life been controlled by the laws operating in more advanced communities, they ought ere now to have ended in bankruptcy and ruin. Instead of this happening, nearly all impartial observers agree that the war has hardly affected their material resources. In most of the Balkan countries agriculture constitutes the staple industry, and the work in the fields continued throughout the crisis as in normal times. In Bulgaria, for instance, the places left vacant by the mobilisation were promptly filled by the women, who proved such efficient substitutes that there was very little difference in the yield of the crops between the years 1913 and 1912. Manufacturing or other industries being practically non-existent, Bulgaria was spared the dire consequences of a prolonged *chomage*. It is no exaggeration to say that, given average harvests, four or five years should suffice to obliterate all material traces of the war. Of course, the case with the national exchequer is somewhat different, but here also the situation is far from being desperate. The heaviest item in the war expenditure, the revictualling of half a million men during eleven months, was met by requisitions, thus constituting a debt which the nation owes to itself. As regards foreign creditors, the war indebtedness of Bulgaria is insignificant, and any difficulties which she may now encounter in trying to place a loan are due to political rather than economic causes. The one loss which will be felt longest is the human toll of the war—killed, dead and maimed—representing a huge army

of at least 100,000, and comprising the most virile elements of the nation. On the other hand, the rate at which population in Bulgaria increases is the highest in Europe, and will enable her to repair the deficiencies sooner than is generally expected. In the meantime, the stream of emigration from the new Servian and Greek territories has more than compensated for the war casualties.

In considering Bulgaria's chances of speedily recovering from the effects of her recent disasters, a point worth noting is that if she was deprived of the legitimate fruits of her sacrifices, she was also spared the labour of reorganising extensive territories. What the difficulties of that task are in countries lacking the first rudiments of civil government may be gathered from the present tribulations of new Albania. Less is known of the situation in Macedonia, but there is no reason for supposing that the pace of progress in that province is any more satisfactory. The fact that martial law is still maintained both by Greeks and Servians points to the conclusion that the work of renovation has hardly yet begun. But the problem must sooner or later be tackled, unless chaos is to be promoted to the dignity of governmental art. How or where the requisite agents for this delicate mission will be found in countries which could hardly meet the demand of the home market for administrative talent is a question more easily asked than answered. At present Macedonia, instead of proving a source of strength to her new masters, is rather a drain on the old countries and makes them more vulnerable than before. So far, Roumania remains the sole Balkan state which has attempted in earnest the organisation of her new territories. Only, as the administrative system in the Bulgarian Dobrudja was of a more advanced type than the one prevalent in Roumania, reform in this case was bound to mean retrogression. What the new Roumanian law has done is to replace the fabric of self-government and local autonomy by administrative sans-gêne, and to undermine the security of private property under the pretext of verifying title-deeds. The exact meaning of this somewhat unusual step will be understood by those who know that the great preoccupation of Roumanian statesmanship is how to provide room for Roumanian colonists in a province entirely inhabited by foreign races.

As a result of the new enactments, Roumania will henceforth possess a class of Bulgarian pariahs in addition to her Jewish ones. A touch of irony is supplied to the story by the fact that all this is happening on the eve of the Roumanian peasant emancipation. The enslavement of the free will in this way synchronise with the liberation of the bondsmen.

The energy and resources, which the other Balkan states will have to expend on evolving order out of anarchy or on keeping alien races in submission, can be devoted by Bulgaria almost entirely to preparations for the day when things Balkan shall be once more thrown into the melting-pot. This work of general overhauling ought to prove a speedy one, for Bulgaria possesses a homogeneous population, famous for its thrift and industry, while her finances are in a less precarious position than those of her rivals. The disasters which the criminal stupidity of the ruling classes brought on the country have chastened its spirit without in the least weakening its resolution. Just now, the nation's unanimity of purpose is somewhat obscured by the clash of party recriminations, but when the fateful hour comes every one will once more be found inspired by the same ideal and sustained by the same will.

If so much stress is laid on Bulgaria, the reason is that in that country resides the chief danger to the new order of things in the Balkans. The beneficiaries under the Treaty of Bukarest realise this perfectly well, and their one anxiety since last August has been how to provide against so manifest a peril. It would, no doubt, be absurd to anticipate any serious trouble in the immediate future; however tough their race, the Bulgarians cannot be spending their whole time fighting. Still, because the risks are distant they do not cease to be real, and statesmen of foresight must take stock of all possible contingencies. Most of the activity which this subject is occasioning, as might be expected, takes place behind the scene and partakes of the nature of diplomatic secrets. People, however, overrate the importance of what is withheld from the public. At all events, those secrets have less to do with Bulgaria than with some other quarters which are suspected of harbouring evil intentions.

As regards Bulgaria, the policy of the new Balkan entente is simplicity itself. Roumania, Servia, and Greece openly avow

that they continue to form a block and are determined by joint efforts to repel all attempts on the part of Bulgaria at altering the Balkan *status quo*. There is not the slightest reason for supposing that the solidarity implied in this policy is not equally sincere on all sides. For the time being, Bulgaria is not only their common enemy, but also their common victim. That fact, by making enmity doubly bitter, renders solidarity an easier virtue. But solidarity on one point, even when cemented by such a potent feeling, does not mean community of interests all along the line. In the present case, all influences are far from being on the side of concord and, as conditions revert to their normal state, the centrifugal tendencies will increase rather than diminish in force. While the memory of common triumphs remains fresh and the fear of reprisals dominates the situation, the adjustment of frictions will prove the pleasantest of tasks. It is when those sentiments begin to wear out, as they must with time, that the permanency of the entente will be put to the test. The problem, as will appear in the course of the article, is far more complicated than is imagined, and the possibility is by no means excluded that the soul would have gone out of the entente before the danger which gave birth to it has actually arisen. The sad story of the first Balkan League leaves little room for illusions as to the durability of most Balkan combinations. Of course, the fate of the last one is always going to differ from that of its predecessors; but the last in those regions has such an inveterate habit of becoming the last but one, that it is worth while enquiring into the chances of the present instance proving an exception to the rule. We therefore, propose, to take each member of the group in turn and examine the various factors that are likely to affect their future conduct.

The place of honour naturally goes to Roumania. The part which that country played in recent events, if not very glorious, has been a most profitable one. While the other Balkan states won or lost on the battlefield, Roumania picked up the palm of Balkan hegemony by merely marching her troops through a defenceless territory. The advance-guard of her army reached the gates of Sofia without encountering a Bulgarian soldier. Whatever reverses Bulgaria may have suffered in Macedonia, she lost the war to an enemy with whom not a shot was exchanged.

This intervention of Roumania at the most critical juncture of the war has definitely brought her into the vortex of Balkan politics from which the elder generation of her statesmen had for many years tried to keep her free. So long as Roumania's face was turned westward, her policy with respect to Bulgaria consisted in cultivating the good-will of that country with the object of covering her flank. As their interests lay in different spheres, there was then no question of rivalry between them. The Treaty of Bukarest has changed all this, and henceforth the former friends will confront each other as rivals. Protestations of good will continue to be made on both sides, and the present Bulgarian Government is exerting itself to bring about a *rapprochement*, but all such efforts are doomed to failure. So long as the Roumanian policy continues to be guided by Balkan ambitions, an understanding with Bulgaria will remain impossible, for the very good reason that all such ambitions can only be at the expense of the latter country. The manifest interest of Roumania, after what has happened, is to keep Bulgaria weak and isolated; any other policy on her part would be courting disaster. She is, therefore, acting very logically in constituting herself *gendarme-en-chef* of the Treaty of Bukarest, and those who, in Bulgaria, believe that Roumania will voluntarily consent to a revision of that instrument are putting their trust in miracles. On the contrary, the chances are that the last voice heard in defence of the present Balkan arrangement will come from the banks of the Dimbovitza.

If the future course of the Roumanian policy as regards Bulgaria is clearly shaped, the same cannot be said of Roumania's relations with the Great Powers; and on this her conduct in any future Balkan complications will to a great extent turn. For many years Roumania stood as the avowed friend of the Triple Alliance and drew her inspiration from Vienna and Berlin. This has ceased to be true, at least for the time being. It is no secret that during the recent crisis she acted not only with the approval, but even at the instigation of Russia and France. Since the conclusion of peace, certain events have occurred which show that those two Powers are leaving no stone unturned to win her to their fold. To a comparatively small country this courting must be sweet incense, and the Roumanians are basking

themselves to the game with the grace befitting their origin. What makes temptation harder to resist is that, in addition to mercies already received, other and even bigger favours are promised elsewhere. It must not be forgotten that Roumania has irredentist ideals in Transylvania where millions of her kinsmen are groaning under a foreign yoke. So long as she owed allegiance in Vienna these aspirations were studiously repressed, but now the tempter comes and whispers of the lands on the other side of the Carpathians. To many it might seem that there is no room for hesitation, and that the plain duty of Roumania is to march with those who can help her to realise her historic mission. On closer examination, however, the question loses its simplicity, and all the arguments are by no means found to be on the same side. Transylvania can only be won by the overthrow of Austria, and that, in its turn, implies the victory of Russia. But such a victory signifies the definite triumph of the Slav race, which will then form a vast ocean, encompassing Roumania on all sides. This is a heavy price to pay even for such an object as the unification of the Roumanian race, and one can well understand why some of the most ardent Roumanian patriots waver before accepting the proffered hand. On the whole and appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, it is very doubtful whether Roumania has at any moment seriously thought of altering her traditional policy. So long as King Charles remains at the helm the ship may be expected to follow the old route, and even when a new pilot has taken his place any deviations from that course are not likely to be more than temporary expedients. The delusion that Roumania can be detached from the Triple Alliance will not outlive the exceptional circumstances which have created it. Sooner or later Franco-Russian diplomacy must admit that it has taken its wishes for reality, and with the return to a saner appreciation of things the present Balkan entente will have lost in the eyes of Russia and France the best part of its charms. For the value of that entente as far as those Powers are concerned depends entirely upon the certitude that it will embrace their quarrels. A combination whose prime member belongs to the enemy's camp is to them worse than useless, and the treatment which they meted to Bulgaria for her supposed betrayal of their cause will one day prove Roumania's lot also.

The case of Greece has many points of resemblance to that of Roumania. Her share under the Treaty of Bukarest was far bigger than the Roumanian one, and her interest in the maintenance of that pact is proportionately greater. The Balkan entente as a defensive instrument is to Greece a necessity of prime importance, for she has roused the bitterest resentment in more than one quarter and is least able to cope with the danger single-handed. But for the fact that she has friends and allies at her side, peace between herself and Bulgaria could not last a week. Beside the general understanding for the defence of the present *status quo* in the Balkans, Greece has a separate agreement with Servia which, originally designed for the purpose of opposing Bulgarian ambitions in Macedonia, has since become a treaty of reinsurance against possible aggressions on the part of their former ally. With all these guarantees for a tranquil enjoyment of her newly won advantages, the position of Greece is far from being satisfactory, and there are specks on her sky which may one day develop into threatening clouds. In contrast with Roumania, she is surrounded on every side by actual or potential rivals, and the only immediate friend on whose assistance she can rely is not without giving her causes for serious reflection. The work of reorganising her new territories is complicated by the fact that a considerable portion of their inhabitants belong to foreign races whose sympathies it is well-nigh impossible to secure. Her finances are far from thriving, while her military expenditure is rendered doubly irksome by the necessity of keeping a strong fleet. She may discover that the winning of those territories was child's play as compared with keeping them.

What was said in connection with the attitude of Roumania towards the Great Powers also applies to Greece, though in a lesser degree. Ever since her liberation, the foreign policy of Greece has been to act as closely as possible with France and England, who have on all occasions shown themselves her supporters and friends. During the recent crisis, France took up the Greek cause with a zeal and energy worthy of the old days. Under these circumstances, the notion that Greece may at any future time modify her policy will strike most people as perfectly gratuitous. But the improbable does happen some-times, and signs are not lacking that the present might prove

one of those occasions. Greece cannot, any more than Roumania, contemplate with equanimity the uninterrupted advance of the Slav wave, and the best way of obviating that danger is not to side with the group which primarily represents the Slav cause. The recent manifestation of King Constantine in Berlin, which at the time gave so much umbrage to the French nation, was certainly more than mere politeness. When all the facts about the latest Balkan crisis are known, it will be found that some of the warmest champions of Greek interests came from unexpected quarters. Another significant symptom is that Germany has more than once expressed her warm approval of the Treaty of Bukarest and her opposition to the idea of its revision. This proves that she, at all events, does not consider the present Balkan entente as inimical to herself. The future alone will show whether hers is not a more correct reading of the situation than the Franco-Russian one.

Now a few words about Servia. As regards Greece and Roumania she stands in the relation of ally and friend, and for the time being the interests of the three are identical. But there are some essential differences between her case and theirs. For one thing, Servia is a Slav country, which Roumania and Greece are not. This fact has important bearings both on Servia's position as a Balkan state and on her relations with the outside world. Whether she likes it or not, her fortunes must follow those of the great Slav empire, and all choice between the two European groups is closed to her. That is undoubtedly why no one thinks of flirting with her, as most of the Powers do with Greece or Roumania, if not with both. Her friends know that they can depend on her fidelity, while those who might like to win her feel instinctively that the most pressing courtship would be labour lost. She too has a Crown Prince of marriageable age, but his name is never mentioned in connection with the matrimonial projects which at present fill so much space in the newspapers. All this may be perfectly natural, but to a sensitive nation whose armies bore the brunt of the fighting it must be none the less galling to be left so much in the cold. This, however, is small matter as compared with the disappointment which Servia suffered in a long-cherished hope. To her, free access to the sea is the most pressing economic

and political necessity. Her first impulse after the outbreak of the war with Turkey was to make a dash through the Albanian mountains and try to secure a foothold on the Adriatic coast. From a military point of view the task proved a simple one, but no sooner had the object been attained than Austria appeared on the stage and uttered her memorable veto on the Servian plan. The rebuff with which Servia then met laid the germ of the second Balkan war, for its immediate consequence was to turn Servian ambitions southward. Such was certainly the secret aim of Ballplatz, and those who talk of the lamentable failure of Austrian diplomacy evidently forget this *coup de génie* of Count Berchtold, which has by no means yet exhausted all its potentialities for evil. Last year it poisoned relations between Servia and Bulgaria; it may one day have the same dire effect on Servo-Greek friendship. For Servia still remains without a port of her own, and now that the best part of Macedonia has been annexed to her territories, she will even oftener think of the Ægean Sea than of the Adriatic. Geographically, Salonika forms part of new Servia, and no amount of parchment can prevent this fact from influencing the future relations of the new allies. Greece has done everything short of surrendering her territory, to accommodate her ally, and the various privileges which have been granted to Servia will make a considerable difference to her economic position. But if Servia is destined to remain for long mistress of the Macedonian hinterland, she must have a sea line which can only be obtained at the expense of Greece. All, therefore, is not plain sailing in front of the Servo-Greek alliance, and very careful steering will be required if that fragile craft is to remain long afloat.

It would be idle to talk of a *rapprochement* between Servia and Bulgaria at this juncture. Time has not yet had a full chance of mellowing down the tragic memories of last July, and a deep chasm still divides the two kindred nations. The air is thick with mutual recriminations; it is charges of treason on one side and accusations of disloyalty on the other. In Bulgaria, public opinion is indignant at the treatment of the Bulgarian population in the new Servian territories. Servians, in their turn, complain that Bulgaria is instigating insurrection among their new subjects. While this state of affairs lasts, all attempts at

bringing Servia and Bulgaria together are foredoomed to failure. But when every allowance has been made for the unfavourable influences, there still remain grounds for believing that such an entente is not outside the range of possibilities. Bulgaria will sooner or later have to emerge from her present isolation and look for a friend in the Balkans. She can go neither to Roumania nor to Greece; and her choice, by mere process of elimination, will be inevitably fixed on her western neighbour. By the time Bulgaria has made up her mind to this initiative, Servia will have discovered that the present arrangement, whatever its momentary advantages, affords neither comfort nor security. A meeting-ground will be found in the fact that, as regards the outside world, their interests point in the same direction. Bulgaria may for a time have abandoned her traditional policy and lent a willing ear to biased councillors. The results have not proved very encouraging, but even if the case had been the reverse she would still have soon returned to the old fold. The great majority of the Bulgarian nation has always been in favour of a close understanding with Russia and the Powers acting with her, and any departure from that course has small chances of securing the support of public opinion which, in a democratic country like Bulgaria, must have the last say on the matter.

A Servo-Bulgarian understanding will be equally advantageous to Servia and to Bulgaria. To the former country, it will not only afford an additional guarantee against the Austrian peril, but also an indispensable support in the event of a union with Montenegro. Such a step is certain to meet with stubborn opposition in the Dual Monarchy, which will probably be backed on this occasion by Roumania. The friendship of Bulgaria, under these circumstances, becomes a valuable asset, and is worth acquiring even at the price of some territorial modifications in Macedonia and the recognition of the Bulgarian nationality in that province. These concessions must be made by Servia, as otherwise the profit will be all on one side and Bulgaria will have no inducement for striking a bargain.

Just as a whole set of circumstances warrant the conjecture that a rapprochement between Bulgaria and Servia is by no means excluded, so, on the other hand, there are facts which point to the conclusion that the present Greco-Roumanian friendship will

eventually mature into something more precise and permanent. Thus, instead of the present somewhat uneven distribution of the Balkan forces, two distinct groups will be formed, each drawing its inspiration from a different source and each pursuing a different ideal. And, as the law of attraction holds good in the political as well as the physical world, the Slav group will naturally gravitate towards that European constellation with which the fortunes of its race are linked; while the non-Slav group, probably reinforced by Turkey, will be arrayed on the opposite side. In this latter case, ethnic solidarity will be replaced by the common dread of Slav submersion. When the Balkan situation definitely crystallises on these lines, a new chapter in the history of the Balkan nations will have opened. But then, as now, the Balkans will remain what they have been for many years past—a chess-board on which the Great Powers play their game, using the Balkan peoples as pawns.

A DIPLOMATIST

GREATER BRITAIN AND INDIA

CANADIAN AFFAIRS

I

THERE is no enthusiasm in Canada for the Home Rule Bill in spite of the efforts of the *Toronto Globe* and other Liberal journals to give their allies in the Mother Country a little help in return for the assistance vouchsafed by Sir Alfred Mond ("Old Nickel" as he was nick-named by a critic dwelling in the vicinity of Sudbury where the Trust-cornered metal is procured) and other cosmopolitan Cobdenites during the Reciprocity controversy. As a rule this journalistic support takes the form of academic arguments such as might be used by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who is a Gladstonian Liberal in theory. But the Toronto organ has been much more enterprising than its contemporaries, having sent a special correspondent to Ulster to study the situation on the spot, with the result that Ulstermen in every part of the Dominion have been lost in amusement and amazement at some of the most absurd dispatches which have ever appeared in a Canadian journal of good standing. Anti-militarism is, of course, a front plank in the platform of the *Toronto Globe*, and the infamous cry of "the Army *v.* the People," which is secretly countenanced by the Asquith Administration, has been taken up by its special correspondent and leader-writers in the hopes of indirectly discrediting the Canadian Minister of Militia, who did good work in South Africa and is now making every effort to bring Canada's land forces into a state of efficiency.

In Canada as in Ireland, however, the intricately woven webs of journalistic special pleading count for nothing or less than nothing. The Canadians are a nation of workers, not word-

mongers; they will always be found on the side of those who would rather act than talk. If there be any Nationalists in Toronto outside the office of its Liberal journal, they have done nothing to strengthen the hands of Messrs. Redmond and Devlin; they are lying low and keeping the pockets buttoned up in which they keep their dollars. On the other hand the Ulstermen in Toronto have contributed to the campaign fund against Separatism, and there can be no doubt whatever that many of them will be found in the field if ever the *ultima ratio* of civil war is reached. But, truth to tell, the general belief in Canada is that the Coalition Government is in bad odour with the constituencies and will make no effort to renew the plot that failed. In fact the Canadian Orangeman is convinced that Asquith and Co. have merely sold a pup to the Redmond-Devlin crowd. "The Nationalists have got their Bill," to quote from a letter I lately received from an Ontario farmer who was born within sight of the "wooden walls" of Derry, "but the people will refuse to foot it."

Meanwhile the impressive demonstration held in the Queen's Park on May 9 was a proof that feeling in Toronto is very strong indeed against the Bill. Many thousands of people, with bands playing and flags flying, came in two great processions from the east and west of the city and met at the Parliament Buildings. In the Park about 20,000 people had assembled when speaking began; thousands of Union Jacks were displayed, and there were remarkable scenes of enthusiasm. The Mayor of Toronto presided, and the proceedings began with prayer and the singing of "Rock of Ages," that monumental collect in rhyme. A resolution was unanimously passed condemning the Home Rule Bill as certain to cause dissension in Ireland and as a menace to the unity of the Empire. One clause in this resolution was as follows:

> We assure our loyal fellow subjects in Ireland of united and determined support, both moral and financial, in the struggle to maintain their rights of full citizenship under the flag of the British Empire, of which we as Canadians are justly proud to form part.

The resolution was moved by Mr. W. D. McPherson, member of the Ontario Legislature, and seconded by Sir John Willison, the famous journalist who made and unmade Sir Wilfrid Laurier

The pick of Toronto's business leadership was present, to say nothing of many well-known politicians, and observers were reminded of some of the demonstrations against American Reciprocity three years ago. Sir Edward Carson's name was vigorously applauded; he is a popular hero to-day in Canada, even among those who disapprove of his policy. Canada, like the Tudor monarchs, loves to look upon a man; she is always more concerned with men than with measures, as her political history clearly shows. It is in vain that the average Canadian is told that the Irish Unionist leader is guilty of treason. "Treason" is a word that carries no weight on the North American Continent; it is there regarded as a survival from the age of the rack and the thumb-screws. Canadians and Americans, the former in view of the fact that Papineau's rebellion was the beginning of their constitutional autonomy, do not forget the epigram:

> Treason doth never prosper: What's the reason?
> When it doth prosper none dare call it treason.

In this case all the forces of loyalty to the Empire and the King-Emperor are behind Ulster's cause, and no plot on paper can prevail aganist it in the long run, now that the argument of Hybrias the Cretan has been adduced.

2

The appointment of Prince Alexander of Teck as the next Governor-General has been welcomed by all sorts and conditions of Canadians, and the protest of Mr. Emmerson, the Liberal member who distinguished himself by reading the American Declaration of Independence in the Commons during last session's naval debate, finds little support even among those who are afraid that a "Court" will become established in Canada. Anything less like a Court than Rideau Hall as it has been under the régime of the Duke and Duchess of Connaught could hardly be imagined. More than one American visitor to the Canadian capital has confessed that the present Governor-General is more accessible than any Trust magnate or plutocratic member of the New York "Four Hundred" (to choose one of many American social oligarchies not as a rule distinguished for anything save

crude luxuriousness and brainless extravagance) and has secretly regretted that anti-monarchical institutions prevent the existence in the United States of any form of social leadership that is above and beyond the power of the purse. There are, and always will be, a number of Canadians who think of themselves, not without reason, as Society (with a big S), and the maintenance at Ottawa of a non-commercial standard of courtliness will help to repress any tendency among them to adopt the "smartness" of the American plutocracy. In justice to Mr. Emmerson, however, it must be admitted that his protest is not so much a sign of disaffection to the Royal Family as a somewhat ill-advised and untimely expression of doubt as to whether it is advisable that Canada should become practically a kingdom, as was actually desired by Sir John Macdonald. In its comments on the appointment the Montreal *Daily Mail* puts this point of view fairly enough:

> The appointment of Prince Alexander of Teck as the next Governor-General comes as a surprise. It has been discussed in the Press with a predominating note of disapproval that the Connaught dynasty might be perpetuated through the appointment of the Duke's eldest son. Not that the Duke of Connaught has not been popular, but feeling in Canada frowned down anything looking to a system of hereditary rulers. While the prediction has not been fulfilled, the ultimate choice is of one most intimately connected with the Ruling House of Great Britain.

But a wider and deeper insight into the situation is shown in the following comments by the Montreal *Star*, one of the ablest journals in the Dominion:

> One great function of the Governor-Generalship is to provide a living link between the optimistic and progressive democracy of this Dominion and the historic and more settled traditions of the old country. It would constitute a very serious menace to the permanence of the Empire if these two civilisations, that of the Colonies and that of the Motherland, were to lose mutual understanding and appreciation of each other. If the Empire is to last, these two differing civilisations must be bound together in sympathy and affection. Naturally, we will react on each other, and it is vitally important that there shall exist conduits through which the forces of each shall easily reach the plastic national life of the other. A common flag and common patriotism will do much, and, if it can be cultivated, will add another bond of union. We, for our part, think the building together of a common Navy would unite our young men and our adventurous spirits in a common effort of self-defence against common foes.
>
> Among these forces of union, however, we must always reckon as important the Governor-Generals who come out to us from the very [illegible] institution, and who offer an object-lesson to our [illegible] [illegible]

Very few Canadians now advocate the abolition of the Governor-General; those who do invariably forget that Canada does not, in point of fact, pay the salary of the Sovereign's representative. As the Duke of Connaught's tenure of office has been an unqualified success, the vast majority of Canadians are pleased to see a second appointment on the same lines. And the feeling that the "young people" are likely to find Prince Alexander and Princess Alice not so immersed in State affairs as not to find zest in sport and social diversions is also universal. Canada is a young country and youth is an invaluable asset; it would be a very great pity if she grew old before her time and lost the secret of *joie-de-vivre*, like decayed politicians and disillusioned journalists. Nothing will be lost, much will be gained, if Canada, the Prince and his Princess are all young together. There have been times when Rideau Hall has been a trifle dull, a little too decorous with all its simplicity. On the whole a young Governor-Generalship is hailed in Canada as a refreshing innovation.

AUSTRALIAN AFFAIRS

[From an Australian Correspondent]

Public opinion in Australia was somewhat startled by Mr Churchill's speech on the Navy Estimates. Statesmen of the Commonwealth had been prepared for a modification of the naval provision proposed to be made by the Admiralty in the Pacific under the agreement made at the Imperial Defence Conference in 1909. But the complete abandonment of the principles which they had been led to believe formed the definite base for a permanent policy in Imperial naval defence has come as somewhat of a surprise. This surprise has been accompanied by a certain amount of resentment at the fact that a vital departure from, if not a complete reversal of, the agreement entered into between the Imperial Government and the Commonwealth of Australia, in common with the other self-governing Dominions of the Empire, has been announced by the First Lord of the Admiralty without the slightest consultation with the Gover

ments interested, or even as much as a private preliminary intimation of the contemplated change. This conduct is the more regrettable because it is unfortunately not an isolated incident. When the Commonwealth Government suggested the summoning of a Defence Conference last August, two months elapsed before even a formal acknowledgment was sent by the Colonial Office, and nearly four months passed before the decision of the Imperial authorities was communicated to the Australian Government. There seems no reason why this neglect and discourtesy should take place, and one result of Sir Hartmann Just's visit to Australia should be to remedy these defects in inter-Imperial relations.

Mr. Churchill in his speech indulged in some fulsome praise of the Commonwealth's efforts in naval defence, which he described as "heroic." Australians would have been better pleased if, instead of these superficial eulogies, the First Lord of the Admiralty had more adequately appreciated their point of view and the claims underlying the defence force which they are organising at much pecuniary and personal sacrifice, and had conferred with their Government more frequently before outlining a policy which alters the whole scheme on which the Royal Australian Navy was inaugurated.

The 1909 agreement, the general principles of which were confirmed in 1911, was founded on two very definite principles, the cogency of which still obtains to-day. They were, first, that it is desirable that a powerful British fleet should be placed in the Pacific Ocean to protect British commercial and other interests, and to safeguard the possessions of the Crown in the outhern seas against possible menace; and, secondly, that this eet should comprise units contributed by both the Mother untry and the three Dominions whose shores are washed by e Pacific. Thus, the very important principle of a joint re- nsibility for common Imperial obligations was given concrete m. Quite apart from the practical result from a defence t of view, the value from a general Imperial standpoint of agreement was incalculable. The attempt to stimulate inter- erial union by a bond far more abiding than an annual [illegible] ribution was clearly worth making. Moreover, the moral in the eyes of the world, of a powerful Imperial fleet in Pacific Ocean to which three of the Dominions would contribute

[illegible]

quotas, would have been, and would still be very great. It would have demonstrated the growing power and National consciousness and sense of responsibility on the part of the younger nations of the British Empire, and to the ties of kinship (still strong and undiminished in intensity let it be said parenthetically) would have been added the cement of joint sacrifice and a united harnessing of national endeavour in order to meet a common Imperial obligation.

It is important that this wider outlook presented by the Imperial naval defence problem should be clearly appreciated and kept in the forefront of discussions on the subject, because it seems that Mr. Churchill, in his anxiety to support his theories with regard to naval organisation, has omitted to give it due or, indeed, any consideration. Yet, it formed a vital factor in the scheme which was agreed to at the Defence Conference in 1909 And the important point for immediate consideration is the fact that Australia entered upon her policy of a local naval unit with the clear understanding that her fleet would be united with the ships of Canada, New Zealand, and the Mother Country to form a powerful joint British Pacific fleet. Alone her vessels could not be expected to play a dominating part in the Defence of Imperial interests in the Pacific. But as a unit in a united Imperial fleet, such as was contemplated in 1909 and again in 1911, they would furnish a very real and effective contribution to the joint provision made by the Empire, the value of which would be enhanced by the training of officers and men, and the construction of dockyards and other essential naval equipment on land. It is the practice of ill-informed critics of the Australian naval policy to refer to what they describe as Australia's "isolated navy." The Royal Australian Navy was never intended to be isolated, as the agreements of 1909 and 1911 clearly show, and it is at least doubtful whether the Commonwealth Government would have entered upon the task to which they had set their hands during the past five years if the situation which has subsequently arisen could have been foreseen.

By consenting to the complete abandonment of the fundamental basis of the 1909 scheme Mr. Churchill has destroyed the valuable Imperial note which was its central feature. But another important result follows from the Imperial Government's decision.

under the plan adopted at one Conference and confirmed at the second. Each force of both the Dominions and the Mother Country had a definite place in a general, co-ordinated Imperial organisation. They were all to be parts of a connected whole, all wheels in the same machine. But if the machinery is scrapped, if the structure into which each unit was to fit is left only partially built, the question may reasonably be asked what altered plans our Imperial architects propose to formulate in order to introduce something in the nature of symmetry into the present chaotic design? "To what point is Australian policy now developing?" asked Mr. Cook after Mr. Churchill's speech was delivered. This question is very pertinent, because, whilst a definite answer could have been made so long as the 1909 agreement remained intact, it is impossible to give a reply in view of the altered direction now given to Imperial defence policy.

Both Mr. Cook, the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, and Mr. Massey, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, have expressed themselves in emphatic terms with regard to Mr. Churchill's references to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the part which the treaty between Great Britain and Japan should play in the naval defence of the Pacific. They both make it clear that Mr. Churchill's assumption that Australia and New Zealand must depend on the vessels of his Majesty the Mikado for the protection of their shores is inconsistent with the views held by the Governments of the two Dominions as to the immediate and potential needs in the matter of defence and the dignified and powerful position which the forces of the British Empire should occupy in the Southern seas. In other words these two statesmen who undoubtedly represent public sentiment in their respective countries, take up the standpoint that it is to a British fleet and not to a Japanese fleet that they look for the maintenance of the might and prestige of British power in the Pacific Ocean. Their statements are of sufficient importance to be placed on record here. Mr. Cook stated:

A great statesman * at the other end of the world recently said that the Pacific has been made safe by the Japanese treaty. That raises for Australia questions of [illegible]

* Our readers will scarcely recognise the [illegible] of Dundee and [illegible] under this designation.—Editor N.R.

importance. I hope Australia will always be on friendly terms with Japan, and will get into closer relations with it in trade and commerce and in the peaceful acts of civilisation. And I hope that the treaty may long continue in its present form, for I believe it is a great power for peace. But when Australia is asked to rely on the Japanese treaty for the defence of the Pacific, a very serious situation is created. Japan is a nation whose people Australia will not admit to its shores. The "White Australia" policy must be defended at all costs, for it is a cardinal principle of Australian political belief. Japanese civilisation differs radically from that of Australia, which has been compelled to see that there should be no mixing of races in her territory. Rightly or wrongly Australia has set herself to avoid the troubles that have come to America and elsewhere. That being the cardinal principle of this country, and action having been taken on the strength of it, it becomes a serious question to be told by the Imperial Government that Australia is to depend for her safety on the Japanese treaty alone.

Mr. Cook went on to state that whilst it was true, as Mr. Churchill had said, that the naval forces of the Empire should be concentrated under a united command in the chief theatres of operations, it should not be forgotten that the Empire's naval problem was a dual one. "Not only," said the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, "should the Imperial power be developed in relation to the world's problem in order that there should be an Imperial navy to fight on any and every sea where Imperial interests are threatened, but these world-wide preparations must be combined to make it possible to concentrate the forces at any point wherever the Dominions happen to have the greatest menace. Whilst Australia always hopes that the Imperial unit may be maintained and the Imperial fleet so developed and arranged that every part of the world would be looked after wherever there might be a possible menace, the Imperial naval confederation should be available at any spot in any part of the Dominions, and so available that this country will in no way depend absolutely on the treaty obligations of any foreign Power whatsoever."

Mr. Massey was equally explicit, as the following extracts from his speech indicate.

Mr. Churchill in his speech states that the alliance between England and Japan ensures the safety of Australia and New Zealand. A statement like that does not appeal to me. It is ambiguous, and I do not quite know what it means. I do not want to do Mr. Churchill any injustice, but if he means that the people of Australia and New Zealand are to be satisfied with the protection afforded by Japanese ships and Japanese sailors, then Mr. Winston Churchill is very much mistaken. I do not believe for one

moment that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has secured the safety of either Australia or New Zealand. I do not think so for one moment, and it is just as well for Mr. Churchill to know it.

Mr. Massey once more dealt with the non-fulfilment by the British Government of its agreement to place two Bristol cruisers in New Zealand waters. "We therefore intend," said the New Zealand Premier, "to ask Parliament at the earliest possible moment to authorise the building of a Bristol cruiser to protect our harbours and trade-routes. I believe the best policy is for the Dominion to provide its own ships. The time will come when the Pacific will be a storm-centre, and Anglo-Saxons will have to fight as their forefathers did. Australia is preparing, and Canada and South Africa will also have to do it. At any rate New Zealand must look forward to the time when there will be a British Navy in the Pacific ready to cope with any foe that comes along."

Mr. Cook spoke after Mr. Massey's pronouncement, and referred to the speech of the New Zealand Premier in appreciative terms as an indication of the probability that Australia would soon be able to welcome her sister Dominion in a joint Imperial naval compact, and as a further recognition of the need for some standardisation of naval preparations within the Empire. The Commonwealth Prime Minister once more emphasised the need for an Inter-Imperial Conference which should discuss the whole subject. "The Government is anxious," said Mr. Cook, "to get a conference with all the self-governing Dominions. Our first fleet unit is being completed, but to what point is the Australian policy developing? An agreement was made a few years ago by which the Imperial Government undertook to send to the Pacific ship for ship with Australia. Mr. Churchill has departed from that agreement. He has proclaimed that ships of inferior calibre will do very well for the Pacific. Australia is entitled to something more than that statement. It is entitled to a free and full discussion of the subject of Imperial defence with every part of the Empire."

It was no doubt as a result of these emphatic expressions of opinion that Mr. Asquith decided to approach the two Dominions with regard to the possibility of holding a conference on the subject at an early date. This action savoured of the policies

of locking the stable door after the steed had flown, for apparently the Imperial Government is now willing to confer with the Dominions with regard to a policy which has already been settled. The fact that the Federal Parliament is to meet on April 15, and that a political crisis and a dissolution of Parliament will probably follow almost immediately make it clearly impossible that the Commonwealth Government could spare any of its Ministers to attend a conference within the next few months. If the Imperial authorities had consented to the Australian Government's request last year, not only could the conference have been held before the political situation in both the Mother Country and Australia made a meeting exceedingly difficult, but an exchange of views could have taken place before the announcement made by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on the Naval Estimates. That a conference must take place before very long is apparent, and the Imperial Government will be wise if they endeavour to arrange it as soon as possible. Neither Australia nor New Zealand accepts the policy propounded by the First Lord of the Admiralty. Australia is proceeding with the organisation of her naval force, and New Zealand is about to follow her example, undeterred by the speech of Mr. Churchill. So unsatisfactory a situation cannot be allowed to continue without impeding that cordial co-operation for common Imperial ends which is essential to the cause of Imperial unity and, indeed, to the establishment of an efficient British naval force in the Pacific Ocean.

It is necessary to refer to two further aspects of Mr. Churchill's statement. The First Lord of the Admiralty suggested that the capital ships of the Dominions should be sent to Home waters. So far as "Australia" is concerned I am in a position to state that there is not the slightest likelihood of any Government of the Commonwealth consenting to such a course. Both Mr. Cook and Senator Millen, the Minister for Defence, have stated, with all the emphasis at their command, that in no circumstances would they consent to this diversion from their appointed sphere of the vessels of the Royal Australian Navy. The Australian fleet, of course, is to become available for general Imperial purposes in time of war or other emergency. But Mr. Churchill contemplates their permanent employment in Europe, thus

as Senator Millen has pointed out, entirely reversing the Australian naval policy which was inaugurated with the full approbation of the Admiralty, since confirmed on more than one occasion. Mr. Churchill's proposed Imperial Squadron, which is to perambulate the Empire, is not regarded in Australia seriously. It does not appear to meet either the needs of the Pacific or those which obtain in Europe. Australian statesmen may not be able to emulate Mr. Churchill in naval strategy, but they ask the pertinent question whether at a period of emergency (which would probably come suddenly) it is possible for a powerful British fleet to travel from Gibraltar to Australian waters in a few hours or even a few days. If there is a potential menace to Imperial interests in the Southern seas, then it is essential that a substantial nucleus of a powerful British force, ready to cope with any danger that may arise, should be established in the Pacific Ocean. It may be that this menace is mitigated by the Anglo-Japanese alliance. But the treaty with Japan may not be renewed, and the difficult task of organising an adequate naval force requires careful preparation in advance over a period of years and cannot be undertaken at a moment's notice.

Australians desire to know in what respects the Imperial situation has altered since 1909 so as to bring about the denunciation by the spokesman of the Imperial Government of the policy then arrived at by the representatives of the Dominions and the Mother Country. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was in existence then, as it was in 1911, and presumably the consequences flowing from it, to which Mr. Churchill has referred, obtained in those years as cogently as they do in the year 1914. The international menace is not greater now than it was in the two previous years. Indeed the Defence conference of 1909 was called together essentially as a result of the situation arising out of the increase in the German navy. And 1911 was the year of the coup d'Agadir! To what, then, is the change of policy due? The Australian Government has every desire to co-operate with the Imperial authorities whole-heartedly, and to be guided, so far as possible, by the expert advice of the high officials of the British Admiralty, from whom, indeed, they have received the utmost assistance and consideration in the difficult task of organising their navy. But the Government of the

Commonwealth is entitled to call attention to the wide Imperial issues which are raised by the matters now in controversy, issues which go to the root of the relations between the Dominions and the Mother Country, which may stimulate or retard the hopes entertained by every sincere citizen of the Empire for a closer union between its component parts. This consummation is calculated to be promoted by such an organisation of Imperial defence forces as will keep ever before each part of the Empire the ideals of Imperial unity based upon the united discharge of common responsibilities. It is for this, amongst other reasons, that Mr. Churchill's speech is to be regretted from the point of view of a true, virile Imperialism.

INDIA

A GOSSIP ABOUT BOMBAY

TWO months ago Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Viceroy of India, steamed through Bombay Harbour on the turbine liner *Lhasa*, snapped a crimson ribbon and entered the great new docks which have made Bombay the best equipped port in Asia. The moment was a memorable one, for it marked the culmination of a long and ceaseless struggle. In the midst of adversity and when still under the stress of a prolonged and devastating visitation of plague, Bombay bravely persevered in her determination to fulfil the greatness of her destinies. The new docks are only one aspect of the manifold activities which in the last twenty years have transformed the face of the city, yet they are in some ways the most remarkable of all. The development of the modern port of Bombay is probably without a parallel. Other ports have built docks and extended harbour facilities in the hope of attracting trade, but Bombay has been engaged of late years in an unending race to keep abreast of the growth of her coastwise and overseas traffic. When King Edward, as Prince of Wales, laid the foundation-stone of the Prince's Dock in 1875, the sea-borne trade of the port had a volume of £48,000,000. The Prince's Dock had a basin accommodation of 30 acres, but by the time it

was finished in 1880 the trade had outstripped it. The Victoria Dock, furnishing another 25 acres, was begun in 1885 and completed in 1888. Again it was found to be inadequate for the growing demand for dock space. When King George, as Prince of Wales, laid the foundation of the Alexandra Dock in 1905 the volume of trade had reached £98,000,000. To-day the figures stand at the enormous total of £142,000,000, and are still rising. The shipping now entering the port totals 4,500,000 tons annually, and the revenue of the Port Trust amounts to nearly £600,000. Such is the present position of a port which began with the little dry dock built by the East India Company in 1689.

The Alexandra Dock, opened by Lord Hardinge, has a basin accommodation of 50 acres, three miles of quays, and a dry dock 1000 feet long and 100 feet wide. Other extensions are approaching completion. At the new mole ocean mail steamers will berth alongside the express trains, which will carry passengers over the main lines of India at a speed worthy to be compared with the best trains of Continental Europe. The railway connections with the docks are to be enormously enlarged, and the Great Indian Peninsula Railway has in hand an expenditure on improvements which is reckoned in millions. The old cotton "green" at Colaba, recently the scene of so many inexplicable fires, is to disappear, and the cotton and grain and seeds and manganese ore which make up the bulk of Bombay exports will be accommodated on a big reclamation space of 580 acres close to the new docks. The Port Trust alone are spending £8,500,000 on these improvements, and when their work is done the berthing accommodation of the port will be increased three-fold. The dry dock will take a Dreadnought, and is certainly large enough to hold the biggest ship likely to traverse the Suez Canal in our time. It has a depth over the blocks of 33 feet 6 inches. The depth of the new dock is 37 feet 6 inches.

This magnificent extension of the port of Bombay, which is here only summarily and partially sketched, is chiefly due to the genius and foresight of two remarkable men. One is Sir Walter Hughes, now perhaps almost the only living representative of that older race of engineers who, in the Public Works Department, have left enduring records of their work in India. Slow of speech, quiet in manner, but gifted with far-seeing judgment,

great courage, and exceptional tenacity, Sir Walter Hughes for many years devoted himself heart and soul to the development of the port of Bombay. It is gratifying to think that, still hale and vigorous and busy in the practice of his profession in England, he was able to return to India and stand on the deck of the *Lhasa* to see the completion of his great enterprise. With him was associated Mr. P. G. Messent, the Port Trust Engineer. Most Port Trusts, when they plan great works, employ engineers of world-wide fame. The Bombay Port Trust knew their man, and were well aware that in Mr. Messent they possessed an engineer of very unusual capacity, who understood their requirements and was fully equal to his exacting task. They trusted him, and events showed that they were not mistaken in their confidence.

The opening of these great works at Bombay is an event of Imperial importance, as was shown by the warm congratulatory telegrams sent by King George and Queen Alexandra. At a time when the news from India is not always of the most comfortable kind, it is good to be able to turn and contemplate so striking an example of solid progress. For the older race of Anglo-Indians, however, the recent ceremonies will suggest reflections upon the many changes which have been witnessed in Bombay in the last twenty years. In two decades the city has in many respects grown almost out of recognition, and the only factor which seems to remain unalterable is the obsolete speed of the mail steamers. Yet even the steamers have seen their changes, too, for twenty years ago the old *Ancona* and the *Kaiser-i-Hind* were still running into Bombay Harbour from the China seas. Such splendid vessels as the *Maloja* and the *Mantua* were then undreamed of. No one outside the hotels now takes much notice of the departure of the mail steamers, but in those days it was still an event. Half European Bombay flocked aboard "the mail" on Saturday morning, and lingered over the generous lunch which the P and O. Company used to serve, with splendid indifference, to any one who chanced to wander into the saloon. The warning bell generally had to be sounded half a dozen times when the moment came to weigh anchor, and the P. and O. officials breathed secret prayers of thanksgiving when plague regulations and the Venice Convention put an end for ever to this ancient custom. Soon

the landing of passengers in launches and the drive through streets blocked with cotton-laden bullock carts will have ended also, and be only a disagreeable memory; but it may be predicted that when the old iron-roofed shed at Ballard Pier has vanished, and passengers step straight from a palatial steamer into a resplendent train, they will still be found grumbling at the P. and O. Your Anglo-Indian is very like King Kama in *Princess Ida*, who sang:

> And isn't your life extremely flat,
> With nothing whatever to grumble at?

He considers, and will always consider, that chief among his inalienable privileges is that of grumbling at the P. and O. I have always noticed that the loudest grumbler about the food aboard ship is generally the man from the jungles who for years has had to kill a sheep every time he wants a mutton chop. As a matter of fact, the P. and O. keeps an excellent table, and has served India better and more faithfully than dwellers in that country will ever realise.

Perhaps nowhere in Bombay have greater changes been seen than in the neighbourhood of the Apollo Bunder, the "Gateway of India." No one quite knows how the Apollo Bunder got its name, though the late Mr. James Douglas, Bombay's ablest antiquarian, was wont to trace it to the corruption of a native word. The Bunder is really a broad terraced sea-wall opposite the naval anchorage. Twenty years ago it was not a very impressive landing-place, for beyond it was a stretch of waste ground. At sunset hundreds of Mohammedans who had been "eating the air" by the sea-wall were accustomed to spread their praying-carpets on the Bunder and kneel in prayer with their faces turned towards Mecca. The only building was the small structure, long ago demolished, which was the original Green and Reed's restaurant. Both Green and Reed were notable men in their day, and generations of Englishmen in Bombay have eaten Karachi oysters beneath their low and exceedingly hot veranda on the edge of the sea. Green and Reed have both passed away, and the great restaurant which still preserves their name, and maintains their old reputation for good cooking, is now an annexe of Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. The site of the hotel was then a

little harbour, and by its slip stood the boathouse of the Bombay Gymkhana. Rowing was still popular in Bombay in those days, as it ought to be to-day. The Gymkhana possessed some good pairs and fours, and in the evening one could enjoy a pleasant pull towards the docks. The decision of the Port Trust to reclaim the slip put an end to rowing. Some of us wanted the Gymkhana to build a new boathouse near the Ballard Pier, but the hunting men swarmed in from the suburb of Bandora, twelve miles away, and killed the scheme. The boats were taken out to Bandora Creek, but as no one cared to row in that muddy inlet the sport soon languished. It was a selfish and a foolish decision.

Beyond the site of the old boathouse the late Mr. Tata reared his majestic hotel, and only his heirs know how many lakhs he spent upon the foundations alone. The wiseacres said that so mighty a building—there is no hotel like it in the East—would soon collapse, but these dismal prophecies are forgotten to-day. The chief trouble he had with the foundations was when he made a big Turkish bath underground. The subsoil water leaked into the swimming bath and it had to be closed. The shining dome of the hotel, which is visible far out at sea, is covered with bits of broken china, like most of the floors. Mr. Tata wanted to put a big searchlight on the dome, but the marine authorities objected on the ground that it would confuse navigators approaching the port. Massive architecture is a characteristic of the new Bombay. The fashion was set by the late Mr. F. W. Stevens, who built as though for eternity. The tremendous Victoria Terminus, of which he was the architect, is as ponderous and enduring as one of the old cathedrals. So, too, is the Corporation building opposite, another pile of immense solidity. The architects of the Taj Mahal Hotel followed his example, and its walls are of enormous strength. Mr. Stevens designed the Yacht Club Chambers, which now dominate the Apollo Bunder, and made them as strong as a formidable castle. The Yacht Club itself, which is the work of Mr. Charles Adams, is perhaps more in keeping with tropical requirements. Broad verandas are not so imposing as domes and rounded towers, but they are cooler. Even the Yacht Club has been largely transformed in the last twenty years, and its new and lofty dining-room with twirling

electric fans is a great change from the old low room with hand-pulled punkahs. Yet it is doubtful whether the change is for the better. Another change which has been witnessed in the last two decades is manifested in the intense jealousy with which the Yacht Club is now regarded by some sections of the Indian community in Bombay. The Parsees are the principal exponents of this antagonism, which once almost led to the ruin of the Apollo Bunder. They started a scheme for the erection of a Parsee Yacht Club in front of the Yacht Club Chambers, and very nearly got it carried. Out of that scheme grew the club on the top of Green and Reed's present building, to which no Europeans are admitted.

The question of the admission of Indians to English clubs in India has assumed political importance, but is very much misunderstood. Globe-trotting Radicals, whose knowledge of clubland is generally confined to the National Liberal Club—which is really a vast caravanserai—have made many abusive and erroneous statements on the subject. In my experience the feeling about the admission of Indians to English clubs exists chiefly in Bombay, and is not very visible elsewhere in India; and in Bombay it centres almost exclusively upon the Yacht Club. The reason is obvious. The Yacht Club has a beautiful lawn on the edge of the sea, where the English residents and their wives and daughters assemble towards sunset for tea. The Apollo Bunder adjoins the lawn, and the Bunder happens to be the only spot where the citizens of Bombay can conveniently gather and look out upon their lovely harbour at eventide. Crowds of wealthy Indians drive down to the Bunder, which has become a fashionable promenade. They look across at the cool green lawn of the Yacht Club, and are embittered by the knowledge that they may not enter there. The bitterness has grown very real, but it is very unreasonable, and arises largely from a lack of knowledge of the principles of clubs. Any clubless Englishman might with just as little reason feel indignant every time he passed the Athenæum Club, or White's, or the Marlborough, or any other London club.

"Oh, but," says the Radical traveller, "there is a very great difference. In Bombay there is a racial bar." That is quite true, but it is instituted for very practical reasons. There is no city in India where the Indian and the English communities live on

better or more intimate terms than in Bombay. The intermingling grows rather than lessens. There is no Englishman long resident in Bombay who cannot say that some of his best and closest friends are Indians. He would gladly welcome his own Indian friends to his clubs, as he does to his house. Why does he not do so? There are four reasons. The first is that the bulk of the Englishmen resident in Bombay are business men. They fear—and the fear is justified—that once the club doors are thrown open, pressure of an irresistible kind may be brought to bear upon them to nominate Indians with whom they have business relations, who may not always be "clubbable" men. The second reason is that if some eligible Indians—of whom there are admittedly many—were admitted, they might in turn propose others not so eligible. The English element might in time become submerged. The third reason is that whereas English club members and committees have recognised standards of eligibility for men of their own race, they might often be unable to tell whether the Indians who went up for election were suitable or not. The fourth, and most vital, reason is that the bulk of the people of India will not eat with Englishmen, or allow Englishmen to meet their womenfolk in social intercourse, and in clubs where English ladies foregather, Englishmen resolutely decline to break down their own barriers while religion and immemorial custom erect invulnerable barriers against themselves. The racial exclusiveness of the English clubs in Bombay inflicts a wounding hardship upon a few Indian gentlemen, some of whom I am proud to number among my friends. Nevertheless, I believe it to be wisely conceived. No one who has long studied this question can fail to come to the conclusion that a change in this matter would not at present make for greater amity, as Radical tourists hastily suppose, but would inevitably produce far greater discord. Moreover, the present system will not always endure. Most thoughtful men who know Bombay conditions well consider now that in time a change may come; but it is best that it should come very slowly, and the hour is not yet ripe for a beginning. Should such a change ever be made, the principal difficulties would have to be overcome—first, by placing a definite limit upon the number of Indian members admitted to any English club, second,

by retaining solely in English hands the control of what are essentially English institutions.

Meanwhile, the admirable Orient Club, which in recent years has flourished apace, furnishes Bombay with a welcome resort where Englishmen and Indians can meet upon a common footing.

I have wandered far from my original theme, though not very far from the Apollo Bunder. That historic spot is now to undergo further reclamation and enlargement, chiefly in response to a suggestion from King George. When the King landed in India to hold his Imperial Durbar at Delhi, a temporary gateway, surmounted with domes, was erected upon the Bunder. His Majesty expressed a wish that the gateway, or some structure resembling it, might be reproduced in a permanent form. Out of this suggestion has grown a scheme for a great increase in the size of the Bunder, and the building of a huge gateway pavilion containing halls in which the elect can assemble to meet future monarchs and Viceroys. The conception of the original temporary structure was not adhered to, on the ground that it resembled an Oriental mausoleum. Why domes should necessarily be held to suggest a mausoleum is not clear. The design finally chosen is reminiscent of the Marble Arch, with Gujarati decoration thrown in; but no doubt it will be an imposing structure, and a suitable gateway for a great Empire.

I began with some intention of reciting the many changes in Bombay in the last twenty years, but have scarcely left the foreshore of the harbour. One notable change during that period has been the widespread substitution of flats for the old low and comfortable bungalows in which Europeans once dwelt. Bombay has always had a housing problem, and apparently always will have one. The Improvement Trust, instituted by Lord Sandhurst after the first outbreak of plague, is doing much for the betterment of the native city, though the financial position of the Trust is not all that it might be. The Europeans, on the other hand, are continuing to huddle in flats which are extremely unsuitable for tropical conditions. Flats are bad enough in London; in the tropics they do not permit people to live a wholesome family life. The problem for Europeans in Bombay is to find building areas on which they can build small bungalows within easy reach

[illegible] Bombay where the Indian Ocean still rolls over shallow foreshores. From the engineering point of view the scheme was admirable enough, but experts condemn it as economically and financially unsound. One calculation insists that small bungalows on the area to be reclaimed could only be built at a rent of £50 a month, and even prosperous Bombay shrinks from such an expenditure in house-rent.

of their business. They do not like the flats; they take them because no other accommodation is available. Lord Sydenham's huge scheme for a reclamation on the shores of Back Bay at Colaba at one time seemed likely to give the necessary relief. He proposed to create a vast new Bombay where the Indian Ocean still rolls over shallow foreshores. From the engineering point of view the scheme was admirable enough, but experts condemn it as economically and financially unsound. One calculation insists that small bungalows on the area to be reclaimed could only be built at a rent of £50 a month, and even prosperous Bombay shrinks from such an expenditure in house-rent.

ASIATICUS

and unlimited allegiance." Moreover "we have gone a long voyage together, we have got a valuable cargo on board; and we are in sight of port." We rarely agree with any member of the present Ministry on any topic, but we unreservedly agree with Sir John Simon as to the grotesqueness of recent rumours concerning Cabinet dissensions, with which certain dubious "Unionist" organs have wearied their readers ever since the opening of the New Year. We can only imagine that they are animated by a desire to do the Government a good turn—not for the first time—as nothing is more calculated to cement his Majesty's Cabinet than "opposition" allegations that they are flying or about to fly at one another's throats. These scandal-mongers have admittedly made egregious exhibitions of themselves. Never in the familiar formula "was any Cabinet more united than the present one"; never, we may add, was "the cohesive power of public plunder" more binding, or, for the matter of that, private plunder either, as with the unlimited right of Ministers to speculate on inside tips established as a tenet of the Coalition creed and with their superior knowledge of impending developments of wireless telegraphy, oil fuel, and the chance of exploiting strikes, they enjoy opportunities of enriching themselves beyond the dreams of avarice, of which several Ministers doubtless take full advantage, though we do not suggest for a moment that Sir John Simon is among the number.

The Real Scandal-mongers

THOUGH his political opinions are poisonous to the last degree, and an amiable exterior conceals bitter class hatred, Sir John Simon is quite above the kind of thing with which the present Government will be for all time associated. He will have, however, to be on his guard because evil communications corrupt good manners, and laxity is catching. His speech shows him to be a man of childlike simplicity on the subject of rumours. He presents the public with a delightful spectacle of a band of brothers locked arm in arm round a table in Downing Street, and marvels as to the origin of allegations of acute divisions. He confesses to a political indiscretion. We plead guilty to a professional indiscretion in enlightening his ignorance and innocence. If our news is new to him we can only reiterate our astonishment. Does the Attorney-General live in a monastery cut off from the outside world save in

so far as rumours of canteen scandals may occasionally penetrate? We join with him in dismissing all this gossip as absurd, but for the different reasons we have given. His colleagues are hypnotised by their emoluments and pickings. They will hang together for fear of hanging separately. Nevertheless, such circumstantial statements as have lately appeared in "Conservative" papers, of which he complains, including accounts of bogus battles between different departments and rival ambitions, to say nothing of repetitions of private conversations, *come straight from the Cabinet*. That is to say they originate with Ministers who make a practice of manipulating the Press for their own purposes, as an incident of manœuvring for position. The Press unfortunately lends itself to this personal propaganda because it is deemed good "copy." It is idle for the Attorney-General to gush about Mr. Asquith as "commanding" anybody or as a man to whom "unlimited allegiance" is due—a strange doctrine from Nonconformist lips. The Prime Minister's "authority" is an invention of the platform and the coalition Press. It does not exist. The only control over the Cabinet is that of Mr. Redmond. Inside everything is at sixes and sevens because Mr. Asquith has lost his nerve and allows himself to be chivied hither and thither by more strident and emphatic personalities, and when these are at loggerheads—or pretend to be at loggerheads—we have the usual outburst of paragraphs planted on the gudgeons of the Unionist Press who remain with their ears and eyes and mouths wide open awaiting any tit-bit that may be vouchsafed to them orally, by telephone, by telegram, post or otherwise. There never was such leakage from any Cabinet as the present, though most of it is inaccurate because it comes from politicians for whom truth has less than the usual attractions and who give their own colour to every canard. There is not the ghost of a chance of this cabal—however chaotic—breaking up, though some people aver that one or other of its members may realise that a sinking ship is not the best place for rats, but the ship would not necessarily founder because some short-sighted rat departed. Meanwhile we have the public scandal of which Sir John Simon complains and wrongly attributes to the malignant imagination of a hostile Press, whereas it is merely part of the great battle between Tweedledum and Tweedledee as to who shall secure the Radical Rattle.

Suicide Clubs

THE readers of the *National Review* will not have been taken in by all the nonsense which has appeared in the newspapers on the subject of National Defence. It is a privilege to be able to publish a corrective in the shape of the wise and searching reflections of Lord Roberts, who brings us down to realities however painful they may be. The analogy between the position of Great Britain in this year of grace and that of France in the period preceding the tragedy of 1870, should serve to prevent any good citizen from "sleeping quietly in his bed," which is all the Admiralty has ever asked of us, though from time to time inane and insane appeals are addressed to Germany to give us "a naval holiday," the single and inevitable result of which is to stiffen the grim determination of Germany to wrest Neptune's trident from a frivolous and degenerate Power. Some "Unionist" newspapers and some members of Parliament—who are understood to belong to "The Other Club" formed for the express purpose of enabling our demagogues to "nobble" our journalists and younger politicians—pretend to believe that everything will be all right so long as the *Enchantress* (the Admiralty yacht) is in full commission. We are invited to imagine that a desperate struggle is raging between the National Suicide Club of the Coalition, and an anti-Suicide Club in the Cabinet. But Coalition Government spells Suicide. We have a suicide Premier, a suicide Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, above all, a Suicide First Lord of the Admiralty. Every autumn and winter we are told by the Churchill Press claque of the wonderful things their hero is going to do in a spring that never comes. The public are heartily sick of this pantomime.

Fooling the Public

ALTHOUGH the Admiralty, which does not yet possess a serious General Staff, though it has a wonderful Press bureau, commands an elaborate official apparatus for misleading the country on matters of fact, although the First Lord is allowed by a feeble-minded Premier to commit every conceivable folly, and is vociferously applauded by the Harmsworth Press whatever he does, it is impossible to conceal his appalling share of responsibility, only second, if it be second, to that of Mr. Lloyd George, for endangering both the British Empire and the United Kingdom. Who have brought us to the edge of danger? Why, the twin demagogues who devoted all the

time they could spare from making hay in their departments to the congenial task of reducing our diminutive Regular Army, and of paralysing the development of the Navy at the critical moment when Germany was about to make another prodigious forward move towards the supremacy of the seas. The single distinction within the Cabinet is between an Immediate Suicide Club who would invite Germany to attack us to-morrow by a derisory programme of two token ships and an Ultimate Suicide Club, who are anxious to postpone the evil day until they are out of office, by adopting the scarcely less perilous programme of the Admiralty which is understood to have been whittled down to four ships. Where are Mr. Churchill's pledges concerning the Mediterranean? What has been done to meet the vast increase in the sea power of the Triple Alliance, which are so many German "Dreadnoughts" under another name, and the indefinite postponement of the Canadian "Dreadnoughts", which were used by the Admiralty as an excuse to curtail the British programme. Where are the hundred and one things essential to a sea-going and sea-keeping Fleet, for which no provision has been made? In his megalomania Mr. Churchill imagines that his week-end visits to the Fleet are adequate substitutes for serious preparation, especially if he can get his name in the papers as having flown in an aeroplane or sunk in a submarine. The whole business is mere eyewash. There is not a single member of the Cabinet who takes an intelligent or sustained interest in National Defence which is far beyond a naval question. Mr. George has frankly declared, "I plead guilty to vote-catching." That is a compendious epitome of his career. If the others were equally frank they would plead the same; they are convinced that National security can be imperilled without losing votes. It is a melancholy state of things, but there is no excuse for bemusing the public by sensational accounts of imaginary struggles by sturdy patriots against a National Suicide Club.

"Enchantress" Policy

THAT there is controversy between the Suicide Club of to-day and the Suicide Club of to-morrow may be true—as between two ships and four ships, coupled in both cases with a total neglect of the Army and the collapse of the Territorial Force. That Unionists should regard the *Enchantress* policy as the last word in patriotism is another grave

symptom of the Sleeping Sickness afflicting the nation, though we can scarcely be surprised, as the Unionist record on National Defence is pitiable, and all the more inexcusable because there is no Suicide Club tugging at our leaders' coat-tails. We must protest emphatically against Unionists affording any support either to the Admiralty Suicide Club or the Treasury Suicide Club. During Mr. Churchill's régime our relative position has steadily receded. He has fobbed us off with pseudo-patriotic speeches alternating with tearful appeals to Germany to leave off building, which have met with the reception they deserve. Unionists are in a position to form their own opinion and to disclaim all responsibility for Churchillism, and they have a convenient guide in the shape of official declarations as contrasted with official performances. In the "Naval Notes" of the *Morning Post* (January 24) the facts are stated in a manner that leaves nothing to be desired. According to the Admiralty estimate of requirements as laid down by the present First Lord on various occasions we require in the first place sixteen large armoured ships—commonly described as "Dreadnoughts"—during the next four years, which involves laying down four immediately. Secondly, we are short of three "Dreadnoughts" in place of those provisionally offered by Canada, which Canadian Asquiths have refused. Thirdly, we need a serious reinforcement in the Mediterranean. On this subject we have so far only some "hot air" from the First Lord. "Our position in the Mediterranean must remain one of national and international importance, and we shall maintain it thus, both on land and sea, *to as full an extent as we have ever done in the past.*" If the Mediterranean Powers were to increase their programme we should correspondingly increase ours. Italy and Austria-Hungary intend to lay down eight more large armoured ships as well as smaller vessels.

The Truth

If his "hot air" signifies anything Mr. Churchill, in addition to the seven heavy ships now due, must, in the words of the *Morning Post*, "equip a squadron of at least eight first-class battleships, several armoured cruisers, a cruiser squadron, a powerful squadron of torpedo craft, and auxiliary vessels for the Mediterranean." Lord Roberts sets forth the slump in our land forces during the Lloyd George-Churchill régime—not that he expresses it that way as his paper

is non-Party in every syllable. Here, according to the *Morning Post*, is the position to which these "statesmen"—who on their own showing inherited a Three Power Standard—have brought British Sea Power.

GREAT BRITAIN AND TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Capital Battleships Built and Building		Battleships Projected	
Great Britain	39	Great Britain	?
Germany	26	Germany	2
Italy	10	Italy	4
Austria	4	Austria	4

Note the success of Germany in casting huge naval obligations on her allies while she develops her military strength on a frantic scale besides a formidable navy. But the reader may ask if Italy and Austria are to be brought into the German account should not we bring in France and Russia? No, because the Triple Alliance is an alliance. We have no allies except Japan. Mr. Lloyd George cuts the French to the quick by openly rejoicing over the military expansion of Germany, which is a deadly menace to France. Meanwhile the entire Radical Press is hounded on by Jews to wage warfare against Russia—who was the idol of the Radicals when she was a hostile Absolutism—apparently in the interests of Germany, because it is certainly nobody else's interest to estrange Bismarck's "Elephant and Whale."

Cranks and Others

If we had only "cranks" to cope with, there might be a glimmering of hope of bringing some of them to reason before the twelfth hour. Unfortunately there is another element than "cranks," viz. cosmopolitans, largely of German extraction, or at any rate sufficiently alien to British civilisation as to be indifferent as to its future, or whether it has a future. It is impossible at this time of day, in the light of what is happening before our eyes, to regard our professional disarmament-mongers as all disinterested enthusiasts animated exclusively by idealism, however misguided. The movement has too much the appearance of being a "put-up job," consisting of dupers and dupes, and as it is worth many millions to Germany we should be surprised if there were no Germany in this first-class investment. For one thing there are no indications of any corresponding movement in Germany, whose armaments by land and sea are the single cause of European unrest and anxiety. Then, again, Militarism is palpably more powerful

across the North Sea to-day than at any time within living memory. Those who talk Disarmament in the face of the Zabern incident—of which we publish an illuminating account elsewhere—have the choice of being knaves or fools. There is no alternative. It is not merely the original episode itself, as any young lieutenant or peppery colonel might lose his head and run amok: it is the manner in which it has been treated by the powers that be in Germany, to which even the most perverse of our Potsdam party cannot afford to be blind. The Reichstag which loomed so large in England and is so small in Germany—being a mere puppet Parliament—has completely curled up after one sham demonstration against the Imperial Chancellor which was treated over here as a "Vote of Censure" involving the usual consequences. The military courts have glorified the brutality of the troops in Alsace whose colonel has become a popular hero throughout Germany not merely lauded sky-high by the Crown Prince, whom our Pacifists in their folly discount, but decorated by the Emperor, whose Ministers have all had to dance to militarist piping.

The Junker

In the face of this development, which has evidently startled some of those who had allowed themselves to be deluded by their own illusions, carefully fostered by Anglo-Germanising agents, does not our peace patter and disarmament agitation become treason to a threatened state? What serious elements exist in Germany capable of responding to the "overtures" which our cranks professed to regard as hopeful? No paper has been more strenuous in misleading British opinion as to the *real* Germany than the *Manchester Guardian*. It has been pro-German all these critical years as it was pro-Boer throughout the Boer War and subsequently, indeed up to the other day, when the Boer Government met Syndicalism with martial law. The Zabern affair has moved our contemporary to publish a short article * on "Prussian Junkerdom: How Zabern is to be explained," which might have come from the pen of the late Sir Rowland Blennerhassett apart from the passage in which the writer forgets that the Prussian Army is not a class affair but "a nation in arms." We make no apology for reproducing this significant contribution.

* See *Manchester Guardian*, January 24, 1914.

The Zabern affair, and still more the arguments advanced in defence of Colonel von Reuter, have shown once more that German militarism is something unparalleled in the rest of the world. This peculiarity is due to the predominance in the State of the Prussian Junkerdom. From its ranks the corps of officers is recruited, and their caste-spirit pervades the organisation of the army.

When the Imperial Chancellor, speaking before the Junkers in the Prussian Landtag, extols the virtues and the honour of the army and claims for it a predominant place in the State, does he mean the common soldier? Do those who listen to him think at the time of the virtues and the honour of the simple Michel who is made to execute the goose-step at Tempelhof and elsewhere? Not a bit of it. The common soldier is no more thought of as possessing any virtues or honour than the *knecht* in the swine-stall on a Pomeranian estate. When the Chancellor and his friends in the Landtag speak of the army as being the salt of the earth they have in view the officers' corps, they think of themselves and their sons and their brothers, who constitute the ruling caste in Prussia, and, through Prussia, of all Germany. It is the officer, not the army as a whole, who is endowed with all virtue and all honour, and is placed above the civil law. He is a translation into the army, where conditions allow a wider and freer scope, of a spirit that tries by every means to assert itself in civil society of Germany.

A hundred years ago the Prussian Junkerdom was deeply discredited. It had been smitten hip and thigh at Jena, and the regeneration between 1806 and 1813 was accomplished by men who had nothing but contempt for it. The people, the democracy of Prussia, carried out the task of freeing the country from the foreign despot, without much help from the Junkers and their King. But the middle class of Prussia was not the middle class of England or of France. It had come late into being with the help of the very State which it rose to combat, and it had at its back a working class which was beginning to have its own notions as to its place in civil society. Though Liberal by profession, the middle class never had the courage and the ability to assert itself. More and more the working class, now constituted as a separate party, pressed from behind, and in abject fear the bourgeoisie surrendered to the Junkerdom all their positions, rejoicing if they succeeded in obtaining in return some concession to their material interests. The Constitution, the army, the entire bureaucratic machinery of the State—all were surrendered almost without resistance.

The Zabern affair was possible because the Junkers are the ruling caste in the Empire. [Our italics.]

The closing sentence crystallises the issue. Germany is ruled by Junkers. Shall Great Britain, shall Europe pass under the same sway? Surely there must be anxious searchings of heart among those who have made it their business to represent Germany as a peaceful Parliamentary Power animated by a Christian love of her neighbours, who only asks to "live and let live." Junkerdom means tyranny and Junkerdom commanding the greatest army and controlling the greatest combination of sea-power imperils Western civilisation.

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Once Bitten, Twice Shy

ALTHOUGH the public are equally weary of speeches for and against Home Rule and are anxiously awaiting the fateful moment of action, attention was arrested by the welcome and unimpeachable declaration of Mr. Bonar Law at Bristol on January 15, which was an immense relief to those who feared that once again the Unionist Leaders might be inveigled into the Conference trap by which our Party was so successfully swindled on the death of King Edward. The painful shock caused by that event, which was known to have been hastened by political worry, due to treacherous counsellors, afforded the imperilled cabal an opportunity of proposing a Conference on the Constitutional Question to their opponents in which bad faith met good faith. The proceedings were sufficiently prolonged to obscure the circumstances surrounding a great Sovereign's death, and when Mr. John Redmond had collected adequate American dollars by Anglophobe speeches across the water the curtain was peremptorily rung down, and an innocent Opposition found itself plunged into a General Election for which it was totally unprepared, with the lamentable results we all know. This Conference was "confidential," which meant that Radicals were free to disseminate what falsehoods they pleased through the usual Unionist channels, while our side were debarred from telling the truth by obligations of honour. Mr. Asquith calculated on playing the same trick over Home Rule on Mr. Bonar Law, who was to be kept "conversing" while his followers disarmed and Ministers matured their plans for springing the Home Rule Bill without the alteration of a comma on a demoralised Opposition and a startled country. Such were the orders of Mr. Redmond, to whom Mr. Asquith must "toe the line" on pain of forfeiting the one thing dear to him and his colleagues. If you lead an unwonted life of "swank," £5000 a year becomes the principal if not the only considerable factor in your existence, just as £8 a week dominates the thoughts of another section of politicians. However, "Once bitten, twice shy," as Mr. Bonar Law's Bristol speech shows. He, at any rate, entertains no illusions as to the advantage of sitting round a table on the pretence of conferring with political tricksters who are not even free agents.

Warnings

Again referring to Press rumours which have been as sensational and unreliable concerning the meetings of the Party Leaders as about the bogus battle between the big Party of the Little Navy and a purely imaginary little Party of the Big Navy in the present Cabinet, Mr. Bonar Law stated with characteristic directness and simplicity, "It is my desire, and I am sure it is equally the desire of the head of the Government, that there should be no unnecessary mystery, and I intend to tell you now exactly how the matter stands." The speaker had continually received letters from Unionists all over the country "all written in the same strain." We are delighted to hear that Mr. Bonar Law's correspondents "all point out that negotiations between political parties mean invariably manœuvring for position, and they warn me that we have to deal with a Government—I am expressing their views, not my own—with which we cannot compete either in astuteness or in unscrupulousness." This is perfectly true, and the general public will be grateful to those who have been at pains to impress this view on Mr. Bonar Law; and we are equally glad to hear from him "I do not think that these warnings are needed. We shall not be beaten in that kind of game, for this reason, that we shall play no such game. If we win, and I think we shall, in the terrible conflict which lies in front of us, we shall win only because right is on our side, and because we trust to that and to that alone." He admitted, and we frankly regret to hear it, that "there have been conversations between Party Leaders" because we hold that if you touch pitch you are defiled, and our Party should have no truck whatsoever with the other side either at week-ends, at private dinner parties or even at tea-fights. There has been much too much of this kind of business, and even the golf links have been exploited as a field of Ministerial intrigue; nor has the ocean been left alone. All these social foregatherings at a great national crisis, between Party Leaders who invite other men to be in earnest—and certainly no one will question Mr. Bonar Law's sincerity or earnestness—are a great mistake, and the sooner they are over and we revert to the healthier traditions of a former generation the worse for the Radicals, no doubt, but the better for Unionists, who suffer severely in reputation from these much advertised social amenities. However, all is well that ends well, and we have Mr. Bonar Law's assurance that so far these "conversations" "have been without

result," and he is "grieved to say, but I think it my duty to say, for nothing can be gained by cherishing vain illusions, that so far as I can judge there can be no result." For this relief much thanks.

Impasse

THE speaker euphemistically added, "I do not say that because I doubt that the Government really and earnestly desire a peaceable solution. I am sure they do." But he touched the spot when he added, "The conditions on which they hold office have apparently made it impossible for them to take the only step which would make a peaceable solution conceivable." In looking over the controversies of the last few months it is some small satisfaction to think that we have never at any moment misled our readers into believing that there was a ghost of a chance of what so many of our contemporaries have toyed with, namely, "a settlement by consent," the obstacles to which are pithily expressed by our correspondent Mr. Dale in a letter elsewhere. Unless we wilfully close our eyes to the elementary and essential facts we can all see that those obstacles are insurmountable. Mr. Bonar Law added, "It is not for us to make proposals. We are opposed utterly to Home Rule. We think Home Rule a great evil; we think that civil war is an evil infinitely greater, and if the Government can make to us any proposal which would do away with the prospect of civil strife, we should not only be ready to consider it, but we should be ready to consider it with a real desire to accept it, if acceptance were possible without—to repeat a qualification I have used before—the sacrifice of national interests or the sacrifice of honour." The central fact of the situation was the determination of the people of Ulster to resist by force if necessary the imposition of this Bill, and any proposal which did not meet their just claims must be futile, as it would not secure the one object which would alone make it worth the while of the Unionist Party to consider compromise. The Unionist Leader admits that at one moment even he was misled by Ministerial utterances into imagining that the Government were prepared to face the facts of the situation. "But at the first whisper of a Conference the Nationalist Leaders made it plain that they would demand their pound of flesh, that they would not be content with the right to govern themselves, but they insisted

as the right to govern the great community which detests their rule, and which, if they relied on their own strength, they never in this world could govern."

His Majesty's Prisoners

To unsophisticated persons like ourselves, who are mere on-lookers at politics and do not pretend to be able to penetrate the parliamentary mind, it is incredible that the Nationalists having been accorded the position they now occupy in our public life, not merely through the subservience of one Party, but owing to the cowardice of two Parties, should for a moment abandon the pound of flesh which circumstances have combined to place within their grasp, and the only astonishing feature in the Home Rule situation is that any man of intelligence should imagine either that the Nationalists should be talked out of their ambition to misgovern Ireland, or that the Radicals should be talked into the abandonment of the Nationalists. Once grasp these two facts and the whole position becomes clear, though not for a second would we underrate its peril; but then we are among those who have thought from the very outset that Home Rule meant civil war, and we must confess that hideous as is the prospect we do not at the time of writing see how it can be avoided. Mr. Bonar Law, as a parliamentarian, could appreciate the difficulties of the Government due to the Party system, which had many advantages, and was indeed the only system under which democratic government had ever been successfully conducted, but like other forms of government, it had great dangers, which he thus diagnosed in a passage which shows an intellectual detachment invaluable to a Party Leader who has not lost all sense of perspective simply because he happens to be taking a prominent part in the parliamentary game.

When Party discipline becomes so rigid, when Party passions are so strong that the interests of Party are not only identified with, but are preferred to the interests of the nation, then the danger to the State is grave indeed. That is the position now. The Government know that if they appeal to the people to-day—the course which it is their clear duty to take, and which, in the long run, they will be compelled to take—if the verdict went against them, the whole work in which for the last two years they have been so assiduously engaged, for the sake of which they have sacrificed everything else, including the dignity and the traditions of the House of Commons, would all be in vain.

The speaker recognised "that is a humiliation to which no Party

Leader will submit if he can help it." Nor was that the only Ministerial difficulty, as they had incurred obligations to the Nationalists who had attended the House of Commons with a regularity which put to shame members in every other part of the House, and again and again had saved the Government from defeat.

British Troops

But that was not all, because as part of the game they had allowed the British Government to impose a Budget upon Ireland "which they admitted was bad for Ireland. They have paid their price. They expect to receive the goods. It is no wonder that the Government feel under an obligation to them. That obligation is not precisely, considering the motives for which it was incurred—it is not precisely a debt of honour, but it, no doubt, weighs, and weighs heavily with them. 'Their honour rooted in dishonour stands, and faith unfaithful makes them falsely true.' They can be true to their allies only by being false to their country." At any rate, as the net result of these "conversations" with the Government the Unionist Leader had now come to the same conclusion as those who have had no "conversations" with the Government, "that it is their present intention to carry out their policy to the bitter end, and on that assumption it becomes our duty, which we do not undertake willingly or light-heartedly, by every means in our power to prevent them from committing what in our hearts and consciences we believe will be a great crime." After reviewing and annihilating the claim of Messrs. Asquith and Co. that they had a mandate to do these things, Mr. Bonar Law dwelt on their hopeless miscalculations concerning Ulster. They had believed Mr. Redmond, who had declared there was no Ulster question at the General Election, and they had not the courage to admit their mistake. Mr. Asquith was asked by a heckler, "Will you use British troops to coerce Ulster?" to which he replied, "That is a contingency which is not likely to arise." Now he knew, as every one else knew, that it was a contingency which was not doubtful but certain, "Does not that alter the whole position?" If Ulster was to be coerced, if British troops were to be used to shoot down men who had ever been loyal to their country and their King, "and if it is to be done to pay a debt to those other men who have rejoiced in our

national misfortunes, who have insulted our Sovereign, who have ever vilified and are vilifying to-day our Army, if Ulster is to be dragooned, surely the order must be given, not by a body of men who are here to-day and will be gone to-morrow. If it is to be given it must be given only as the declared will of the whole people of this country." Before they were involved in bloodshed could any one maintain, even the Prime Minister, that he had the right to persist unless he was sure that he was carrying out the will of the people. "If he is not sure he has absolutely no right to do it; if he is sure why does he not put it to the test? By doing so, if he is right, he would lose nothing. (A Voice: £400 a year.) No, not at all; if he is right he will not lose his £5000 a year; if he is right he will lose nothing, not even time, for if a General Election took place to-morrow and the Government won it they could carry through the Bill without the loss of a single day. They have everything to gain and they have nothing to lose, that is, on the assumption that the people are behind them."

A Written Compact?

One of Mr. Bonar Law's merits is that he never makes a false point, though we cannot help feeling that other Unionist speakers on Home Rule have failed to drive home this particularly cogent argument possibly through their forgetfulness of the provisions of the Parliament Act. The Unionist Leader had an alternative to a General Election which it was said might not be a test on account of other issues, though if it would not be a test now how was it a test last time. "But if that is their fear they have an alternative; they can present their proposals to the people as a clear issue by means of a Referendum, and we—and I speak for the Unionist Party—should in every case bow to the decision. If the Government wish to avoid the horrors which are facing us nothing is easier. Let them take either of the courses I have indicated and the difficulties disappear. If they win, they will have the moral sanction which is lacking to them now, and whatever they do, whether it is right or wrong, the responsibility will not be theirs alone." But the only reason they rejected these obvious alternatives was either because they dreaded the verdict of the country "or because they have made a bargain with their allies which prevents them from doing their duty to their country."

That is probably the true explanation. Ministers are believed to be blackmailing one another over many other matters, but they are blackmailed by the Nationalists on Home Rule as at some time or another they incautiously committed themselves to paper, the publication of which by the possessors of that paper in the event of their violating a written undertaking, would damn them even more than they are damned at present. The Leader of the Opposition thus crystallised a disagreeable situation "They are ready apparently to face civil war rather than face the people." Mr. Bonar Law is evidently alive to realities. There is nothing of the "Wait and See" about him, and he is prepared to face the assumption that as needs must where the Devil drives the Government will prosecute their policy to its logical conclusion. "Suppose they carry Home Rule under the Parliament Act, suppose they put down relentlessly and successfully the resistance of Ulster, what then? They will have changed a population which has played a great part in the history of our country, a population of which any country would be proud—they will have changed them from loyal citizens to sullen and remorseless foes. In Ireland, the memory of such an outrage would never be effaced, and the chance, the possibility, of a peaceful and contented Ireland would be gone for ever. If I were the most ardent Nationalist who ever lived, unless I had lost my reason, I should not accept Home Rule on terms like that." After an eloquent and convincing vindication of the attitude of Ulster, to whom the words once used by Cromwell about his Ironsides were applicable, "They know what they are fighting for and they love what they know," Mr. Bonar Law declared, "Ulster had no alternative, and we here in Great Britain who believe they are right have no alternative either." The Unionist Leaders fully realised their responsibility and appreciated the consequences of their action.

It is a responsibility which weighs heavily upon us. I can say for myself that it oppresses us; but we should not shirk it because the Government have left us no choice. We have given a pledge that if Ulster resists we will support her in her resistance. We intend, with the help of the Almighty, to keep the pledge, and the keeping of it involves something more than making speeches; it involves this, that we are bound in honour to Ulster to use every means, any means which seem to us effective to prevent the coercion of Ulster. But the responsibility for that pledge does not rest only on the Leaders of the Unionist Party; it rests also upon the Unionist Party, which has accepted and which has endorsed that pledge. The path of duty lies clear

before us and, believe me, the path of duty is also the path of national safety, for if the Government once realise that the Unionist Party in Great Britain—half and, as I believe, more than half—are in earnest, if they realise we are in earnest, as they realise to-day that Ulster is in earnest, then they would see that what they propose is impossible and that they must appeal to the people.

What Next?

THIS is one of the gravest declarations that has fallen from the lips of any Party Leader in this country. We trust that all those who are involved appreciate its consequences. The era of speeches is over. The moment of action is at hand. There is no lingering shadow of doubt as to the nature of Ulster's action, as she has taken the world into her confidence so that all who run may read. She has been steadily preparing for the crisis of her fate for more than a year, and her preparations are so far advanced that when the Syndicalists at the head of the British Government follow up the placing of the Home Rule Bill, or rather the Civil War Bill, on the Statute Book—which implies an abuse of the constitutional functions of the Crown such as we have neither seen nor read of—by endeavouring to enforce it, it will become necessary to call out the British Reserves in order to shoot down the Ulster Army at the bidding of the Molly Maguires who have consistently spat on the British Army. The Duke of Bedford has discussed the problem in one of his thoughtful pertinent speeches. We are for the moment concerned with something else. Are the Unionist Leaders and the Unionist Party to devote the interval before "the great day," which will indeed be a "great day" for Germany, to the usual Parliamentary flummery? Will the House meet a few days hence as if nothing was happening or was likely to happen and go through all the conventional formalities of a Debate on the Address with its accompanying humbug? Will the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords, after congratulating Lord Murray on his safe return from Bogota, pass the time of day to Lord Crewe and following the customary compliments to mover and seconder, deliver the usual elaborate impromptu on a Speech from the Throne of which advance proofs will have been courteously sent to the Opposition Leaders the previous day? Will the Leader of the Opposition in "another place" do ditto in the House of Commons, throwing in a few seasonable compliments on the number of academic distinctions gained by the Asquith family and congratulations to Ministers on

Sir Rufus Isaacs' appointment and their own escape from appendicitis operations? It is admittedly very flippant to criticise the Holy of Holies at Westminster, whose mysteries are beyond mortal ken, but the "man in the street," who gets little hearing in the Press and none in the House of Commons, seriously and sincerely desires to know not what the Unionist Party are going to say in order to prevent Home Rule from becoming the law of the land, but what they are going to do. They rightly demand a Dissolution. Can they not force one? If so they must begin on the opening day. As we have not set eyes on a Front Bench man this year and are in no one's confidence it is permissible to speak freely the thoughts that are in the minds of men who are only important because they are numerous.

Mr. Chamberlain's Retirement

ALTHOUGH it is several years since Mr. Chamberlain ceased to play an active part in public life, so great is the power of a great personality that it would be no exaggeration to say that the political world was thunderstruck on learning on January 8 that our one great living statesman had decided to sever the last link connecting him with Parliament by vacating his seat at West Birmingham, with which his name and fame are imperishably associated, at the next General Election. The announcement was characteristic of the man. In letters written from his home at Highbury to Mr. George Titterton, the President of the West Birmingham Liberal-Unionist Association, and to Alderman Tonks, the President of the West Birmingham Conservative Association, he conveyed the news in such irrevocable terms as to leave no room for any request for reconsideration, and his decision, though causing profound sorrow in Birmingham, was accepted unmurmuringly there as elsewhere. To Mr. Titterton he wrote: "Before leaving home for the South of France I think I ought to communicate to you the decision at which I have arrived to retire from Parliament at the next General Election. I have not come to this decision without many regrets at the severance of a connection which has already lasted for over thirty-seven years and has been marked on the part of my constituents by an ever-growing confidence and support; but I cannot hope again to do my work in Parliament, and I feel that our city and the constituency need the services of a younger man, who will

take an active part in the parliamentary struggle, and help you to maintain the supremacy of the Unionist cause in Birmingham." Mr. Chamberlain added: "In announcing to my old friends and constituents that I shall not offer myself again for re-election when a General Election comes, I would ask you to thank them all for their long-continued kindness to me and for the loyal and undeviating support which has been my mainstay throughout my public life. Assure them of my abiding interest in all that concerns their welfare, and of my lasting gratitude for their friendship and goodwill." Mr. Chamberlain wrote in similar terms to the President of the West Birmingham Conservative Association, closing with an expression of warm thanks to the support which the Conservatives of his constituency had afforded him. "I shall also gratefully remember your kindness and follow with interest the fortunes of my old constituents. I know that I can trust them to maintain the reputation of West Birmingham as a stronghold of the Unionist cause."

Balance of Power

We publish elsewhere a well-informed and sympathetic article from the capable pen of Mr. C. A. Vince, on the long and intimate relations between Mr. Chamberlain and the citizens of Birmingham, which helps us to appreciate one of the most remarkable associations in parliamentary history. On this point we will only venture to say here, though the opinion of outsiders is not popular in Birmingham, that the withdrawal of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain even from the nominal representation of the great metropolis of patriotism is a more far-reaching event than even the most imaginative among us realise. It will cast an additional burden on the Unionists of the Midlands, of which they have no conception unless they are infinitely more intelligent than many practical politicians in other places, who usually labour under the delusion that to-morrow will be as to-day. His was and is a great name to conjure with. Throughout an area returning nearly fifty members to Parliament, which has held the balance of political power at various crises during the last thirty years, people could always feel even when supporting some indifferent Unionist candidate that "a vote for Blank is a vote for Joe." Think what that meant to the average "man in the street" as often as not a detached politician preferring men to measures. Think what

the withdrawal of the magic name of Joe means—necessarily on the one side a great awakening of aggressive Radical and socialistic activity; already we are told that in future Birmingham elections will be fought in a vastly different spirit to the hopeless contests against Joe in the plenitude of his power, which was at its zenith in Birmingham in proportion as Unionist fortunes were at a low ebb elsewhere. Meanwhile the detached politician will become more detached than ever and consequently more at the mercy of the frothy demagogue. These considerations are so obvious as to be necessarily present to men of light and leading in the city, towards which the entire Empire has turned for inspiration during the Chamberlain epoch. They must be therefore fully alive to the vital necessity of meeting a new situation and counteracting the new forces now coming into play by a display of activity and pugnacity which will recall the Birmingham of the brave days of old.

The Younger Chamberlains

It was rumoured from the outset that Mr. Austen Chamberlain would succeed his father in West Birmingham, though not without searchings of heart, as his selection for the City would necessitate the transference of the Unionist candidature in the important Division of East Worcestershire to somebody else, and one cannot envy any one the job of stepping into Mr. Austen Chamberlain's shoes. Some days later came the unexpected news that that splendid veteran Mr. Jesse Collings, who has more fight in his little finger than many of our younger politicians in their whole anatomy, had decided to follow the example of his great leader and vacate his seat in Edgbaston. Mr. Jesse Collings is regarded with respect and affection by all who know him. He loves the people from whom he is proud to have sprung, and he loves his country with an abiding affection, foreign to the ordinary professional politician, whom happily he does not resemble in any respect. Nothing has been definitely settled as regards the future representation of Birmingham at the time of writing, though there is a widespread hope that it may be possible at last for Mr. Chamberlain's second son, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, to find his way into Parliament where those who know him are convinced he would have a distinguished career, and what is much more important, in view of the somewhat poverty-stricken

personnel of the House of Commons, he would become a really valuable public servant. He is essentially a chip of the old block, and having kept out of politics he has retained that freshness of outlook which is lost at Westminster by all but the greatest men. All Unionists throughout the country will join in wishing God-speed to Mr. Austen Chamberlain in the high and responsible task he has undertaken in accepting the leadership of Birmingham Unionists. His success, like that of his father before him, will depend on the amount of enthusiastic loyalty which the younger generation of Unionists are prepared to devote to the causes for which the Unionist Party stands, which in its turn will be affected by the amount of encouragement which they receive from the heads of the Party, which was always a feature of the Chamberlain régime, though it could hardly be described as the predominant characteristic of contemporary parliamentarians. Mr. Austen Chamberlain has such fine personal qualities, is so transparently sincere, single-minded and public spirited that though he had the misfortune to don official livery at an unusually early age, we believe, as we hope, that he will be able to pull off this tremendous task, but let us make no mistake about it, it is a tremendous task.

Retrospect

OF Mr. Chamberlain's services to his city, to the nation, and the Empire it would be premature to speak. They will be seen in truer proportion by those who come afterwards, but we cannot help feeling that as regards the last, and in some respects the greatest, of his campaigns as Missionary of Empire his reputation will stand infinitely higher than that of any of his contemporaries. We know him to be a great man to-day. He will seem a greater man hereafter because he will completely dwarf his generation. The obstructors of his policy of Imperial Preference, in whatsoever Party they may be found, will receive short shrift at the Bar of History. We are not thinking only of the opponents—the hungry mountebanks who had wandered long in the wilderness of Opposition and greedily grasped the opportunity of arousing popular prejudice against an attempt "to make the rich richer and the poor poorer." There were the intending turncoats who seized a pretext for selling themselves to the other side, which they calculated was in for a long innings and was ready to reward rats and renegades.

There were some of whom better things might have been expected, apart from honest cranks who seriously hold that man is made for Free Trade and not Free Trade for man, who would confessedly sink with Cobden rather than swim with Chamberlain. There was a vast inert mass of Unionists of unsettled convictions who only cared as to which way the cat might be going to jump. Few of them had ever given a thought to the fiscal question. Thinking is less in their line than speaking. Some of them were doubtless jealous of the ascendancy and popularity of Mr. Chamberlain throughout the Empire and with the people at home. They welcomed a chance of tripping him up. Others, though rendering lip service to Imperialism, were essentially Little Englanders at heart, having been brought up to believe that the sun rises and sets in the Home counties.

Unionist Responsibility

We have latterly fallen into the habit of imagining that Chamberlainism was defeated by the Radicals in 1906 and has never recovered from the shock. We forget that it was crippled by a Unionist Government during the fateful and fatal years following 1903, when the Tariff Reform movement was launched and Mr. Chamberlain was politely elbowed out of a Government of which he had been the life and soul. It must be acknowledged that he made one grave mistake in leaving his son, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, behind him in the Cabinet as a hostage to fortune, who could do little to help his father's policy among unsympathetic colleagues, while his membership of the Government contributed to paralyse the father's propaganda, on which the conversion of the country depended. It is easy to be wise after the event. We can see it all now as plain as a pikestaff. But for the association of Tariff Reform with an unpopular Unionist Government at the end of its tether it would certainly have triumphed within two or three years. Never did a new idea receive such an ovation from a Conservative people. At the worst it would have kept any Radical victory within manageable dimensions, and after a brief spell of office, possibly without power, the Bannermans, the Asquiths, and the Georges would have been hooted off the stage and we should have accomplished our "first constructive work," which would long since have justified itself, and the history of these disastrous years would have been rewritten.

Collapse of Cobdenism

ALL the main arguments originally advanced against Mr. Chamberlain and Tariff Reform have gone by the board; the two that appealed most cogently to Unionist Free Traders, was in the first place the delusion that Cobdenism afforded a solid guarantee against Socialism which was the exclusive affliction of benighted Protectionist countries. Nowhere has Socialism made such progress as in Great Britain under Mr. Asquith, whose Government lives on Limehouse. The other assertion most assiduously trotted out for the benefit of Mugwumps was that we could only maintain the pristine purity of our public life which made us the envy and admiration of Foreign Powers by consenting to remain the common dumping-ground. The moment we taxed a German sausage we should lose our character. We are still the common dumping-ground and open our arms to the German sausage. But where is our character? What has become of the harem of Cæsar's wives, who made us what we were? Not only are our leading politicians convicted of receiving valuable tips from Government contractors, but their conduct is enthusiastically approved by the Cobdenite Party and the Cobdenite Press, and any Cobdenite member who dare dissent from the accepted creed is summarily sent about his business by his Caucus. No Protectionist Power has been degraded as we have been degraded during the past year. We have lost almost as much prestige as if we had been beaten in war.

"Rare and Refreshing Fruits"

THE remaining "rare and refreshing fruits" of Cobdenism need no recital. We cannot afford to maintain a reasonable minimum of national security, our finances are in a state of hopeless chaos, we are in a chronic state of strikes, our capital is flying abroad, our people are following, and those left behind find that in spite of the record boom and ever-increasing wealth of the Radical Plutocracy the struggle for life is harder than ever through the fall in real wages or the increased cost of living, as you may choose to call it. We were promised immunity from Socialism, Clean Government, universal prosperity, overflowing happiness, if we turned our back on Mr. Chamberlain's quack nostrums. We have got two discontented islands drifting into civil war under the auspices of Panama politicians. Had Mr. Chamberlain been decently

supported by his pseudo friends he would have triumphed over his enemies, our people would be far more prosperous and our Imperial future assured. Heavy is the responsibility of the Knock-Knees and the Faint Hearts who rejected a priceless opportunity and are still engaged in whittling away a great policy.

The Twenty-Five Questions

Lord Murray of Elibank has at last responded to "the call," and having failed to summon a new world into existence to redress the Balance of the old, he has returned to this effete country—in the *George Washington*. Instead of being met on landing by the brass band of the National Liberal Club, the wanderer was confronted by twenty-five questions from the *Morning Post*, which he refused to answer, though they afforded him what should have been a welcome opportunity of commencing the process of "cleaning up"—to borrow his own suggestive phrase—the Marconi mess, so long overdue. These interrogatories will be useful in coming controversies.

(1) When you went into the American Marconi transaction on April 17, 1912, did Sir Rufus Isaacs tell you that both the information on which you were acting and the shares in which you were dealing came originally from the Managing Director of a company with which the Government was in negotiation ?

(2) If so, how do you reconcile it with your duty as a public servant to place yourself under an obligation to a Government contractor ?

(3) Did you the day after you bought 1000 American Marconi shares for yourself at £2 buy 2500 of the same shares for your Party at £3 5s ?

(4) Did you get all the shares you applied for on behalf of the Liberal Party ?

(5) Did you conceal this purchase from your two colleagues, Sir Rufus Isaacs and Mr. Lloyd George, and from your co-trustee, Mr. Illingworth, and, if so, why ?

(6) Did you buy these shares through Mr. Fenner ?

(7) Was not Mr. Fenner your private stockbroker before you became Chief Whip ?

(8) Was he first employed for the Party when you became Chief Whip ?

(9) Did you instruct Mr. Fenner to purchase Home Rails for the Party to the amount of over £21,000 in March 1912, when the Government was negotiating the settlement of the coal strike ?

(10) Did Mr. Fenner write to you on March 23, after the purchases had been made : "I think with the first sign of any strike settlement we should see a general rise all round ?"

(11) Were these Home Railway Stocks so purchased ever delivered to you by Mr. Fenner ?

(12) Had you not evidence by July 1912 that the broker had misappropriated Party funds to the amount of £30,000, as well as £30,000 of the money of another client ?

(13) Despite of this knowledge, did you allow Mr. Fenner to continue to do business until his insolvency in April of the following year ?

(14) Have you taken any legal steps to recover the money of which you were trustee ?

(15) Did you open a Party account in the Charing Cross Branch of the National Bank ?

(16) Did you describe this account, in your letter of June 7, 1911, to Mr. Molony, the manager, as " the political account " ?

(17) When you resigned the office of Chief Whip did you inform your successor of this account ?

(18) If you did, how do you explain Mr. Illingworth's statement before the Select Committee that he knew nothing of any Party account with the Charing Cross Branch of the National Bank ?

(19) The Assistant Manager of the Branch told the Committee on June 10, 1913, that this account was still open. How do you explain the existence of this " political account " in your name nearly a year after your connection with the Party funds was supposed to have ceased ?

(20) We know the explanation of your silence on the Marconi speculation—" not to involve new Whip in the muddle "—how does this explanation apply to the politcal account still open nearly a year after at the Charing Cross Branch of the National Bank ?

(21) Were you actually in this country for two months when the Select Committee was sitting ?

(22) Did you not think it your duty to appear before that Committee and explain your position ?

(23) How do you justify your action in remaining away from this country, even upon most important business, when matters affecting your conduct were being investigated by a Select Committee of the House of Commons ?

(24) Do you think an ex-Chief Whip is justified in acting for a company in operations which may become the subject of international controversy ?

(25) Having failed to appear before the Select Committee, will you answer these questions in our columns or will you explain your position in the House of Lords ?

Tampering with the Jury

THE *Morning Post* followed up the interrogatories administered to Lord Murray by an admirable leading article (January 22) setting forth the vital issues at stake in the fight for Clean Government in which this great journal has borne a conspicuous and honourable part rendered all the more striking by the painful silence of other organs from some of which better things might have been expected. Our contemporary was unable to understand " this iron boycott " which was " doing politics and the administration of England a very great deal of harm."

Three Ministers of the Crown have been publicly accused of taking financial favours from a Government contractor. This accusation has been made not merely in quarters which are privileged, but in the public Press—in our own columns, for example. What

have these Ministers done? They were given the opportunity of clearing their reputations in the public courts of this country before an impartial Judge and Jury. If they refused to do this the proper alternative was to resign their position as Ministers of the Crown. They did neither: they chose to skulk behind a Party Tribunal: one of them deliberately imparted information to two of his friends on that Tribunal while keeping it back from the rest.

That Minister,

now Lord Chief Justice of England, actually lobbied two Members of the Court which was enquiring into his conduct. When, by the honesty of its Chairman and the independence of the minority, the truth could not be altogether suppressed, the Parliament which had been previously hoodwinked was cajoled by a sort of half apology, and immediately after this ceremonial humiliation, this conventional day of atonement, there was a jubilation of thanksgiving and self-congratulation at the National Liberal Club.

As the *Morning Post* appropriately observes:

If these secret practices of Ministers had been committed by some wretched underpaid petty officer in the Navy, or clerk in the Civil Service, we need not say what would have happened to him. There would have been no question about his motive: the contract on the one side and the shares on the other would have been quite sufficient evidence. His motive might have been as white as a sheet; he might have taken gifts, as Lord Chancellor Bacon said he took them, without any corruptness of heart. He might have pleaded that he was a comparatively poor man, and that he had already suffered agonies of sleeplessness and apprehension. All such pleadings would not have helped him. He would have had to pay the penalty—and rightly so. Those who administer justice and the affairs of a country have no right to let private feelings of sentiment or compassion—or interest—override their public duty.

It had thus been made clear to the whole world that in the England of to-day "there is one law for the great and one law for the poor, and the man who more than any other made this clear to the world administers the justice of the King's Bench. And the Bar which has the duty of guarding the principles of justice, as a priest guards the altar, made itself accessory to this degradation by refusing to protest—only one barrister had the courage out of all the swarms that hive and cluster in the Inns of Court." And where was the Opposition entrusted with the traditional duty under our unwritten constitution of keeping the Government clean by publicity and criticism? "They were not altogether silent: they made their protest in the House; they publicly washed their hands in the basin of the Minority Report. But when Ministers left the House, and threw the winter garment of repentance in the fire of the National Liberal Club; when they publicly rejoiced over their

sham acquittal, then, we say, it was the duty of the Unionist Party to press the matter home to the conscience of the country and refuse to have peace or truce in the matter."

Enoch Arden

A FEW years ago neither party could have tolerated or condoned such an episode. The *Morning Post* cannot tell us "how the subtle and enervating change has taken place or what influences—sinister influences, to use a favourite expression of our Liberal contemporaries—have contributed to bring it about. But the fact remains. Ministers are charged with receiving favours from a contractor, and they either go on being Ministers or go up higher, and the thing is applauded by one party, condoned by another, and boycotted by a large part of the Press." Undoubtedly, "this country has taken a big step on a downward road, along which other democracies have walked before, a road which leads to a stage in which public honesty is regarded as singular, and where political parties and Press unite in a common conspiracy to deceive and hoodwink the public, while the public on its side admit with a weary cynicism that nothing can be done because there is no soundness left on which to build. If we have not reached that stage yet, we have taken a definite step in that direction." Lord Murray "the Enoch Arden" of the Liberal Party had returned and refused to answer the catechism of the *Morning Post* and we are promised a statement in the House of Lords which, for reasons given elsewhere, is totally inadequate to meet the situation, as no statement from any of Mr. Asquith's colleagues on any matter connected with the Marconi question is of the smallest use unless it be made on oath and subject to cross-examination. The *Morning Post* appeals to the Peers to do their duty.

The House of Lords is not yet completely under the sway of the Party system; it still contains some Peers who value the high traditions of our Administration more than the comfortable silence of a mutual accommodation. They will not, we trust, be restrained by the thought that the Party system, with all its abuses and corruptions, must be preserved at any cost. If Party funds are abused, let us have Party funds placed on a reformed basis. There is much talk of reform; let us reform the Party funds system. Let us look into the question of the buying of honours. To buy honours like merchandise is to degrade the House of Lords and the Crown. Let the House of Lords try to make an end of it.

Our contemporary points out to the Peers, "that in this Enquiry they have the chance of showing to the country that they at least have not forgotten the honour of England and the high traditions of our public Service." Let us hope that the appeal may not fall on deaf ears, and that the same feather beds which smother the Opposition in the House of Commons will be in abeyance "in another place." There is backbone in some of our Back Benchers who fight with a halter round their necks, as the Government has renewed its declaration of war against the Lords while continually flooding the House. On the face of it it is unthinkable that the Peers should identify themselves with the Panama politics of the National Liberal Club. There must be a statement on oath from Lord Murray before he takes his seat.

A New Party

OUR diverting contemporary the *Daily Mail* somewhat prematurely let the cat out of the bag and revealed to an astonished world the Be-all and End-all of its continuous and nauseating booming of Mr. Churchill. It is not so much a big Navy that he wants—we never for a moment imagined that it was—but a New Party. Having ratted from one sinking ship in 1905, he contemplates ratting from another in 1914, and as re-ratting is rather a tall order even for his own Press claque, he is to be provided with a comfortable raft in the shape of a brand new Party of his own, though its composition is for the present a profound secret. In any case we may be sure that the new Leader of the New Party will not forget his old friends of the Amalgamated and Associated Press who have kept him in the limelight ever since he was out of his teens. In an inimitable article "By a Political Critic" (vide *Daily Mail*, January 12) we are told that "the question of Mr. Churchill's future is one of the most interesting in the domestic politics of the moment." Mr. Churchill has thought so for at least fifteen years. Did he write the article? Then follows a puff of the Windbag of Dundee which would be fulsome even in the case of a really great man. A veil is drawn over his escape from Pretoria as over his unspeakable performances at the Colonial Office where he insulted almost every community under the British Flag and almost every individual enjoying the confidence of his countrymen. Nothing is said of his achievements

at the Board of Trade, which he turned into an electioneering office, or the Home Office, where he is chiefly remembered in connection with the release of the Dartmoor Shepherd, nor of his triumph in reducing our naval programme in 1908 to two Dreadnoughts as against Germany's four, a folly from which we have never recovered and possibly never may, or his indecent capture of the Admiralty in 1911 for not having the requisites withheld by the combined efforts of himself and his twin demagogue the Artful Dodger of Carnarvon Boroughs. Nor are we allowed to know anything of his conduct at the Admiralty, which he has reduced to turmoil and confusion—no man however capable or distinguished being safe from his impertinent interference. The presence of such a personage in Whitehall is probably worth at least five battleships to Germany.

Two Top Dogs

HOWEVER, the *Daily Mail* thinks otherwise and dwells affectionately on "the majestic personality which stimulates enthusiasm and moves the masses." We should like to see that "enthusiasm" and to meet those "masses" because the surest recipe for producing a slump at any public meeting is to mention the name of Winston Churchill (prolonged silence). We are told that "he is quite entitled to aspire to the chief place in the counsels of a Party and in those of the Crown"—though it is dismally added and we cordially agree: "it hardly looks as if that ambition were likely to be fulfilled." This is a sad confession on the part of an organ which has been inconsistent on everything except the daily advertisement of the Windbag. "For reasons which seemed good to him at the time, Mr. Churchill, in 1906, cast in his lot with the Liberals." Quite so. The Unionists were obviously going into Opposition while the Radicals were coming into office. Now the parts are reversed and Mr. Churchill's relations with his present colleagues are such that "the strain has now nearly reached the breaking-point." There is "a difference fundamental and irreconcilable between Mr. Churchill and his chief rival for the succession to the Liberal throne when vacated by its present occupant." Once more we agree. There is an acute difference between these two adventurers, who are both making a stalking horse of the British Navy. It is not a differ-

ence on any principle, but simply as to which of them shall be "top dog" whenever they succeed in ousting the limpet at the head of the Government. On the same authority—is it, we repeat, himself—we learn that Mr. Churchill is an ardent "Imperialist," that he has an aversion to "toeing the line" to the Molly Maguires, which is somewhat ungrateful seeing that he owes his seat at Dundee when kicked out of Manchester some years ago exclusively to Molly Maguire votes, just as the Cabinet of which he is an ornament owes its continued existence to Nationalist support. Then comes the vital question. "But if Mr. Churchill abandons the Liberals, where else will he find scope for his ambition and his ability?"

Concentration

According to the *Daily Mail*, the sole function of this much afflicted community is to find scope for the personal ambitions of professional politicians. There is never the whisper of a suggestion that any obligations are due by these adventures to the country. "He is far too important a person to drop out of public life altogether at forty; he will certainly remain in politics, and if he is in politics he must be a leader. Shall he return to the Unionist Front Bench? One hears the suggestion from time to time; but I do not think it will be carried into effect." It would be difficult for any man to return to a place where he has never been. He has occupied many offices in Radical Governments but he has never sat on a Unionist Front Bench. The entertainment is not over as we learn "No doubt there are vast numbers of Unionists in the constituencies who would hail his return to the fold with delight?" Where are they? Echo answers, "Where." So the only solution is a New Party. "So ardent and venturous a spirit might prefer another alternative. Why should he not place himself at the head of another Party, a great, independent, National Party, a Party of concentration, as it would be called in France, which would be neither Liberal nor Unionist, but would draw some of the most valuable elements from both?" Such a combination would be strong in Parliament as it would comprise "from the outset some of the ablest and most energetic of the younger men on both sides," while elsewhere "enthusiasm would be kindled afresh for a combination which

stood for genuine convictions (*sic*), for patriotism (*sic*), for Union (*sic*), for the Constitution (*sic*), and for reform (*sic*). The hour has struck for such a new grouping of forces, and of that hour Mr. Churchill is the man." When this new and powerful combination takes office only two things will be lacking to its success—principles and votes.

New Year's Honours

THE campaign for Clean Government and against Panama politics has already had one salutary effect. The Honours lists are nowadays scanned with unprecedented vigilance. There was quite an outbreak of new Peers, including Professor Bryce, O.M., our late Ambassador in Washington, who is chiefly remembered for his zeal for the commercial annexation of Canada by the United States via Reciprocity, the fiasco of the Arbitration Treaty and the Panama Canal Bill. He must as a modest man have been amazed at the ecstatic enthusiasm of the Radical Press, by whom he was lauded sky-high as though he had been Sir Robert Morier and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe rolled into one. There had never been such diplomacy. We can almost hear the Americans laughing in their sleeve. The explanation of these extravagant eulogies is simplicity itself. Professor Bryce had been out of Radical Party politics—which have been growing more dirty year by year—so his Peerage was comparatively innocuous, which could scarcely be said of all the other new creations. Among them curiously enough was a highly respectable Unionist Member of Parliament, Sir Alfred Cripps—a lawyer—who must have been surprised at the enthusiasm of his opponents on his elevation, though, according to all accounts, it aroused infinitely less enthusiasm among his constituents of South Buckinghamshire, who had not given him a big majority at the last General Election in order that he might suddenly leave them in the lurch and plunge them into an unexpected by-election in mid-winter. We cannot conceive how any self-respecting Unionist could persuade himself to take any honour from this disreputable gang of gamblers now engaged in engineering a civil war, and we trust that in future Unionist Associations when selecting a candidate will exact a pledge that he shall not vacate the seat to meet the convenience of the other side. Lord

Parmoor (the title selected by Sir Alfred Cripps) must be very simpleminded if his suspicions are not aroused by the effusiveness of the unctuous humbug on the Woolsack. Sir Rufus Isaacs, late Attorney-General, and now Lord Chief Justice of England—the first Jew to attain that position, though whether the rest of the Jewish community share his satisfaction at the appointment is another question—becomes a member of the House of Lords, which he has devoted his political career to humiliating. Unlike eminent Radical lawyers, *e.g.* Lord Herschell and Lord Russell, he abandons his surname and appropriates the entire town of Reading. Henceforward he is to be known as Lord Reading of Early, not Lord Earlybird of Reading or Lord Isaacs of Foxhills—where he lives. It appears that he has house property at Reading, which never transpired when his colleague, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was waging war upon ground landlords. Another Peerage which passed almost unnoticed in the Ministerial Press was the elevation of our old friend the late Lord Advocate, Mr. Ure, recently appointed Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland and now disguised as Lord Strathclyde. Mr. Ure's presence in the Upper House—of which he is unlikely to be a silent member—will afford their lordships a perpetual opportunity of ascertaining the exact facts upon any controversial matter.

The Harmsworth Peerage

In many respects the Peerage of Sir Harold Harmsworth is the most interesting, though equally unnoticed in the Press, apart from the curious observation of the *Daily Mail* attributing it to his "misguided zeal" for the Radical Party. Why "misguided?" Sir Harold Harmsworth is a convinced Radical and an intimate personal friend and warm admirer of Sir Rufus Isaacs, Mr. Lloyd George, the Master of Elibank and other Big Wigs of his Party to whom he has played the hospitable host at Cap Martin, when these great men have been "run down" as a result of their single-minded and strenuous devotion to the public weal. It was from Cap Martin that the Master of Elibank telegraphed to the Party Broker, two years ago, when with his friends the Attorney-General and the Chancellor of the Exchequer he was basking in the sunshine of that beautiful place—January 8, 1912:

"Montmorency, London.

"My address, Villa Dragonier, Cap Martin, Alps (*sic*) Maritimes. Write me how things are looking.

"ALEXANDER MURRAY."

Fenner's reply, dated January 9, 1912, contains the following sentence:

"Another share which has marked a very substantial rise during the last few months is that of the Marconi Company. With these exceptions markets generally have tended downwards."

Fenner's reference was to English Marconis, as the new American Company had not yet come out and there was no boom in other Marconi shares. As we know, the Master of Elibank and his friends would sooner have been hung, drawn and quartered, than touch an English Marconi share. There was absolutely no point in this mention of Marconi, though conceivably it might have given rise to some discussion among the "merry party" at Cap Martin upon the subject of speculation generally, in the course of which it would be made abundantly clear that Ministers, though investors at a pinch, had a peculiar aversion to any form of gambling on the Stock Exchange. We have no idea as to whether Sir Harold Harmsworth was then at Cap Martin, but rightly or wrongly we have always regarded this visit as an interesting indication. The Harmsworth family have a genius for friendship, and when the storm burst the host doubtless exercised all his immense influence in the Press to protect his guests from criticism by diverting public attention to other topics. This may be the "misguided zeal" which oppresses the *Daily Mail*. But then Sir Harold Harmsworth is an open and avowed Radical who would frankly do his utmost to save his own Party, even from the consequences of their own wrongdoing, and though such an attitude does not represent the highest conception of public duty in a newspaper proprietor, it is intelligible that a man who knew these Ministers personally, trusted them absolutely, and was convinced that they were incapable of speculating in Marconi shares during the negotiation of the Marconi Contract—on a tip from the Contractor—should gradually have drifted into a position in which black really eemed white and white—black.

As he had been misled so doubtless he misled others. That a man of his intelligence, ability and power, should stoop to a Peerage in these degenerate days is amazing; that he should have it if he wants it is only natural. We must defend him from the criticism of the *Daily Mail*. What we complain of, and the complaint is widespread, is not so much the conduct of Radicals in standing by other Radicals in distress, but the conduct of Unionists or spurious Unionists in allowing countless organs of public opinion which bear the Unionist label, to be manipulated by Radicals in order to save the bacon of the Radical Government. If the entire Harmsworth Press were inspired and controlled by Sir Harold Harmsworth, it could scarcely have a worse record on the Marconi scandal from the Unionist point of view, which is on this question the National point of view. The whitewashing of Ministers guilty of malpractices and mendacity by the Cocoa Press or the Chemical Press, or by any other newspapers whether representing Oil or other interests with which the Radical plutocracy are identified, has surprised no one. We never expected anything better. If the *Westminster Gazette*, the *Daily News*, the *Daily Chronicle*, the *Star*, or the *Manchester Guardian* published decent articles on Clean Government, and denounced the deceptions practised on Parliament and the public by Messrs. Asquith and Co., protested against party speculations in Home Rails during a Coal strike, or condemned the appointment of the late Attorney-General to the Lord Chief Justiceship, we should all fall flat with astonishment. Such action demands moral courage, and there is no room for moral courage in modern Radicalism. But the public expect something different from a non-Ministerial Press and we have no hesitation in describing such articles as appeared in the *Times* on the morrow of that highly mysterious *Matin* libel action last March, and the article which appeared in the *Daily Mail* on the promotion of Sir Rufus Isaacs—as a disgrace to English journalism.

The Harmsworth Press?

If the Harmsworth Press is at heart a Coalition Press with a mission to help the Government out of every hole and to queer the pitch for the Opposition, let us be plainly told so. Unlike the *Daily Mail* we unreservedly congratulate Sir Harold Harmsworth on a peerage earned from the Party point of view, while from the public point

One Man One Newspaper

of view it is as well to know that a leading, if not the leading, member of the Harmsworth Press is an out and out Radical. Its daily, hourly, incessant advertisement of the principal mountebanks of the Radical Party becomes intelligible, as also the support of Reciprocity between the United States and Canada, the capitulation of the Peers over the Parliament Bill, and the ignominious scuttle of the Unionist Party in the House of Commons on Tariff Reform. These are all painful and puzzling episodes if we regard their advocates as genuine Unionists, but if we regard them as the other thing they cease to be puzzling or painful. In any event, the spread of these titanic Newspaper Syndicates, whereby a handful of billionaire wirepullers can misdirect and falsify public opinion, is the greatest danger now threatening democracy. Much has been said on "One man one vote" and "One vote one value," but there is one reform of infinitely greater importance, namely that the people shall be allowed to know whose opinions they are reading, which can be crystallised into the formula "One man one newspaper."

Civilisation v. Syndicalism

No one can describe South Africa as dull. It has lavishly contributed its fair share to the making of history, and among the many sensational episodes for which it has provided a stage nothing is more notable than the extraordinary events of the past month, even though in the absence of fuller news we may not be in a position to pass final judgment. Our pro-Boer friends have had a rude awakening. They deliberately placed South Africa (apart from Rhodesia, which wisely stood out) under Boerdom for no better reason than to vindicate their own pro-Boerdom, and because the Boers had fought against us and were consequently the darlings of the National Liberal Club. We can all recall with shame the humiliating and repulsive exhibition which our Lloyd Georges made of themselves whenever Boers condescended to visit us and the studiously offensive attitude of the Churchills to the British of South Africa. They have their reward though it has tarried by the way. Doubtless inspired by the Syndicalists of Limehouse, the South African Lloyd Georges decided that the moment was ripe to hold up the Government and the community. There had been a foretaste in July when the Union Cabinet was unready. This time General Botha and his

colleagues were prepared, and what is unusual in parliamenta Ministries they were resolute. No sooner was a general railw strike declared, which was taken up by the industries of the Ra and threatened to become universal, than martial law was swift proclaimed and enforced by sixty thousand citizen soldiers. Tv hundred Lloyd Georges ensconced themselves in the Liberty Hall Johannesburg, and having announced their determination to d sooner than surrender—capitulated to a single field piece. To o domestic Radicals not the least impressive incident is to find t sacred name of Gladstone at the foot of a proclamation of marti law. After this no one can charge Providence with being devo of humour. A Harcourt is also involved. Labour circles at Hon are frantic, and the Labour Party in Parliament is sternly dete mined to bring the arch-criminals to account by doing—nothing.

Obituary

The obituary of the past month contains several distinguish names. Two stand out as those of men who in their differe ways served their countries and indeed civilisatio The word Bayard is so bandied about nowada as to have lost all meaning, but in its original and proper sense is applicable to General Picquart, the hero of the Dreyfus cas who unflinchingly sacrificed a brilliant career to right a gre wrong, and ultimately found himself, through an amazing turn fortune's wheel, Minister of War in Monsieur Clemenceau Cabinet. He died the other day and is mourned wherever valo and virtue are admired. Lord Strathcona, the Canadian Hig Commissioner, succumbed during the cold weather at the patria chal age of ninety-three, having devoted a wonderful existen to the making and service of Canada. His earlier life was passe in the open, his later life in cities, which gave his mind unusu balance and his judgment was much valued. His largeness view, noble patriotism, and princely generosity made him a gre man. Who is to replace the splendid veterans who have made t British Empire what it is? Even in death Lord Strathcon preserves his native simplicity, preferring to repose by the sic of his wife in a country churchyard.

AN OMINOUS PARALLEL

FRANCE 1866–1870: THE UNITED KINGDOM 1903–1913

I PROPOSE, in this paper, to touch upon some of the events which occurred in France in the years 1866 to 1870, and to show how closely those events correspond with what has happened in this country during the past ten years. My object in doing this will be easily seen; it is to enable my fellow countrymen to profit by the lessons of history, so that they may escape the disgrace, humiliation, loss of territory and of money which France suffered some forty years ago.

The extraordinary success of Prussia in her short and sharp campaign against Austria in 1866 naturally caused alarm in France, and the French Emperor and his advisers instituted searching enquiries into the military system which had gained so great a triumph for the arms of Prussia. At the very outbreak of the war the Emperor Napoleon had sent one of his own orderly officers, Colonel Baron Stoffel, into Bohemia in order that he might study, and report upon, the events of the war. Stoffel was subsequently appointed Military Attaché at Berlin, and held that post until July 19, 1870, when, war having been declared, he was ordered to leave Berlin at a few hours' notice.

Stoffel lost no time in setting to work, for his first report was submitted on September 8, 1866, and in this paper the sagacious French officer put his finger on the main cause of the superiority of the Prussian army:

The Prussians [he wrote] are pleased to call their army "the people in arms," a very just title, on account of the system of obligatory military service; and they make no mistake about the great power which their army acquires owing to the presence in its ranks of the educated and well-brought-up men of the rich and leisured classes, who, as officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, devote to the defence of their country all the vital forces, all the intelligence which the country contains.

Stoffel follows this up by suggesting that in France they should begin to improve their army by stopping the system which then prevailed of allowing the rich who were drawn by lot for military service to buy themselves off. As matters stood, he said, the French army was nothing but "a collection of the most needy and the most ignorant of the French people, to whom the favoured classes entrusted the task of fighting for them."

For four years Stoffel continued, with zeal and energy, to report on the wonderful power conferred on the Prussian army by the *moral* superiority of the system of universal obligation for military service, which was enforced in Prussia but neglected in France, but his reports were never published. The Emperor was, however, much influenced by them and made strenuous attempts to improve the organisation of the French army. As early as October 1866 he wrote to his War Minister recommending a scheme of reform based upon universal obligation to service. A Commission was assembled to report on the best means of securing the defence of French territory and the maintenance of French political influence, and the point which the Commission had to settle resolved itself into the question of how an army of a million men, counting reserves, was to be procured.

Prince Napoleon, cousin of the Emperor, was President of this Commission, and quoted from the writings of the latter, when he was a prisoner in the fortress of Ham, the following passage: "The Prussian organisation is the only one which is suited to our democratic nation, to our equal laws, and our political situation; for it is based on justice, equality and economy, and has for its aim not conquest, but independence." The Prince therefore advocated the adoption of the Prussian system, but the civilians on the Commission opposed tooth and nail all suggestions of universal service. They said that

it was impossible to aggravate the military burden, or increase the army estimate, still less to call out the entire class of the year: by so doing they would furnish arguments to the opposition which was putting in its programme a reduction of the annual contingent from 100,000 to 80,000 men, as well as of war expenditure generally.

The soldiers on the Commission said: "Tell the country the truth, explain to the people the actual political situation resulting from recent events; make them understand the dangers to

which we are exposed by this situation, and they will not refuse you the means for strengthening the army." But this it was impossible for the civilian Ministers to do. M. Rouher, the chief of them all, could not tell the country that it was in danger, for he had just recently explained that Germany, by cutting itself into three divisions—Austria, the Confederation of the North, and that of the South—had become weaker and therefore less of a menace than ever.

General Pedoya, in a book published in 1908, shows how the Battle of Sadowa affected Europe like a clap of thunder. Public opinion attributed the success of the Prussians to their needle-gun and their superior organisation. As regards the former, the French School of Musketry had just succeeded in experimenting with a new weapon and the French infantry was soon in possession of the *chassepot*, a weapon superior to the needle-gun of the Prussians. The Government also began to study the question of providing adequate reserves for the army. The Emperor did his best to push on the necessary reforms, and in his speech on the opening of Parliament in 1867 he said that "the influence of a nation depended on the number of men which it could put under arms." This led to the Military Bill of 1868.

This Bill, which was based on universal liability for service, asked for a reduction of the period with the colours to five years, and for the creation of the "Garde Mobile," which should have corresponded to our Territorial Force, if the latter were based on compulsory enlistment. The French Parliament, by a large majority, rejected the proposal for obligatory personal service, which was declared to be "impracticable for France." "It might be possible," it was said, "for the peasant and the working man, but it was much too burdensome for the literary man, the savant, the artist, or even for the rich land-owner who would want to look after the management of his own farms."

The organisation of the "Garde Mobile" was voted with a bad grace and its members could only be called out for fifteen days in the year, and then only for one day at a time. Even against such difficulties Marshal Niel might have made some headway, but he died, and his successor, Marshal Lebœuf, stopped the work of organisation begun by Niel, and actually said, "I intend to

let the Emperor understand that, in peace time, the 'Garde Mobile' shall exist only on paper."

But to return to Marshal Niel. Thwarted in his attempts at real reform and denied the money which he demanded for carrying out the organisation of the "Garde Mobile," Marshal Niel was driven to cover up the defects of the army by reiterated declarations that everything was in perfect order. "Sire," he said to the Emperor, "you have the finest army in the world."

On another occasion, in April 1869, he said in the Senate: "We have an excellent army, trained, full of ardour, perfectly organised, and provided with everything."

Emile Ollivier, in his great book *L'Empire Liberal*, harps much on these and similar expressions of the Emperor and of Marshal Niel, and declares that the army was all right but that it was extremely badly handled by its generals in the campaign of 1870. But we know from a letter of the Emperor's to Marshal Niel that, even in March 1869 he was getting hints from generals in the army that the forces were not so ready as was said. The colonels spoke of a shortage in numbers of men; said that there would be many horses to be bought for the cavalry if war were to break out; that they were not sure whether all the artillery horses boarded out with farmers would be immediately available, and so on.

But perhaps the most ominous of all the shortcomings of the French was a failure in determination on the part of those who were responsible for the Government of France at this critical juncture. A letter of Lord Lyons to our Ambassador, dated from Paris, January 30, 1870, has lately been published in a life of Lord Lyons written by my friend and colleague in the National Service League, Lord Newton.

The letter begins thus:

I have had a visit from M. Emile Ollivier. The thing uppermost in his mind was disarmament. He said he was very anxious that England should exert her influence with Prussia. He explained the position of the present French ministers with regard to the subject. They depended, he said, principally on the great agricultural population of France for support against Socialism and Radicalism. It was essential, therefore, that they should do something for that population. To conciliate them, either taxes might be remitted or the call upon them for recruits be diminished.

This letter reveals the fact that the rulers of the French had

lost the firmness and resolution necessary to enable them to face the hard task of maintaining the armaments necessary for the protection of their country and actually condescended to appeal to Bismarck to slacken in his preparations for war, in order that they, the French Ministers, might gain votes and remain in power. I need hardly say that the fact that these proposals for limitation of armaments emanated from France was to be carefully concealed from Bismarck; but the fact that the origin of the proposals was carefully concealed only makes them the more contemptible.

I have explained the position of affairs in France during the years immediately preceding the catastrophe of the Franco-German War, and I will now ask my countrymen to consider how matters have gone with us in this country during the last ten years.

We had our warnings as to our military weakness, not from the pigeon-holed reports of a Military Attaché, but from the events, known to every Briton who could read the newspapers, of the war in South Africa. There is no need, and certainly no desire on my part, to under-rate the difficulties of that war, the mobility and tactical skill of our enemies, their fine rifle-shooting, the vast extent of country that we had to work over, the lack of roads and railways which made it difficult to move our men and to keep them well supplied. All these difficulties were overcome but with incredible exertion and at an enormous expense of time and money, and as far as the Regular Army was concerned, owing to the great reforms carried out by Lord Cardwell, it came well through the struggle.

But the outstanding lesson of the War was clearly summed up in the Report of the Elgin Commission in the words: "No military system will be satisfactory which does not contain powers of expansion outside the limits of the Regular forces of the Crown, whatever that limit may be."

The only existing source from which such power of expansion could be drawn was the Auxiliary Forces. The Duke of Norfolk's Commission of Enquiry into the condition of those Forces found them unfit to face trained troops with any prospect of success. It recommended a variety of minor reforms, but found that it was impossible, from Volunteers, to exact any standard adequate to secure real fighting efficiency. The Commission consequently

declared that "a Home Defence Army capable, in the absence of the whole or greater part of the Regular Forces, of protecting this country against invasion can only be raised on the principle that it is the duty of every citizen to be trained for the National Defence."

This Report was issued in April 1904, but the Unionist Government which was then in power did absolutely nothing to give effect to the advice of the Royal Commission. On the contrary, an official paper was drawn up, in which the "cost of Conscription" was estimated at £28,000,000. Calculations in this paper were, no doubt, correct in themselves, but they were based on the amazing assumption that every male Briton who reached the age of twenty would be fit for military training, although every one in the War Office must have known that an enormous percentage of those who offer to enlist in the Regular Army are rejected every year as absolutely unfit for soldiering on physical grounds.

The Liberal Government certainly did make an effort to put matters right. The Special Reserve was substituted for the old Militia, and in theory the reform was a good one, for the men of the Special Reserve, on joining, undertook a liability to serve abroad with the Regulars in time of war and each man (or boy), on joining, was to go through a course of six months training. Then again, the Territorial Force was substituted for the old Volunteers. The organisation of this new Force was a very great improvement on the old Volunteers, but, being based on the voluntary principle of enlistment, it has failed, as the Report of the Norfolk Commission said must be the case, to furnish the country with a Home Defence Force capable, in the absence of the Regular Army, of protecting the country against invasion.

But as early as the year 1902, and long before these two Royal Commissions had issued their warnings, a patriotic organisation—the National Service League—had begun to urge the necessity of creating a great Reserve of trained men in this country, and had shown that the only way to do this efficiently, economically and fairly was by a system of compulsory and universal military training for Home Defence.

After I left the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1905, I

was invited to become the President of this League, and in 1909 I was entrusted by the same body with the task of introducing the "National Service—Training and Home Defence—Bill" in the House of Lords.

As in France in 1868, so it was with our Bill—universal obligatory service was rejected, and I grieve to have to record my opinion that it was rejected for the same reason, namely, the fear of offending the voters.

Again, just as in France the military members of Prince Napoleon's Commission had urged the politicians to tell the country the plain truth, to explain to the people the actual political situation and to make them understand the dangers to which they were exposed, so in this country retired naval and military officers who are free to speak have supported me in making a similar appeal to our politicians. In vain have we besought them to explain the change caused by the rise of a great German navy, by the growth of armaments on the Continent of Europe, by a visible collapse of our own military institutions. Year after year our military forces dwindle and nothing is done. If more money is wanted for the Territorial Force, it is taken from the sums allotted formerly to the Regular Army; when a new and expensive wing—that of military aviation—is added to the Army, the funds for it are got by cutting down the Artillery.

I have mentioned "the visible collapse" of our military institutions; it is clearly demonstrated in the following Table of figures given by the Secretary of State for War in the House of Commons last July:

1903	Establishment	Strength
Regular Army	272,577	272,797
Militia	126,942	100,320
Volunteers and Yeomanry	378,280	277,267
Total	777,799	650,384
1913		
Regular Army	244,765	235,231
Special Reserve	75,832	58,912
Territorial Force	312,319	250,134
Total	632,916	544,277

As to the Territorial Force, its numbers had fallen another

5000 by October 1 last, when they stood at 245,000, but I need not labour the point of this breakdown. It was openly admitted by Colonel Seely himself in the House of Commons in April last, in the speech which he made in opposition to Mr. G. J. Sandys' Bill for completing by compulsion the numbers voted by Parliament for the Territorial Force. Colonel Seely was anxious on that occasion to force the House to a Division on the Bill, but he said, "Let every man who votes against this Bill realise that we have failed in achievement." And he repeated with emphasis these last words, for he went on to say: "Although this is no time for panic, it is a time of preparation, but we have failed in achievement."

But if the Territorial Force is a failure, the Special Reserve is an even worse failure. The physique of the men enlisted for it is so poor that the War Office will not even furnish to the House of Commons tables of their ages, heights, chest measurements and weight—although these particulars are given every year in the case of recruits for the Regular Army, are recorded for those of the Special Reserve, and could easily be procured and published. As to the numbers, the Table given above shows that where we had 100,000 men in the old Militia, we have now less than 60,000 in the Special Reserve; and as to the training, I have it on good authority that, in some regiments at least, the training of recruits of the Special Reserve has been cut down to two months or very little more than that of the old Militia.

Do the politicians tell the people the real truth about these deficiencies? Not they. We can, in truth, extort from them the bare facts such as are revealed in the Table I have quoted, but no attempt is made, except by some of those who are not in power, to arouse the country to a sense of its danger, or to ask them to make further sacrifices and exertions to ensure the safety of the country. In the same speech as that from which I have just quoted, Colonel Seely said: "I cannot stand at this box and say that the General Staff inform me that the arrangements we now have are inadequate to prevent us suffering from this blow at the heart, which would cause the loss of our national independence." He knows quite well that a member of the Army Council must either accept the decision of the Government not to ask the country for universal service or else resign his seat

on the Council and revert from an income of about £2000 a year to half-pay of £500 or £600. Of course, while our warships are nearly all in the North Sea and the Regular troops are still in the United Kingdom, the General Staff cannot go to the Secretary of State for War and say that we are exposed to a blow at the heart. But this is only part of the war preparation necessary; the Territorial Force, in Lord Haldane's own words, was designed to set free the Expeditionary Force and thus to enable our Regular troops to go to any part of the world where British interests might require their presence. This function the Territorial Force is not able to discharge, because neither in numbers nor in training is it capable, in the absence of the Regulars, of defending this country against invasion.

To take another instance of the half-truths which are uttered by those responsible for the defence of the country: last November a Deputation from the Council of County Associations of the Territorial Force approached the Prime Minister and reported to him that there was "a continued deficiency in the establishment of the Territorial Force in the country, notwithstanding the extraordinary efforts that have been made during the past five years to obtain recruits." In his reply, while admitting that, instead of 313,000, the Force could muster only 245,000 men, Mr. Asquith said that the Territorial Force, as it stood to-day, was incomparably superior to the old Volunteer Force. What on earth is the use of that? The point, of course, is that the Territorial Force, like the old Volunteer Force, is not in a position to fulfil the functions for which it exists, namely, that of relieving the Regular Army from the duty of defending this country on the day that war begins.

I am particularly anxious to state that these remarks about members of the Government are not made in a Party spirit. I began this part of my paper by reminding you that the Unionist Party, when in power, did nothing at all, while I admit that under the Liberal Government a great improvement in organisation has been made.

There is one other point of resemblance between the state of France before 1870 and the present state of affairs in our own islands; we have got a campaign going on in favour of the limitation of armaments. On December 17 last another Depu-

tation waited on the Prime Minister, and this was one of the arguments they used:

> We feel that the promise of the reform of education and of land tenure, and of housing, along with the development of agriculture entailing the expenditure of many millions, in the expectation of which we are arousing the hopes of the people, must be broken if the imposition of the additional burdens foretold by Mr. Churchill is not checked.

Compare this with what M. Emile Ollivier said to Lord Lyons in January 1870, and you will find a sinister resemblance in the ideas of both utterances. And what was the result of this whine of M. Ollivier addressed by way of the back stairs to the "Man of Blood and Iron"? Just a year after Ollivier's visit to Lord Lyons, France, after a shattering series of defeats, was driven to make peace on terms deeply humiliating to a proud people. She had to cede two rich provinces and to pay a "war fine" of £200,000,000 to her stern conquerors. Instead of taxes being remitted, as M. Ollivier had fondly hoped, the taxation of the French people stood, soon after the war, three times as high as it had done before the war.

I have gone point by point through the events which preceded the disasters of 1870 in France, and I have shown the close analogy between them and recent happenings in our own dear land. In each case war gives a warning: those responsible for the defence of the country initiate enquiries into the events of the war; in both cases it is shown that reserves are as necessary to an army as "air to a man's lungs"; in both cases the great superiority of universal service is pointed out—especially in the matter of furnishing adequate reserves; in both cases fear of the voters and a want of resolution is shown by the rulers of the countries concerned; in both cases an attempt is made to cover up defects by optimism and bombast.

Here, I am glad to say, the analogy ends. We have not yet suffered disaster, and what I particularly wish to point out is that there is no need why we should do so. The pathos of our present situation is that so little remains to be done in order to complete our arrangements. All that is now needed is to establish a system of compulsory training for, and compulsory enrolment in, the Territorial Force, and the problem of national defence will be solved.

In conclusion, I wish to add a word to those who say that we shall not get compulsory service till after the next war, that the people will never stand it, and so on. I claim to know something of my countrymen. I have had the honour of serving with our soldiers in India, Afghanistan, and South Africa, and to say of the race from which those soldiers came that it will not give you universal military training for Home Defence—*when, its leaders explain the need for such a system*—is, in my opinion nothing less than gross calumny.

ROBERTS.

UNDER THE PRUSSIAN JACKBOOT

THE ZABERN AFFAIR AND ITS LESSON

The extraordinary series of incidents in the little Alsatian town of Zabern and the still more extraordinary military trials which have followed, acquitting Prussian officers who had overridden the civil authorities and inflicted outrages of all kinds upon inoffensive citizens and Alsatian officials, should at least remove the last illusions in England as to the forces dominant in modern Germany. As the *Temps* has pointed out, the belief that the Germans are a gentle, humanitarian people must be dismissed. "The Germany with which we have to deal resembles the France of Louis XIV much more closely than any contemporary régime." It is living in the seventeenth century, inaccessible to modern ideas of "progress," firmly convinced that might is right. The army is supreme and is ready to trample civil rights and the civil powers under foot at a word from its lord. Alsace-Lorraine, the conquered province, which forty-four years after the great tragedy of 1870 still remains French at heart, is regarded as deserving of condign punishment for its sin of not becoming German. The Prussian Minister of War has declared: "We will do all in our power to extirpate the spirit of its population"; and now its people have been shown in the most bitterly humiliating manner that no constitution, no protection of law, no authority of the courts stands between them and the most violent exercise of military tyranny. The Pan-German Press is busy urging that their country should be annexed to Prussia to facilitate coercion.

The affair is the more sinister because of the figures moving in the background. In France it is firmly believed by a large section of opinion that the outrages of the Prussian troops were purposed and deliberate, planned by Pan-Germans with the

object of forcing the Kaiser's hand and provoking a great European war. Though the supposition may at first sight seem fantastic to Englishmen who are not familiar with the methods of German diplomacy, the history of the Hohenzollern candidature and the Ems telegram in 1870 lends some countenance to it. The Crown Prince unquestionably incited and encouraged the officers concerned, though the precise form of his intervention is disputed. And the Crown Prince is the enthusiastic supporter of the Pan-Germans and of the war party, who are perpetually assailing the Kaiser for his supposed pusillanimity in refusing to make an end of France. His Royal Highness in 1911 distinguished himself by the frantic ardour with which he applauded a bellicose speech in the Reichstag directed against England, when the Agadir crisis was still a danger to the peace of Europe. If there was a deliberate purpose behind the Zabern affair, its gravity increases enormously. The calculation made was probably this: that the incidents would culminate in the shooting down of Alsatians wholesale, and that such a massacre of unarmed men and women in a province which had once belonged to France and had been torn from her by violence would have compelled the French Government to remonstrate or have provoked an outburst of feeling in the French Press, when a quarrel would promptly have been picked with France. As it was, the French Press maintained an attitude of remarkable forbearance. The French Ambassador in Berlin, M. Cambon, did venture to make some cautious enquiries when the incidents began, but finding they were none too well received, saw the snare and drew back.

The occasion may have seemed favourable for a war to the German military party. The French army is in process of reorganisation under the new military law, which has necessarily caused a good deal of temporary confusion. Six months or a year hence, when the law has been carried out, the strength of the French army will be greatly increased, but for the moment, owing to the enormous number of raw recruits with the colours, it is markedly inferior to the German army. Bismarck struck in 1870 in precisely such a period of reorganisation. But if this was the case and if Europe in last November was on the brink of war, what must be thought of Mr. Lloyd George's amazing interview in which he protested the pacific intentions of Germany,

Herr Mahl went out and inspected this "formidable crowd," which he discovered to consist mainly of women and children. To mollify the angry officer, however, some twenty arrests were made, though the police reported that the real cause why the people gathered in the streets was the spectacle of patrols marching to and fro with fixed bayonets, as though war had broken out. Herr Mahl strengthened the police and induced the factory owners to warn their employees against demonstrations, and for a brief period quiet reigned.

On November 26, however, the officers spent a festive evening and "made a great deal of noise," according to Herr Mahl, who, it must be remembered, is a German bureaucrat and by no means unsympathetic to the German army. Lieutenant Schad, a subaltern in the 99th regiment, is alleged to have taken too much drink, which may have conduced to the liveliness of his proceedings. He marched a patrol into the street and with drawn sword executed a charge on a number of children and raided a café, finally arresting a luckless bank clerk who was accused of hissing the army, though he stoutly contended, and it would appear with absolute truth, that he was only whistling "Deutschland ueber alles." This arrest was irregular and Lieutenant Schad was plainly told so by Herr Mahl.

About this date some unknown influence must have intervened, for a few days previously Colonel von Reuter had sent in his resignation on the ground that the civil authorities did not support him. Now he suddenly decided upon the most violent action. He himself deposed at his trial that he had been "repeatedly reproached for his want of energy," though by whom he had been reproached was not made clear. He bethought him—or perhaps he was reminded—of a Royal Prussian Ordinance of 1820 which had been circulated to officers in 1899, after being almost forgotten for half a century. This instructs commandants that they have the right and the duty to intervene and repress disturbances "when they have in their souls and consciences the intimate conviction that the civil authorities are slow in calling upon them to act or have not the means necessary to restore order." In such circumstances they can take whatever measures they think fit and the civil powers must submit to them. This ordinance, which places the army permanently above the law

and gives it in peace powers over the civilian population such as in other countries are only granted to the troops in the gravest emergencies, is of doubtful legality in Prussia. In Alsace-Lorraine it could have no authority at all, for though the conquered territory is placed under the Emperor, who is also the Prussian monarch, it is not Prussian, but belongs to the whole German Empire and has its own Constitution, which recognises no such "right of the sabre."

That something serious was about to happen was learnt by some of the people from the talk of the officers of the 99th. These warned their friends among the tradesmen to keep in their backrooms in case firing took place, as bullets would pierce the front walls. In preparation for a "drive" among the inhabitants, Colonel von Reuter gave instructions for a coal-cellar in the barracks, ironically known as "the cave of the Pandors," to be emptied so as to accommodate prisoners. Then the military were turned loose upon the town. Machine guns were held ready for action in the barracks. The Colonel announced to the magistrates that he would fire on the populace if they collected in the square before the barracks and laughed at him and his troops, but he does not appear to have warned the public of his kindly intentions. Matters came to a head on November 28, when the way was cleared by the absence in Strassburg of Herr Mahl. That afternoon Lieutenant von Forstner went shopping with his usual escort and excited some derision. In the evening the subalterns of the 99th regiment were leaving the regimental gymnasium when they met a number of schoolboys, who laughed and jeered. Instantly Lieutenant Schad turned out the guard. Though there is some conflict of evidence, most of the children and schoolboys seem to have disappeared by the time the troops began their drive, and witness after witness asserted that the streets were almost empty and that only fifteen people were in the square. The soldiers, however, rushed after any civilians they could see and arrested them. Sixty infantrymen were marshalled in the Schlossplatz in two lines, and Colonel von Reuter took personal command of them and ordered them to load their rifles. Drums were beaten and the troops were instructed to clear the streets.

The results were grotesque. A fireman was tranquilly taking

his supper in his home when he heard the beat of the drums, and supposing that a fire had broken out and that his services were needed, he rushed out into the street. At that moment Lieutenant Schad was passing with a patrol. Schad gave orders for his arrest, and when he bolted back into the house and fled to the second floor, had him pursued and arrested in his own domicile. He was beaten by the soldiers and dragged off despite all his protests. Herr Schauffler, a lawyer, deposed that as he was quietly taking an evening walk the troops appeared, deployed, loaded their rifles and beat the drum—he supposed to give warning that they were going to fire. There were no cries or demonstrations from civilians because there were only one or two people in the street. Being a prudent man, he hastily retired, but as he went he saw the troops giving chase to any person they observed and making arrests. They did not spare the officials of a German judicial court which happened to have just concluded its sitting when the raid began. Judge Kalesch, Herr Kleinbohmer and Herr Beemelmans, three personages in the State service, were seized. Kalesch was arrested first, when Kleinbohmer remarked to the patrol, " This is quite illegal." At this an officer ordered his arrest, but in the end let him go, pleading that he was obeying the instructions of his superiors. Kleinbohmer, however, used his liberty to demand from Colonel von Reuter the release of the other officials, and succeeded after a sharp passage-of-arms with the worthy officer, who " *seemed greatly excited* " and made to another witness the curiously significant remark, " I should regard it as a piece of good luck if blood were to flow in the streets."

Meanwhile Schad and other officers continued the chase. Schad, according to the evidence which he gave at the court-martial, was ordered by Colonel von Reuter to arrest any one who laughed, but he added that he had arrested several civilians not because they had laughed at him, but because he " suspected them of laughing." If any chance passer-by ran before the loaded rifles of his men, he took that as proof positive of guilt. He broke into one civilian's house, he said, to catch the civilian in the very act of laughing. In the end some twenty-seven persons, three of them boys of 15, 16 and 17, were dragged off to the barracks and thrust into " the cave of the Pandors." That apartment was dark, crowded and bitterly cold, though the

prisoners were so packed that they could scarcely move. The soldiers, hearing them complain of the cold, shouted coarse jests at them. They were given nothing to eat that night, and when next morning a scanty allowance of coffee and black bread—of the kind which, according to Mr. Lloyd George, would revolt tramps—was brought to them, their gaoler remarked facetiously, "Here is some cake for you from his Majesty, the Emperor." Every one of these prisoners protested that he had committed no sort of offence. Three of them said that they had only whistled popular airs which the Prussian officers, with sad ears for music and strange want of humour, had mistaken for hisses. They were brought before the Civil Court next day, when they were promptly released. The Colonel was informed by Herr Mahl, now returned from Strassburg, that he had exceeded his powers and meddled with matters which were the concern of the civil authorities and the police. His answer to this was to defy the authorities by making further arbitrary arrests.

The next incident occurred at Dettweiler, a village near Zabern, on December 2. As Lieutenant von Forstner was passing through the place at the head of his company he was recognised by some children, who, according to the semi-official account, insulted him with contemptuous cries. He halted his men and ordered the offenders to be secured, but all of them took to flight, with the exception of a half-paralysed cobbler named Blank. The man protested he had done nothing and struggled when an ensign seized him. Forstner rushed at him, used his sword and slashed the man on the head, inflicting a gash five inches long. The paralytic was then dragged off to the civil authorities and interrogated for thirty minutes before the wound, which was dripping with blood, was allowed to be bandaged.

A mild storm in the Reichstag followed these events. Even good Prussians were a little startled for the moment to discover that any Colonel had a right to override the law at his own pleasure and that German subjects could be subjected to a military despotism of this kind—worthy of a Central American republic. A vote of censure on the Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, was moved, which extracted from the Chancellor some very important admissions. On December 3 he said: "The officers acted at Zabern as they did to prevent grave disorder. Of that

I am sure, though in the end the measures taken went beyond the limits of the law." Next day he undertook that full enquiry should be made, and declared: "I told you expressly that the arrests were illegal; the faults which were committed will be punished." Notwithstanding these smooth words, the Reichstag passed the vote of censure by 293 to 54, and condemned the usurpation of power by the army in Alsace. Some simple people in this country imagined that thereupon the Chancellor would resign, the wings of Colonel von Reuter be clipped, and German policy in the conquered provinces be revolutionised. Not the slightest effect was produced in real fact. The vote of censure by the German debating society—for that is what the Reichstag is and was meant to be by Prince Bismarck, who devised it—was treated with quiet contempt by the Government and boldly disregarded by the military element which is all-powerful in Prussia. There was no sign that the influential classes cared. The business class in Germany, apart from the Jews, is nationalist when it has any political views at all, and is convinced of the importance of the army. The official class is militarist to the backbone. As for the artisans and Socialists, they are impotent, even if in their heart of hearts they do not sympathise with the rule of force. Bismarck once said that "the Germans are a race of non-commissioned officers—humble, docile, asking rather to be strongly governed than to exercise their individuality." The Zabern affair has demonstrated the truth of his judgment.

The one practical result was that the Kaiser sent for the Chancellor, after previously interviewing the Prussian War Minister, and General von Deimling, and that the 99th regiment was temporarily removed from Zabern and despatched to manœuvre elsewhere. "Now we can laugh," the children shouted as it marched off—and, wonderful to relate, they were not seized or bayoneted. Meantime Lieutenant von Forstner was tried and sentenced by a court-martial to forty-three days' imprisonment for assaulting a civilian and making unlawful use of his weapons. Against this, however, could be set the severe sentences inflicted on three Alsatian recruits out of the batch of thirty arrested for divulging barrack secrets. One of these men received six weeks' imprisonment and the other two three weeks each on

the charge that they had signed a declaration in an Alsatian newspaper as to Lieutenant von Forstner's language.

On January 5 the enquiry by a military tribunal into the conduct of the military at Zabern on November 28 began. Two officers were indicted—Colonel von Reuter for assuming police functions without warrant, imprisoning twenty-seven civilians for a night, and violating the military penal code; Lieutenant Schad for the unjustifiable arrest of civilians, punching prisoners' heads, and forcing his way into private houses. The proceedings were worthy of *Alice in Wonderland*. The prosecutor, a soldier himself, made a speech which was virtually a defence of the accused, and called for only the most trifling sentence. Colonel von Reuter expressed no regret for the past. On the contrary, he gloried in what he had done. "I acted," he said, "according to law and equity, duty and conscience, and I may add that I should do the same in like circumstances in the future." He admitted having said that it would be "well for blood to flow," as the authority of the Government was impugned. He professed that by filling the coal-cellar with victims he had prevented bloodshed—a statement which in view of the police and civilian evidence was simply farcical. He pleaded—so far as he deigned to plead—the Ordinance of 1820 as covering his own action. As for himself, he "executed the orders of my King." As for Lieutenant Schad, that officer had acted under his own orders and authority, and he accepted full responsibility for him. The Court acquitted Colonel von Reuter on January 10, on the ground that the public peace was disturbed, that the civil authorities had failed to act, and that he was therefore right to intervene. It found that the Ordinance of 1820 was operative in the conquered province, and that the Colonel was guiltless "because he did not feel that he was acting illegally." It held that he had committed no offence by arresting civilians arbitrarily, detaining them in the coal-cellar, and examining them. Lieutenant Schad was acquitted on identical grounds, and the Court found that there was no evidence of his having punched a prisoner's head and broken a tooth, though the man had appeared in Court with the damaged tooth and sworn to the assault. The climax, however, was reached when on the same day another military court quashed the sentence on Lieutenant von Forstner for slashing the paralytic

over the head. This Court found that he was absolutely justified in so doing because he was alarmed by dangers which the Court admitted might be imaginary, and because his sword had not been specially sharpened! These remarkable verdicts may have been to some extent influenced by a remark of the Crown Prince, published while the proceedings were pending, that a German officer's honour should be protected at all cost.

The effect of the trials is thus to proclaim that any colonel has a right to use violence against the civilian population when he thinks or professes to think that the public peace is in danger. He or his officers and men acting under his orders can arrest and incarcerate in coal-cellars or other dismal dungeons civilians and even high judicial officials; can seize boys who whistle popular tunes and men who are "suspected of laughing"; can enter houses and make arrests of those guilty of the same heinous crime; can punch men's heads and knock out their teeth; and can slash over the face helpless creatures who might conceivably meditate attack on the army, provided always the weapon used for inflicting the cuts is not specially sharpened. Every single right which civilians possess in this country is abrogated by these amazing decisions so far as the Germans are concerned. Mr. Keir Hardie is wont to declare that the working men of Yorkshire or South Wales would have nothing to lose by a war in which Germany conquered this country. What, we may ask him, would he say if he or his constituents were subjected to this treatment at the very time when their sons were taken from them by force to serve in the German army?

The German Press has received the verdict with a few timid bleats, but of any great wave of indignation in Germany there is not the faintest sign. The Prussian seems perfectly satisfied with the result, which places the whole country under the military jackboot and establishes indefinitely the rule of the sabre. The *Berliner Tageblatt* may point out that, in view of this decision, the army, if it believes the Reichstag to have gone beyond its powers, may marshal its guns on the Koenigsplatz against that Assembly. The German Radicals may affect to deplore the disappearance of their Constitution. But the real truth is that Germany is an armed camp and that the feudal spirit is still triumphant there as in the days of Frederick the Great. Germans

will cheerfully submit to be trampled upon at home, so long as they can hope to trample upon foreign peoples, and for the woes of Alsace-Lorraine they care not one jot. The modern humanitarian and liberal movement has not touched them; and the British plutocrats of the Sir John Brunner type who imagine that they are panting to disarm are made to look absurdly foolish. Force, and force alone, is king to-day in the Kaiser's domain, as it was under the ascendancy of Bismarck. The German nation, so far as its ideas and feelings find expression, holds with Professor Rein of Jena, that "in policy ethical principles have no application but must yield to a selfishness, the one aim of which must be to augment the physical force of the State to which the German belongs."

What is most astonishing is that the Liberal Press, or a large part of it, in England can condone or excuse these German outrages. While declaiming against the perils of what it calls "militarism" at home, it is ready to look with a very tolerant eye upon the violence of the German military autocrat. It has received its cue from Mr. Lloyd George, who, in the discreditable interview which has caused such infinite harm to his own country, proclaimed: "The German army is vital not merely to the existence of the German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation itself"; and then went on to suggest that the British Navy should be heavily reduced because the competition in armaments is "organised insanity." It never seems to have struck him that the British Navy is equally vital to Britain, that the present competition in armaments proceeds from Germany, who is setting the pace both on land and sea, and that if this competition is not courageously faced and if the United Kingdom disarms in isolation, then the certain result is that British counties will suffer the fate of Alsace-Lorraine, and British towns be treated with the same brutality and violence as Zabern.

IGNOTUS.

BIRMINGHAM AND MR. CHAMBERLAIN

BIRMINGHAM and Manchester first acquired the right to send members to Parliament by the Reform Act of 1832. Since that time the total number of persons who have sat in Parliament as representatives either of the whole borough of Birmingham or of any of the seven Divisions constituted in 1885, has been twenty-seven. There have been only two instances in which a member for Birmingham seeking re-election has suffered defeat: one in 1847, when a Protectionist, who had slipped in at a by-election by reason of a Liberal split, lost his seat; one in 1886, when a Liberal who had voted for the Home Rule Bill fell in the first victory of the Unionist Alliance. In Manchester, during the same period, eleven members have lost their seats by loss of the favour of those who had elected them; and the list of these victims of inconstancy includes Mr. John Bright and Mr. Arthur Balfour.

What, however, seems to make the political fidelity of Birmingham a matter of some national or historical interest is its relation to the careers of Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain—two political leaders whose names, at least to Birmingham men, are inseparably associated, in spite of some salient points of contrast. Mr. Bright's membership for the town extended over thirty-two years; Mr. Chamberlain's has already lasted for thirty-seven; and together they cover a period of fifty-seven years, or more than two-thirds of the whole life of the city as a parliamentary borough. The contrast already noted between the political behaviour of Birmingham and Manchester is inevitably suggested by the history of Mr. Bright's association with the two towns. He represented Manchester for ten years; but in 1857, though he was a Lancashire man, a cotton-spinner, an acknowledged doctor of the Manchester School, and a hero of the Anti-Corn-Law

League, of which Manchester was proud to be the home, he suffered defeat in his own town. By this defeat he paid the penalty of his opposition to the anti-Russian policy of the first Government that was constituted on a Free Trade basis, of his independence of party ties, and of his outspoken hostility to the most popular Liberal leader of the time. Later in the same year he was elected for Birmingham, and thereby comfortably installed in a seat which he was to occupy to the end of his life without fear of defeat, without recourse to any arts of nursing or electioneering, without any expense beyond a railway-ticket from London or Rochdale to Birmingham once or twice a year, and also without any temptation to hold in check his natural and cherished habit of saying, both in and out of Parliament, whatsoever it seemed good to him to say. It was, in fact, from 1857 onwards, under the influence of the engaging honesty and compelling eloquence of John Bright that Birmingham political life began to exhibit those qualities of personal discipleship which, in later times, have affected with some surprise the observers of the political career of Mr. Chamberlain.

For our present purpose Mr. Bright's relations with his constituents are interesting merely so far as they may be regarded as establishing that habit of loyalty to the chosen man which has been so serviceable to Mr. Chamberlain. But it is not irrelevant to add the observation that Mr. Bright also carried his constituents with him, or at least did not risk any repetition of the rebuke he had suffered at Manchester, when from time to time he dissociated himself from the politicians with whom he had in general acted. Such conduct was characteristic—indeed almost habitual. In his first speech to his constituents he started, without asking any one's leave, an agitation for a new Reform Bill—a project for which the leaders of his party had then only a lukewarm affection. He had no respect for the Machine. In his later years his mind ran in grooves worn by itself; but it never ran in grooves worn by his party. He did not like Russell; and his antipathy to Palmerston was at least as strong, and expressed as candidly, as his distrust of Toryism. The most eloquent speech he ever delivered in Birmingham was a rejoinder to Mr. Gladstone, and the most vivacious was a rebuke to Sir William Harcourt. Even office, which he accepted with

much reluctance, made very little difference; for more than once he was formally arraigned in the House of Commons for neglecting the reticence imposed by association with colleagues in a Cabinet. With all these performances, it appears that his constituents were thoroughly well satisfied.

Thus we owe to Mr. Bright's leadership and mastery of the art of persuasion the disposition of Birmingham Liberals to trust their own man, whether he was in agreement or disagreement with the Party. The habit was formed before Mr. Chamberlain's time, and long before the catastrophe of 1886, when the town became a centre of what was then called Dissentient Liberalism. It may be worth while to recall that Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Collings first became known in politics outside Birmingham as leaders of a movement that was entirely distasteful to Mr. Gladstone and his friends, and that was carried to the verge of a revolt, in which the whole body of Birmingham Liberals was implicated.*

This sort of loyalty has brought upon the town the charge of inconsistency; it has changed sides, they say, because Mr. Chamberlain has changed his mind. It is not a serious imputation; for it is surely evident that in politics somebody must be inconsistent, or there would be no progress; if minds are not changed, nothing is changed. In this case, however, it is not even necessary to resort to the maxim of Cicero, that change of purpose is not inconsistency. *Nemo doctus unquam mutationem consili inconstantiam dixit esse.* There has been no change of purpose, only the strengthening of a purpose that was always there. Throughout his public life, even when, for the sake of other purposes, associated with empire-wreckers, Mr. Chamberlain has been, primarily and consistently, an Imperialist, desiring to turn to good account opportunities won by the prowess of the

* Among other acts of rebellion, the Birmingham League promoted, or threatened to promote, the nomination of independent candidates. They once sent an agent to a borough in which a by-election was pending, with instructions to procure the nomination of a League candidate if the official candidate gave unsatisfactory answers to their questions. At first the gentleman was obstinate; but later they received, by the same post: (1) a letter from him promising to satisfy their conditions if they would withdraw their man, and (2) a letter from their agent telling them that their candidate could not be nominated, because he could not find in the borough a sufficient number of supporters to make a valid nomination paper. I believe there is a moral to this story, but I am not certain what it is.

builders of Empire, and so sadly squandered by politicians, and learning gradually, by study and experience, how the thing is to be done. He found that Cobdenism and practical Imperialism could not live together; one of them must go. This was not a change of mind, but a discovery of experience. In his decision to sacrifice the ghost of Cobden to the Empire, rather than the Empire to the ghost or fetish, there was nothing inconsistent with any earlier acquiescence in the old Manchester maxims—except indeed on the supposition, in his case incredible, that he had been one of the idolaters who regard those maxims as eternal and absolute truths, a sort of Decalogue to be received on bended knees and with unquestioning obedience. At the best, they cannot be more than definitions of means to an end; and the purpose for the sake of which they were formulated was not Mr. Chamberlain's purpose. Also he discovered, as any one may discover if he will take the pains to enquire, that, so far from being eternal truths they were not even true. If it is asked how he so easily overcame the Free-Trade traditions of Birmingham, the answer is that there was no such obstacle to surmount. The traditions, if any, were nothing but traditions—a set of phrases surviving from bygone controversies. The creed was not, perhaps, wholly forgotten; but it is always easier to recite the Creed than to master the Evidences. What percentage of Liberals anywhere, before 1903, could have told you why they were Free-Traders—unless you had given them time to write to Mr. Harold Cox? *

As for an earlier change—a change not of purpose but of association—no further explanation seems necessary. Bright had taught the Birmingham Liberals, first, to think for themselves, and secondly, to think with him. When they refused to be parties to the capitulation to Parnell, it is clear that the boast of consistency, for what it is worth, belonged to them, and not to the Liberals, who took the other turning. Mr. Chamberlain—a Home Ruler till Parnell gave a new definition of Home Rule—had repeatedly declared before, during, and after the 1885 election

* Birmingham seems to have given little assistance to the Anti-Corn-Law League. The only prominent Leaguer in the town was Mr. Joseph Sturge, who stood as a Free-Trader in 1844, but did not get in. There was then a strong Chartist element in Birmingham Liberalism, and the Chartists were not friendly to the League.

that the new demands of Parnell must be resisted at all hazards and none of his friends had dissented. No one who understood the political character of the place could have failed, if he had been able to forecast the circumstances, to anticipate the result.

Under modern democratic conditions, such authority as in turn Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain achieved and maintained in the town they represented is, of course, impossible to any man whose gifts do not include skill in popular oratory. In many respects the character of Mr. Chamberlain's eloquence differs widely from that of Mr. Bright's. The common qualities—and they are qualities of character rather than of style—are confidence and candour. When Bright addressed his constituents they were always satisfied that what he said was what he meant and that the reasons he offered for his uncompromising judgments were precisely and exactly the reasons on which, in his own mind, the judgments were based; and this recognition of candour carries a meeting a long way towards conviction. Though a great orator, he was wholly unversed in rhetorical tricks. In the estimation of his own townsmen Mr. Chamberlain possesses the virtue of absolute candour in as high a degree as Bright himself. When he advances reasons in support of a conclusion, he is giving a true account of the process by which he reached those conclusions. I am, of course, aware that some of Mr. Chamberlain's unfriendly critics do not share this view. I have read "studies" of Mr. Chamberlain in which it is assumed that he is a dealer in hidden meanings; he is represented as a very clever man, a creator of illusions, whose conduct cannot be understood without the aid of an interpreter possessing the sceptical sort of shrewdness in which the author of the "study" is an adept; his real motives are not the motives he avows; whatever he means, it must be something other than he says. This does not seem a very hopeful method of study, opening up as it does a trackless field of conjecture which cannot be explored with any success. If any one wishes to know, being ignorant, why Mr. Chamberlain is a Unionist, why he is a Tariff Reformer, why he contended against Krugerism, and so forth, the obvious way of acquiring the information may, after all, be the most satisfactory, namely, to read Mr. Chamberlain's speeches, in which he will find the reasons he seeks set down in language that

is easily intelligible, and quite exceptionally free from ambiguous phrasing.

Certainly every one who has been admitted in any degree into his confidence will testify that there has been no discrepancy between his conversation and his speaking, between the motives he discloses in private and the reasons he alleges in public; he has never had one argument for the committee-room and another for the platform, or rested on any distinction between principle and policy. The merit which the least friendly critics agree to allow him is lucidity. Well, lucidity is the quality of speech that reflects veracity of character. The lucid speaker is the man who knows what he means, and is not afraid to be judged by his words; the vague rhetorician either does not fully know what he means or why he means it, or is not quite certain that his mental processes will stand fire, or wishes to provide for alternative interpretations according to future convenience. Indeed, the same critics who think it due to their own cleverness to suspect Mr. Chamberlain of reserve, and beg you to hear them read between the lines, will in the next paragraph convict him of carrying candour to the point of indiscretion: he ought not to have used a blunt Shakespearean proverb to express the national indignation at Russian trickery; he should not have addressed such plain language to Kruger; he would have been wise to pretend that he had not said what he had said about the German army when von Bülow demanded an apology. He was blamed for inventing the new diplomacy, which differed from the old by being more truthful. He chose to treat international politics with the same frankness which, following Bright's example, he had always practised in dealing with home politics.

The purpose of these comments is to support the testimony I offer that it was by virtue of this quality of candour that he succeeded to Mr. Bright's authority in the city that sent them both to Parliament. His constituents reposed confidence in him, because they were satisfied that he always took them frankly into his confidence. There has always been a sense of comradeship and reciprocity and co-operation in his foregathering with his Birmingham supporters. This really was something new; Mr. Bright's visits had rather the air of a descent from Olympus.

Every Member of Parliament is, according to his ability, an

instructor of his constituents, unless he is content to be a delegate. When somebody said that Mr. Chamberlain spoke as though he had discovered the Empire, that was really a tribute to the tact of the competent teacher; for in good teaching there must always be a sense of finding something out—best of all if the instructor and his class seem to make the discovery together. His popular addresses have always been diligently prepared; here he has chosen not to trust, except in dealing with interruptions, to the power of extemporisation that made him a great parliamentary debater. His appeal has always been to the patriotic sense; that is, a man's vote is treated as a share of political power held in trust and to be used for the advantage of the country. The alternative method is to tell him that his vote is an intermittent opportunity of getting something for himself. This method is gaining in favour, but it cannot be recommended to any moderate man: first, because it is hardly honest, as requiring suppression of the certain truth that, at the best, what the State can do to help a man (unless, of course, it gives him a job) is inconsiderable when compared with what he can do to make or mar his own fortunes; secondly, because it sets up a competition in which the reasonable candidate is easily outbidden by a more sanguine, or less scrupulous, competitor. What is the use of giving away sixpennyworth of socialism, when the entire New Jerusalem is on offer round the corner? We need not, however, count Mr. Chamberlain's success in kindling the patriotic sentiment among his feats of instruction. Patriotism belongs to the natural man; it need not be taught, though, unhappily, it may be unlearned by an effort of miseducation. On the other hand, to teach citizens to think imperially—to acknowledge responsibility to the Empire as well as a duty to king and country—is such a feat. Every one knows that there is a country, but has to be taught that there is an Empire.

In this business Mr. Chamberlain was no longer building on a foundation laid by Mr. Bright. It seems really unfair to label Mr. Bright as a Little-Englander, because that type has developed so rapidly since his time. The Little-Englander of to-day is far superior, as such, to the Little-Englander of Bright's generation—just as the Pharisees we know are vastly more pharisaical than the Pharisees we read about in the New Testament. But there

seems to have been no suitable place for imperialism in Mr. Bright's theory of the public good. Mr. Chamberlain relates how when still a very young man he encountered Mr. Bright on a point of imperial politics. It was at a dinner-party at Mr. George Dixon's house, not long after Mr. Bright had become member for Birmingham; and the thesis which Mr. Bright laid down, and the young politician found courage to dispute, was that Britain ought to give up Gibraltar. At that time this proposition, which was developed a few years later in Helps's book called *Realmah*, but is now nearly forgotten, supplied a fair test of the two men's different ways of thinking.

Certainly the popular interest in politics was stimulated as well as enlightened by this widening of the outlook and discovery of the larger and remoter issues. Even if the imperialism of which Mr. Chamberlain has been an apostle were illusory, it would still be one of the illusions for which we should be grateful, because of its influence on character and temper. We are concerned here not with the national value of Mr. Chamberlain's political conduct and political ideas, but with the question of their attractiveness to all classes, and especially to the artisans, of his own town. People who listened to him were at least grateful to him for making politics so much more interesting. He came into public life not very long after there had been a great new enfranchisement, which had trebled the electorate, and therefore not long before the disillusionment that was bound to follow the millennial expectations of the Reform League. After a short experience the new voter was sure to find that he did not enjoy his vote so much as he had enjoyed his indignation at not having a vote. Politics were disappointing, like the toy that looked so attractive through the shop-window before you had saved up enough money to buy it; probably, a man was inclined to think, they did not matter so much as he had been led to understand; it was time to find some new interest to enliven his leisure. The case required new ideals and fresh instruction. The people of Birmingham might have turned to politics of the sullen, indignant, and envious sort; but the town, though ill-built, has a bracing climate, and the inhabitants, though not exceptionally well-off, are of a cheerful disposition. Mr. Chamberlain was the man they wanted. He was, as Mr. Bonar Law put it in Scotch, "a bonny fighter," or,

as the Public Orator at Cambridge described him in a still mo foreign tongue, *quolibet sub cælo ad dimicationem semper promptu semper paratus*. They found in him a leader unmistakably earnest, but never ponderous, independent of party traditio and scornful of party copy-books, never content to be a repeat of the commonplaces that a party meeting applauds automatical dealing in ideas that had the attraction of breadth and freshnes zealous for reform and ever eager to find something that neede to be put right, and constantly enlisting their co-operation hopeful enterprises. *Qualis ab incepto:* such was the man whe his neighbours greeted him as a leader five-and-forty years ag and such, through all vicissitudes of circumstance, he remains the end.

C. A. VINCE.

THE RETURN OF THE WANDERER

ENGLAND—to say nothing of Scotland, Ireland, or Wales—breathes more freely now that at last, after many vicissitudes that eminent statesman, immortalised for all time as the Master of Elibank, is once more among us. Why he ever left us remains an unsolved mystery. There is even some doubt as to the date of his departure and where he has been, though all these minor problems are merged in the dominating fact that he is safe and sound, yearning and burning to "clean up" the great and ever-growing Marconi mess, to the making of which it must be admitted he contributed his full share.

He is peculiarly happy in enjoying the enthusiastic support of a zealous, possibly an over-zealous, Press, which, while discreetly silent about his movements at the beginning of last year, latterly kept him before the public as a National Hero engaged in a titanic struggle with the enemies of this country in order that the British Navy, to which he and his political associates are notoriously devoted, might be adequately supplied with oil fuel—a pressing necessity because our provident First Lord of the Admiralty, another hero of the same Press, had, so to speak, off his own bat ordered the construction of oil-driven battleships without acquiring any oil. With the Master of Elibank's business triumphs on the other side of the Atlantic I am not concerned for the moment. It is not easy to ascertain their precise extent, but there can be no shadow of doubt as to the political mischief wrought by the manner in which his quest for oil was boomed in what is known as the Hush-up Press, which is presumably under great obligations to Lord Murray—as we must now learn to call the ex-Ministerial Whip, who speedily followed up the humiliation of the House of Lords by the Parliament Act by enrolling himself as the not least humiliated member of that humiliated assembly.

The *National Review* has never belonged to the gushing brigade which was wont to regard every Anglo-American problem as soluble by British slobber. Our public men of all parties, our Americanised newspapers, most of the Bishops, nearly all the Professors and mugwumps and people who relieve their souls by writing letters to the *Times*, keep on tap a perennial flow of amiable platitudes available whenever any difference arises between the two countries or any opportunity is afforded by way of exhibition or centenary to advertise their abiding affection for their American kinsmen, which is, *ex hypothesi*, surpassed by the supposed attachment of the Americans towards their British cousins. This platform, though paved with good intentions, has been so poisonous, because so exasperating to the vast mass of Americans who regard it as pure hypocrisy, that no one with any knowledge of effective American opinion, who values decent Anglo-American relations, would dream of associating himself with a flatulent movement which has done more harm than any amount of critical or hostile comment. Reasonable relations with the United States would be possible if our "Anglo-Saxon" orators and writers could only be persuaded to hold their tongues and put aside their pens.

It is not a party folly, but a national folly. Unionist statesmen equally with Radical politicians, few of whom have been within three thousand miles of the Great Republic, are among the worst offenders, and when they foregather at the Mansion House under the auspices of an emotional Lord Mayor to discuss the common brotherhood, every self-respecting American outside Wall Street "sees red," and looks for his shooting irons. Radicals can, however, always give their opponents points in the gushing game. On foreign policy there was but a single question on which the Coalition were at one, namely, in kow-towing in season and out of season to the United States. Radicals are inspired by that sentiment and tradition which makes them fawn upon any Great Power disposed to make herself disagreeable, while the Nationalists, having been "kept" for at least a generation by American Anglophobes, are obliged, if possible, to go one better than their English allies. There is absolutely nothing whatsoever to show in return for this outpouring, and serious Americans who set some store by Anglo-American co-operation in international

affairs deplore it as much as we do, recognising that its effect on the masses of their countrymen is highly prejudicial to Anglo-American friendship because it enables our avowed enemies across the water, who are infinitely numerous and infinitely active, to be continually denouncing Great Britain as a nation of humbugs.

In this country every national interest is habitually sacrificed to Party interests or Press interests, and though optimists endeavour to persuade themselves that there is continuity in our foreign policy, when the real pinch comes the greater gives way to the less and the vital goes to the wall. The very Party and Press which have wearied us year in year out with their pitiful "Anglo-Saxon" twaddle found themselves constrained under the stress of the Marconi mess and its by-products to take another tack and have latterly indulged in the unwonted amusement of pin-pricking the Americans in order to cover up the tracks of a domestic scandal. Of this disagreeable episode Lord Murray of Bogota has been the centre. For reasons not yet disclosed, though doubtless discoverable in time, the interests of particular newspapers, no less than the existence of the Coalition, demanded that the Marconi mystery should remain a mystery, and that an atmosphere, or rather a mirage, should be created, which would enable the ex-Chief Whip to return home as a saviour of his country whose prodigious services would overwhelm his "detractors" and enable our modern South Sea Bubble to be relegated to the limbo of forgotten things. With this object in view a systematic Press campaign was set on foot and glowing accounts were published of the splendid feats of Lord Murray in various Central American communities, whose politicians appeared to be yielding to his blandishments like so many Radical Members of Parliament, or editors, in want of a knighthood in Coronation year. A new Empire was to be added to the British Empire in return for an old song, and we should find ourselves rich beyond the dreams of avarice in those raw materials we most urgently needed. But this was not enough for the boomsters. In order to arouse public opinion in Europe as well as in these islands, Lord Murray was represented as challenging the Monroe Doctrine, the recognition of which had hitherto been regarded as a corner-stone of British policy. In another moment we should have been told that he was about to construct a competitive Panama canal.

Let me say at once that I do not for a single moment believe that there was a vestige of fact in any of these romances. They were so many lightning conductors to draw attention off the particular business which these various interests for their own purposes are determined to hush up. Americans, or at any rate many popular American newspapers, are frequently unreasonable and unfair where British interests are concerned, and what is euphemistically described as "twisting the lion's tail" is an infinitely successful sport in the United States. If our people had any idea of what is habitually written about Great Britain in American newspapers, it would be impossible to keep up any pretence of preserving friendly relations between the two countries. For once, however, those of us outside the Anglo-American gushing brigade can sympathise with the irritation of the American public over the Elibank mission to Central America, which was loudly advertised in the Elibank Press of this country —not confined to one side of politics—as involving a succession of serious rebuffs to American interests within the sphere of the Monroe Doctrine. Although Englishmen are less sensitive than the Americans, we should have been similarly annoyed by a similar episode.

A further stage in working up the British people and the American people against one another was the quotation of articles from indignant American newspapers describing the portentous defeat of American policy by the brilliant diplomacy of our ex-Chief Whip, who is commonly believed to have betaken himself to another hemisphere to avoid facing the music at home. In fairness to Americans it should also be remembered—and we may be sure that the facts were exploited in the American Press—that Lord Murray represented a firm in close relations with the British Government. Lord Cowdray, who was created a Peer while Lord Murray was Chief Whip, has been described as the "universal provider" of the Radical Party, and though the phrase, like most phrases, is doubtless an exaggeration, it is noteworthy that besides providing a directorship or partnership at a very large salary for the Master of Elibank when the Fenner fiasco and the Marconi flutter compelled him to retire from public life, the house of Pearson is understood to have found a billet at an opportune moment for the brother-in-law of one

Cabinet Minister, while Mr. Lloyd George, junior, is likewise a member of the same house in some capacity or another. Indeed, though the incident has not been as widely trumpeted in the British Press as some less interesting episodes—we may be sure it has not been lost on the other side—Mr. Lloyd George, junior, is understood to have followed Lord Murray to Central America to assist in the negotiation of abortive contracts and no doubt to give official colour to the proceedings. The net result of all these peregrinations is, and the sooner we recognise the fact the better, that between them, a politician in distress and the journals which for undisclosed reasons are resolved to see him through, have given a more serious set-back to Anglo-American relations than they have sustained at any time since the American Civil War. If only Lord Murray had gone quietly about his business and this insensate Press campaign had never been started, he might conceivably have struck oil, if oil was his real objective.

Nor can Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane be said to have enhanced British prestige in Washington by promoting the late Attorney-General, Sir Rufus Isaacs, to the Lord Chief Justiceship—an appointment that would be impossible in any other country pretending to greatness, least of all the United States, where the Supreme Court is still a name to conjure with, and the higher judiciary is reserved for those Cæsar's wives of whom we hear too much in political speeches and see too little in our public life. The gross impropriety of the appointment was emphasised by the Prime Minister's mendacious suggestion to the Leader of the Opposition on the closing day of last Session, that he (Mr. Asquith) expected the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Alverstone, to resume his active duties, being aware at the time that there was not the ghost of a chance of Lord Alverstone doing anything of the kind. The appointment was made worse by the action of the Committee of the Stock Exchange in censuring jobbers participating in the flotation of the American Marconi Company in London with which the Isaacs family were identified. The dates indicate that Sir Rufus Isaacs appointment was precipitated in order to anticipate the verdict of the Stock Exchange, which if published before the appointment would have made that culminating outrage impossible even for a callous cynic such as our Panama Premier.

May we hope that the tardy withdrawal of Lord Murray of Bogota from the scenes of his glory may both serve to allay the angry passions gratuitously aroused across the water and promote a further elucidation of a fascinating if sordid mystery. May we derive encouragement from the accident that for several days Lord Murray was aboard the *George Washington*, a name that stands above all things for truth. Possibly he took a passage by this particular steamer as a hint to the world that the day of mystification is over and that the time has come, in homely phrase, "to tell the truth and shame the devil." George Washington is alleged to have owned up before being found out, and though so far there is little in the record of any of Mr. Asquith's colleagues, especially the Marconi Ministers, to justify a comparison between them and the first American President, there is such danger to the Government in continuing to pile a Pelion on Ossa of falsehood, that conceivably the traveller, who has had abundant time for reflection, may deem that it is idle to attempt any further adjournment of the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Per contra must be set the ominous and apparently inspired statement of the Elibank Press that their hero will content himself with a personal statement in the House of Lords. In view of the elaborate and deliberate deceptions already practised on Parliament and the public by Ministers involved in Marconi speculations, no statement whatsoever made by any Minister, or by any former member of the present Government, is worth the breath with which it is spoken. Lord Murray shirked or funked facing the Marconi Select Committee and bolted abroad when there was a risk of his case being reached, although it was a packed committee directed by Messrs. Falconer and Handel Booth, who were probably acting throughout in collusion with the Government, and are convicted of having intrigued with a Cabinet Minister to frustrate the ends of justice, and to stop perilous revelations. Lord Murray refused to appear where he would at any rate have been speaking on oath and subject to cross-examination, however good natured and mild. Any statement from him, or indeed from any Minister not on oath with reference to Marconi matters, will not have the slightest weight with anybody to-day. To

mislead the House—any House, every House—on matters of fact is regarded by our parliamentary pundits as the greatest of all Ministerial gifts. It was exhibited in its highest perfection during the fateful Festival of Truth (October 11, 1912) when three Cabinet Ministers, with the unstinted approval, not to say enthusiastic applause, of the Prime Minister gave their colleagues in the House, and the country at large, to understand that any suggestion that any Minister had ever speculated in any Marconi share during the negotiation of the Marconi contract was a foul and wicked calumny, which could only be inspired by the most degraded Party passion.

I make no apology for reproducing these utterances, although they are familiar to the readers of the *National Review*, because they give us a truer insight into the prevailing parliamentary code than anything else which has occurred. Moreover, they are worth preserving for the benefit of the future historian upon whom will devolve the painful task of studying a great country in decay. These declarations must not be dismissed as mere "stupidities." They were anything but stupid. They were exceedingly slim—too slim as the event proved. They served their immediate purpose. They completely hocussed the House of Commons, which, it must be admitted, only asks to be hocussed by Ministers. They committed the Press to glorifying our spotless and stainless statesmen. They misled the public and but for a chapter of unforeseen and unforeseeable accidents, they would have continued to do so. With the whole resources of the Government whose existence was at stake strained to suppress the truth, and a packed committee of unscrupulous partisans who would stick at nothing led hither and thither by Ministers themselves, the odds on the escape of the culprits were heavy. Neither Mr. Herbert Samuel nor Sir Rufus Isaacs is precisely a fool, and though Mr. George is half imbecile, half knave, his obvious hypocrisies still deceive the House of Commons almost as easily as his cheap tearful revivalism bamboozles an audience of illiterate Celts. These men all knew what they were talking about, and if aware of the risks they could equally appraise the guarantees against being found out. The Attorney-General (Sir Rufus Isaacs), House of Commons, October 11, 1912, see Official Report:

Let me go to the next charge, which is, I think, a worse charge. It is that some member of the Government not named, but hinted at—some member or members of the Cabinet—knowing that these negotiations were taking place, knowing that there was a contract in contemplation, and thinking the shares would go up when the announcement of the contract came to be made—the price of the shares being then 14s. or 15s. and eventually rose to £9 after the announcement of the contract was made—thereupon, and in consequence of the information which some member of the Government had got, bought shares in this Company at a low price, in order to sell them at the higher price when the contract was announced. I desire to say frankly, on behalf of myself, that that is absolutely untrue. Never from the beginning, when the shares were 14s. or £9, have I had one single transaction with the shares of that Company. I am not only speaking for myself, but I am also speaking on behalf, I know, of both my right hon. friend the Postmaster-General, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, in some way or other, in some of the articles, have been brought into this matter.

Mr. Lloyd George (Chancellor of the Exchequer):

The hon. member said something about the Government, and he has talked about "rumours." I want to know what these rumours are. If the hon. gentleman has any charge to make against the Government as a whole or against individual members of it, I think it ought to be stated openly The reason why the Government wanted a frank discussion before going to Committee was because we wanted to bring here these rumours, these sinister rumours, that have been passed from one foul lip to another behind the backs of the House. . . . I came here this afternoon because I had heard what was said outside. I have waited carefully, and not a single member on the other side of the House, or anybody else who has taken part in this debate, has ever hinted at anything. The only member who has hinted completely dissociated himself from the rumours. The hon. member (Mr Lansbury) is the first one who has said so: I demand that his charge shall be formulated.

The Postmaster-General (Mr. Herbert Samuel):

Neither I myself nor any of my colleagues have at any time held one shilling's worth of shares in this Company, directly or indirectly, or have derived one penny profit from the fluctuations in their prices. It seems shameful that political feeling can carry so far, that lying tongues can be found to speak and ears found to listen to such wicked and utterly baseless slanders such as these This Committee (i.e. the Marconi Committee) which will be appointed, will enquire into every aspect of this question, and members of the Government will be most ready to appear before it. Every member of the House may have full confidence that while every part of this transaction will come under the searchlight of examination, it will be shown that there is no uncleanliness in any quarter.

Such was the manner in which the Ministry of most of the virtues and all the talents, conveyed to the House of Commons and the public the fact that during the negotiation of the great contract between the parent Marconi Company, of which Mr.

Godfrey Isaacs was the General Manager, and on early inside information from Mr. Isaacs not available to the general public, three Ministers had acquired 10,000 shares at a privileged price in one of the "associated" Marconi companies—an offspring of the parent Company, and like other offspring, brought into the world by the parent. As critics are compelled to be as careful in their facts as his Majesty's Ministers are careless, we must distinguish between the knowledge at that time of these three speakers. Sir Rufus Isaacs harped on "this Company" in order to keep within the bounds of technical accuracy. Mr. Lloyd George blustered in order to avoid a direct denial, but both Ministers knew of their own American Marconi purchases and sales, also that at the time they misled the House of Commons that they were still substantial holders of Marconis. Outside the political world such deceptions would make people impossible, but professional politicians have a sneaking, if not an open admiration for such performances. Their indignation is reserved for those who expose the falsehood. A strange impression must have been made by these declarations of disinterestedness on City circles aware of the facts, and it is scarcely surprising that shortly after the debate Mr. Lloyd George's broker came to see the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the Treasury apparently to remind him that he had still "two thousand Marconis." There was not even any mention of the qualifying word "American," as in those days, when it was equally wicked to suggest that Ministers had dabbled in American, Spanish, Canadian or British Marconis, the entire group were colloquially termed "Marconis."

A special responsibility devolved on Mr. Herbert Samuel during this never-to-be-forgotten debate, because without being involved in Marconi speculations himself, he was the appointed mouthpiece of the Government, and he was supposed to have blown the rumours to the winds on announcing the appointment of the Committee which "will enquire into every aspect of this question, and *members of the Government will be most ready to appear before it. Every member of the House may have full confidence that while every part of this transaction will come under the searchlight of examination, it will be shown that there is no uncleanliness in any quarter.*" [My italics.]

It would be difficult to frame a more comprehensive or

categorical disclaimer, and anybody who trusted Mr. Samuel and was unfamiliar with the evidence would be prepared to go into the box and swear that it would be impossible for a British Cabinet Minister to make any such declaration had he known at the time that any of his colleagues had speculated in Marconi shares. Unfortunately—and nothing has done more to shake confidence in Ministerial statements—Mr. Samuel was subsequently constrained to confess that he had long been aware of his colleagues' original American Marconi speculation before he publicly placed his hand on his heart and pledged his word that there was "no uncleanliness in any quarter." Moreover, the Postmaster-General's subsequent mean and niggardly action in making a public demonstration of virtue by disrating an official at the Post Office at the outset of the Select Committee's sittings for buying a few Marconi shares is surely conclusive evidence of his conviction that there was little risk of the discovery of the great gamble. Even a self-righteous smug without a sense of humour would hesitate to court the humiliation which he brought upon himself over the Taylor case had he suspected any risk of the miscarriage of Ministerial plans for concealing the famous flutter.

It was at one time asserted and believed even outside the ranks of the Coalition, that though men with the traditions of the Isaacses, the Samuels and the Georges might trifle with the truth, the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, with a veneer of Oxford culture, would hesitate before associating himself with such a disgraceful episode. His friends expressed the utmost indignation at any imputations on the integrity of a leader who had been grossly deceived by his colleagues. Unfortunately that cock won't fight any longer. Among the most painful revelations of the Marconi scandal was the discovery that the Prime Minister had been apprised of the American Marconi speculation months before the Festival of Truth. In order to remove all shadow of a doubt as to his attitude and—his character—he has in terms expressed unlimited approval of the misleading statements of his colleagues. Though not a hearer he was a reader of those utterances, and approved the dirty trick played on the public, for he cynically informed the House of Commons in June last year: "When I read the declarations, which I did, of my right

hon. friends, they seemed to me to be *perfectly natural, proper, and full.*" [My italics.]

As a corollary to the unlimited right of Ministers to speculate, we have the unlimited right of Ministers to lie in order to conceal those speculations. Such is the New Liberalism of the Asquith school as contrasted with the Old Liberalism of the Gladstonian school. In the face of this openly accepted creed and the conduct of Ministers whitewashed by the House of Commons and glorified by the National Liberal Club, it seems incredible that the House of Lords should stultify itself by allowing Lord Murray to make any statement until he has been examined and cross-examined on oath before a Select Committee of his Peers. All the Commoners proved to have been implicated in Marconi transactions went before the Marconi Committee to make statements which were at any rate sworn even if they were not seriously tested. Although the Upper House has been cruelly watered of late years by "Lloyd George noblemen," the great majority of Peers are gentlemen, and however easygoing they may be, outsiders refuse to believe that they will allow Lord Murray to ride off on a speech in the face of the performances of his bosom associates, Sir Rufus Isaacs, Mr. Herbert Samuel and Mr. Lloyd George in "another place."

Lord Murray has behaved about as badly as a man can behave, both towards the Party which gave him unlimited confidence and unlimited cash without asking any questions in return, and to the House of Commons, where he was bound by every obligation of honour to make a clean breast of the highly discreditable transactions in which he had involved himself and those of whom he was Trustee. As Master of Elibank he had no illusions as to the origin of the rumours concerning Ministerial speculations. That he never attributed them to the disordered imaginations of wild-eyed and embittered political partisans is established by the testimony of Mr. Herbert Samuel before the Marconi Committee. He was asked by Mr. Amery, "At what date did Sir Rufus Isaacs inform you of his transactions in American Marconi shares?" Observe the Postmaster-General's answer. "It was at the end of July or the beginning of August (*i.e.* 1912) but I am not quite sure. My impression is I was first told by the Master of Elibank, and Sir Rufus Isaacs told me about the same

time—I am not sure which—I think it was the Master of Elibank." Mr. Amery naturally enquired, "Did you at the time suggest to either of them the advisability of making the matter public?" Mr. Herbert Samuel: "No." The Postmaster-General according to his own statement had considered the possibility of having a Select Committee on the Marconi Agreement when motions were being put down for a Select Committee or for the rejection of the Contract. He artlessly added: "I was rather surprised at those motions and did not understand them, and I went to the Chief Whip (the Master of Elibank) and said to him: 'What does all this mean? Have you any information?' And I was pressing him very strongly to give me an early opportunity to bring the contract on for debate in the House. *He* (*i.e.* the Master of Elibank, now Lord Murray) *said to me that he thought that these motions were not due to any objection to the contract as such, but to rumours with respect to Ministers' shares, and he thought I ought to know that, while so far as he was aware there was absolutely no truth in any of these rumours at all, he himself, Mr. Lloyd George, and Sir Rufus Isaacs had bought a comparatively small holding in American Marconis. I* (*i.e.* Mr. Herbert Samuel) *did not attach very great importance to it at the time*" [my italics]. Perhaps not at the time, but, as we know, within a very few days the Postmaster-General, having been made aware of his colleagues' Marconi speculations, made a determined, if despairing, effort to get the Marconi contract through the House of Commons without a Select Committee and thus bury the subject for all time, by appealing, on high patriotic grounds, for the sake of the Empire, to Major Archer-Shee to withdraw his opposition. Fortunately he failed, thanks to the staunchness of Major Archer-Shee, and on the failure of this bluff, which may have been prompted by the Master of Elibank, the appointment of a Select Committee involving further investigation became inevitable. As any investigation was fraught with peril, the Chief Whip speedily retired from politics to the oil trade—an episode proclaimed with a great flourish of trumpets by Radical journalists, which attributed his action partly to a filial desire to reclaim the family estates—presumably impaired by Lloyd George legislation—and partly to Lord Cowdray's ambition to have a man of real business capacity on his Board.

At this stage the Marconi Mystery merges into the Fenner

Mystery. The appalling loss of party funds during the late Chief Whip's Trusteeship was discovered in July 1912 and was undoubtedly *a* factor in his departure, if it was not *the* factor. It coincided with the Marconi mess into which the Master of Elibank had got his Party by his private speculations, and still more by his trustee investments of Party funds in Marconi shares. Mr. Fenner was master of the situation, because the disclosure of the damning fact that the Party was "in Marconis" before the completion of the Contract and à fortiori before its Parliamentary ratification would have brought down the Government in twenty-four hours. The Harmsworth Press would have had no time to save them. I am not suggesting that Mr. Fenner blackmailed the Government, but the fact that he was the broker who had made the fatal investment in circumstances not yet fully elucidated placed Ministers so completely at his mercy that no question could even arise of proceeding against him either for misappropriating Party money or other people's money. He remained undisturbed at the expense of his unfortunate clients, while the Master of Elibank resigned the Trusteeship and Treasurership of the Party, vacated his seat in Midlothian—which was captured by the Opposition—in order to retire to the Peerage, which is understood to be privileged from attending Select Committees of the House of Commons, and ultimately betook himself to Bogota at some undetermined date.

In order to keep the Marconi part of our South Sea Bubble clear I will leave the Fenner business for the moment, while reminding the reader that so far Mr. Lloyd George, who is ever ready to answer any question which affords him an opportunity of scoring, has failed to make any response to this enquiry addressed to him from the platform, by personal letter, and repeatedly published in the Press.

> *Did the Master of Elibank, with whom you had a "common venture" in American Marconis at £2 on April* 17, 1912, *conceal from you the fact that he was purchasing the same security as trustee of the Radical Party funds at* £3 5s. *per share on the following day, April* 18?

The point of this question strikes one in the face. There is no catch or trap about it. Mr. Lloyd George's refusal to answer, coupled with his pitiful Christmas whine, suggests that he has

not yet made a clean breast of all he knows and that he is still suffering from a guilty conscience. Was he or was he not aware of the investment of Radical Party funds in American Marconis during the negotiation of the Marconi contract? If so, why doesn't he own up? He has gained nothing by subterfuge, ambiguity, evasiveness, falsehood, or silence. There is a tremendous slump in Lloyd Georgeism, and it is a home-made slump, and not all the frantic efforts of his friends in the Unionist Press can put Humpty Dumpty together again. The year 1913 saw his fortunes at a very low ebb, even though he was able to display Mr. Churchill as captive to his bow and spear at the notorious Marconi luncheon at the National Liberal Club. Was he privy to the investment of the Party funds in American Marconis in April 1912? Or does he ask us to believe that he had never heard of it until the accidental revelations following Fenner's default? Did Mr. Lloyd George know that while he had secured this gilt-edged security for £2 per share, the poor old Party came in a bad second at £3 5s. Lord Murray cannot dispose of this conundrum by cablegram or by speech any more than Mr. Lloyd George can get rid of it by emotion. We must have sworn statements on oath. Although the Upper House has no reason for loving the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, not content with limehousing the Lords, has packed that unfortunate Assembly with his personal friends, a House of Lords Select Committee would doubtless afford him and any of his colleagues anxious to unburden their souls an opportunity of finally clearing up or "cleaning up"—to borrow Lord Murray's expressive phrase—this singularly dirty business.

Bear in mind that Mr. George appeared before the Select Committee two months prior to the Fenner disclosures, and with characteristic recklessness, though speaking on oath, he took upon himself to declare in reply to Mr. George Faber, who asked him, "With the exception of Sir Rufus Isaacs and Lord Murray—we know now they had shares in the American Company—of your own knowledge could you extend that * to the other Members of the Government?"

* "That" consisted of the following emphatic declaration by Mr. Lloyd George. "Excepting for the above transactions I have not, either directly or indirectly, benefited or attempted to benefit, in any way from operations, conducted either by myself or by any one acting on my behalf, in any Marconi shares in this country or elsewhere."

Mr. Lloyd George: "*Certainly I would. I have no hesitation in doing it. But at the same time it is not for me to answer, though I am certain of it, and absolutely certain of it, perfectly certain.*" [My italics.]

Was there a *double entendre* in this answer designed to mislead the Committee while keeping within the limits of technical accuracy? One is naturally suspicious after the experiences we have had of Ministerial mendacity during the Marconi Scandal. If there was no *double entendre*, one might have anticipated that directly it transpired two months later that beyond the private Ministerial flutter the Party had likewise been involved in American Marconis to the tune of between £9000 and £10,000 the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have requested to reappear before the Committee for the purpose of explaining his statement that there were no other Ministerial Marconi speculations. Instead of which the Enquiry was promptly shut down, doubtless on the orders of the Government, which was terrified of further revelations. We have since learnt on the uncontradicted authority of Mr. Parker, the Labour Member of the Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Labour Party in the House of Commons, that in order to secure a whitewashing report the incriminated Ministers sent a private message to selected members of the Committee intimating that they intended to apologise to the House of Commons for their conduct. They gained their object and got the whitewash in the shape of the Falconer Report, but the Committee and the country are still awaiting a long-overdue apology.

Though a digression, the preceding paragraphs should help Lord Murray, who has had other matters to think about, to understand the "atmosphere" created by the performances of his colleagues. He may have forgotten that his own conduct is no whit better than theirs. When the Marconi Select Committee was appointed in October 1912 on Mr. Samuel's undertaking that there would be an immediate and searching investigation concerning Ministers, upon whose fair fame no speck of dust would be found, a Special Report was issued, on which much stress has been laid, inviting all and sundry to assist the Committee in clearing up the questions to be investigated, of which the rumours concerning Ministers bulked most largely in the public mind.

The text of this Report is worth recalling to the attention of the wanderer from far Bogota: "That the Committee wish it to be known that they are prepared to consider all evidence bearing on the negotiation and completion of the Marconi Agreement, and invite any person in possession of such evidence to communicate with the Clerk." The chief repository of knowledge upon the most important branch of the Enquiry, namely, the rumours concerning Ministers which had been furiously repelled in the House of Commons, was unquestionably the Master of Elibank, now Lord Murray, and it might have been supposed by those unfamiliar with the tricks of the trade that the very moment the Committee was constituted under the Chairmanship of Sir Albert Spicer the ex-Chief Whip would have written asking to be heard because he had valuable information to communicate which was calculated to dissipate once and for all those sinister rumours that had circulated from one set of "foul lips" to another to the detriment of a Cabinet of Cæsar's wives. As the Committee preferred that intending witnesses should provide a précis of their evidence, it was open to the Master of Elibank to send the Clerk—I should even say it was a duty of the Master of Elibank—if he did not care to address the Chairman, a brief account of his own transactions in his private capacity in American Marconis, together with his trustee transactions which his colleagues in the Cabinet, headed by Mr. Asquith, regarded and regard as perfectly innocuous and marked by rare delicacy and discretion. Indeed, judging by the Premier's emotion in extolling the "man of integrity," the American Marconi Company was about the only suitable investment either for Ministers or Ministerial funds. Then why all this concealment as everything was done decently and in order?

Lord Murray, so far as we know, carefully abstained from making any communication whatsoever to the Parliamentary Committee to which, as late Chief Whip of the Party in the House of Commons, he owed a special duty, and he allowed the majority of its members to go on week after week and month after month making an egregious exhibition of themselves in a professed zeal to trace rumours to their true source, which was of course the speculations into which the three Ministers had been tempted under circumstances which are still far from clear.

Excuses were at one time made for Lord Murray's reticence on the ground that he was abroad on business of vital importance, on the success of which it was whispered that our future naval supremacy depended. With his mind absorbed in great affairs, he was probably not even conscious that any Marconi Committee was sitting. His dangerous friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, did his utmost to encourage this delusion, going so far as to inform the Committee that he (Mr. Lloyd George) had never been able to have a final settlement with his broker of his second venture in American Marconis in company with the Master of Elibank because that potentate had been away from England ever since August 1912, *i.e.* two months before the Committee began to sit. This assertion is so astonishing that unless one had the printed evidence under one's eyes one would refuse to credit it. Mr. Lloyd George had explained to the Committee that he had bought this second block of 3000 American Marconis at $2\frac{5}{32}$ on May 22, 1500 being for himself and 1500 for the Chief Whip, the total cost being £6400, his own share £3200, and in reply to Lord Robert Cecil he said, "Certainly it was a large investment for me, I admit."

Question: "And you took those shares up?"

Answer: "My broker took them up, yes."

Q. "And of course you have paid for them in the ordinary course?"

A. "I still have got a balance, but I have paid some; there is something still due to him. I am waiting until the Master of Elibank comes back to settle up, because the liability is mine as the order was given through me and the broker deals with me."

Q. "Then you did not settle it as between yourself and the Master of Elibank before he went away?"

A. "*He has been away pretty well since August, I believe.*" [My italics.]

Q. "Has he really?"

A. "Yes, he was in Algiers for some weeks, if not months, and New York, and I think he is in Colombia now, so I really have not had a talk with him about the matter."

This was a clear and convincing account by one of his most intimate friends of the Master of Elibank's movements, and if it

meant anything it certainly meant that he had been absent from England throughout the sittings of the Marconi Committee, and that Mr. Lloyd George had consequently never been able to settle their joint debt to the broker on these three thousand American Marconis. This was not a mere speech delivered from a *Front Bench in the House of Commons*, which has become little better than a factory of falsehood. It was a sworn statement made under the sanction of an oath which one might have thought would have a steadying effect even on Mr. Lloyd George.

When, however, as a result of the Fenner disclosures Mr. Illingworth, the successor of the Master of Elibank as Chief Ministerial Whip, appeared before the Committee he gave a totally different account of Lord Murray's mysterious movements, about which I confess to some curiosity. Mr. Illingworth was asked, "You told us that Lord Murray resigned your present office on August 7 (1912)?"

MR. ILLINGWORTH: "Yes, I think that was the date; it was announced."

Q. "Was he in England after that?"

A. "Oh, yes."

Q. "When did you last see him in England?"

A. "Well, I went to see him off."

Q. "When was that, about, I do not mean to the day, but what month?"

A. "I could not tell you; it was when he sailed for South America. I saw him off at Waterloo."

Q. "Was it this year (1913) or last year (1912)?"

A. "Last year."

Q. "Was it December, or November, or October, or earlier?"

A. "Well, I have nothing to date it by; it was after the House had met."

His Majesty's Ministers have singularly unretentive memories when it suits them to forget. Mr. Lloyd George imagined that Lord Murray had been abroad since the previous August. Mr. Illingworth knew that he had been at home until the House met in October, and although he had seen him off to South America he could not tell whether that great event had occurred in October or November or December. Captain Murray, the brother of Lord Murray, one of the very few Radical witnesses

before the Marconi Committee whose evidence rang true, differed both from Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Illingworth as to the date of his brother's departure, which he gave as January 1, 1913, and in the course of his cross-examination by Mr. Amery Captain Murray volunteered the remarkable statement that the ex-Chief Whip had been in the country during two months of the sittings of the Marconi Committee, thus giving the lie direct to Mr. Lloyd George's statement that he could not settle up with his broker as he couldn't communicate with his co-speculator. As editors have to be careful if Ministers are reckless, I quote the official evidence, to which I would respectfully call the attention of Lord Lansdowne, the chief custodian of the honour of the House of Lords:

"Did he (Lord Murray) at that time inform you, or did you know, that he had had other transactions in American Marconi shares (*i.e.* beside the Party transaction)?"

CAPTAIN MURRAY: "I had heard from him, yes."

Q. "And did you know that Sir Rufus Isaacs and Mr. Lloyd George had had transactions in those shares?"

A. "I knew the transactions of Sir Rufus Isaacs, yes."

Q. "Did Lord Murray give you to understand that those transactions were going to come out before the Committee?"

A. "Which transactions?"

Q. "Sir Rufus Isaacs' and Mr. Lloyd George's?"

A. "I take it it was certainly assumed that as soon as Ministers were brought before the Committee they would come out, and Lord Murray *was actually in this country for very nearly two months while the Committee was sitting*. [My italics.] Had the Committee summoned him the transaction would have come out at the time."

It would be tempting to probe the matter somewhat further if there were any available information. Mr. Lloyd George knew that his friend had spent some weeks or months in Algiers. Mr. Illingworth located him in England until the opening of the autumn Session. His brother kept him there until the close of the year and appears to make it a grievance that he was never summoned before the Committee, though, as we know, when ultimately he was summoned he showed little or no zeal to come. If he went abroad on January 1, 1913, and there is no reason for

disputing Captain Murray's evidence on this point, he chose the psychological moment, because, after wasting many weeks over the official evidence on the merits of the Marconi Contract, the Committee were then about to examine rumours concerning Ministers and had already summoned the journalists, as I can testify. Lord Murray naturally went abroad, and he was doubtless assured by the powers-that-be, including his friends on the Press, that if he could keep away for a year the Marconi clouds would roll by, and as there was no shadow of doubt as to his impending diplomatic triumphs in Central America he would be able to return to the strains of "See the conquering hero comes," played by the massed bands of the octopus newspaper Trust.

Curiously enough, at about the moment of Lord Murray's return his Press gave prominence to the announcement that another warrant for the arrest of the Party broker had been issued, and the suspicion will cross the mind of the most unsuspecting person, after the unpleasant experiences we have had of Radical deviousness, that this new move may be a blind in order to provide the wanderer with a pretext for evading many matters on which the public in general and the House of Lords in particular is entitled to further and better particulars lest the possible trial of Fenner might be prejudiced thereby. We Unionists have shown ourselves to be simpletons over this business, but one would indeed despair of the Republic if the House of Lords is diverted from a plain duty by what bears all the appearance of a transparent trick. The Upper House has a chance of striking a blow for sound and clean government and of finally slamming the door on the malpractices endorsed by our first paid Parliament; and until the contrary is proved the public will decline to believe that the Peers will reject a golden opportunity of showing that in spite of recent creations their standards and traditions remain unimpaired, and that on an elementary question of right and wrong they are ready to act without fear or favour.

I feel that I ought not to close these pages without rendering one small service to an ungrateful Radical Party, not that I entertain any respect for any of their leaders, but because one cannot help feeling some sympathy for that large proportion of

the rank and file who have no private axes to grind, at the shameless manner in which their enthusiasms and energies are exploited by those in authority. I append what I have reason to believe is a fairly complete list of the investments made by the Master of Elibank during his uncontrolled trusteeship of the Party funds, together with a list of the losses sustained by those funds largely owing to the failure of the Trustee, who was lavish in doling out cheques to the Party broker, to see that the securities bought were delivered.

My knowledge does not pretend to extend beyond the business of one of the Party brokers, the firm of Montmorency and Co., of which Mr. Fenner was the leading spirit. There may have been other brokers and other losses. We know that there was more than one Radical Party Bank, though the present Chief Whip, Mr. Illingworth, appears to be as hazy on this point as his predecessor was vague about securities. Radicals who value their property should now set their house in order. They could not begin better than by ascertaining the identity of their brokers and bankers and insisting on serious trustees and a proper audit. It is monstrous that the power of the purse in any great Party should be entrusted to a single individual without any check whatsoever on his operations. Under the present system the Chief Whip may collect what contributions he pleases, from whom he pleases, on what terms he pleases either as regards the future policy of the Party or the pollution of the Fountain of Honour without any accountability to anybody. It would be possible for foreign Trusts to purchase the prolongation of our system of free imports, which suits them to a turn, or for the moneyed patriots of Germany to keep the Radical Party in funds so long as it reduced British armaments, without any member of the public or even any member of the Cabinet having any inkling of what was happening. I know nothing whatsoever of Mr. Illingworth save that he has a passion for slaughtering game, and I make no imputations on him and do not imagine that he would be guilty of either form of treason. Nevertheless, no individual, whoever he may be, should occupy such a position as, according to the Chief Whip's evidence before the Marconi Committee, the Master of Elibank occupied yesterday towards the Party fund and Mr. Illingworth occupies to-day.

He has now, at any rate, a chance of checking the Fenner securities handed over to him in the fateful month of August 1912. He had previously been a mere co-trustee who regarded his functions as a "formality" and apparently signed any transfers placed before him by the Chief Whip without asking any questions. To-day he holds a similar position with presumably another nominal "Co." I devoutly trust that no such financial despot exists in the Unionist Party.

Inquisitive Radicals will observe several striking features in the Party investments. In the first place, Free Trade funds evidently prefer the security of protected countries, possibly to escape the detrimental influence of Lloyd George finance. Secondly, these Protectionist investments are generally gilt-edged unless American Marconis are outside that category. Thirdly a notable exception to the usual run of Radical investments is the large purchase of Home Rail Ordinaries on March 6, 1912, at a time when Ministers were engaged in settling the Coal Strike, and the Chief Whip would presumably have the advantage over the ordinary investor of inside knowledge. In the fourth place, the good democrat, trained by his leaders to detest every form of privilege, especially hereditary honours, cannot fail to be struck by the great accumulation of funds prior to the King's Coronation in 1911 at about the time the Honours list would be under consideration. There was no General Election in prospect and payment of members was about to be introduced, so there seems to have been no urgent need of money. If nearly £70,000 could be invested by a single broker, *i.e.* placed to reserve, what, we may ask, was the full amount collected, and who were the contributors? Possibly a microscopic examination of the subsequent Coronation Honours list might elucidate the latter part of the question. Let me repeat what I have frequently said before, that I am not concerned with the private affairs of the Murray family, but solely with the record of the Master of Elibank in his public capacity of Trustee of the Ministerial Party. There are probably some mistakes due to the manner in which the books of the Party broker were kept as there are clerical errors which I leave as they are.

In the year 1910, when the Master of Elibank became Chief Ministerial Whip (announced in the Press on February 15), there

were two General Elections, so it is not surprising that the investment account should have been small.

1910			£	s.	d.
Mar. 31	£6,153 15s. 9d. Consols . . .	cost	5,000	0	0
Aug. 15	£6,500 L.C.C. 3 % Inscribed . .	"	5,663	10	6
Sept. 8	£3,220 G.I.P. 3½ % Def.	"	3,014	0	10

Of the above the first and third entries are noted in the Bought Journal as being for Trust account. The second, *i.e.* the L.C.C. Stock, was not so noted and was posted to the Master of Elibank's ordinary account; but this may have been an inadvertence in the office, and experts regard it as part of the Trust account. It appears in the Inscribed Stock Register as registered in the name of the Master of Elibank, but the Consols were omitted to be entered. The Transfer Register shows the G.I.P. Def. Stock transferred to his name. The transactions in the Trust account in the Fenner books in 1911 (Coronation year) were as follows:

1911			£	s.	d.
Mar. 31	10,000 Johanbg 4 % Mun Loan . .	cost	9,938	0	0
	10,000 S Manchurian Loan * 4½ %	"	9,825	10	0
	5,000 U.S Brazil 4 % Loan 1911 . .	"	4,703	8	6
	5,000 " " . . .	"	4,703	8	6
	10,000 Havana Terminal 5 % Deb .	"	10,538	2	0
	4,000 Vera Cruz Terminal 4 % Deb. . .	"	4,060	6	0
	1,000 " " .	"	1,017	13	0
	10,000 Chinese Imperial Ry 5 % Loan .		10,375	12	0
			£55 162	0	0
Apr. 12	5,000 Anglo-Amer Teleg Pf. Ord.		5,883	18	0
8	5,000 Can. Nth 5 % Inc Con. Deb. New (Appn).		250	0	0
20	" " " " (Allotment)		369	15	0
	Calls on 4,265 Stock . . .		3,539	19	0
12	" " Cost of 735 Stock . .		727	13	11
Dec. 19	5,000 Can. Nth. 5 % Inc Con Deb. New .		5,189	9	3
			£71,142	15	2

The £55,000 invested on March 31 was paid for by a cheque of £20,000 sent on account on April 10, the entry in the cash-book being "Master of Elibank (Trust)." On April 12 the balance of £35,162 was paid. The Johannesburg Loan appears in the Inscribed Stock Register as registered in the names of the Master

* *Sic.*

of Elibank and P. H. Illingworth, whereas in 1910 the Stocks were registered in the one name only. The £5000 Anglo-American Telegraph Stock—is this a gilt-edged security?—appears in the Transfer Register in the two names, but the £5000 Canadian Northern New Debenture Stock purchased in April does not appear in the Register, though the correspondence shows that it was registered in the two names and duly delivered. The second £5000 of the same stock purchased on December 19 was registered in the name of C. E. Fenner, and is noted in the Transfer Register as transferred to his bank the London City and Midland Bank. The correspondence indicates that a transfer presumably from Fenner to the two Trustees was duly executed and returned to Fenner on February 12 (1912). I am informed by an expert student of the Fenner books that "there is no record of the transfer being completed, and it is quite likely that the Stock was never delivered." However, in a business of this kind where there is any room for the shadow of a doubt the defendant should receive the benefit of it. The investments on Trust account in 1912 were:

1912			£	s.	d.
Feb. 12	11,000 Can Nth. Ont 3½ % Gtd 1st Mort. Deb Stk.	cost	10 120	12	0
Mar. 6	10,000 Midland Def at 71¾	„	7,198	15	6
	5,000 Great Western Ordy at 118	„	5,965	0	6
	1,000 „ at 117¾	„	1,190	0	6
	20,000 N. British Def at 31¼	„	6,382	5	6
	2,000 „ at 31¼	„	639	14	6
			£21,365	16	6
May 7	$5,000 Atchison 4 % Adjt Bonds	cost	962	12	0
	$5,000 Chicago Mil 4 % 1934 Gold Bonds	„	960	2	0
	£1,000 Gt. Nth St. Paul Min. 4 % St Ex Bonds	„	985	2	0
	$5,000 Nth. Pac. 3% Gen. Lien Ld. Grant Bds.	„	735	2	0
	£1,000 Un Pac 4% 1st Lien Rfnd. Mtg. Bonds	„	995	2	0
			£4,638	0	0
May 18	$10,000 Atchison 4 % Adjt. Bonds	cost	1,935	4	0
	$10,000 Chic Mil. 4 % 1934 Gold Bonds	„	1,930	4	0
	£2,000 G N. St Paul Min. 4% St. Ex. Bonds	„	1,995	4	0
	$15,000 Nth. Pac. 3% Gen. Lien Ry. and Ld. Grant Bonds	cost	2,212	14	0
	£2,000 Un. Pac. 4% 1st Lien Refd. Mtg. Bonds		2,005	4	0
			£10,078	10	0

I am informed that the Bond Book shows that the £11,000 Canadian Northern 3½ per cent. Bonds were duly handed over, but as £6000 worth were sold and credited to Stock account [on June 28 and the balance dealt with in a similar way on July 4, the entry in the Bond book can scarcely be regarded as reliable.

The famous Home Railway stocks of March 6, 1912, appear to have been duly purchased by Fenner, who, however, carried them over instead of taking them up. He wrote at the time to say that they would be registered in the usual names (*i.e.* the Master of Elibank and Mr. Illingworth) unless he heard to the contrary. A fortnight later he wrote stating that he had made a mistake with regard to the yield on North British Deferred, and that he had purchased Great Northern Deferred instead. "This change is made without any expense to you whatever." He adds, "and is subject to your approval." "If, therefore, I do not hear from you, I shall conclude that you approve." The exchange was evidently approved, as later on the Master of Elibank's official Private Secretary—it is interesting to note the duties of official Private Secretaries to Radical Ministers—wrote: "Will you kindly let me know at what price Great Northern Deferred was purchased, that I may note it in my book." This was on May 3. The Fenner books show that 10,000 Great Northern Deferred was purchased for £5175 as compared with the cost of 22,000 North British Deferred, viz. £7022. On May 6 Fenner wrote to the official Private Secretary, "I am sending you a statement of the sale and re-purchase." It would be interesting to know whether this statement showed the difference of about £1800, and if so, how the adjustment was made?

According to the entries in the Bond Book the various bonds purchased in May 1912 were duly delivered with the exception of some Atchison 4 per cent. Adjustment Bonds. Possibly the balance had been deposited with the bank. Last, but not least, we have the particular investments for which the Elibank Trusteeship will always be remembered:

1912				£	s.	d.
Apr. 18	2,500 American Marconis at 3¼	. .	cost	8,188	0	0
May 14	500 " at $2\frac{7}{16}$	. .	"	1,231	5	0
				£9,419	5	0

Sufficient comment has already been made on this transaction,

upon which it must be confessed that the Master of Elibank has been placed in a somewhat serious hole by his co-speculators in American Marconis, Sir Rufus Isaacs and Mr. Lloyd George, who insisted that they had no advantage over the general public in getting their shares for £2 on April 17, 1912, a transaction in which the Master of Elibank participated on his private account. When before the Select Committee on March 25, 1913, Sir Rufus Isaacs was asked (*see* Question 500) by Lord Robert Cecil, "But you obtained these shares (*i.e.* the American Marconis), before they were available for the general public, and at a price lower than they were afterwards introduced to the public." SIR RUFUS ISAACS: "Yes, I think you can say that on their introduction here—in England." This was a proper because a correct answer, but unfortunately Sir Rufus Isaacs would not leave it there, for he insisted at the commencement of the next sitting of the Committee on making this unfortunate qualification.

> I should like to make one observation in answer to a question which was put to me by Lord Robert Cecil at the end of the last sitting; that is with reference to dealings which were taking place in England by the public in American shares. I did not know at the time in detail, and, of course, I was anxious not to state anything of which I was not clear; but I am told definitely—I have had information supplied to me, in fact by persons I don't know, in reference to it—that there were dealings in England in the American shares for days before the 17th, and that transactions were taking place at 25s., 30s., and a little over, and at £2 on the 17th, *and, of course, afterwards up to the 19th* [my italics]. I do not say I was aware of these facts before, but I am now. There were dealings by the public generally in large numbers; the exact amount, of course, it is impossible for me to say.

In other words, Sir Rufus Isaacs claimed that he and his colleagues were on precisely the same footing as the ordinary public in getting these shares at £2 on April 17. He even interrupted Mr. Lloyd George's testimony on March 31 in order to repeat, "I made it perfectly clear, I think, that the public could buy just the same as I could buy." But if the public could buy just the same as Ministers could buy, surely the Party should have bought on the same terms as Ministers. The private purchase at £2 and the Trustee purchase at £3 5s. within twenty-four hours will require a lot of explaining away, and the explanation is not made easy by the moral cowardice of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Attorney-General in refusing to acknowledge the palpable and incontestable fact that they were privileged purchasers at a

privileged price. The Master of Elibank will also be anxious to explain, and the public is no less anxious to hear, how he managed to get all the American Marconis he wanted, whereas the ordinary applicant could only obtain about a sixth of his application. Was he a privileged applicant as Chief Whip of the Party or was he compelled in order to get his 2500 American Marconis for the Party funds to apply for six times that amount—in other words, to pledge the Party funds to the tune of nearly £50,000? Now is the moment for a real "clean up."

L. J. MAXSE.

P.S. I had almost forgotten to tabulate the Party losses. I am informed that the following securities were not delivered to the Master of Elibank *re* the Trust account. Mr. Illingworth should be able to check and verify the list, as there is a doubt as to whether the £5000 Canadian Northern 5 per cent. Stock was delivered, in which case the losses would be reduced to £33,806 13s. 6d., which, curiously enough, approximates to the figure given in evidence by the Trustee in bankruptcy of the Fenner estate as to Fenner's liabilities to the Master of Elibank.

				£	s.	d.
1911						
Dec 19	5,000 Can Nth 5% Inc Deb Stk.	cost		5,189	9	3
1912						
Feb. 12	11,000 Can. Nth Ont 3½ % Gtd 1st Mortg Deb Stock	cost		10,120	12	0
May 7	$2,000 Atchison 4 % Adjt Bonds	"		365	1	0
18	$10,000 "	"		1,925	4	0
Mar. 6	Railway Stocks	"		21,365	16	6
	Total			38,996	2	9

THE GORDON RIOTS

> When the rude rabble's watch-word was—destroy,
> And blazing London seem'd a second Troy.
>
> COWPER, 1781.

LORD GEORGE GORDON is one of those ambiguous historical personages who, for a brief period, flash into sudden significance, and then, having contrived to do incalculable mischief, fade away again as suddenly. Their intentions may have been good, though their methods were mistaken; but as individuals they lie so much on the border-line that it is difficult to determine whether they are more sane than mad—more fanatic than lunatic. The difficulty of discriminating is not diminished by the absence of biographical data; and as regards Lord George's early life, the recorded facts are only moderately instructive. He was the third son of the third Duke of Gordon, and was born in London in December 1751. Like Pope's Molly Lepel, he received a military commission when scarcely out of his cradle; but he eventually entered the Navy from Eton as a midshipman. He served on the American station, becoming a lieutenant in March 1772. Then, being disappointed of a ship by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Sandwich, he quitted the Service. Having thus declined to become a Howe or a Hawke, we next hear of him as a candidate for Inverness-shire, which he contested with General Fraser (eldest son of Hogarth's Lord Lovat), who finding his rival's faculty for speaking Gaelic and giving balls with attractive Highland partners, made him a too formidable antagonist, judged it prudent to purchase for him from Lord Melbourne, the seat of Ludgershall in Wiltshire, for which he was returned in 1774. Concerning his senatorial career, little is related except that he made himself conspicuous, if not notorious, for his impartiality in attacking both the Ins and

the Outs, and for his denunciations of the Roman Catholics; and that, in June 1780, his name is inseparably connected with the "No Popery" Riots.

The story of the five days' disturbances, which practically paralysed London and almost amounted to a temporary Reign of Terror, requires no long introduction. In 1778, when the toleration which the different Governments of Europe were extending to their peaceable Roman Catholic subjects was gradually beginning to obtain in England, Sir George Savile, one of the most open-minded and upright of philanthropists—in whom some critics have recognised the lineaments of Goldsmith's "Mr. Burchell"—introduced a bill to relieve Roman Catholics in this country from certain civil disabilities and penalties to which they were liable under an Act of William of Orange. From lapse of time and altered conditions this Act had become not only unnecessary but unjust. Those whom Savile's measure immediately concerned welcomed it warmly; and the Bill was carried in both Houses without a division. Then came the question of extending its provisions to Scotland. But here, at once, difficulties arose with the Presbyterians. The provincial synods hastened to form adverse Protestant associations; and the agitation thus created was assiduously fanned by pamphlets, sermons, and newspaper paragraphs. As a result at Edinburgh and Glasgow serious riots took place, in which Mass-houses were burned and much Roman Catholic property destroyed. So sinister and inveterate was the opposition, that the authorities decided to hold their hands; and as far as Scotland was concerned legislation was abandoned.

In England, however, where, for some time, a "No Popery" movement had been simmering in the public Press, these proceedings in Scotland naturally produced a reaction. A London "Protestant Association" was at once set on foot, and Lord George Gordon, who had been president of a similar body in North Britain, was elected president. He attended its initial deliberations regularly, and on Monday, May 29, assembled by advertisement an extraordinary meeting in Coach-makers' Hall, Foster Lane, Cheapside, to consider the best method for presenting a petition to Parliament for the repeal of Savile's Act. Taking for his pretext the success of resistance in North Britain,

he delivered a "long inflammatory harangue." In consequence a unanimous resolution was passed, that, on the following Friday, the entire Protestant Association, distinguished by blue cockades, should meet in St. George's-Fields, a waste space on the Surrey side of the Thames (where the whirligig of Time has now erected a Roman Catholic Cathedral), and accompany its president to the House of Commons. Upon this, Lord George announced that if less than twenty thousand of his fellow citizens attended, he would not present the petition; and he further suggested that, for the better preservation of order, they should group themselves in different divisions.

On June 2, the day fixed, these arrangements were carried out, with an exactitude which reflects considerable credit on the executive of the Protestant Association. Starting from St. George's-Fields at noon, one party, led by Gordon himself, and preceded by the petition—a huge roll of parchment said to contain a hundred and twenty thousand signatures—crossed the river at Westminster. Another section made its way by Blackfriars; a third by London Bridge. About half-past two the whole body had simultaneously reached Palace Yard, an event which they announced by a "general shout" Up to this time their progress had been quiet and decorous; but it soon became evident that their ranks had been recruited on the road by many undesirable sympathisers of the lowest class, and that the motley cohort which accompanied Gordon to the very entrance of the Commons, and surged after him into the Lobby, must have included not a few spurious "blue cockades," whose proclivities were to active disorder rather than passive protest. These last began speedily to hustle and maltreat the members as they arrived, particularly if they happened to be Peers, constraining them to cry "No Popery"—to assume the Protestant badge—to promise to support the repeal of the Act. They even attempted to force the doors of the House, all the approaches to which they effectually blockaded. In Parliament Street, the Archbishop of York was hissed and hooted. The Lord President of the Council, old Lord Bathurst, was violently assaulted and kicked; Lord Mansfield (*clarum et venerabile nomen!*), who had been instrumental in acquitting a Popish priest, not only had the glasses and panels of his coach beaten in, but narrowly escaped with his

life. The hat of Lord North, the Premier, was cut to pieces and the fragments sold to the spectators; * the Duke of Northumberland was robbed of his watch; the Bishop of Lichfield's gown was torn to tatters; and the Bishop of Lincoln, a brother of the unpopular Lord Chancellor Thurlow, his carriage-wheels having been wrenched off, was only saved in a half-fainting condition by seeking shelter in a neighbouring house, whence he departed in disguise over the adjoining roofs. Other high dignitaries and politicians fared no better. Lord Townshend, then Master-General of the Ordnance, and Lord Hillsborough, a Secretary of State, having been grossly insulted, lost those "honours of their heads," their silk bags, and entered the House with their hair hanging loose; while Lord Stormont, another Secretary of State, whose equipage was literally battered to pieces, after remaining helpless for nearly half an hour in the hands of the rabble, was extricated at last by the courageous intervention of a friendly bystander. Lord Boston was so long detained by his assailants that, at one time, it was proposed by his brother Peers to sally out in a body to his assistance. Similar outrages were suffered by Lord Willoughby de Broke, Lord St. John, and Lord Dudley, while Welbore Ellis, the Treasurer of the Navy, got free with the utmost hazard by taking sanctuary at the Westminster Guildhall, the windows of which were incontinently smashed, the doors demolished, and the Justice and constables ejected.

Inside the House—as soon as opportunity offered—for the state of things outside naturally occupied considerable attention—Lord George, in due course, presented his petition, demanding its immediate consideration. During the heated debate that took place he repeatedly came to the top of the gallery-stairs to acquaint his supporters in the Lobby with the course taken by the discussion, and to denounce to them those—North and Burke among others—who opposed his motion. By several of the members these ill-advised utterances were warmly resented. Walpole's friend, General Conway, publicly rebuked the reckless orator, whom others threatened with personal violence; and Colonel Murray,† his relative, appearing suddenly at his side, declared,

* *Angelo's Reminiscences*, 1830, ii. 146.

† In the *Annual Register* and *Barnaby Rudge* this name is given as Gordon. But in Walpole's *Letters*, the *Gentleman's Magazine*, and *Notes and Queries* it is Murray—

in a voice audible to those below, that he would run his sword into Lord George's body the instant any of his lordship's "rascally adherents" presumed to enter the House. Eventually the Commons, courageously declining to be overawed by numbers —and the postulated twenty had now grown to about sixty thousand—adjourned consideration of the petition to Tuesday, June 6. The dissatisfied crowd were consequently left to console themselves with their leader's optimistic assurance that he had no doubt King George the Third, being a gracious monarch, "would send to his Ministers to repeal the Act when he saw the confusion it created."* In the meantime Lord North had contrived to summon the Guards. But it was nearly nine before they made their appearance, and the vast assembly which had kept the two Houses besieged for many hours of a stifling June day, gradually dispersed. Yet, though the majority broke up in Westminster, there were many of them still deliberately bent on mischief; and these, following the Scottish precedent, forthwith repaired to the Romish chapels of the Bavarian and Sardinian Ministers in Golden Square and Lincoln's Inn Fields, which —to use their own word—they "gutted" and burned, carrying away silver lamps, vestments, and appointments. Tardily, as before, the troops arrived, and some thirteen of the rioters were taken into custody.

With the scenes that ensued, it will be best to deal in the time-table fashion adopted by Dr. Johnson to Mrs. Thrale. On Saturday, the 3rd, the rioters remained quiet; but on the afternoon of Sunday, the 4th, they assembled in large numbers to attack the chapels and dwellings of the Roman Catholics in and about Moorfields. Altars, pulpits, pews, and furniture were ruthlessly broken up, nothing being left but bare walls. On Monday, the 5th, the King's birthday, the mob paraded as far as Lord George's house in Welbeck Street, taking with them their spoils and trophies, which they burned in the then adjacent fields. They afterwards made their way to Wapping and Smithfield, intent on similar depredations; but directing their efforts more especially against those who had given evidence with

i.e. Colonel James Murray of Strowan, Member for Perthshire, and uncle to the Duke of Athol.

* Erskine's *Speeches*, 1810, i. 63.

respect to the prisoners taken on the previous Friday. Sir George Savile, the introducer of the Act of 1778, was also singled out for retribution. He had been prudent enough to remove his plate; but his historic house on the north side of Leicester Square was completely stripped, its contents set fire to in the enclosure, and its iron railings converted into weapons of offence.

On the same day, notwithstanding the fact that the now contrite Protestant Association issued a handbill, signed by its President, deprecating "all unconstitutional proceedings," the Guards, convoying the aforementioned prisoners to Newgate, were on their return pelted by the populace. On Tuesday, the 6th, the two Houses, the Tower, and St. James's Palace were all in charge of the military; but Lord Sandwich, driving to Westminster, was nevertheless assaulted. His coach was wrecked, he himself was cut about the face, and the soldiers had the greatest difficulty in protecting him from further danger. In the evening a party of the rioters demolished the house in St. Martin's Street of Justice Hyde, who had led the military to Palace Yard. Between six and seven another party set out, by way of Long Acre and Holborn, for Newgate, bent on releasing their captured comrades. On the refusal of Boswell's friend, Mr. Akerman, the head keeper, to deliver them up without authority, they at once attacked and burned his house, subsequently piling his blazing furniture against the door of the prison, which, like the house, was speedily in flames, and the prisoners, some three hundred in number, including four under immediate sentence of death, were set at liberty, of course swelling the ranks of the malcontents. Other outrages followed these. Justice Cox's house in Great Queen Street was burned; as also that in Bow Street of Sir John Fielding. At Clerkenwell Green the so-called New Prison was broken open, and the prisoners turned out; after which a more desperate gang attacked Lord Mansfield's famous mansion in the corner of Bloomsbury Square. Beginning by breaking the doors and windows, they went on to fling the contents of the rooms into the street, where large fires were ready lighted to receive them. They then burned the valuable library, some thousand volumes, including "many capital manuscripts, mortgages, papers, and other deeds."

Priceless pictures* and sumptuous wearing apparel were also consigned to the flames, and the choice vintages of the cellars "plentifully bestowed on the populace." The Guards arriving, the Riot Act was read; and there was some half-hearted firing on the part of the soldiers. Nothing, however, could check the fury of the rabble, who literally pulled the building down, burning even the out-houses and stables, so that, in a short time, the whole was entirely consumed. Lord and Lady Mansfield had fortunately made their exit by a back door, before the rioters got in. Not satisfied with what they had done, however, a party of miscreants set out to destroy his lordship's country seat at Caen Wood, Hampstead. But here, happily, they were forestalled, the house being protected by the Militia.

Lord Mansfield's household goods were still blazing fiercely at one o'clock on the morning of Wednesday, June 7—the blackest day in the record. In the forenoon the mob had the "infernal humanity" to give notice that they intended to burn the Fleet, the King's Bench, and other buildings, specifying in particular the premises of Mr. Thomas Langdale, a well-known Roman Catholic distiller in Holborn, next to Barnard's Inn. This plan of campaign they carried out so punctually that at nightfall some six-and-thirty fires are said to have been visible from London Bridge, burning simultaneously in different quarters of the city. At Mr. Langdale's the scene was "horrible beyond description." His vaults were stored with vast quantities of unrectified spirit which ran from the started casks in torrents down the street, and, when ignited, added to the fury of the flames. Numbers of rioters and onlookers drank greedily of the liquor; and were either suffocated at once or burned to death in a state of stupor. Others were buried in the ruins of the falling houses. But by this time the palsied authorities, galvanised into decision by the timely firmness of George the Third, had recovered from their deplorable lethargy. Detachments of Regulars and Militia came pouring into the metropolis at many points. Gradually the field of action was localised; and the

* Malone thought these included Pope's solitary effort at portraiture in oil. But this must have been safe at Caen Wood; for Pope's copy of Kneller's Betterton was exhibited at the National Portrait Exhibition in 1867, No. 61, by the Earl of Mansfield.

insurgents were vigorously checked. Attempts on the Pay Office at Whitehall and the Bank of England* (where Alderman Wilkes and Gibbon's friend, Col. Holroyd, afterwards Lord Sheffield, led the defending forces) were successfully repulsed; and by Thursday, the 8th, though the shops continued shut, and business remained at a standstill, it was plain that the protracted disorder had reached its close, and there was no longer anything to fear. Seventy-two private houses and four public jails had been destroyed.† Two hundred and eighty-five of the rioters are said to have been killed outright by the soldiers; one hundred and seventy-three were wounded; fifty-nine were capitally convicted, and twenty-one of these were afterwards executed. But of those who died from intoxication or other causes, the number was never accurately ascertained. A large number of the escaped prisoners, it should be added, were speedily retaken, and placed once more in confinement.

In the first half of the last century there must have been not a few who, as children, remembered, with Raimbach the engraver, the roar of the rioters rushing through the streets and calling to all good citizens to illuminate—nay, there must have been those living who, like Walpole's printer Kirgate, had actually seen dead bodies lying by empty casks in Holborn. Many trustworthy eye-witnesses have left their impressions of this terrible time; and most of the contemporary memoir writers refer to one or other of the incidents which came under their especial notice. Walpole, Gibbon, Burke, Johnson, Susan Burney, Crabbe, Wraxall, Angelo—all contribute their quota, confirmatory or otherwise, to the body of evidence. To Walpole, the arch-priest of the *nouvelles à la main*, who scribbles off daily letters to Mann and Mason and Lady Ossory on the reigning theme, one naturally turns first, though much of what he has to

* In attacking the Bank of England the rioters were led by a brewer's boy on a powerful dray-horse, which was caparisoned by fetters taken from Newgate. Dickens has remembered this in chap. lxvii of *Barnaby Rudge*, where such a charger is ridden by Hugh of the Maypole. Another instance of his minute study of his material is to be found in the death of the blind man, Stagg, in chap. lxix, who is killed by the soldiers, and runs full forty yards after he is hit. This is plainly suggested by a passage in the *Annual Register*, 1780, p. 261, describing the destruction of the toll-gates at Blackfriars. "One man, who was shot, ran thirty or forty yards before he dropped."

† *Annual Register*, 1780, p. 281.

say is the merest hand-to-mouth gossip (including, of course, Selwyn's latest *mot* thereon) which to-morrow will contradict, and it is safer to trust to what he has actually seen than to those "first reports" he has heard. Personally he had "disliked and condemned the repeal of the Popish statutes," but he was equally averse from reformation by massacre; and for him Lord George is a "lunatic," an "arch-incendiary," the "ruffian apostle who preached up the storm," &c. He confirms generally the occurrences in Palace Yard, decorating them, of course in his own inimitable way; and he also makes mention more than once of the intervention of Colonel Murray. Lord Mansfield (whom he did not like) he describes as "quivering on the woolsack like an aspen," which, seeing that he was a septuagenarian who had been in danger of his life, was not unnatural. Of the burning of the chapels on the same day, Walpole writes to Lady Ossory on June 3:

> The mob forced the Sardinian Minister's chapel in Lincoln's Inn Fields, and gutted it. He saved nothing but two chalices; lost the silver lamps, &c., and the benches being tossed into the street, were food for a bonfire, with the blazing brands of which they set fire to the inside of the chapel, nor, till the Guards arrived, would suffer the engines to play. My cousin, [Thomas], Walpole, fetched poor Madam Cordon,* who was ill, and guarded her in his house till three in the morning, when all was quiet.

The chapel of St. Anselm and St. Cecilia was the oldest Roman Catholic place of worship in London, which was probably why it was selected for destruction by the wirepullers of the mob. As a connoisseur, Walpole should have regretted the loss of its beautiful altar-piece by the Chevalier Casali, reported to have cost £2500. To Count Haslang, the Bavarian envoy, he is unsympathetic:

> Old Haslang's Chapel was broken open and plundered; and, as he is a prince of smugglers as well as Bavarian Minister, great quantities of run tea and contraband goods were found in his house. This one cannot lament; and still less, as the old wretch has for these forty years usurped a hired house, and, though the proprietor for many years has offered to remit his arrears of rent, he will neither quit the house nor pay for it.†

Of the depredations of Sunday, Walpole says little, as he had returned to Strawberry Hill "to avoid the Birthday (Monday

* The Sardinian Minister was the Marquis de Cordon.

† Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, June 5, 1780.

the 5th), and for the next occurrences we must go to a fresh witness, Fanny Burney's lively sister, Susan, then resident with her family in Sir Isaac Newton's old house, No. 1 St. Martin's Street, Leicester Square, from the Observatory of which they had exceptional opportunities of surveying the scenes in their immediate neighbourhood.* From this coign of vantage they saw the whole of Leicester Square lighted up by Sir George Savile's burning property. "They [the mob] had piled up the furniture in the midst of the Square, and had forced Sir George's servant to bring them a candle to set fire to it. They would doubtless have set the house itself on fire [also] had not the Horse and Foot Guards prevented [their doing so]." This was on Monday, the 5th. Next day came the burning of Justice Hyde's, which was in St. Martin's Street itself.†

From our windows we saw them throw chairs, tables, cloathes, in short everything the house contained, into the street, and as there was too much furniture for one fire, they made several. I counted six of these fires, which reached from the bottom of the street up to the crossing which separates Orange and Blue Cross Streets. Such a scene I never beheld! As it grew dusk, the wretches who were involved in smoak

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* "Newton House," once No. 1, and latterly No. 35 St. Martin's Street, the residence from 1710 to 1725 of Sir Isaac Newton; and from 1774 and many years subsequently, of Dr. Charles Burney, the musician, is now, alas! pulled down. The "Observatory" to which Susan Burney refers existed in 1778, since Fanny Burney tells us expressly that her father went to the expense of practically reconstructing it after the hurricane of that year. Parts of her first novel, *Evelina*, were written in this "square turret." It is consolatory to learn from a letter of Mr. Hugh Phillips to the *Times* of December 4, 1913, that this historic dwelling has not fallen a prey to the house-wrecker, and that it has been removed "in sections carefully packed and numbered" to Hitchin, where its re-erection is contemplated. That this may come to pass is devoutly to be wished, if only to justify Lord Macaulay's too-sanguine prediction in the *Edinburgh Review* for January 1843, that the building would "continue to be well known as long as our island retains any traces of civilisation." Meanwhile a useful memorial of it exists in Miss Constance Hill's pleasant volume entitled *A House in St. Martin's Street*, 1907, to which we are indebted for our extracts from Susan Burney's unpublished Diary.

† The *Gentleman's Magazine* says Hyde's house was in Lisle Street. But Lisle Street lies north of Leicester Square; and Susan Burney places the house towards the bottom of "our street," i.e. St. Martin's Street on the southern side. Lisle Street has, however, its memories of these troublous days, since Francis Wheatley's great picture of the Riots, being too large to be removed, was destroyed here at a fire in the house of James Heath, who engraved it for Boydell (Edwards's *Anecdotes of Painters*, [illegible], p. [illegible]).

and covered with dust, with the flames glaring upon them . . . seemed like so many infernals. . . . .

One thing was remarkable and convinced us that the mob was secretly directed by somebody above themselves: they brought an engine with them and while they pulled Hyde's house to pieces and threw everything they found into the flames, they ordered the engine to play on the neighbouring houses to prevent them catching fire.*

Early that morning Mrs. Burney, Susan's stepmother, had seen Burke pass through St. Martin's Street, beset by a crowd who wished to extort from him a promise that he would vote for the repeal of the Act. "My mother . . . heard him say: 'I beseech you, gentlemen; gentlemen, I beg ——'." Finally he was obliged to draw his sword in order to free himself from their importunities. He was lucky to escape. He had been denounced with North by Lord George at Westminster, as opposing the repeal; and if his house in Charles Street, St. James's Square, had not been stoutly garrisoned by sixteen soldiers, it would probably have shared the fate of Sir George Savile's.

One of the diarist's entries illustrates the difficulties of the military. An ensign and thirty Foot Guards marched into the street, and after a few words to the rioters from the officer, marched out again, "the mob shouting and clapping the soldiers on their backs as they passed." The soldiers were as unwilling to use force as the magistrates were to send for the soldiers; and Walpole mentions a brother-in-law of Lord George who had "to conceal himself" because he had given orders to fire at Bloomsbury Square. Such a state of things Johnson had foreseen four years before when he said: "The characteristick of our own government at present is imbecility. The magistrate dare not call the guards for fear of being hanged. The guards will not come for fear of being given up to the blind rage of popular juries." †

At night-time the watchers from the St. Martin's Street Observatory saw the flames ascending from Sir John Fielding's house in Bow Street; from Newgate; and from Lord Mansfield's. Concerning this last, there is not much to add, save that Parson Warner, Selwyn's chaplain and Thackeray's Sampson, found, or professed to have found, a page of Virgil from the famous library—

* *The House in St. Martin's Street*, 1907, 257.

† Hill's *Boswell's Johnson*, 1887, iii. 46.

the "lettered store" of which Cowper wrote—fluttering in the enclosure. *Sunt lacrimæ rerum*—was the legend on this fugitive fragment. Many similar relics, charred and stained, were for a long time preserved in Caen Wood; but "silver-tongued Murray" is said to have regretted most of all the loss of his manuscript of a speech on the privilege of Parliament which he considered contained all the law and all the eloquence he possessed. To this, possibly, Cowper intended to refer in the neat copy of verses he sent to William Unwin:

> And MURRAY sighs o'er Pope and Swift,
> And many a treasure more,
> The well-judg'd purchase and the gift
> That grac'd his letter'd store.
>
> *Their* pages mangled, burnt and torn,
> The loss was *his alone*;
> But ages yet to come shall mourn
> The burning of *his own*.

Sir John Fielding had also to lament the destruction of his furniture, effects, and "writings"—a lament with which posterity may fairly sympathise, as they probably included some of the rare letters and MSS. of the great novelist who was his half-brother and predecessor. But if details are scanty as to Bow Street and Bloomsbury Square, they are abundant concerning the burning of Newgate. George Crabbe, the poet, who, with three pounds in his pocket, had come to London in the previous April to seek his fortune, was still seeking it when, wandering aimlessly homeward to his lodging near the Royal Exchange, he turned out of Ludgate Hill at about half-past seven on Tuesday evening (the 6th) to find the mob already occupied in firing Mr. Akerman's house:

> As I was standing near the spot [he writes in his journal to Miss Elmy, the Mira of his affections] there approached another body of men, I suppose 500, and Lord George Gordon in a coach, drawn by the mob towards Alderman Bull's [the seconder of his motion in the House of Commons], bowing as he passed along. He is a lively looking young man in appearance, and nothing more, though just now the reigning hero. By eight o'clock, Akerman's house was in flames. I went close to it, and never saw anything so dreadful. The prison was, as I said, a remarkably strong building; but, determined to force it, they broke the gates with crows and other instruments, and climbed up the outside of the cell part, which joins the two great wings of the building, where the felons were confined; and I stood where I plainly saw

their operations. They broke the roof, tore away the rafters, and having got ladders they descended. . . . Flames all around them, and a body of soldiers expected, they defied and laughed at all opposition. The prisoners escaped. I stood and saw about twelve women and eight men ascend from their confinement to the open air, and they were conducted through the streets in their chains. . . . You have no conception of the frenzy of the multitude. This being done, and Akerman's house now a mere shell of brickwork, they kept a store of flame there for other purposes. It became red hot, and the doors and windows appeared like the entrances to so many volcanoes. With some difficulty they then fired the debtor's prison—broke the doors—and they, too, all made their escape. Tired of the scene, I went home. . . .*

At eleven o'clock he returned to find Newgate "open to all," for the incendiaries had transferred their operations to Bloomsbury Square. Another spectator of the attack upon Newgate was Henry Angelo, the fencing-master, who, hiring for sixpence a garret-window opposite, had a full view of the whole—the first onslaught with pick-axes and sledge hammers, the breaking open of the debtor's-door, the subsequent rising of smoke from different points, and "a new species of jail delivery." "The captives marched out with all the honours of war, accompanied by a musical band of rattling fetters," which Angelo presently heard being knocked off in the neighbouring houses. Next day Dr. Johnson who, at Bolt Court, was not far off, visited the ruins:†

On Wednesday [he writes to Mrs. Thrale] I walked with Dr. Scot [afterwards Lord Stowell] to look at Newgate, and found it in ruins, with the fire yet glowing. As I went by, the Protestants were plundering the Sessions-house at the Old Bailey. There were not, I believe, a hundred; but they did their work at leisure, in full security without sentinels, without trepidation, as men lawfully employed, in full day. Such is the cowardice of a commercial place ‡

And then he goes on to enumerate the incidents of "black Wednesday," when one might watch, as Walpole did from the roof of Gloucester House in Upper Grosvenor Street, "the glare of conflagration fill the sky;" and listen hourly to fresh tidings of new enormities at Blackfriars Bridge and Holborn.

On the 7th came the King's Proclamation, with the belated issue of General Orders authorising the military to "use force for dispersing the illegal and tumultuous assemblies of the people." Wraxall, who, though he mixes up his dates, seems to have witnessed the burning of Lord Mansfield's house, the "sublime

* Crabbe's *Works*, 1834, i. 83. † Angelo's *Reminiscences*, 1830, ii. 147-8.
‡ Hill's *Johnson's Letters*, 1892, ii. 169.

ight" of the King's Bench in flames, and the terrible scenes at Langdale's distilleries, says at this point:

From the instant that the three Bridges over the Thames were occupied by regular troops, the danger was at an end. This awful convulsion, which, on Wednesday, the *seventh* of June, seemed to menace the destruction of everything; was so completed quelled, and so suddenly extinguished, that on the *eighth*, hardly a spark survived of the popular effervescence. Some few persons in the Borough of Southwark,* attempted to repeat the outrages of Wednesday; but they were easily and immediately quelled by the military force. Never was a contrast exhibited more striking than between those two evenings, in the same city! † The patroles of Cavalry, stationed in the Squares and great streets throughout the West End of the Town, gave London the aspect of a Garrison: while the Camp which was immediately afterwards formed in St. James's Park, afforded a picturesque landscape; both sides of the Canal, from the Queen's House [*i.e.* Buckingham House] down to the vicinity of the Horse Guards, being covered with tents and troops.‡

"This audacious tumult is perfectly quelled," wrote Gibbon to his stepmother on the 10th. On the 27th he writes again:

The measures of Government have been seasonable and vigorous; and even opposition has been forced to confess, that the military force was applied and regulated with the utmost propriety. Our danger is at an end, but our disgrace will be lasting, and the month of June 1780, will ever be marked by a dark and diabolical fanaticism, which I had supposed to be extinct, but which actually subsists in Great Britain, perhaps beyond any other Country in Europe.§

Meanwhile, on June 9, the President of the London Protestant Association, to whose ill-starred proposals for placing his petition before Parliament these deplorable scenes were the calamitous sequel, had been arrested at his house in Welbeck Street, examined by a Committee at the Horse Guards, and escorted to

* *Thrale's Brewery* in Deadman's Place, Southwark, was naturally visited. But here, on the first occasion, "the clamorous crowd is hush'd by mugs of mum." judiciously exhibiting some £50 worth of meat and drink, Mr. Perkins, the Superintendent, contrived to send them away. When they returned they were confronted by soldiers (Hill's Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, 1887, iii. 435).

† This is confirmed by Mr. Urban's chronicler: "The writer of this paragraph, whose residence is at a small but equal distance from three dreadful fires which at the same period were blazing on the Wednesday night, when he was surrounded by hundreds of families who were distractedly employed in removing their children and their valuables, sat down to his literary amusements on Thursday night as uninterruptedly as if he had resided on Salisbury Plain. Not a human voice was to be heard." (*Gentleman's Magazine*, August 1780, p. 369.)

‡ Wraxall's *Historical Memoirs of my Own Time*, 1904, p. 207.

§ Gibbon's *Corr.*, 1896, i. 382.

the Tower in charge of an exceptionally strong military guard. He had—it was alleged by his friends—taken no active part in the riots; he had even gone fruitlessly to Buckingham House to offer King George his assistance in suppressing them, and it was afterwards testified by Sir James Lowther, in whose carriage Lord George had left the House of Commons on the 6th, that he had earnestly entreated the mob to go home and be quiet. Whilst confined in the Tower, he was well supplied with books, and is reported to have devoted himself, among other things, to the study of the ten folio volumes of the State Trials. According to Malone * he applied for "a Protestant clergyman, a Popish priest, a Presbyterian preacher, and an Anabaptist to be sent to him: but his wishes were not complied with. He then requested to have a fiddler, which was readily granted." But he was certainly visited, with Lord Stormont's permission, by John Wesley, who, on December 19, spent an hour with him, conversing about Popery and religion. Wesley found him well acquainted with the Bible; and was agreeably surprised to note that he did not complain of any person or thing † After being imprisoned for eight months, on February 5, 1781, he was tried in the Court of King's Bench on a charge of high treason. His senior counsel was Lloyd (afterwards Lord) Kenyon; the junior, Thomas, later Lord Erskine, then a young man of thirty-one. Lord Mansfield, the aged Lord Chief Justice, presided. The Crown brought witnesses to show that the riots had been the preconcerted results of the demonstration connected with the presentation of the petition, and that Gordon, as the originator of that demonstration, was guilty of treason, or—to speak precisely—of what was then legally known as *constructive* treason, *i.e.* something "equivalent to treason though not intended or realised as such." Special stress was laid, in this connection, on the fact that he had signed a protection by which a house in Long Acre was saved from destruction. But Kenyon's inexorable cross-examination of the witnesses, particularly of one William Hay, made havoc of some of the evidence for the prosecution, while Erskine, in a concluding speech occupying some sixty octavo pages of print, and marked by extraordinary forensic ability, addressed the jury on behalf

* *Charlemon Corr.*, Hist. MSS. Comm., 1891, i. 374.

† *Wesley's Journal*, 1901, iv. 185.

of the prisoner. His main contention was that the petitioners of June 2, who belonged to the Protestant Association, had been orderly and peaceable in their intentions; that his client had neither part nor lot in the excesses that ensued—excesses that were "at the very worst, unforeseen, undesigned, unabetted and deeply regretted consequences"—and that, in the meaning of the statute, Gordon was in no wise guilty. These arguments, admirably marshalled and supported, must have had their weight with the jury, who, at a quarter after five o'clock on the morning of February 6, returned a verdict of "Not Guilty"—a verdict which, according to Erskine's editor James Ridgway, was "repeated from mouth to mouth to the uttermost extremities of London, by the multitudes which filled the streets." Dr. Johnson's comment on the finding, as recorded by Boswell, is characteristic: "He said he was glad Lord George Gordon had escaped, rather than that a precedent should be established for hanging a man for *constructive treason*." *

"Escaped"—it will be noticed—is Johnson's word; and there can be no question that Gordon owed much to the able advocacy of Erskine, who, by the way, besides being a compatriot of his own age, had also begun life as a midshipman. But the precise amount of Lord George's responsibility for the riots is extremely difficult to establish. By his contemporary apologists it is urged that his notification of May 29 had the misfortune to attract in the train of the guileless Protestant Association a host of disreputable characters, "thieves, pick-pockets, house-breakers," and the like, to whom the "No Popery" cry meant nothing but a call to disorder; and who were, in fact, an unsolicited and unwelcome contingent from that large, dangerous, and powerful body, the Mob, which, eight and twenty years before, Henry Fielding had ironically termed the real Fourth Estate. They feared, he said, two orders of men only: the justices of the peace and the soldiery—both of which preservers of public tranquillity, in the occurrences of June 1780, owing to the inactivity of the authorities, had for some time left them a free hand. Beginning, for form's sake, with the burning of Popish chapels, impunity had rapidly hurried them on to the destruction of private property, the demolition of

* Hill's Boswell's Johnson, 1887, iv. 87.

public institutions, and to spoliation generally. All this may be true. At the same time it is impossible to hold with the *Gentleman's Magazine*, that the Protestant Association of Coachmakers Hall were merely "a set of well-meaning men (*who could not have been aware of the consequences*)* met for the defence of the established religion." The "consequences" in Scotland had been riots and the burning of Popish chapels; and these were the consequences in England, aggravated by special social conditions, and assuredly not modified by the inflammatory speeches and reckless rhetoric of Gordon himself, who must have known that preaching constitutional restraint to an infuriated audience is the idlest of injunctions. To kindle dangerously combustible material is surely a serious crime, which cannot be condoned on the trivial pretence that you did not afterwards feed the fire. Yet it was mainly on this latter plea that Gordon was acquitted.

By the historians he has been treated no better than by Horace Walpole. He is a "crack-brained member of parliament," a "half-crazy fanatic," and so forth. John Forster, who was a Commissioner of Lunacy, regarded him as a madman; and thought those pages of *Barnaby Rudge* in which he appeared were the feeblest parts of the book. Dickens, on the contrary, found redeeming points in his "Protestant hero." He must, he contended, "have been at heart a kind man, and a lover of the despised and rejected, after his own fashion. He lived upon a small income, and always within it; was known to relieve the necessities of many people. . . . He always spoke on the people's side, and tried against his muddled brains to expose the profligacy of both parties. He never got anything by his madness, and never sought it."† To this may be added that he was certainly fearless; that he must have possessed considerable persuasive powers as a platform speaker, and that, having gone through the rude discipline of the six years' probation of bad air, bad food, and bad manners which characterised the orlop deck of a Georgian man-of-war, he could scarcely have emerged without some experimental knowledge of humanity in the rough.

Unfortunately, the remaining incidents of his career enforce rather than extenuate the debatable aspect of his personality.

* The italics are ours.

† Forster's *Life of Dickens*, ch. ix.

In 1784 we find him, for the nonce, donning a Dutch uniform, girt with a Highland broadsword, and inciting the British Seaman, with whom, as an ex-lieutenant, he had naturally a certain authority, to take up arms for the Dutch against the Emperor Joseph. Two years later he is championing the cause of another "friend of mankind," Carlyle's "Sicilian jail-bird," Cagliostro, and libelling Marie-Antoinette for "publicly persecuting" that egregious impostor. Then he is accused of libelling British justice, in a bogus "Prisoners' Petition" against transportation, addressed to, but written by, himself. For these latter exploits he was in 1787–88 tried and eventually sentenced to five years' confinement in Newgate. Already he had become a convert to Judaism—gaberdine and long beard included. In Newgate he lived on the whole not unagreeably, occupying apartments on the master's side; playing the bagpipes; entertaining friends and admirers daily; giving fortnightly balls, and, between whiles, vainly petitioning the French National Assembly to intervene for his release. At the expiration of his sentence, failing to find securities for his good behaviour, he remained in custody, dying at length of jail-fever on November 1, 1793. His last act was to sing the Revolutionary *Carillon National* of *Ça ira*. He was in his forty-second year. Being refused Jewish burial, he was privately interred in the graveyard of St. James's Chapel in the Hampstead Road. But no stone marks the spot.

AUSTIN DOBSON.

STOLEN PICTURES

PICTURE stealing is assuredly one of the most foolish and profitless of crimes. It may indeed be classed as a species of insanity, for it often appears to be the result of a sudden and irresistible attack of mental aberration. Unlike most other thefts, there is no advantage whatever to be derived from the "pastime." And yet, if one may stretch a point and include statues, picture stealing has at least the merit of being sanctified by antiquity. The Romans plundered the Greeks, and we know that Verres, as Governor of Sicily, robbed the Sicilians on every hand; he "even ventured to appropriate to himself the colossal candelabrum of gold enriched with precious stones which the son of Antiochus was conveying as a present to the Republic"; he possessed the Cupid of Praxiteles, the Hercules of Myron, the Sappho of Silanion, and many other treasures of antiquity, his "title" to which was more in the region of force than argument.

But unfortunately it is not necessary to go back to ancient times for instances. Within recent years the picture thief has been particularly busy, his fiendish ingenuity always breaking out in the most unexpected places. Public museums and private galleries have been rifled of their treasures, involving the wholesale dismissal of officials, the apprehension of innocent persons, and the expenditure of much newspaper fury. The only people to benefit by these robberies are the photographers, to whom every theft of a masterpiece must be a small gold-mine—for even an indifferent photograph is more valuable in tracing a missing picture than any amount of printed details.

The thief is equally indifferent in selecting the object of his exploit; sometimes it is a private collection and at others a public gallery. The Gainsborough *Duchess of Devonshire* and

the Leonardo da Vinci *Monna Lisa* are the most famous thefts in these two sections. Both happened to have had fortunate terminations, after lapses in the one case of over a quarter of a century and in the other of over two years. Both robberies were planned and carried out with a boldness and an ingenuity which showed extraordinary skill and coolness, and both thieves merit a prominent place in any dictionary of clever scoundrels.

Generally speaking, the picture thief has devoted his talents to the robbing of public museums in preference to private galleries, and in this respect no culprit of ancient or modern times plundered on the scale of Napoleon I. The spoils of war may or may not legally rank as thefts, but it is quite certain that a nation's pictures, whether in museums or churches, ought not to be the loot of victorious armies. Napoleon thought otherwise, and so did his generals, or such of them—Soult for example—as had a taste for art. The Emperor had at least one merit in this respect; he plundered pictures for the glory of his capital, whilst Soult plundered for his own private advantage—an advantage from which his heirs reaped a fortune when his pictures were sold in 1852.

Napoleon's enterprises in this matter are fairly well known, at least to the student of the by-ways of art history. They formed at the time the subjects of several "Catalogues," most of which are now rarely met with, but some of which I am fortunate enough to possess. One of the earliest of these was by J. B. P. Lebrun, the picture dealer, artist and husband of the much more famous artist, Madame Vigée Lebrun. Lebrun was the *commissaire expert* of the Musée Central des Arts when, in 1798, his *Examen Historique et Critique des Tableaux . . . venant des premier et second envois de Milan, Cremone, Parme, Plaisance, Modène, Cento et Bologne* was published. "Hommage au héros vainqueur de l'Italie! hommage aux braves soldats qui ont partagé ses lauriers!" exclaims Lebrun in his introduction, and his elation appears to have been entirely symptomatic of the general sentiment in Paris, almost the only discordant voice being that of Quatremère de Quincy. Lebrun describes over sixty pictures and sculpture, among them the Raphael *St. Cecilia* from the St. Giovanni Church at Bologna, the Raphael *Resurrection* from St. Paolo, Parma; the Titian *Christ Crowned*

with Thorns from the Dominican Church at Milan; four pictures emblematical of the Elements by Jean Breughel and Van Balen from the Ambrosian Library at Milan; the *Virgin and Child*, by Rubens and Breughel, from the same place, and many others. In 1803 Legrand published, with over ninety fine plates, a Catalogue of the antique statues and other sculpture, the *fruit des conquêtes de l'arme d'Italie*; whilst among the other books on the subject an anonymous writer issued in 1816, through an Edinburgh publisher, an excellent "Descriptive Catalogue of the Antique Statues, Paintings, and other Productions of the Fine Arts" that existed in the Louvre at the time the Allies took possession of Paris in July 1815. He describes over 400 statues and many hundreds of pictures then in the Louvre, many of which, of course, were not the spoils of war, but the property of the French nation.

We have a vivid picture of the dismantling of the Louvre in *Paris Revisited*, 1815, by John Scott, editor of the *Champion* newspaper. But for the insistence of the Allies, and particularly the active co-operation of the English, to whom, in a sense, it was a matter of no importance, the Louvre would never have rendered up its ill-gotten treasures, the French Ministers refusing to promise satisfaction or to uphold a strenuous opposition. The temper of the Parisian public was in a very uncertain condition. But on September 23, a guard of 150 British riflemen were stationed outside the Louvre, and the dismantling began—"it seemed," wrote Scott, "as if a nation had become ruined through improvidence and was selling off." When the gallery was thoroughly cleared of the property of other nations, Scott counted the number of pictures which remained to it and found that the total left to the French nation of the 1500 pictures which constituted this magnificent collection was 274. The Italian division dwindled from eighty-five to twelve. We need not dwell any longer on this great episode in the history of stolen treasures, except to repeat what a Frenchman said to Scott when he saw that the Horses from the Church of St. Mark's, Venice, had also been returned: "You have left me nothing for my children but hatred against England; this shall be my legacy to them."

It is an international calamity that Napoleon's generals were

not also compelled to disgorge. Soult robbed Spain of nearly a score of famous pictures by Murillo, one of which, so the story goes, the Marshal used to point at as having saved the lives of two very estimable persons: he threatened to shoot them if they refused to give him the picture! In his hurried departure from Spain, Soult, even as it was, left behind some hundreds of pictures which he had marked down for export. Lady Wantage's beautiful *Virgin and Child in Clouds*, once an altar-piece in a church at Seville, was taken away by Soult, but while yet in Spain thieves got access to the place where it was stored, and cut out and carried away the central portion with the Virgin and child. This fragment (forty inches by thirty inches) found its way to England and into Lord Overstone's collection, while the mutilated canvas was taken to Paris by Soult, whose heirs sold it in 1855 to an agent of Lord Overstone, and the two portions were skilfully reunited after a separation of over forty years.

General Desolle stole Murillo's *Immaculate Conception* from the Royal Palace at Madrid. it was purchased many years afterwards by the King of Holland, and is now in America. General Sebastiani was another person who "prevailed upon" the unfortunate Spaniards to "present" him with Murillos and other pictures, one of the most important of which was the *St. Thomas of Villanueva*, for many years in the Ashburton collection and considered by Mrs. Jameson as one of the finest Murillos in England. The largest painting ever executed by Murillo, *St. Anthony of Padua and the Infant Jesus* (about eighteen feet by eleven feet), was mutilated at the Cathedral at Seville on November 5, 1874, the figure of St. Anthony being cut out. In the following January a Spaniard named Fernando Garcia offered the St. Anthony to a New York picture dealer, Mr. W. Schaus, who at once recognised it and handed it over to the Spanish authorities. The figure was restored to its original position "amid imposing religious and secular festivities" on October 30, 1875; for some reason never explained the thief was allowed to go unpunished.

We will venture to quote one more Spanish illustration. Herr von Nemes of Budapest, one of the most widely known collectors on the Continent, has for years made a special feature

of Spanish pictures. He possessed several fine examples of Goya, among them was *Las Gigantillas* (*Enfants jouant à se porter*), or as we should say, playing at "leap-frog," which had long been in his possession, had been publicly exhibited at Budapest, at Munich, and in Dusseldorf, and was illustrated in his Catalogue. The collection came up for sale in Paris last June and at the last moment it was suddenly discovered that the Goya was a stolen picture; it was naturally withdrawn from the sale, and there can be little doubt that this is one of the several fine Goyas stolen from the Royal Palace at Madrid in May 1870. But the story of picture robberies in Spain, by conquering generals, by officials, and by private individuals is so long that it would fill a goodly volume.

The breaking up of religious institutions in England and elsewhere seems to have been the excuse for plundering by both clergy and laity. When the English college at Rheims was dissolved at the end of the seventeenth century, a great quantity of property disappeared. An important picture by Rubens, known to have belonged to the College was long afterwards discovered hidden in an old house in process of demolition; the picture was transferred to Antwerp Cathedral, and was again "lost" during a fire which occurred there, and only came to light again in 1895 through a law suit, the discoverer being a well-known French student, M. Alvain-Beaumont. A portrait of Cardinal Pole, also stolen from the Rheims College, was in 1895 in the collection of the Marquess D'Oyley.

Dresden has an almost historical fame in the matter of picture brigandage, although most of the stolen pictures have been recovered. In 1747 three pictures were stolen from the Museum in that city, one of which by Mieris was subsequently recovered. In the autumn of 1788 three small pictures, Correggio's *Reading Magdalen*, Van der Werff's *Judgment of Paris*, and a portrait by Seybold, were stolen; a reward of a thousand ducats (nearly £500) was advertised in the foreign newspapers, but a few days after the robbery two of the pictures were found in the streets of Dresden, and the *Magdalen* was discovered in a hayloft, but robbed of its valuable frame of gold and precious stones. In 1810 a small Holbein portrait disappeared and has never been found; in 1849 a person calling herself Sophia May von Langensalza effected a

neat theft of a Metsu picture which, on being offered for sale at Leipzig, was recognised and the thief apprehended.

Another theft which could not have benefited the perpetrator was carried out when the Dusseldorf Gallery was transferred to Munich about 1805. A picture by Raphael was missed in transit, and nothing more was heard of it until September 1883, when it was found rolled up and hidden behind the wainscoting of a little country house in Blankenheim, in Rhenish Prussia, and found to be the long-lost Raphael. Even during last month three pictures were stolen during the night from the ground floor galleries of the New Pinacothek at Munich, and so far have not been recovered. In 1847 the English and other papers reported that the Munich Gallery was robbed of its Mieris, a portrait of the artist himself in the act of *Sacrificing to Bacchus*, but we have not been able to verify the fact that such a picture was ever in the Gallery. A few years prior to this—in 1841—and as an instance of what thieves will steal, a number of Egyptian articles were stolen from the Berlin Museum. One of the most sensational thefts in Holland was effected at the Amsterdam Museum in April 1859, when a *Holy Family* by van de Werff, 1710, valued at £2000, was brought to London and offered to a dealer at £1500. It was recovered by Inspector Whitaker, who appears to have had a special faculty for tracing stolen pictures, and returned to Amsterdam.

Robberies from French museums and libraries have been numerous, particularly during the Revolution and up to the first half of the nineteenth century. Book thefts do not fall within the scope of this article, but, on account of its superbly illuminated miniatures, an exception may be made of the fifteenth-century MS. of the *Cité de Dieu*, which the town of Maçon acquired in 1835. Some time afterwards an unknown vandal despoiled this fine book of nine of its large miniatures. In the course of time it was discovered that the museum of Lyons had purchased three of the missing pages and, following the announcement of this discovery, two more were found in the cabinet of a well-known collector, M. de Quirielle, who was honest enough to return them to Maçon. Three of the remaining four turned up in London at a sale at Sotheby's in 1899, and the whole story of the affair is told by the late M. L. Delisle in *The Library* of

December of that year. Two years ago a picture of Boucher was stolen from the Museum at Quimper, but the culprit was detected and convicted.

But all other picture thefts in France—and they are many—pale before the dramatic robbery of Leonardo da Vinci's *Monna Lisa* or *La Gioconda*, from the Salon Carré at the Louvre on August 22, 1911. The sensation of the theft was no less great than that of the discovery of the picture in Florence on December 12 last. The whole story is too recent and too familiar to be again told here, but it may be said with truth that *Monna Lisa* returned to her old quarters the most famous "stolen" picture in the world—more famous even than her sister, the *Duchess of Devonshire*.

Picture stealing in Italy has long been cultivated as a fine art among certain criminals. The Pacca and other laws prohibiting the exportation of old pictures have had the effect of sharpening the ingenuity of the thief. For over half a century thefts have been exceedingly frequent. In December 1860 the Uffizi Gallery was the scene of an extensive robbery of art treasures, valued at the time at a million francs. Church robberies have been more frequent than any others in recent years. An oval picture of *The Holy Family*, by some ascribed to Raphael and by others to Timoteo Viti, one of his masters, was stolen from the Church of Sant' Andrea at Urbino in 1886. Two years later *The Entombment of Christ*, a famous altar-piece in the Church of St. Peter's, Perugia, was stolen from its place. Two years ago Girolamo de Pacchia's picture of *St. John* was stolen from Siena; and last year's achievements in this direction included Fra Angelico's *Madonna della Stella*, from the Convent of San Marco, and Benedetto Diana's *Madonna and Child*, from Santa Maria, but both pictures were recovered after a short absence. As recently as October last Pinturrichio's *Madonna and Child*, valued at £10,000, was stolen from the Spello Church at Umbria, but was recovered in a remarkable manner in the cloak-room, Charing Cross station, London, a few days later; it had been removed from its frame and replaced by a cleverly executed copy. A priest of the church, an Italian marquess, a sculptor, and the artist who executed the copy, were arrested in Italy as they were about to start for England.

Like other countries, England has had its sensational thefts

as well as its petty larcenies in the matter of pictures. Our greatest sensation in this respect was in connection with Gainsborough's *Portrait of the Duchess of Devonshire.* Purchased in 1841 of a Miss Maginnis for about £56 by John Bentley, the picture dealer, and by him sold at a small profit to Wynn Ellis, it produced the then record auction price of 10,100 guineas at Christie's on May 6, 1876, the buyer being Mr. (afterwards Sir) William Agnew, the picture dealer. The picture had attracted all the town whilst it was on view prior to the public sale, the enormous price paid for it adding to the general sensation. On the night of May 26, the picture was cut away from the stretching-frame and stolen out of Messrs. Agnew's galleries; it remained in captivity, in the undignified seclusion of the false bottom of a travelling trunk, until it was handed over to Mr. Morland Agnew in the Auditorium Hotel, Chicago, on March 28, 1901. We need not enter into the history of "The Return of the Duchess" to London; it must be sufficient to say that the picture was almost immediately purchased by the late Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, at about three times the price paid for it at the auction sale in 1876, and at its exhibition at Messrs. Agnew's Galleries in November 1901 it attracted many thousands of visitors. The robbery was the masterstroke of one of the most accomplished criminals of modern times, Adam Worth, otherwise Harry Raymond, who died in a house near Regent's Park, London, on January 8, 1902.

Other English picture thefts are commonplace beside that of the *Duchess of Devonshire.* Nevertheless some of them are not without interest. In June 1806 some valuable prints were stolen from the British Museum and were presumably never recovered. The Marquess of Londonderry's house at Balderwood, in the New Forest, was robbed of a valuable Flemish painting of the *Holy Family* in the spring of 1832, and a "complete daub" was discovered in its place. A somewhat similar theft of a fine portrait of a Dutch Admiral by Paris Bordone was effected in a private collection in Vienna many years ago. The picture was cut out of its frame and carried off; in response to offers of a handsome reward, and after certain negotiations were completed, "no questions" to be asked, a person returned a portrait which fitted exactly into the frame even to the edges of the mutilated canvas. The reward was paid, but it was soon

afterwards discovered that a mere copy had been substituted for the original!

Another daring robbery was effected at 12 Old Bond Street in April 1851, when a person entered the gallery of Mr. Walesby, took a picture and cleared off with it. Four years afterwards the Earl of Suffolk's mansion near Malmesbury was broken into and ten pictures stolen, among them a Leonardo da Vinci *Virgin and Child*, then estimated to be worth £4000. But the thieves were unable to turn their plunder into cash, and the pictures were discovered under one of the arches of Blackfriars Bridge. The most sensational picture robbery in London of recent years was effected at the late Mr. Charles J. Wertheimer's house in Norfolk Street, Park Lane, in February 1907. The thieves cleared off with eighteen gold snuff-boxes and two pictures—Gainsborough's *Nancy Parsons* and Sir Joshua Reynolds's portrait of the *Hon. Mrs. Charles Yorke*. Both portraits were cut out of the frames and, whilst some of the objects of *vertu* were recovered, the pictures are still "stolen." The value of the "haul" was estimated at £50,000. Photographs of both portraits were circulated all over the world, so that the pictures will never have any commercial value.

Thefts from our public galleries have not been many. In 1836 two miniatures were stolen from the Exhibition Room of the Royal Academy at Somerset House; one in a gold frame representing a gentleman and ladies, and the other with a lady at a harpischord and a gentleman playing a flute; they were probably diploma pictures. Last July history repeated itself, for three miniatures were stolen from the summer exhibition at Burlington House, but after two or three days of newspaper excitement were mysteriously returned on August 3. Probably the most serious robbery at the Royal Academy was effected in May 1848, when several valuable objects, chiefly statuettes of small size, were stolen, and presumably were never returned. In October 1904 Plimer's miniature of Baron Dimsdale, the famous eighteenth-century inoculator, was stolen from the National Portrait Gallery in broad daylight; the loss was not discovered until some hours after. An attendant had heard a slight scratching sound, to which he had paid no attention. The miniature is still missing.

W. ROBERTS.

WASHINGTON, *January* 8, 1914

AFTER the collapse of the ill-starred Confederacy Jefferson Davi its first and only President, retired to Beauvoir, his ancestr home in the State of Mississippi, and there spent the declinin years of his life, although his death was in Richmond, the form capital of the Confederacy. It was at Beauvoir that Davis wrot *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, a history of t great struggle told by one of its chief participants. It was i this Mississippi backwater that the leader of the "Lost Cause reviewed his tragic part in that senseless conflict. Davis Beauvoir suggests Napoleon at St. Helena, although Davis w no prisoner. He was free to come and go, for the North, wit rare generosity, had granted him amnesty; and he had merel to take the oath of allegiance to the Union he had so lately trie to disrupt to be restored to his full political rights. Davis, lik Napoleon, had slain his tens of thousands and convulsed th world; Davis, like Napoleon, died a broken-hearted man, hi ambition unrealised, the sacrifice in vain.

Beauvoir is thirty miles east of Pass Christian, where Preside Wilson is still spending the Christmas holidays. In the interva between playing golf and motoring over the hard level shell road Mr. Wilson may stroll where Davis walked. A man of imagina tion, how that historic ground must stir Mr. Wilson's emotions and how great the contrast between the two lives! For fift years Jefferson Davis has been a great name in American history— revered in the South, execrated in the North. As Davis, wor and weary, looked over the shining waters of the Gulf, alway changing but ever the same, what must have been his thoughts Did he reproach himself for having attempted, or only regre having failed? And what must be Mr. Wilson's thoughts as h

gazes over that vast expanse and ponders the mystery of the sea? It would be strange if in that place he did not compare his own life with that of the man who laid such a heavy burden on the Democratic Party, and if he was not more than ever impressed with his own "predestination."

Four years ago Woodrow Wilson was comparatively unknown: a writer and a teacher; seemingly without political ambition; apparently with no way to gratify that ambition, if he entertained it. At that time no one had thought of him in connection with the Presidency; any one of a dozen Americans might hope to be chosen, but the college president could expect no such amazing fortune. But for a stroke of the most extraordinary luck he would not have been the nominee of his party; but for even greater luck the Republican Party would not have been divided so that he might conquer. At Beauvoir Davis's star was in decline. At Pass Christian Mr. Wilson's star is in the ascendancy.

The material cost of the war, between North and South, was enormous; the spiritual cost was so enormously larger that the debt has not yet been liquidated. The war brought the Republicans into power, and they remained in power for the following quarter of a century: drunk with their success; fearing nothing, for there was nothing for them to fear; countenancing legislative corruption because it was "good for business"; making laws in the interest of a class; government becoming an oligarchy so that the power of the Republicans might be strengthened and the fortunes of the favoured increased. In political corruption its parallel may be found in England in the eighteenth century; materially conditions were not unlike those of Gaul in 53 B.C., when "the whole power and wealth of the country was being concentrated into the hands of a small plutocracy that had grown rich on war, usury, and the farming of the public taxes."

There have been few wars that have so profoundly affected the life and destinies of a people as the American Civil War. In the first place, it destroyed slavery. Involuntary servitude was bound to go because economically it was unsound, it was the most wasteful and costly of all labour; and in time the South would have realised that, but in 1861 the South was still in the darkness of economic ignorance and was willing to shed blood

so as to be able to produce cheap cotton, and it was foolish enough to think that only through slave labour would cotton be grown profitably. When Lincoln liberated the blacks and the surrender of the South made slavery no longer tolerated in the United States, the death-blow was given to slave labour throughout the world. Had the South triumphed, had two Republics been set up in what is now the United States, one of these Republics free and the other slave, how different would have been the social and political history of the world.

The destruction of slavery in the United States was one of the great consequences of the war, but it had other consequences no less vital. One was to fasten upon the American people a currency and banking system that was financial slavery and as destructive and costly as African slavery, and it is only after fifty years that the Americans have been able to escape from its shackles. Bad and disastrous as the currency system was, the war imposed even heavier burdens. The corruption of courts and politics, the licensed piracy that the law protected under the name of commerce, the iniquities of the trusts, the defiance of the public by the railways, the crimes of "big business," the passage of the tariff and other laws which made it possible for a small plutocracy to amass enormous fortunes in a generation or two by sweating labour and levying tribute on the public—these things came because Jefferson Davis and the South had gambled with destiny and lost.

The life of a nation is not very different from the lives of the individuals who compose it. Men either become worse before they recover their health, whether spiritual or physical, or they die, physically or spiritually, because they are not strong enough to resist and survive. The years that saw the Republicans in complete power and the Democrats, as a result of the war, negligible as a political force and unable to exert any legislative influence were, it can now be seen because it is possible to obtain a correct perspective, the critical years in American history, and the life of the Republic was fully as much threatened as it had been during the four years of war. It is speculation to say what might have happened, but another ten years or so of a continuance of the conditions then existing and one can well believe that

Republican institutions would have proved they were too weak to survive, or the remedy would have been applied drastically.

The first Republican President, Abraham Lincoln, was elected in 1860, and the succession was unbroken for twenty-five years, when Arthur retired in 1885. It is significant that the change in popular sentiment that temporarily put the Republican Party in eclipse and for the first time after the war brought the Democrats into power was to see the beginning of a change in the view held by the American people of the relations of the State to the individual. Up to that time the Americans had elevated the cult of *laissez-faire* to a religion and had carried the doctrine of individualism to such extreme lengths that the power of the State was weakened and the individual was forced to fight single-handed. The dual system of political control, national and State, tied the hands of the nation and deprived the States of the power to act. This created a political Alsatia that was sanctuary for the dishonest. In the twilight zone between federal and local laws the licensed pirates of commerce found refuge.

Mr. Cleveland was elected President in 1884, the first Democrat to come to the Presidency since the Civil War, and two years after he was inaugurated Congress put on the statute books the Interstate Commerce Act, which was the beginning of the legislation to bring the artificial creation Americans commonly call a "corporation," and we in England more generally term a joint stock company, under efficient control. Previous to the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Law, practically speaking Congress exercised no supervisory control over the railways or commerce between the States. It is true that by an express provision of the Federal Constitution this power was vested in Congress, but to all intents and purposes it was non-existent. Railways were governed more by State laws than by Acts of Congress. An article manufactured in one State but sold in another was not, the Supreme Court of the United States held, commerce in the meaning of the Constitution, and therefore it was not subject to the control of Congress.

Mr. Cleveland went out of office in 1889, but he had so quickened the public conscience that the good he did lived after him, and for a short time the Republicans were stirred to imitate their opponents and go on with the work begun by Mr. Cleveland in

protecting the individual against the combined force of monopoly. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was followed in the year after the Democratic débâcle by the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890. These two laws, the one to regulate the railways and make them subject to Federal regulation and the other to prevent illegal combinations in restraint of trade and make it impossible for the monopolistic trusts to crush the small trader, have been the sling in the hands of David. All the legislation of recent years has turned about these two enactments. Originally giving the Interstate Commerce Commission power merely to supervise, the Act has been so broadened and strengthened that to-day the Commission is able to determine whether rates are equitable and to prevent the railways from raising their rates if an increase would be contrary to public welfare. In the same way the Sherman Act has given the Government a weapon whose power was little realised at the time when the law was passed. It remained practically a dead letter for some years owing to the reluctance of the Courts to magnify the authority of the Central Government by weakening that of the States, but now that unwillingness no longer exists. It is by virtue of the Sherman law and the more liberal construction given to it by the Supreme Court that some of the great trusts have been dissolved, the monopolistic features of others surrendered, and the small shipper or manufacturer is no longer penalised by secret rebates and "drawbacks" paid to the great trusts.

The effect of both laws has been cumulative. Public opinion has been seriously affected by them; it would almost appear as if the laws had created public opinion, and of course it is well known to every student of government that a law is simply the concrete expression of public sentiment; unless it is, unless a law voices the desire of the majority, it can never be effective. The more these laws have been applied the more their merit has been appreciated, the greater the determination to bring about reforms and end abuses found to be intolerable. Both laws were bitterly opposed and stubbornly fought, every device that ingenuity could invent was availed of to render them impotent; the lawyer able to discover a new ground on which to attack their validity was sure of influential clients and imposing fees. Once the fundamental questions were settled, that the laws were

constitutional and they could be made effective, the rest followed as a matter of course. Presidents, at first timid about enforcing them, became rigorous in their execution. When it was found they could not be resisted efforts were made to evade them, but the loopholes were blocked up, and the would-be violator of the law must either obey or suffer the consequences.

From the breaking out of the Civil War until the election of Mr. Wilson last year was a stretch of fifty-two years, and this half-century can conveniently be divided into three political periods. The first is from the election of Lincoln in 1860 until the end of Arthur's Presidency in 1885, a quarter of a century of Republican rule. Then came the second period, four years of Cleveland, followed by four years of Republicanism under Harrison, and again four years of Cleveland. In the last period Republicans were in control for sixteen years. Now it is curious to note with what striking fidelity history has thus far repeated itself. It was not until the Democrats came in and Mr. Cleveland was seated in the White House that the Interstate Commerce law was enacted and the first steps taken effectively to bring the railways under control. Then after the see-sawing between the two parties the Republicans had full sway for sixteen years, and although they had talked about the necessity of reforming the currency and passing other laws, they did nothing. Mr. Wilson brings his party back into office and repeats the achievement of Mr. Cleveland twenty-six years earlier, but more brilliantly and even more spectacularly. In less than a year after his inauguration Mr. Wilson passes a Tariff Bill, satisfying popular demand, and follows it with the passage of the Currency Bill. With the reassembling of Congress next week he will recommend further anti-trust legislation.

The passage of the Currency Bill has again emphasised Mr. Wilson's influence over Congress and naturally suggested a comparison with that exercised by his immediate predecessors. The three men, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, differ as much in their methods in dealing with the legislative body as they differ in ideas, temperament, and policies. Roosevelt's favourite method of attack on Congress was with a club, which succeeded while

Mr. Roosevelt and his club were new, but was then resented and later resisted, and finally led to the House in effect censuring the President by refusing to receive one of his messages. One of the reasons Mr. Roosevelt was unable to secure the passage of any legislation of lasting importance was because of the friction that always existed between him and the Congressional leaders of his party, who somewhat naturally objected to having the club swung over them, even although they knew there was no danger of it falling across their shoulders.

Mr. Taft went to the other extreme, which may partially explain his failure. He was on good terms with nearly every member of Congress, Democrats as well as Republicans, and perhaps for his own comfort the relations were too amiable. Mr. Taft often created the impression of being a more easygoing man than he really was; there were times when he could be firm enough and insist upon having his own way—when he forced the Canadian Reciprocity Bill through Congress against the advice and over the protests of his party leaders is a case in point—but for some reason not easy to be explained he allowed Congress to get out of hand, and he accomplished less than he hoped for.

Mr. Wilson has not used the club, neither has he been especially conciliatory, which makes his success the more interesting and the more surprising. Mr. Roosevelt loved to lecture Congress as a body and members of Congress individually, and his lectures were always delivered in public. Mr. Wilson has not thought it necessary to admonish Congress or its members or to cajole them. He has probably been brought in less intimate relations with members of his party than any other President of recent years; he has perhaps made few, if any, real friendships since coming to Washington; and he has not used the great social power of the Presidency to strengthen his hold, or the even greater power of appointment to disarm opposition or stiffen the wavering.

The fact is, I think, that Mr. Wilson has struck out a plan of his own in dealing with Congress. In the past Presidents have looked to individuals to make effective their policies. There were a few men, the recognised leaders in both Houses, to be consulted, frequently deferred to, often to be conciliated; there were men aspiring to leadership not to be needlessly antagonised;

there were others whom it was wise to treat with consideration. Mr. Wilson looks not to individuals, but to his party as a whole to carry out the policies to which the party is pledged. He has consulted with a few men because that could not be avoided, but he has not sought to influence the mass by personal appeal but by the weight of party authority. Democrats must either support the measures advocated by the President and by their support prove their loyalty to their party, or oppose these measures and admit their disloyalty. The President has shown so little anxiety about results that men inclined to rebel to magnify their importance have become convinced of the folly of rebellion when there was no hope of success. The President's attitude has been much as if he said to Congress, "You have more to lose by defeating my measures than I have by being defeated at your hands," but it has been said quietly, courteously, and thus far without giving offence.

Yet one would hardly call the President popular with his party, although I may add, Presidents seldom are. As a rule they may expect more criticism than praise. If they are men of positive force they offend the rank and file, who naturally prefer an easygoing, complacent, weak Executive in fear of Congress to a strong man of whom Congress is in fear; and the amiable President quickly loses respect and is denounced for his weakness and inability to lead. It is almost inevitable that a President should have more enemies than friends, that is among members of Congress. Congressmen are jealous of the President, whose position is so much greater than theirs; they are always apt to think that he is "ungrateful" because he will not appoint the men they recommend to office or disregards their suggestions touching legislation; they hold him responsible for every disaster, and take credit to themselves if the country sustains the party.

Mr. Wilson would, no doubt, be more popular for the moment if he cultivated closer relations with Congress, but that is a fleeting popularity. Members of Congress complain that the President is too much of a "boss," that he dominates Congress, that he has made himself its master; and although they do not add, "instead of being its servant," that is the unexpressed thought. They would rather he said "May I" than "You must," but it would advantage him nothing. No President has been more

successful, no President has accomplished so much in such a short time. What may happen in the remaining three years of his term no one can tell, but to-day he undoubtedly has the respect of the country, to which achievement always appeals. But he remains much of an enigma to the country; less human than his predecessors but a greater intellectual force; a man so indifferent to notoriety or the plaudits of the public that the public is puzzled to classify him. A President, like a Sovereign, is expected to show himself, to be much on exhibition, to be the central figure of processions and parades, to be the excuse for a holiday in a middle western town or a banquet in New York. The American people like a President who makes speeches or writes quotable letters; they have no fault to find if occasionally he indulges in the spectacular. Mr. Wilson is the least spectacular of men. He has no love for parades or show. He does not yield to the temptation to make speeches. He has no genius for sensation. He sticks to his job and makes Congress work. An interesting study this man, who to-day is almost as little known and understood as he was when he emerged from the comparative obscurity of the Governorship of New Jersey into the blinding light of the Presidency of the United States.

The future of politics, the fate of parties, the fortunes of individuals no one can predict to-day; everything depends on events yet to determine themselves. The practical operations of the tariff and the new currency law and Mexico—these are the things that will make or destroy reputations. Whether the tariff is at fault or the causes are more world-wide it is impossible to say, but the fact remains that business is depressed, and while men want to be cheerful they are not over-sanguine. No President and no political party can survive hard times. If the country is prosperous the party in power does not always receive the credit for it, but when the country suffers the dominant party must pay the penalty.

Mexico may make the President's position impregnable, or offset weakness in other directions, or destroy him. It is a toss up. If he can save the country from war, he will be hailed as a great man, for it was much easier to plunge into war than to abstain from it, and war Americans do not want. If he must go

to war other things may be forgotten. It is one of the traditions of American history that a "war President" can count on re-election; and Americans have a feeling that to reject a President in the midst of war is almost treason, as it would give encouragement to the enemy and convince him that the country was divided and the President had forfeited popular support for not having prevented the war. But there is this to be taken into consideration if war comes. It might be long and costly, it might mean the sacrifice of a great many lives and desolate hearts and homes in the great cities as well as the small towns and villages. People would then realise in its most poignant form what war means, and there would be a feeling of bitter resentment. It would not be a popular war, nor would it be a war to arouse enthusiasm because the life of the nation was at stake or great wrongs had to be avenged. The flaming torch of patriotism would not be lighted. The work would be done, but the country would watch it sullenly and with cold hearts.

Mr. Wilson would be the victim. He would be held to responsibility for having brought on a war that might have been avoided by simply recognising Huerta. The country so far has stood behind the President, content to leave affairs in his hands, feeling that it would be disloyal to embarrass him by criticism, ignorant of what his policy is but hoping he will be able to find a way out, and trusting to his wisdom and courage. Yet it must not be overlooked that there is a great deal of dissatisfaction, and while it finds only casual expression in the Press, it is deep-seated. Mr. Wilson's policy is declared to be no policy—the policy of drift and opportunism; faith in a miracle, when in a practical age wise men turn to the practical and leave miracles to dreamers. The President could not hope to escape the attack by sharing the blame. He has been given a free hand; Congress has not attempted either to direct or instruct him. If he comes out successful, if Huerta is disposed of and some semblance of peace and order restored in Mexico without the armed intervention of the United States, Mr. Wilson will have greatly added to his reputation; if his policy fails it may not improbably drag him down.

. . .

"The New Holy Alliance" is the phrase coined by some of

the newspapers in discussing the preposterous yarn of an Anglo-German alliance directed against the United States to destroy American commerce, especially in South America. The story was set afloat for a purpose. It was the brilliant conception, if rumour is to be believed, of a "press agent" of the San Francisco Exhibition, who hoped to arouse so much feeling against Great Britain and Germany for refusing to be officially represented at the Exhibition that both Governments would have to show that they were not conspiring against the United States by giving practical proof of their goodwill, and of course that could only be done by rescinding their former decision. It was the sort of thing that amateur "diplomacy" delights in. The Exhibition has been unfortunate in the choice of its agents and the methods it has employed. It has been under a handicap from the beginning. Abroad no great enthusiasm has been shown because the men entrusted with bringing the merits of the Exhibition to the notice of foreign Governments appear not to have done their work with marked ability. In this country there is somewhat of a prejudice against the show because San Francisco and California are under a cloud. The violent anti-Japanese sentiment of California and the contempt of its legislature and people for treaty obligations have aroused considerable feeling everywhere except on the Pacific Coast, and a great many persons think it would be a salutary lesson for California to learn that its conduct has been resented. A certain number of people from the East will make the Exhibition an excuse for visiting San Francisco and the Pacific Coast, but there is little expectation of a large attendance from east of Chicago. It is a long, expensive, and tedious journey across the continent, and it will cost more to see the show than the average person is able to spend.

With the exception of a few newspapers who seize on every opportunity to cast slurs on England, little would be heard of the refusal of the British Government to be officially represented at the Exhibition were it not for the British Press. Every time an English newspaper, whether of the first rank or an obscure sheet, attacks the Government for its refusal to participate and indulges in the stock phrases about "the tie that binds," the effusion is cabled over here, to serve as the text for "the Government opposing the real sentiment of the British people." As a

matter of fact there is so little interest in the Exhibition, outside the professional exhibition touters, that the average American neither knows nor cares whether Great Britain is represented.

English newspapers must be singularly badly informed if they believe British non-participation in the show will have the slightest effect on Anglo-American relations. It will not. It will no more embitter relations than a grant of five millions for an exhibit would strengthen them. Anglo-American relations are less sentimental than most Englishmen like to imagine. They are largely commercial. So long as the trade currents flow uninterruptedly all goes well, but trade is not governed by sentiment. The average American neither likes nor dislikes England, his attitude is one largely of indifference. So long as there is nothing to excite friction he can be said to be negatively—very negatively—friendly to England, but the moment there is anything to put a strain on the relations he quickly shows that he becomes a very stout American. In a word, he does not allow friendship to weigh against national interests. In that the American is not very different from other peoples. He is a Nationalist first. But so is the Englishman, the German, the Frenchman. It is what we commonly call patriotism.

A. Maurice Low.

THE DEATH AND CENSURE OF RICHARD CORFIELD

WHEN the British Parliament meets for the 1914 session one of the matters to be brought to its notice will be the events in Somaliland from April 1912 to September 1913. If the past is a safe guide, there will be, concerning the death of Richard Corfield and his censure after death by the British Government, a short debate; and some gentlemen not bound to obey the Liberal, Nationalist, or Labour Whips will express a little indignation; and other gentlemen on behalf of the Government will speak with regret of "a painful duty done"; and there the matter will end. It is not reasonable to hope for anything better. The fibre of the British race in the Home Country—if it can be judged by Parliament—has slackened far beyond the point at which a quiver can be evoked by this story of a frontier soldier killed in fighting for England's honour and ignobly slandered after death. Pre-Cobdenite England would have been wrathful enough to fling back at the Government its censure; and probably no existing Overseas British Cabinet would survive that "Harcourt minute." But England these days has a great capacity for being calm. She will be calm again, one may forecast safely.

Yet in this matter of the censure after death of Richard Corfield, to suit the exigencies of political manœuvring, the British nation faces a far greater issue than the fate of one brave man. There are many brave men in the British nation, and the loss of one, an injustice to one, is in itself perhaps a small point. But the turning-point in a people's history may be a small point; and so may be the point at which a vital current of national life is diverted to be lost in the marshes. Allow the Corfield censure to stand and it will mark a parting of the ways, towards a policy of discouraging and driving

away from our flag its most devoted guardians. It is therefore the duty of British public men who still keep to a faith in the destiny of their race not to be satisfied with recording a disregarded protest against the injustice and the treachery of the Corfield censure, but to make it a point of honour to see that it is one day swept off the official records. Let party politicians play their paltry little games on other issues, but keep from tampering with the courage, the honour, the devotion of the loyal servants of the Empire on its frontiers. Richard Corfield was a gallant and dutiful servant. His services to his country were great; and were carried up to the sacrifice of his life. Then his good name was aspersed in the name of the British people because of official panic, official stupidity, and political time-serving. The British people must, it seems to me, make it clear that they do not think with the Government which spoke for them in that censure, or close up the book of Empire.

To understand the facts as to Richard Corfield, it is necessary to go back in the history of Somaliland as far as 1907. We were then labouring heavily over the task of keeping order in Somaliland. We had entered the country for our own convenience; had undertaken certain obligations towards the native tribes, which had accepted our rule; and in 1907 a newly constituted Liberal Government was irritated at the price it was necessary to pay to keep these obligations. Who was first responsible for the suggestion that the cheapest way out was to repudiate the obligations, I do not know. It is alleged that it followed a visit of Mr. Winston Churchill, then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, and in the first flush of his enthusiasm for anti-Imperial bolting. But whoever first suggested scuttle, the ultimate responsibility for accepting the suggestion was that of the British Government as a whole. In 1909 we retired to the coast, leaving the friendly tribes who had come under our protection to fight among themselves and to face by themselves the wrath of the Dervish raiders. What followed is told in the Colonial Office Blue Book (Cd. 7066), which tells of the death of Richard Corfield. The Commissioner of Somaliland reported in April 1912:

It was not long before disorder broke out. . . . Almost immediately after the concentration at the coast, internal quarrels among the Habr Toljaala culminated in somewhat serious fighting, and very shortly afterwards the Habr Yunis tribe, with the

rifles issued to them by the Government (*i.e.* British Government) for defence purposes made a big and successful raid on the Ogaden Somalis, living in Abyssinian territory. . . . The policy initiated with the evacuation, while it precluded the use of forcible intervention in tribal affairs, required that they should be directed by moral influence, advice and support at the coast. It was hoped that by assisting the peaceable tribes and by withholding subsidies and supplies of ammunition from the recalcitrant it would be possible to maintain some kind of order in the interior and to establish Berbera as a centre at which Government influence would act as an arbiter in effecting amicable settlements of difficulties. Effort in this direction has been unceasing, but the hope has proved entirely delusive. . . . Though they were slow to realise it at first the tribes are now fully convinced that under no circumstances will the Government attempt active interference or reprisals outside the coast towns. . . . The policy now in operation has disappointed expectations; it has been given a full and complete trial and it has failed. It is leading to a steady diminution of Government prestige, and it promises a worse condition of affairs in the future than at present. One very apparent and serious effect of this dwindling of prestige and loss of confidence is to be seen in the attitude of native Government servants, police, interpreters, and the rest. Tribal feeling runs so high and runs a course so impossible to check, that every such employé places his personal safety and the safety of his family and property in the interior before the honest performance of his duty, finding external influences too strong for him. In consequence, it is difficult to ascertain the truth in any matter, or to ensure that the police will arrest any man when ordered to do so, either for political or criminal offences.

Coming to the conclusion of a long and dismal record of bloodshed and reprisal, the Commissioner concluded: "The present situation is profoundly unsatisfactory and the future holds out a prospect of development for the worse rather than for the better."

This memorandum was written two years after the evacuation had been completed. That evacuation had been marked with blood and with tears—the blood of our slaughtered friendly native subjects, the tears, springing not from weakness but from rage and pity, of British officers officially ordered to desert the men to whose defence they were pledged. One of those officers was Richard Corfield, who, because he had inspired to a special extent the confidence and devotion of the natives, seems to have felt with particular keenness this desertion of them.

In consequence of the memorandum of 1912 the Colonial Office, a little repentant one may hope of the harvest of horror that had followed from its sowing, agreed to the smallest of the remedial proposals made by the Commissioner, *i.e.* to establish a Camel Corps of natives under white command "to maintain order by coercion within a radius of fifty miles or so of Berbera,

and to keep the main roads clear." The Commissioner suggested a force of about seventy. The Colonial Office approved of a force of 150; 100 were raised. The Commissioner telegraphed (June 2, 1912):

As regards officers it is absolutely essential to appoint men of ability and experience to command, and therefore I very strongly recommend Corfield of Northern Nigeria. If he is still at home can he be detained till my arrival? Should require him here early September. There is no need to select other officers before that date.

It is important to note this special choice of Richard Corfield for the Camel Corps service. The choice called for a great deal of courage. It was necessary to ignore the claims of men in Somaliland anxious for the task of leading a little force which would try to lift the British name out of the pit. It caused some discontent in Somaliland. Discontent in the sense of disappointment was honourable. Officers chained to the coast and conscious of the growing contempt of the natives for the British, had the right to be chagrined when they were passed over for this man's work that was to be done. But if—as there is strong cause to suspect; and on this point there must be full enquiry—discontent was allowed to dictate a feeling of resentment against Corfield and a disinclination to co-operate heartily with him in some quarters, that was unworthy.

On December 4 the newly appointed Camel Corps moved out from Berbera to Mandera, forty-two miles south-west, by order of the Commissioner and with the approval of the British Government. The reason given by telegraph was that "unless prompt action taken Government authority will become dead letter and our position impossible at the coast." Richard Corfield was now launched on his work—he with one other white officer and one hundred natives, these natives being as soldiers exactly what he could make of them. By nature they were on the same level as the thousands of Somalis whom they would have to meet and subdue. By training—the training which only the British man in all this world can give to the "native," a training founded on justice, sympathy, and quiet courage—they were heroic soldiers, as soon would be proved. Corfield went out towards the desert, a hundred men after him, a hundred thousand possible enemies before him, with a gay courage; and every decent British man in Berbera envied him the chance given to take desperate risks

for the flag. For that is of the spirit of the British race abroad where it is not choked by the gab of politicians, and smothered in the steam and dust of the factories.

Richard Corfield had his standing orders. He had been chosen because of his high courage and the special regard he inspired in the natives. For the reason of that courage he had to be warned against rashness. The Commissioner's instructions to him concluded :

> I believe that you fully share my opinion that the Corps is of ample strength for the work it has to do, and that if it succeeds in its objects the beneficial effect, in general, will be incalculable. At the same time I wish you to realise fully that at this juncture we cannot afford to fail. Small successes at the outset are essential in order to give the men confidence in their own strength, and to instil respect for the constabulary into the tribal mind. You will, therefore, bear this constantly in mind, waiting always for favourable opportunities to act, and not permitting yourself to take undue risks which, if they resulted in failure, would entail serious embarrassment for the administration.
>
> There is not any present prospect of your encountering Dervish raiders, but should you receive news of the near presence of any considerable force you would carefully avoid being attacked or surrounded, and would at once retire on the coast. For this reason I intend that for some little time to come you should not form a temporary base more than fifty miles—a day's march—from the coast. Subsequent movements will be dictated by developments, and you will obtain my assent to any proposal to move into a fresh grazing camp. You must assume that the constabulary is part of the force available to Berbera, and that it is based on Berbera, occupying temporary camps in the interior for purposes of convenience.

In effect that said the Camel Corps must win victories at the outset. Note the qualifying phrases "at this juncture," "present prospect," "for some little time to come." Behind the policy of caution at the outset there is promise of boldness in the future.

The Camel Corps began at once to win victories. On December 21, 1912, it chastised the Habr Yunis, who were attacking the coastal Habr Awals. The enemy had attacked the Camel Corps, which inflicted a heavy defeat, killing about forty and capturing great herds of camels, sheep, and oxen. The British Government expressed its satisfaction, and well it might, as a large area was pacified with one blow, and there followed some half-hearted overtures for peace from the Dervish Mullah.

The Commissioner, seeing that the position had now changed for the better, suggested January 3, 1913, a further move forward

for the Camel Corps. In a despatch to the Colonial Office he stated:

I believe that if the Camelry were to move at once to the Ain, it would attract a large body of friendlies, and could, without difficulty, defeat and drive out a small Dervish party now there. But the Corps was not raised for this purpose and I feel that my discretionary power does not justify me in using it for this object without your expressed consent, although it is possible that the Dervishes would not await attack since they are said to be making constant and minute enquiries as to any movements of troops. The only course which appears to me to be possible under the circumstances, though it is not altogether satisfactory, is to move the Camelry slowly in the direction of the Ain to Sheikh, and by degrees to Burao or Ber, with orders not to proceed beyond a prescribed limit and to avoid contact with Dervish parties. . . . The Camelry if it is to achieve its primary object must display continued activity, and must in any case shortly proceed to Sheikh and Burao to deal with local troubles in *those districts*, and to open the road to caravan traffic.

The Commissioner was thus already converted to the view that the time for excessive caution had now passed. From this date forward he was constantly urging a forward policy and gradually securing greater freedom for Corfield. But the Colonial Office was not to be hurried in giving up its policy of scuttle. Mr. Harcourt replied to this despatch:

I regret that I am unable to give my approval to the suggestion that the Camel Corps should proceed at once to the spot with a view to engaging with these small Dervish parties now there. Such an arrangement would be contrary to the policy of his Majesty's Government in withdrawing from active participation in affairs in the interior of the Protectorate and confining the scope of the administration to the coast towns and the friendly tribes in the neighbourhood of the coast.

On January 23, the Commissioner reported "a distinct improvement" in the position within eighty miles of the coast owing to the operations of the Camel Corps. Again the Colonial Office expressed satisfaction. On March 6 the Commissioner reported that "since the arrival of the Camel Corps . . . the progress has been extraordinary, and has exceeded my most sanguine expectations." On April 9 he reported "very satisfactory progress continues to be made by the Commandant of the Camel Corps. . . . *Three months have passed without an* instance of caravan looting and there has consequently been an increase of traffic to and from the coast with a corresponding improvement in the trade of the towns." On April 10 definite overtures for peace were made by the Dervish Mullah. All events seemed to point to the fact that the time had come for a

definite abandonment of the policy of scuttle, a policy which had been adopted on the plea of the vast expense entailed in upholding our obligations of honour (Richard Corfield's Camelry was costing £7950 a year). Probably a definite move forward with the help of an Indian contingent would have decided the wavering Mullah. It was not made. But the Colonial Office seemed to be content to allow British honour to be vindicated as far as it could be, on £7950 a year, and allowed the Camel Corps to move further inland. On May 8, 1913, the Commissioner reported further achievements on the part of the Camel Corps, and concluded a despatch :

> I again wish to record my appreciation of the excellent work done by Mr. Corfield in the western part of the Protectorate, work which, I trust, may be lasting in its effect. Should he be equally successful in the east, the Camel Corps will have gone a long way towards removing the more serious causes of warfare in the Protectorate generally, and it should thereafter be able to maintain the general peace which it has brought about.

On May 22 the Commissioner sent a significant desptach in which he said :

> Dervish stock suffered very severely in the drought of the early spring, and of the ponies, upon which depends the possibility both of sudden raids and of hurried retreat, a large number died of starvation. The Mullah's letter to me, therefore, was calculated to avert the danger of a hasty descent by the Camel Corps at a moment when he was unable to move, and to give time for the recovery of the ponies after the April rain should provide fresh grazing. . . . I attach importance to the fact that during the present month Dervish raids have been successfully made against our tribes, one on the Gadwein and two on the Dolbahanta. In each case the raiders were a mere handful of men and no great material damage was inflicted, but morally, as I have often pointed out, where the friendlies, numerous and well armed, permit a dozen Dervishes to carry off stock without making any serious effort to pursue and recover, the effect is as bad on our side as it is inspiriting to the enemy.

It is very clear from this that there was in the Commissioner's mind at the time regret that an opportunity had been lost to deliver a blow at the Mullah, and the thought that it was now time for operations by the victorious Camel Corps against the Dervishes. The policy of attacking the friendlies when they made trouble, but allowing the enemy a free run was clearly impossible. The Camel Corps had now established its reputation, and Somaliland official feeling was strong in favour of its carrying its good work on farther.

Shortly after, Mr. Byatt, the Commissioner of Somaliland,

left on holidays, and his place was taken temporarily by Mr. Archer. I am reluctant to write anything in criticism of Mr. Archer; but it is necessary in order to establish the truth. It will be accepted, I hope, as a principle that a subordinate left in charge whilst his chief is on a holiday should "carry on," without attempting to initiate any new policy or to interfere with the development of a shaping policy. Now as to the trend of Mr. Byatt's policy there is not a shadow of doubt. It was forward. Each succeeding despatch coaxing the Colonial Office to go a little farther shows that. A very little while after Mr. Byatt's departure Mr. Archer took occasion of an incident—an incident in which the Camel Corps had acted courageously, promptly and, as usual, successfully, to declare against the trend of Mr. Byatt's policy. He wrote to Corfield:

Though there is no reason to doubt that the arrival of the Camel Corps on the scene at this juncture could have had other than a steadying effect on our tribesmen in full retreat, yet I cannot pass over the incident without drawing your attention to the explicit nature of the instructions conveyed to you from time to time on the subject of confining Camel Corps operations to the immediate vicinity of Burao (in the Nogal direction) with Ber as an extreme limit for occasional patrols. You are personally aware, moreover, that the Secretary of State has expressly disapproved of the suggestion of employing the Camel Corps against small Dervish parties, even where danger was little and success more or less assured, on the grounds that such measures were entirely foreign to the duties of the Constabulary, as well as contrary to Government policy; and there is no discretionary power of any sort on this subject allowed. I cannot, therefore, impress upon you too strongly the necessity of abiding strictly to this decision. Admittedly it does not make your position easy, but this is inevitable at the present juncture; and the principle must be realised that we do not, and cannot, as at present constituted, assume responsibility for the defence of the outlying "jilibs" at times of threatened Dervish attack.

On the other hand, the presence of the Camel Corps at Burao does provide for our tribes a good rallying-point in the face of small Dervish raiding parties; while there is no reason to anticipate at the present time any Dervish advance on such a scale as would necessitate your falling back from this point, which, as you are aware, is the tenor of your instructions in the face of grave and imminent danger.

Those who defend the censure of Corfield must found their case on this document. It is clear enough. It restates the case for scuttle. It shows a curious knowledge of the "Government policy," which is stated to be a refusal of *all* action against the Dervishes, though our own friendly tribes could be attacked if they broke the peace. But there is little doubt that Corfield did not accept this document as definite "orders." It was putting

back the clock twelve months. Mr. Byatt's instructions had steadily progressed from extreme caution to fairly bold progress; and at the back of them Mr. Byatt was constantly urging on London more boldness, as Corfield knew.

On July 25 Mr. Archer wrote to the Colonial Secretary that he was leaving Berbera for Burao "to consult Mr. Corfield." This action was unusual. His place was at Berbera, not Burao. On August 6 Mr. Archer arrived at Burao. On August 8 Corfield received a report that the friendlies were being raided by the Dervishes between Idowina and Burao. Mr. Archer states that he (Archer) was sceptical as to the imminence of the danger, but "ordered a strong reconnaissance by the Camel Corps in the direction of Ber to ascertain the facts." Reporting to the Colonial Office after the action at Dul Madoba, Mr. Archer further stated that had Corfield when he came in touch with the Dervishes "fallen back and reported to me on the situation, a valuable service would have been rendered, even though some risk had been incurred."

That was the view accepted by the Colonial Office, which censured Corfield, seemingly because he did not retire. Yet it is difficult to conceive of a view more absurd. If there had been a large British force holding Burao, and Corfield had been ordered to go out to make a strong reconnaissance with a fraction of that force to ascertain the real strength of the enemy and then to fall back upon his main body, that would have been comprehensible. But it is not comprehensible that practically the whole of a fighting force should be sent out to "reconnoitre" with orders not to engage. If the idea had been to find out whether the enemy was actually in the field and with what strength, and then to consider whether to hold Burao or to retire from Burao, that was work for half a dozen scouts. There is the choice of alternatives: either the Camel Corps went out with the understanding that it was to engage the Dervishes if the commandant thought fit when he came in touch with them and ascertained their strength, or the Camel Corps was sent out to risk its existence on a scouting task, and to damn British prestige again by coming in face of the enemy and then running away. It is much more reasonable to believe the first: the second presumes an almost incredible degree of stupidity. If the first view is correct, Corfield was not guilty of the slightest

technical departure from orders. If the second view is correct, it was the duty of the Government to take very serious notice of the people responsible for such a folly, and to absolve Corfield from all blame for a "disobedience" which under the circumstances was as valuable, as patriotic, as well warranted as any in British history. If Corfield was ordered to go out with his full force with positive instructions to run away if he met a Dervish enemy, he was put in a position where he had to disobey orders that were so foolish and wrong. If he was sent out (as I take to be actually the case) to see the situation and decide for himself whether there was a chance to fight, then he acted afterwards not only with courage and devotion but with the soundest technical propriety and with an accurate judgment of the situation which the subsequent event justified.

On August 8 Corfield learned the probable strength of the Dervishes, heard of the atrocities they had committed and was informed that they were drawing away great herds of cattle looted from the British friendly natives. Knowing his men, he decided to stand in the way of the Dervishes' retreat to the Ain Valley and fight them. On the morning of August 9 he moved to occupy a ridge which he had chosen for his position. Mischance met the Camel Corps at once. The attack of the Dervishes came before they could occupy the ridge, and they had to fight in a bushy hollow. Their one Maxim gun jammed and was put out of action. Nevertheless, in spite of all this misfortune, the British force fought the Dervishes to a standstill, beat them off, and were left in occupation of the battlefield of Dul Madoba. Corfield fell early in the action. Mr. C. de S. Dunn took over the command and carried on the fight as the mate of such a man would do; and the native levies proved the stuff that had been put into them by standing to their ground after suffering the loss of half their number by casualties. It was a thrilling incident in Imperial history, as proud a justification of our race as has come from India or from the Spanish Main. And it was a victory.

In the afternoon of that day, the Dervishes having retired, and water being wanted for the wounded, Mr. Dunn began a march towards wells on the road to Burao. He brought with him all his wounded and the disabled gun. At 6 P.M. that evening Mr. Archer, hearing that the Camel Corps had been engaged and

reduced to a remnant (a false report), moved out from Burao with what force he could muster. This action on his part was courageous and well in keeping with the spirit of the day. But it is not true (as statements published in the press and seemingly inspired by the Colonial Office represented) that Mr. Archer brought the Camel Corps away from the field in face of the Dervishes. It was Mr. Dunn's achievement that the force was safely marched away; but it was not in face of the Dervishes, for they had fled.

Up to this point nothing had occurred which was "disastrous." The Dervish leader had been engaged with a force which represented not more than one-tenth, perhaps only one-twentieth, of his own; had been defeated with losses far exceeding the total number of the British force, after an engagement in which the courage of Corfield and Mr. Dunn was matched by the courage of their native soldiers. That Corfield had fallen was a great misfortune. That the Camel Corps, partly because of his loss, partly because of the heavy casualties among the native soldiers and the camels, could not pursue the Dervishes was a further misfortune. But there was no disaster. The position indicated a concentration on Burao, where some slight reinforcement could be obtained and the future position considered. Mr. Dunn acted soundly in moving towards Burao.

As soon as the retiring Camel Corps under Mr. Dunn joined Mr. Archer a new spirit took charge. The cause of that spirit can be guessed—fear of the politicians. Clearly Mr. Archer is not a coward. When he moved out of Burao with a tiny force to march to a battlefield where, it was reported, the Camel Corps had been cut up, he showed that. But from the morning of August 10 his despatches and actions were deficient. On August 10 (when he had the means of knowing, if not of appreciating, the real facts) he telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary:

> I feel it my duty to say that the Commandant of Camel Corps was gravely indiscreet in his action in following and engaging Dervishes in face of all instructions. . . . I consider an attack on Burao in the immediate future probable and I shall evacuate it, if possible, this evening.

So Somaliland was thrown back to seethe in disorder; and a censure was suggested by Mr. Archer on the dead man, who

within a year had largely restored it to peace by work worthy of the highest traditions of Imperial England. In a subsequent written despatch Mr. Archer stated: "A rash act has involved the Government of the Protectorate in a severe set-back, and, under the circumstances, in a politically disastrous withdrawal from Burao."

Yes; but the rash act was the scuttle from a scene of victory, not Corfield's battle. Before Mr. Dunn moved off from the field of battle he had "assured himself of the final retirement of the Dervishes." It was the clear duty of the British force to hold on at Burao, to give the British Government the chance to follow up the Battle of Dul Madoba by a movement to extinguish the defeated and shaken Dervish Mullah. Probably the chance would not have been taken. Mr. Redmond, Mr. Keir Hardie, Mr. Handel Booth, and all that sort would have vetoed it. But it was the duty of the men on the spot to have given the nation the chance to reap the fruits of Corfield's heroic life and death.

The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Harcourt, accepted, it would seem eagerly, the local lead given him, and on September 5, 1913, minuted:

> It is evident that the whole responsibility for this ill-advised and disastrous action must rest with the late Mr. Corfield. He has paid the penalty with his life, and I have no desire to dwell on this aspect of the matter. But I am compelled, if only in justice to the other officers concerned, to record my opinion that the disaster is due to his complete disregard of the instructions issued by his Majesty's Government, by Mr. Byatt, and by yourself.

While that minute—misstating facts and marked, even if its facts were correct, by both callousness and injustice—stands, there flies a danger-signal warning all dutiful and courageous soldiers and sailors of the Empire against regarding the traditions of the Drakes, Wolfes, Nelsons, and Clives. They are told that the path of duty may lead to a grave which the politicians will dishonour with a slander. If the warning stands and is regarded, it will be the end of Empire, and we may prepare to trudge to our factories under the protecting and chastening arm of a more manly race.

FRANK FOX.

MEADOW AND WATER VOLES

We have three species of voles in this country, namely the water-vole—better known as the water-rat—the field-vole, and the bank-vole. The first two are very nearly allied, but the latter is placed in a separate genus. Its scientific name is Evotomys glareolus, the others belong to the genus Microtus—formerly called Arvicola—and boast respectively the appropriate names amphibius and agrestis; but to the casual observer there seems to be more resemblance between the bank and the field-vole than there is between the latter and the water "rat," the difference in size alone preventing confusion, for the stream side dweller is as big as the rat whose name it often bears, but the two smaller voles are almost the same size, and are equally round, furry, comfortable-looking little animals. The bank-vole has certainly a much brighter red-brown coat (with a very nice white "waistcoat") than the meadow-vole, which is clad in dull brown, with under parts of a greyish hue. They both have the same hairy tails, short in proportion to the length of their bodies, rounded muzzles, little eyes, and ears that are buried in their fur. In the bank-vole the ears are a trifle more prominent than in the other one, but they are not likely to be mistaken for true mice or rats, though they are often spoken of as short-tailed field-mice, but there is little real likeness to the mice, with their slender forms, large eyes, big ears, and long naked tails. This applies also to the water-vole; a glance will show it is not really a rat, which it resembles only in its general dark brown colour. In the present article I do not propose to give a lengthy account of the "red mouse" or bank vole, as I shall not have space to fully describe it as well as the water vole and the meadow vole.

Even in the most unfavourable seasons the commonest of the three is undoubtedly the field-vole. It is found everywhere,

from the mountain tops down to sea level, but it has a preference for low-lying, damp meadows, where there is abundance of succulent grass, for the little creature is a vegetarian, and eats rush stems, grass, &c. The spot where voles are located can be easily noted, as they make a system of complicated paths in the herbage around their home. They literally eat out their roads before them, so that the grass is tunnelled for yards about their holes, but as they only eat the stems the dead grass remains to arch over the "runs" and give shelter from the numerous enemies that are ever on the watch. Night and day death stalks at their heels; the brown owl and the kestrel prefer them to any other food, and keep a keen watch, the one by day, the other during the hours of darkness. Many other creatures help in the task of keeping down the numbers of the voles; the barn owl, the fox, the badger, the prowling cat, and near the coast the different gulls, while crows, the magpie, and the jay, &c., lend their assistance, to say nothing of the weasel and the stoat!

A vole's life is one long effort to keep out of sight of its foes, for once it is seen its fate is certain, so from the moment the baby vole leaves the snug nest of shredded grass in which it was born it commences a career in which success—success in nature means the producing and rearing of more young than your neighbour—goes to the individuals that can best render themselves invisible. It is undoubtedly the severe selection which has produced the dull brown coat of the meadow-vole, for the tint is admirably adapted to harmonise with dead grass and the tones of bare earth; not that it resembles either exactly, but it does match most wonderfully the shadows in the stems of the herbage and those which fall on the bare earth beneath. The minute any sound is heard, or tremor of the ground felt, a vole either tumbles headlong down its hole, or remains, as if frozen, crouching in its pathway. If the alarm was a false one it will in a few seconds resume its incessant nibbling, for these little creatures are enormous eaters, and sometimes do great damage to crops. It bites off a stem of grass and quickly gnaws away the white and delicate part, but leaves the coarse green piece to dry up and afford shelter. The alarm being quite over, other inhabitants of the holes will come scuttling out, hurry along the "runs" until they come to spots where the food is good, and then set to work to nibble,

nibble, and nibble, and so extend the roads. One foolish young vole pushes its head out of the grass to obtain a glimpse of the great wide world that lies so fair beneath the spring sunshine, but it does not see a tiny black speck high up against the blue of the sky, indeed it has no time! Down like a thunderbolt falls the kestrel, who has been hovering up aloft and watching the meadow for some such movement in the grass. There is a thump, a muffled squeak, and off flies the little falcon with the vole in its claws. The kestrel's chattering call is heard as it cries to its mate, and then silence sinks on the inhabitants of the colony, save for the song of a lark that is hovering higher even than the height at which the kestrel was "waiting on." However, fear is only a momentary emotion with these small creatures, were it otherwise life would be impossible for them, and in a second they are running to and fro, and nibbling more busily than ever. One or two perhaps sit up and wash their faces—which is often a sign of nervousness and recovery from a fright in the mice world—passing their little brown "hands" over their faces and licking their fur at a great rate, but the majority settle down at once.

For a short time peace broods over the settlement, while the voles sit on their doorsteps or out in the "runs" and nibble more busily than ever; others are curled up in the underground passages, which run in all directions under the soil as the paths above do between the stems of the plants, one or two of the latter lead away from the main colony to neat nests made ot shredded blades which are hidden away among the grass. Here the babies are tucked warmly up and guarded by their anxious mothers, for many are the dangers peculiar to this stage of their life; they may be trodden underfoot by cattle, nosed out by the rooting badger as it comes its rounds in the middle of the night, to say nothing of the weasel's liking for tender young voles. But the weasel is at all times of the vole's life its most deadly foe. Small and slim, yet gifted with the most wonderful sense of smell and great perseverance, this animal can follow the unfortunate rodent on whose trail it fastens through all the windings of the burrows and pathways. A weasel's presence in the "runs" causes instant terror among the inhabitants; they rush frantically in all directions, though, like a rabbit pursued by a stoat, they do not go far before pausing to listen and find out whether the

weasel is really on some other vole's track, and if they can return quietly home. But the unfortunate vole that the weasel is really hunting is doomed; no resemblance to its surroundings can save it now, and it can only run wildly on and hope—if it has the wits to hope at all—that the destroyer may change to the line of some other mouse, though this is the last thing that is likely to happen, as the weasel only too thoroughly understands the art of the hunter and knows well that if it were continually changing it might hunt all day and never catch a vole, so it sticks closely to the original trail, and never wavers, however the poor little thing turns and twists; it puzzles out with inexhaustible patience places where other mice have crossed the line, and becomes so absorbed in the chase that it is oblivious to everything else. In the meantime the desperate vole will cross high roads and brave all sorts of dangers to try and throw off its implacable pursuer. On one occasion I saw a vole run across a road almost under the wheels of a trap. The friend who was with me stopped the pony and we waited to see what would happen; a second later a weasel emerged from the fence, slipped down into the ditch, hunted up and down the muddy bottom for a moment, picked up the scent, and with nose to the ground sprang out on to the grass that edged the highway, where it hesitated for a second, cast itself like a huntsman casts a pack of hounds, recovered the line, and galloped across the road exactly where the vole had gone, disappearing on the further side into the long uncut grass that here bordered it. All was still, not even a grass blade quivered, and we thought hunter and hunted had quite disappeared, but just as we were moving on the weasel ran out of a little gutter that took the drainage of the road down to the ditch, and I saw it had the vole dead in its mouth. It saw us now, and paused, sat up inquisitively on its hind legs, and then slipped back quietly into the grass, but a moment later it again looked out—still with its victim in its mouth; however the pony started forward, and this time the weasel disappeared for good. Probably in a few more minutes it was hunting again, for this creature hunts as much from sport as necessity, and as its favourite game is the meadow-vole the numbers it destroys are simply incredible. Young or old, it pursues them with equal gusto, and a nestful of naked young ones are as much appreciated as those that can

run about, so those that are bred underground have as many dangers to face as those whose nursery is on the surface.

In favourable years this vole has a prolonged breeding season, nests being found from February to September, and probably later, but in ordinary times they do not commence quite so early. Five or six is the most usual number of young ones, but there may be more or less. The great time for finding the nurseries is when the hay is being mown, as the cutting of the grass exposes the balls of fine hay of which they are made. Half a dozen nests may often be discovered within a few yards of one another, some containing pink naked babies but a few hours old, others with more advanced youngsters that are brown and hairy. Little ones at this stage are queer looking mites, for their heads appear two sizes too big for them, while their diminutive tails are ridiculously short. At this age they are blind, and still dependent on their mother for nourishment, but the minute their eyes are open they get out into the grass and begin to nibble at the nearest stems, and the parent is free to consider the next family, which soon arrives, for the intervals between family cares are short. The males do not appear to take the slightest interest in their offspring.

If one can capture the young voles at the age when they are just able to look after themselves they make charming pets, for they have not learnt fear, so become tame at once, and make most engaging inmates for a cage where they can be constantly observed. They are rather difficult to catch at this age, as once they can run about they are quick to take the alarm and flee from their home, and having no particular tastes, except green food, it is not easy to bait a trap for them, though the bank-vole can be caught in an ordinary mouse-trap, for cheese appeals to it. Even full-grown voles soon loose their timidity and settle down in a cage, but whether young or old all voles should never be stinted for food, as their appetites, as I have already pointed out, are enormous. However, they are not difficult to provide for, a few handfuls of grass being all that is required.

If hard pressed the mother vole, like many other creatures, does not hesitate to murder her own young, though whether it is to preserve them from an unknown fate, or whether it is that fear and excitement perverts her natural affection I cannot say.

I only know that once I chanced on a field-vole's nest in a hay field, and as I approached it the parent ran out, I made a grab at her, and by a lucky chance caught her; with some difficulty, for she kept nipping my fingers, I got her into my handkerchief, after which I examined the nest. It contained at least half a dozen little pink babies. If they remained where they were they would certainly be killed, so I picked the nest up and took them all to the house, thinking that if I gave the family a suitable place to live in they would be all right and that I should see how small voles were brought up. It was a glass-fronted cage I put them into, so having provided all necessaries I sat down at a little distance and waited to see what would happen. The old vole went into the nest—having first washed herself—and came out at once with a little one in her mouth which was squeaking loudly, and before I could guess what was going to happen had given it a sharp bite and killed it! She murdered them all!

Voles seldom increase to any undue extent in a district where there are badgers and hedgehogs, as both these animals, though too clumsy in their movements to catch the adults, are gifted with wonderful noses that enable them to locate the nests. Half a dozen young meadow voles may be a fair meal for a hedgehog, but it is nothing to the ever hungry badger, who will munch them up, and promptly nose about for another family, and so on, until all that are at hand have disappeared, after which he will still be hungry and probably finish his night's hunting by dining off a wasps' nest. A badger covers a big extent of country in its nightly wanderings, so the service it renders in keeping down voles cannot be underestimated, and it should be ranked with the brown owl, the kestrel, and the weasel.

As long as these and the other creatures that prey on mice and small mammals are not killed down, we are not likely to be troubled with "vole plagues," such as have done such immense damage in various parts of the country in the past, when warm dry seasons favoured their increase, and unchecked they multiplied enormously, but gamekeepers are a prejudiced race, and it is difficult to convince them that the creatures they dub "vermin" may possibly be beneficial, for the "balance of Nature" and such sentences have little meaning for a man whose business in life is to preserve great quantities of game and thereby upset it.

The preservation of game on a large scale has done more to alter the fauna of this country than anything since the opening of the historic period, probably more creatures having been brought to the verge of extinction during the last hundred and fifty years than ever before. The polecat, pine-marten, and wild cat have practically disappeared, but it is the commoner animals, which have also had their numbers much reduced, that have the greatest bearing on the subject under discussion, and their reduced numbers have of course been in favour of an increase in the number of mice and voles. Few people seem to realise what a real and ever present thing the struggle for existence is. They know of it vaguely as one of the great laws of nature, but that it is going on around them, on all sides, bearing even on themselves, does not seem to enter their heads. Though we do not see it, nowhere is the struggle fiercer than in this seemingly placid England of ours, each yard of hedgerow, each inch of velvety turf, is a battle-field where hosts of contending forms fight for existence, and victory is the lot of those which can claim the slightest advantage over their fellows, but these are few, for the production is so much greater than there is room for that very many must fail. And this applies to the tiny field-voles, whose great rate of increase would enable them to overrun the country in the space of a single summer were it not that so many creatures prey on them, but the danger of killing off these foes and upsetting the wonderful "balance of nature" is obvious.

To go back to the voles themselves, beside the meadow-vole there is the bank-vole, which has already been alluded to; not only is its appearance different, but also its habitation, for it prefers to dwell, as its name indicates, in hedgerows and banks, especially such dry old banks as are clothed with ivy. It is not nearly so plentiful as the meadow-vole, though it is found in most parts of the country, but its preference for cover explains this to a certain extent, for there is not the same extent of plantations and hedgerows open to it as there are bare fields to its relative. The two little creatures are much alike in their habits, and what has been said of the one will apply to the other with equal force.

Our bigger vole, the "water-rat," is usually a very harmless sort of animal, though it sometimes gets the credit of deeds committed by the real water-rat, *i.e.* an individual of the brown

species (the common, too common rat I mean, whose scientific name is Mus decumanus). The latter, we all know, is a demon whose character is lost beyond redemption, but it is rather "hard lines" on the poor water-vole when the killing of little ducklings, the stealing of eggs, &c. &c., are visited on its head, especially when the brown rat adds insult to injury by turning it out of its water-side burrows which it has excavated with so much care and labour and appropriates them for itself and family. The water-vole engineers quite lengthy tunnels, generally taking care to have one or more underwater exits so that it has a ready means of escape should danger threaten. But it is not really a timid animal, being gifted with a large amount of curiosity, so that as long as the observer will remain quiet, or at least make no sudden movement, the vole will go about its business in perfect peace of mind.

One fine June day I was fishing in an old mill-pool when my eye was caught by a movement of some dark thing on an old tree stump that projected from the water on the other side. As my eyes focused the spot I made out a water-vole sitting up on its hind legs and busily gnawing away at a piece of rush, the charming little fellow being seemingly quite unconscious of my presence. As gently as I could I stopped throwing my fly, and waited to see what he would do. In a few seconds the rush stem was finished, so he paused, looked round, washed his face, passing his hands over his head at lightning speed, and then licked his body fur. When his toilet was finished he slipped from his perch into the water and swam towards me, paddling along with his head well out of water, while the parts of his body that were submerged looked like silver from the numerous bubbles of air that were caught in the fur. He landed on a stretch of shingle, and disappeared under the bank. However, I kept perfectly still—if the observer only keeps quiet the most timid animals will ignore him, apparently not recognising a motionless thing for a human being, though of course the wind may tell tales—and the vole soon reappeared bearing in his mouth a reed stem; this he towed across the stream, and carried it up to his former seat, where, holding it in his paws as a squirrel does a nut, he commenced to gnaw it. Just then a man came in sight down the path that led to the mill. He was whistling cheerfully,

but the sounds did not appeal to the "water-rat"; there was a slight splash, and the little animal had disappeared, though a string of bubbles rising from the bottom of the pool told where he had gone and the direction he had taken.

I thought I saw a dark brown shadow drag itself from the water under the farther bank where one or two holes could also be seen, so I waited a moment or two more, and was soon rewarded, for it was not long before the water-vole came out again, and another moment saw a second emerge, which was followed by a third. The last was a young one, just like its parents, only much smaller. Before I left the spot I saw four young ones come out and play about in the water.

This vole makes a snug nest of grass, leaves, &c., at the end of one of its long tunnels as a nursery for its young. These generally number from five to seven, though there may be as many as ten, or as few as one or two. The breeding season, as with its smaller relatives, seems to embrace the spring, summer, and early autumn months, yet it is not subject to those sudden increases in numbers which make the field and bank voles creatures to be dreaded and severely repressed, though the latter have more natural foes than the water-vole, which has but few to dread.

The weasel will sometimes invade the stream side tunnels and no doubt takes heavy toll of the inhabitants, especially the younger ones that cannot make their escape into the water, but those which have reached years—or is it "months"?—of discretion probably make good their escape. My own opinion is that the creature which persecutes the water-vole most is the common rat. It is a much more powerful animal than the vole, and is found in considerable numbers at the stream sides, while we all know what a fierce, formidable creature it is, how fearless and pitiless, and as it is frequently found in holes that a short time before were the homes of the water-voles, it must have evicted them. Burrows take time to scratch out, so "holeless voles" have no accommodation for young ones, and though they may travel on to other parts of the stream they will almost certainly meet the same fate as soon as they have settled down again. The rat too has no dislike for flesh, and a few tender young voles will not be despised by it if it chances on a nest in one of the recesses of the holes. The heron has been known to

kill a water-vole, when the "rat" has come in its way, but this bird cannot be classed as one of the foes.

The worst crimes that can be laid to the charge of the "water-rat" are those of driving holes into dams when they are made of loose soil, so that the water eventually gets in and washes them away; secondly, that it will in hard weather when food is scarce gnaw the bark off willows, but in most localities neither is a serious sin, and verdict "harmless" can be given.

With the smaller voles the matter is different. When there are but few of them they do not do much harm, but when their numbers increase and they lay bare the earth it is altogether another matter. We have had several bad epidemics of them in England, notably in the New Forest in 1814, when their depredations were incredible, while a more recent outbreak was that in the Lowlands of Scotland in 1890–91, but the worst plagues of all have been on the Continent. All writers on the subject agree in noticing how suddenly the hosts appeared and finally disappeared. Their disappearance in each case seeming to be due more to disease and the efforts of the owls, hawks, buzzards, &c., attracted to the spot by such abundance of food than to anything done by the human inhabitants of the afflicted districts. "And the moral of it is" that hawks, owls, stoats, weasels, and the many creatures which prey on mice and voles should not, as I have already said, be slaughtered indiscriminately. No doubt it is too much to ask a keeper not to kill stoats, for game must be preserved, but from the agriculturist's point of view the fewer that are killed the better; while the kestrel, brown owl, barn owl, the weasel, and other creatures which not only live almost entirely on voles, but do no manner of harm to game or anything else, should receive every protection. Even birds like the magpie and jay, whose greatest admirer could not call harmless, might (in consideration for their services in killing young voles) have more toleration extended to them.

FRANCES PITT.

THE RACIAL PROBLEM IN CANADA

PROBABLY very few of those resident in the British Isles, and certainly only a very small percentage of Canadians, are as yet fully awake to the national problem that is rapidly crystallising into definite and tangible shape, through the almost overwhelming flood-tide of immigration which has poured, and is still pouring, into the Dominion. The great majority of the immigrants coming in at present are drawn from Central Europe, though the Scotch and English are still arriving, in spite of all the warnings that have been issued by the Government and immigration offices.

It is safe to say that nine out of ten of the Central Europeans, and a good many of the British, arrive in a destitute condition, often having borrowed the money for their passage and the money to show to the immigration inspectors. Moreover, although they often bear an outward resemblance to one another, they speak a variety of tongues and are drawn from races that are hereditarily antipathetic to one another. At the present moment forty-eight different languages are in daily use in Canada, and practically every known religious creed is represented.

Thus it is that those whose foresight is longer than that of the average person are beginning to realise that unless immediate steps are taken to weld this heterogeneous mass of peoples into the life of the country, unless they can be Canadianised and Imperialised before the generation which has now to be educated comes to maturity very grave results to the Dominion and to the Empire will inevitably follow. Already coming events are casting their preliminary shadows before them.

A London daily paper which I have before me at the moment, in an article published on October 28 of last year, in which statistics are given of the immigration into Canada during 1913

gravely asserts that there is no danger of British ideals and British aspirations becoming swamped before the influx of foreign born immigrants. Nor would there be if the figures in this article were not erroneous and misleading, and if several important settlements of races from the Orient and the United States had not been overlooked. Simultaneously with this article there reached me a report of a speech by an eminent Canadian divine who has been making a careful study of this question. In this report he states:

> This is indeed a crucial time in the history of Canada, and every thinking man and woman should devote all their energies towards the advancement of Christianity along practical and educative lines. Life in Canada must be more noble than life in any country from which the immigrants are drawn if Canada is to maintain even her present place amongst nations. The future of the country depends upon what is done for the incoming people during the next few years.

A study of the map of the Dominion, and a realisation of the vast tracts of country which it embodies, and the assimilation of the idea that almost every variety of climate and nearly every type of people are represented within its boundaries, will give some conception of the magnitude of the problem which is forcing itself upon the attention of the Canadians. Take for instance the Province of Quebec—here the population is entirely French (the term "French-Canadian" is never used by Canadians). The French hold the balance of power and the Roman Catholic Church is predominant. One would not like to say that these people present in any way a menace to the life of the Dominion, but it is a fact that they are, as a general rule, antagonistic to Imperial ideals, and in some districts they are still in such a state of ignorance as to be classed as "scarcely human" by people who have come in contact with them, and there is no doubt that before Canada can become really Imperial by some means or other the French must be moulded more completely into the actual Imperial life of the country than they are at present.

In the extreme south of Ontario there is another large French settlement; here, however, the French blood is largely intermingled with Indian blood, and in some cases there is a distinct dash of the negro. Altogether an undesirable combination of races.

In the North-West there is the great Ruthenian, or Galician,

settlement. There are at present over a quarter of a million Ruthenians in Canada, and they are increasing very rapidly. These people are thrifty, hardworking and intelligent. Coming into the country practically destitute, settled on the poorest and most unproductive of land, living in the most rigorous of climates, they are yet becoming prosperous and powerful. Taken all round, physically, morally and intellectually, I think the Ruthenians represent the finest type of immigrants that Canada receives. They are naturally law abiding and moral, in so far as their conception of morality goes. Physically and featurally they are a magnificent race. Many of the men are nearly seven feet in height and well proportioned, while the women are well built and handsome. They are a hardy race, capable of enduring the utmost privation, and their intellectual level is quite on an average with that of the immigrants from Great Britain, where education has been compulsory; yet most of the Ruthenians can neither read nor write when they arrive in Canada.

In the Middle West there are the Italian settlements. The exact figures as to their numbers I have not been able to obtain, but in Toronto alone the Italian settlement numbers over 18,000 persons, and has been divided into three sections. The Italians are the most useful of Canadian immigrants. They are amenable, sympathetic and tractable, hardworking and law abiding. Were it only the Italians that Canada had to cope with there would be little or no difficulty in nationalising them.

But in Alberta there comes into the reckoning another and a more vital and dangerous element, and one that no one likes to mention or dwell upon. Driven out of the United States the Mormons are flocking into Alberta; already 14,000 of them are settled on the land, are acquiring property and becoming wealthy, and they will be followed, as a natural result, by a further influx of their own people. It is a recognised and acknowledged fact amongst those who are studying the racial problem that in the very near future the Mormons will hold the balance of power as firmly in Alberta as the French do in Quebec, with the additional drawback that they have not the hereditary interest in the country which the French have.

Going further west to British Columbia we meet with the Oriental. Every ninth person in British Columbia is an Oriental,

every fifth male in the population of British Columbia is an Oriental. There are the Hindoos, the Chinese, and the Japs, all of them racially antagonistic to the European and the American. In British Columbia, too, there are the Doukhobors, a sect of Russian Quakers who in themselves provide material for speculation, and have already necessitated the sitting of a special commission to decide as to where the limit can be drawn as regards their acquisition of property and so on. The Doukhobors are a peculiar people. They recognise no law but that of God, which they interpret to suit their own convenience, resenting any attempt to coerce them or force them into conforming with the laws and conventions of the country. They were settled originally on the poorest and most unproductive section of Manitoba land. There in the face of conditions which would have reduced an Englishman or a Canadian to starvation, they became prosperous farmers, and at the same time multiplied and increased and made themselves generally such a nuisance to the authorities that a large section of them was settled on some of the waste British Columbian land, only to find the same conditions resulting in a very short time. At present they are spreading across from Manitoba to British Columbia, acquiring property and wealth. They have a positive genius for farming, and in addition they have an extraordinary gift for constructional work, being employed on the railways and especially on bridge construction, but always proving a source of disturbance and speculation wherever they may be.

Then again, in addition to these various races of people, who are already settled and established in the Dominion, there is a new element insidiously and inexorably forcing its way across the country. The Jews, evicted from Russia, are turning their faces towards Canada, and every steamer brings them into the Dominion in hundreds. In 1881 there were only 661 Jews in the whole of Canada, to-day there are over 160,000, and they are coming in at the rate of 7000 a year. In Toronto there are 30,000 Jews, and a good deal of the best town property is owned by them.

Now the Jew would provide no menace to Canada if Canada understood him or knew how to handle him, but she no more knows how to manage him than she knows how to manage the Oriental, the Doukhobor, or the Mormon.

The Jew, hunted, persecuted, destitute, comes into Canada imbued with the idea that he is entering the land of freedom; like many others who have absorbed the same idea, viz. the English as well as the Central European and the Oriental, he naturally often mistakes liberty for licence. The Jew is ambitious of becoming a Canadian; he is sensitive, emotional, ignorant, and servile from centuries of oppression and ill-treatment. He finds himself, on his entry into Canada, only one degree less hated and despised than he is in the countries from which he has escaped. Wherever he goes he is thrown by compulsion into contact with the very lowest phases of humanity. He receives neither assistance nor charity, except from people of his own race and creed. Is it to be wondered at if his ideals remain low, if his natural acquisitiveness takes a form repellent to the civilised section of the community, if he sees little to admire in the ideals or the morals of a so-called Christian country? A Jewish Presbyterian minister, speaking before a large audience in Toronto recently, brought this point very forcibly forward. "If Canada wants to Christianise the Jew," he said, "she must first show him Christ made manifest in the religion of the country—if the Jews are becoming a menace to Canada, Canadians have only themselves to thank for it."

A large influx of people of different races and creeds coming into a country where organisation is already firmly established, presents little or no problem to that country; the people are soon absorbed. But a large influx of such peoples flooding a country which is as yet only in its infancy and which is neither organised nor established is a very different matter. In the same way a highly civilised race appropriating a country peopled with an ignorant and undeveloped race easily subjugates the original inhabitants and becomes predominant in manners, customs, religion, and ideals. But so far there has never been a country which was in the position of Canada to-day, for the civilised race is a mere unit, and is being overwhelmed by an avalanche of races drawn from almost every quarter of the globe. How, then, is this small unit of thinking, organised, and civilised people going to remain predominant, and to mould the superabundance of ignorance and diversification of races into one united Canadian whole?

The whole country from sea to sea is in a state of unrest and uneasiness, both financial, religious and civil. To use a slang term, "Canada has bitten off more than she can chew." She asked for immigration and received in reply such a deluge of immigration that she is totally unable to cope with it. It is all very well for people to say that Canada covers so many square miles of land and that she still has nothing like the population to people it. A good many of those square acres of land will not support a family, and even if they could do so, no country can or should be peopled in the space of a couple of years. As matters stand at present, if immigration was entirely closed it would take Canada at least ten years to absorb and provide for the people she now has established within her boundaries. Her internal condition may be compared to that of a Christmas pudding which has had all the dry ingredients flung pell mell into a mixing bowl and is still awaiting the liquid and leavening element which will bind it into the consolidated form in which it should appear at table.

The question is what is this leavening and binding element to be. How are the Canadians, themselves of differing creeds and trends of thought, going to be able to educate and mould this conglomerate mass of human life into one consolidated whole? The housing problem in the cities alone is stupendous. Here in Toronto, where the immigrants are pouring day by day in hundreds, there are actually no houses for them, and the conditions of overcrowding are unspeakable, and are likely seriously to affect the health of the city.

The schools, to which every one pins their faith as the great melting-pots in which the various races will be assimilated, are, except in the cities, totally inadequate—all through the West the lack of teachers is a serious matter. Schools have had to be closed in several districts because teachers cannot be obtained for them. Foreign teachers do not meet the case, since it is the Anglicising of the children that is the great necessity.

The Missions of all the churches are struggling to make headway. The Presbyterians and the Methodists are especially active, and have established Mission schools and hospitals amongst the Ruthenians and Italians in the West. The Anglican Church follows, a trifle slowly, in their wake, and the Roman Catholics are

arousing from their long slumber and pushing forward into the van. Yet all these are as a mere drop in the ocean as compared to what is necessary, and the call comes back ever more and more insistently for workers and always workers—workers who are prepared to devote their lives in return for a living wage, to the amalgamation of races and the salvation of Canada.

Canada has long since realised that there is no need for her to subscribe to foreign Missions, for she has the foreigner on her very doorstep, and she has to deal with him on a more difficult and dangerous basis than do the workers in the Missions established amongst these people in their own lands. For the Chinaman, the Japanese, the Hindoo, the Jew, the Ruthenian, and the Italian, slips his shackles off him when he enters Canada and becomes a free man. Those who understand what the ignorant conception of freedom is will realise what the possible result of this may be to the life of a country if steps are not taken in time to counteract it.

There is so much that might be said on this subject that it is impossible to deal with it fully in a small space, but if, in this very brief and inadequate sketch, I have been able to bring before English readers some faint idea of the magnitude of the task which Canada has before her, and which she must cope with or suffer the inevitable consequences, I have said enough to lay the seeds of an understanding that may later on result in tangible assistance.

(Mrs.) Donald Shaw.

GREATER BRITAIN

CANADIAN AFFAIRS

I

THE Duke of Connaught opened the Dominion Parliament on the 15th of last month and delivered the Speech from the Throne, which began with an expression of gratitude for the "comfort and support that was afforded us at the time of the serious illness of the Duchess of Connaught by the numerous messages of sympathy that were received from Canada and by the knowledge that the hearts of so many Canadians were with us during those dark days." It is gratifying to learn that the health of the Duchess is maintained, though it was thought advisable that she should not run any risk of over-taxing her strength by attending the opening of Parliament or the Drawing Room that was held afterwards.

By the time these notes appear in print the full text of the Speech and the comments of the Opposition leaders on the legislative programme outlined therein will have reached the Mother Country—so that the ever-increasing number of its inhabitants who take an intelligent interest in Canadian affairs will be in a better position than I am at the moment of writing to discuss the new phases of the Government's constructive policy and of the Opposition's campaign of destructive criticism. The most surprising feature of the speech was the omission of any reference to the Naval issue which still dominates politics in the Federal sphere of action and reaction. The position of Mr. R. L. Borden and the Conservative Party (and, it must be added, of many sound Liberals whose sympathies are actively Imperialist) in regard to a direct temporary contribution to the stock of Imperial sea-power is unaltered and unalterable, and many Conservatives

believed that the Governor-General's pronouncement would include a reaffirmation of the principles expressed in the Naval Aid Bill. At the same time it was generally known that the Bill would not be re-introduced again until a majority of the Senate is in accord with the Government, Mr. Borden and his chief lieutenants believing that a second rejection would be prejudicial to the interests of Canada and the Empire. After all, it will not be very long before the anti-Imperialist majority in the secondary Chamber melts away like a snowdrift in the spring sunshine. Liberal Senators are not immortal, and the vacancies that occur from time to time in their ranks will be filled up, of course, by Conservatives who are more closely in touch with the stern realities of world-politics, and world-business, and wish to see their country once more something more than a sleeping partner in the Imperial confederacy of autonomous nations. Moreover, the statutory increase of Western representation, which is based, under the British North America Act, on the results of each successive census, will enable the Government to appoint nine additional Senators during the present year. The Prime Minister has given notice of a resolution in the House of Commons providing for these appointments—six additional seats in the Senate being equally divided among Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, while three are assigned to British Columbia, the population of which has increased more rapidly in the decade 1901–1911 than that of the three Prairie provinces. These new Senators will be Conservatives, of course, and their Western vigour and lack of obsequiousness to the shibboleths of Party politics will liven up the proceedings of a Chamber which is at times dignified and decorous to the verge of dulness. By next year I should think that the Opposition majority in the Senate will be capable of designation by a single digit. It is a pity, no doubt, that a Senatorship should invariably be regarded as a part of the patronage of the Party in power for the time being. A more capable and influential body, and one more in touch with the vital changes in national opinion, could be secured if Senators were elected for a term, say, of ten years, re-election being permissible. But the Canadian system of recruiting the Senate is far better than that whereby the House of Lords is periodically replenished. Any wealthy stay-at-home Briton can procure a peerage by contri-

buting a certain sum to the campaign-chest of either British Party. But Senatorships in Canada are not exposed for sale on a bargain-counter; they are given for services rendered, which is at any rate a nobler form of payment than filthy lucre.

2

The great transportation problem, the deepening and widening of the East-to-West channels of Canadian trade and traffic, is still the all-important underlying issue in the political economy of the Dominion. Canada will soon have three transcontinental railways; the Grand Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern sparing no efforts to complete their communications between the Atlantic and the Pacific, and both corporations have the financial support of a Government which knows very well that railways through a new country add to its wealth at least a hundred times the profit they get out of it. In a closely settled land such as Great Britain, where the building of a new railway-line of any length merely diverts existing traffic, it is forgotten that a new line in the half-occupied territories of Canada—even if it be the sketchiest affair with a box-car for a station—creates cities as it goes along and multiplies the value of the "shadowy acres" that lie far afield on either side. There is no farmer in Great Britain who cannot get his crops to market; there are myriads along every frontier of civilisation in the Dominions. If these facts be forgotten, the vast importance of Canadian railway expansion will be grossly underrated; the stay-at-home Englishman will fail to see, for example, that the working-out of the Canadian Pacific system of branch-lines is not less serviceable to the whole community in the west than the carrying out of more grandiose schemes by the younger rivals of the one completed transcontinental thoroughfare. "If we had to pay ten times as much as we do to get railways," a Minister of the Interior once told me, "we should have to put up the money. Railways are the first necessities of our national existence."

Another branch of the Canadian transportation problem is also a cause of expenditure on the grand scale. The improvement of the system of navigation through the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes cannot be relinquished for a moment. If the best use be made of the inland waterways, which provide the

cheapest possible trade-route between the Eastern sea-board and the inner West, Canada will eventually get control of all the traffic originating in half a dozen States. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Administration never stinted expenditure on the building and improvement of canals, &c., and their successors will continue the policy of the last twenty years in regard to the improvement of lake- and river-navigation. If the lock-gates had to be built of solid gold with diamond hinges, Canada could not afford to dispense with the "Soo" and her other canals on the Great Lakes. She has already spent $103,400,588 on the construction of these short-cuts, and she will spend as much in the future on the improvement of her system of inland waterways —in order that Montreal may become the clearing-house for two-thirds of the grain traffic of the whole North American prairie region. Only in this way can she become independent of the American scheme (on which as much money, or even more, will be spent) of deepening the Erie Canal and the Hudson channel from Troy to Coxsackie, which is specially framed to enable the American ports of the Atlantic façade to keep a share of the profits of handling the crops of Western Canada.

In the matter of roads, however, it cannot be said that Canada has as yet grasped the possibilities of the new situation set up by the advent of the motor-driven vehicle. Next to Great Britain, the United States and France, the Dominion has, it is true, more motor-cars than any other country in the world. The *Toronto Globe* makes the following remarks on this striking development:

If the possession of motor cars, like the flocks and herds of the olden patriarchs, is a sign of prosperity, then the Dominion has reason to be proud of the high place it occupies in the world.

The British *Board of Trade Journal* has compiled statistics regarding the number of motor cars in use in the principal countries, excluding the British Isles and the United States. From these figures it appears that France had 89,165 motor cars in use at the end of 1911, while Canada, at the end of September 1913, possessed 42,479. Compared with other important countries the lead shown by France and Canada is remarkable. Germany, at the end of 1911, had only 15,618 cars, about one-sixth of the number owned in France. Italy has about 16,000; Australia comes next with 12,949—a large number in proportion to population. Next follow Austria-Hungary with 12,000 Russia, 8000; India, 5925; New Zealand, 4460; British South Africa, 4140; Mexico, 2000; and Japan with the insignificant total of 200. It is certainly surprising to find Japan so far behind other nations. The Dominions display a wonderful enterprise in adopting so largely the most efficient means of transportation. The Provinces of

them. The Labour Senators, however, having had three years of a Labour majority in both Houses, have not yet become accustomed to the new order of things in which their opponents have a majority, albeit it is a small one, in the House of Representatives. They have frequently taken the business out of the hands of the Government, and for some time it seemed as if they would decline to consider Government measures sent up to them by the House of Representatives at all. The Senate frequently adjourned without dealing with Government business, the excuse put forward on one occasion being that a motion of censure which was on the notice paper of the House of Representatives had not been considered by the Lower House. This was, indeed, a further attempt, of which there have been several examples this session, to influence the course of proceedings in the Lower Chamber. The Government, of course, resisted this attempt, and as events have turned out, with success. The censure motion, which was the occasion of the "strike" of the Senate to which I have referred, was the third which had been moved this session, and inasmuch as it did not break any new ground of criticism, Mr. Cook took the view that he was justified in regarding it as a further effort to obstruct Ministerial business, and that therefore no facilities should be given by the Government for its discussion.

During the last few weeks of the session the Government has been independent of the Speaker's vote. Mr. McGrath, the Labour Member for Ballarat, Mr. Deakin's old constituency, made an indiscreet and unwarranted attack on the Speaker, for which he refused to apologise to the House. He was accordingly suspended for the remainder of the Session or until such time as he apologised. The suspension was carried without the necessity to utilise the Speaker's vote, as another Labour member had previously been suspended for the remainder of the day's sitting. The Opposition has since lost two of its number by the premature death of two ex-Ministers, Mr. Frazer and Mr. Roberts, who were two of the younger and ablest members of the party. In the House of Representatives, therefore, the Government has during recent weeks had control of its business, and has been able to pass two measures at least which it was thought would be rejected by the Senate and thus provide material for bringing about a double dissolution next year.

The Electoral Reform Bill proved too complicated a measure to force through this Session in time for consideration by the Senate, and a single-clause measure restoring the Postal Vote was substituted for it. A further single-clause Bill prohibiting preference to Trade Unionists within the Commonwealth public service was also sent up to the Senate. The latter Bill was rejected on the second reading, as was bound to be the case unless Labour Senators were willing to surrender one of their most cherished principles. The Postal Voting Bill was amended and may be passed by compromise between the two Houses. Although the Government's Bill was opposed by the Opposition in the House of Representatives, it was clear that the principle of the Postal Vote would not be forced by the Labour Party to an issue between the two Houses. It could scarcely defend with justification the virtual disfranchisement of shearers and other workers employed at a considerable distance from a polling booth in the "back-blocks" and women at the time of childbirth.

The Government Preference Prohibition Bill is likely, therefore, to be the only measure on the rejection of which the Government will be entitled to ask the Governor-General for a double dissolution, although the excision of provisions in the Loan Bill for the purchase of land for defence purpose may also become an issue between the two Houses. Three months must elapse between the first and the second rejection or failure to pass by the Senate of a measure sent up to it by the House of Representatives. The feeling in the Liberal Party is in favour of the reassembling of Parliament at the earliest possible moment in 1914. This would mean that in order to comply with the provisions of Section 57 of the Constitution Act, the House of Representatives would not be able to pass the Preference Bill again until the second week in March (*i.e.* three months after the first rejection by the Senate). In ordinary circumstances Parliament would not meet again before June, but the view is strongly held by Party tacticians that the sooner the Government goes to the country the better. Only in this way can the present dissonance between the two Houses be removed. A good deal will depend on whether Ministers will find it necessary to visit London. If an Imperial Defence Conference should after all be summoned during the year this will clearly be necessary, and it is possible

also that Mr. Glynn, the Minister for External Affairs, will pay a visit to London in connection with the problem of the New Hebrides and other questions.

The recent Session has been almost entirely a barren one so far as legislative enactment is concerned. Apart from financial measures and the two Bills to which reference has been made above, the Federal Parliament has only dealt with the transfer of Norfolk Island to the Commonwealth and the establishment of a Federal Bureau for Agriculture. The remainder of its time has been occupied in fruitless and often unsavoury wrangles and obstructionist disputations. One is not surprised that Mr. Cook should be anxious to get into recess and devote his attention to important administrative problems such as immigration and the Northern Territory. At the close he has turned the other cheek to the smiting Senators, and the result has been that the language emanating from the "pot-house" has been less embittered and essential Government measures have been expedited.

2

The New South Wales State elections have unexpectedly resulted in the return of the Labour Party by an increased majority. It was fully anticipated that the failure of the Labour Government to fulfil its pledges; its somewhat reckless financial career; the opposition in the country districts to the principle of leasehold tenure of Crown lands for which the Labour Party stood sponsor; the apprehension amongst the farmers with regard to the demands for improved labour conditions on the part of the rural workers; resentment at the eviction of Lord Denman from Government House, Sydney; the association of the Labour Party with the *opera-bouffe* speakership of Mr. Henry Willis; and the proverbial swing of the pendulum—would all *inter alia* have contributed to the removal of the small majority of two which Mr. Holman possessed at the dissolution. Whilst the Liberals have increased their hold in the rural districts, the Labourites have entrenched themselves still more strongly in the metropolis.

The tempestuous advocacy of Mr. Holman, who succeeded McGowen as Premier shortly before the dissolution, coupled with the mediocre platitudes, trivialities, and personalities in which the Liberal leaders too often indulged, were responsible for a

considerable accession to the Labour Party of those unpledged electors who determine the result of every election. Mr. Holman is clearly the ablest politician on either side in public life in New South Wales at the present moment. He has apparently made his peace with the Federal Labour Party (he strenuously opposed the Referendum proposals for the alteration of the Constitution in 1911), and his influence with the Labour Caucus will be infinitely greater than that of his predecessor, who was at best a straightforward mediocrity. Mr. Beeby, who broke away from the Labour Party and resigned his position as a Minister early last year, was defeated, and his attempt to establish an Independent Party ended in a disastrous failure and the defeat of the whole of his candidates. A similar fate was experienced by the candidates of the recently formed "Country Party." Out of seventy-five Independent candidates only three emerged from the first ballots undefeated. On the other hand, the co-operation between the Farmers' and Settlers' Association and the Liberal Leagues ensured the success of several candidates jointly nominated by these bodies. For the present, at all events, the two-party system finds favour with the electors of New South Wales.

The working of the second ballots on this occasion has been an interesting commentary on the system which was inaugurated prior to the last election. Five second ballots in rural constituencies have still to be held at the time of writing. In the seven metropolitan second ballots, however, the voting on the second occasion in every case favoured the Labour Party, although the Liberal vote exceeded that of the Labour candidate in every instance on the first ballot. There was, however, an increased poll in each case, and it was this rather than the Independent votes which secured the return of the Labour candidate in five cases out of seven. The second ballot system has been condemned by both parties, and some form of preferential voting is likely to replace it before the next election. Parenthetically, it may be stated that Mr. Cook, the Commonweath Prime Minister, has announced his adhesion to the principle of the preferential vote, and it is not unlikely that this will be engrafted on to the Federal electoral system also.

Although the successes of the Federal and State Labour Parties in 1910, and to a smaller extent the success of the State

Labour Party at this last election, have been due to their increased hold in the country districts, sooner or later there is bound to be a conflict in the political as in the economic spheres between the cities of Australia and the country. In Victoria almost the whole strength of the Labour Party lies in the city and suburbs of Melbourne. In New South Wales Labour candidates have been returned for twenty-four out of the thirty-nine metropolitan seats; in the last Parliament it held only seventeen out of thirty-three Sydney seats. The "two Australias," to which Sir Rider Haggard referred during his recent visit as a member of the Dominions Royal Commission, are thus clearly divided politically, and this process will inevitably continue, so long as the capital cities increase in population and the number of manual workers is augmented as a result of the growth of local manufactures in the same proportion as in recent years.

Under Mr. Holman's leadership the new Government in New South Wales is likely to perform more useful work than its predecessor on non-controversial lines. The financial position of the State is still on the whole thoroughly sound in spite of the imprudence of the late Government, and it will need a great deal more reckless legislation before the great resources and abounding prosperity of the mother State of the Commonwealth can be seriously impaired. The widening of the markets and the maintenance of prices obtained for Australian wool and meats, together with a plenteous wheat harvest, cover a multitude of Governmental sins. The Labour Premier is shrewd enough to appreciate this, but he may also be expected more emphatically than some of his colleagues to restrict the extent of wild-cat finance and wasteful public works with which the Labour Party has in the past been too often associated.

The Labour Party has both an able leader and a definite policy. Many friends of the Liberal Party in New South Wales assert that their own Party has neither of these essentials to success at the polls. I am inclined to take the view that this criticism is not without some justification.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE LESSON OF THE NAVAL MANŒUVRES

To the Editor of the NATIONAL REVIEW

SIR,—Your correspondent "Navalis" has in your number of the *National Review* just published *three* lines to which, with your permission, I venture to call the attention of your readers—most of whom are, I take it, thoughtful men.

They are as follows: "The submarine mines, which would have rendered any invader exceedingly cautious, had been 'scrapped' and thrown away years before as the result of one of Lord Fisher's 'reforms.'" He goes on to say, "the handful of Blue ships that remained . . . had no safe retreat, and in war would probably have been destroyed."

It will be remembered by a few, perhaps, that when Sir John Fisher, First Lord of of the Admiralty, brought about the "reform" mentioned by "Navalis," he also undertook to defend all our ports by submarine boats, of which there were at that time one or two in existence. Now they are numerous; but where was the local defence at this most critical moment.

It always has been a wonder to me that the Admiral's views were adopted without question, or if not without question absolutely, at any rate without question of those who were acquainted with the subject of military submarine mining.

I worked at this branch from the very beginning, and knew all its details and the wonderful efficiency it had attained before it was swept away. It could put down a fair defence in twenty-four hours—in forty-eight a complete one for a large station. There were, I think, seventeen stations at Home so defended, but I am not quite sure if my memory is correct. At any rate, quite a number of important points were thus denied to an enemy. The efficiency of submarine mines had been amply shown in the Russo-Japanese War, and it was the cheapest possible protection, for it was very largely worked by Volunteers, guided and headed, of course, by a few Regular sappers.

Moreover these deadly weapons, the submarine mines, were perfectly harmless if they broke from their moorings—they could be laid on the bottom of the channel they guarded unhurt by storms, unnoticed by ships as they passed over them until called upon to take up their duty of defence, and even then they were harmless until put on full cock, as I may say, by the officer-in-charge, who by simply plugging a hole or by taking the plug out could render the whole system or parts of it active or inactive at pleasure in a moment.

It is not yet too late to restore this beautiful service to the country, but it is not to be done by saying from the War Office—"let it be done."

It will take time—but I implore you to use what influence you may have to impress upon the nation the most important words of "Navalis" to which I have drawn attention.

I am, &c.,

E. D. Malcolm,

Late Col. R.E.

3.1.14.

HOME RULE BY CONSENT

To the Editor of the National Review

Sir,—May I as an elector ask what right the Unionist leaders have to enter into negotiations with the Government to settle Home Rule by consent? The Unionist Party exists to preserve the Union and prevent separation. The Nationalist leaders have stated again and again that their object is to make Ireland a nation absolutely free and independent of the British Empire and that they look to Home Rule to secure this either immediately or in the near future.

Mr. Asquith has stated that one of the indispensable conditions of entering into negotiations must be that the principle of Home Rule must be conceded. Mr. Asquith cannot give up Home Rule. The Nationalists would turn him out at once if he did. The negotiations, therefore, must of necessity be futile unless the Unionists are prepared to give up the principle for which they exist.

From the evidence of those who really know Ireland it would seem that outside the Nationalist Members, their agents, and some of the priests, the enormous majority of Irishmen, Catholic as well as Protestant, do not want Home Rule, as they recognise that it would mean financial ruin to the country and to themselves. As people will not willingly fight for what they do not want, it follows that the alternative is not, as stated by Lord Loreburn, the coercion of Ulster by the Radicals or the coercion of the Nationalists by the Unionists, but Home Rule and civil war, or the defeat of Home Rule and peace. For what the Irish want above everything is to be left alone.

In these circumstances is it not clearly the duty of the Unionist leaders to say boldly and decisively that they will have nothing to do with Home Rule or any specious substitute for it and that, Union and Separation being diametrically opposed, there is no possible ground for negotiation between the two, and that the question must be submitted to the electors for decision by a General Election?

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

George W. M. Dale.

January 12, 1914.

THE NATIONAL REVIEW

No. 373. MARCH 1914

EPISODES OF THE MONTH

The Augean Stables

THE rage and terror in Mr. Asquith's Augean Stables are no less significant than diverting. Unionists should not overlook the possible political consequences of recent developments in the shape of a Dissolution, which may be nearer at hand than most of us imagine. It is common ground that the detection of another Minister in Marconi speculations during the negotiation of the Marconi Contract, which, be it never forgotten, was only executed and presented to the House of Commons on July 19, 1912, would bring down the Government, and it may be that increasing dread of further exposure will outweigh that dread of Dissolution which has hitherto governed every action of Messrs. Asquith and Co. in accordance with the written undertaking which Mr. Redmond is believed to have extorted from our "toe the liners" in return for Nationalist assistance in passing the hated People's Budget in 1910. The Molly Maguire vote was only available for valuable consideration, namely, that the British people should be denied any opportunity of pronouncing upon Home Rule which they had invariably condemned. Hence the present crisis and impending civil war. The House of Lords would have hopelessly stultified itself had it allowed Lord Murray of Elibank to take his seat as if nothing had happened on the strength of the absurd and

impudent typoscript which, encouraged by the successful effrontery of his co-speculators "in another place," he sought to palm off on his brother peers, textually reproduced elsewhere (*see* "The Fight for Clean Government"). Lord Ampthill and his friends have placed the country under a deep obligation by their courage and determination in insisting from the outset that as Lord Murray had shirked a plain duty to the Marconi Select Committee, the House of Commons, and the country—it will be remembered that he departed to the ends of the earth just as his case was about to be reached, and declined the invitation of the Committee to return—he could not now ride off on any speech in the Lords, but must, like his Marconi colleagues in the Commons, appear before a Committee of his peers, and give evidence on oath subject to the test of cross-examination. The House of Lords could not have survived the discredit and ridicule of saying ditto to our present discreditable and ridiculous House of Commons on the Marconi scandal, and the vast majority of the Upper House made no concealment of their sentiments and wishes. In spite of recent creations it remains an assembly of gentlemen, with the faults of gentlemen, namely, an inclination to be too easygoing and generous towards opponents however unscrupulous and vindictive, for which in return the Lords are "Limehoused." Here, however, was too clear a case for that mistaken sense of "chivalry"—which resembles collusion—to operate.

Rigging the Press

INITIATIVE is as important in politics as in other walks of life. Lord Ampthill performed invaluable service by his sound and manly speech delivered after Lord Murray's miserable statement, when there was some anxiety owing to interested and misleading rumours circulated by the Hush-up Press as to the precise attitude of the Unionist Front Bench, and Lord Lansdowne in particular, who for the moment was fawned upon as though he belonged to the Marconi Tea-party. It was with immense satisfaction that the public learnt that our greatly respected leader in the House of Lords would take the matter into his own hands and himself move Lord Ampthill's motion (February 19) which ran as follows:

"To move that a Select Committee be appointed to enquire into certain charges and allegations made in the public Press against a Member of this House, namely, the Lord Murray of Elibank, and into all matters relating thereto; and that the said Committee be authorised to hear Counsel and to examine witnesses on oath; and that the evidence taken from time to time before the said Committee be printed for the use of Members of the House."

If Lord Lansdowne is slow to move in a disagreeable business, his high standard of honour and sense of duty enable him to discharge his task without flinching. Rarely has the House of Lords heard a more remarkable speech than his deadly analysis of "what is commonly called 'the Marconi scandal.' The country has been ringing with it for months past, and all I can say about it is that there never was a wilder or more discreditable gamble upon the Stock Exchange than that which took place in connection with the issue of the American Marconi shares which were introduced to the British stock market." He reminded his audience of what some people are apt to overlook, namely, that besides "inordinate gains" there were "cruel and undeserved losses. I am told that it has been calculated that within the space of two days the little knot of individuals who had particular means of knowing the inwardness of these transactions probably made a profit of something like one and a half millions." At any rate, the business was so disreputable "that the Committee of the Stock Exchange took the unusual course of suspending for five years the firm of jobbers who were concerned with the introduction of those shares to the market." Lord Lansdowne was evidently never taken in by the gigantic newspaper conspiracy, possibly engineered by interested parties, some of whom might conceivably have received profitable tips from Ministerial friends privy to the negotiations between the Government and the Parent Company. We have learnt a great deal from the Marconi scandal, *inter alia*, that Press opinion is one thing and public opinion another, and people are beginning to regard some of these Octopus Syndicates not merely with distrust and suspicion but with positive repugnance. The old British theory that the Press existed for the sake of the public, has been

replaced by the modern American theory that the public exists for the sake of the Press. Newspaper proprietors may falsify, misdirect, poison or boycott opinion as suits their pocket interests, with the single result of convincing the country of the urgent need of some legislation to enable us to know whose opinions we are reading, in columns preserving a familiar appearance, which may conceivably have been sold overnight or are wire-pulled by some undisclosed speculator round the corner, awaiting the happy moment when he will receive a peerage—unless he be fobbed off with a baronetcy or a knighthood—for services rendered to the Government of the day.

Form of Public Opinion

As Lord Lansdowne remarked, and the observation is a tribute to public opinion rather than Press opinion, "When it became known that Ministers of the Crown were concerned—to what extent no one knew, but still to some extent—in these speculations, a feeling of profound uneasiness developed throughout the country. I do not think any of us can recall an occasion upon which feeling was more intense and more widespread." Doubtless there was some "morbid curiosity" concerning the reputation of individuals, especially public men,

> but I am sure in this case there was something much more than that. The feeling of the people of this country was that these revelations had disclosed something seriously amiss in our public life—something fatal to those great traditions upon which we pride ourselves—traditions, the observance of which has enabled us to maintain our own self-respect, and not only our own self-respect, but the respect of foreign countries—and of our fellow subjects beyond the seas, who have asked for nothing better than that their standard of public morality should conform to ours.

As a result—let the *Elibank Echo* take note—"a passionate desire to probe these matters to the utmost arose in the land, and resulted in the appointment of the House of Commons Committee." The mere fact that Lord Murray had come before them "to make an explanatory statement to your lordships, shows that, in his opinion, at any rate, the matter could not be allowed to remain where the House of Commons left it. But, in addition to that, I am bound to say—and I say so with no want of respect to the Committee appointed by the other House—that for a

purpose of this kind I cannot conceive a more ill-suited tribunal than a House of Commons Committee set up on the ordinary lines." Why it was upon record "that at one moment information was imparted to members of the Committee and made use of by them in the course of examination of witnesses, but withheld from the knowledge of the Committee as a whole." Our old friends Messrs. Falconer and Handel Booth cannot fail to enjoy the enviable immortality they secured by their performances on that Committee which in happier days made them the heroes of the Coalition Press. Alas, poor Yorick! As Lord Lansdowne pointed out, when the Commons Committee began considering their Report, the minority received short shrift, while the Report proposed by the Radical Chairman, Sir Albert Spicer, because it contained one or two "mildly regretful passages," was rejected by the Stalwarts, who substituted for it "a Report absolutely and entirely whitewashing the Ministers whose conduct was submitted to their criticism"—a document that was so obviously inadequate to the circumstances that the Government did not venture to endorse it, "but substituted for it a different resolution, in which they were obliged, for decency's sake, to accept the expressions of regret which had been tendered to them by the Ministers involved—regret for their conduct in the matter of these speculations and for the suppression of facts when the matter came before the House of Commons in the previous month of October."

Lord Murray's Case

THE House of Lords could not accept the House of Commons Report as covering Lord Murray. "It is true that the Committee, by one bold stroke of the brush, whitewashed not only the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Attorney-General, but all the Ministers concerned in this transaction. But I suggest that they were not in a position to absolve Lord Murray—in regard to these transactions. Lord Murray was not before the Committee." Lord Lansdowne then dealt with another remarkable episode. Early in their proceedings the Commons Committee passed a resolution intimating that they were prepared to consider all evidence, and inviting persons in possession of such evidence to communicate with the Clerk of the Committee,

and it was intimated by one of the noble Marquess's colleagues that members of the Government would be most ready to appear before the Committee. So much was this the case that Sir Rufus Isaacs, as he then was, when he eventually appeared as a witness before the Committee, explained to them that he would gladly have appeared sooner if he had been allowed to do so, but that he did not think he was justified in pressing to be taken out of turn, and that he was, if I may so put it, straining at the leash in order to get to the Committee and be allowed to give his explanation before it.

The speaker enquired, Why were Ministers so anxious to come and give evidence before that Committee ?

Well, surely, it was for this reason, that they thoroughly realised that no explanations which they could give on the floor of the House would be sufficient to clear them from the imputations under which they were suffering. Lord Murray never appeared before the House of Commons Committee. I believe it is not disputed that while the Committee were sitting he spent somewhere about two months in this country ; but he never presented himself and never was called ; and I noted that in the full explanation which he gave on Tuesday last he failed to state how it had come to pass that he had not found an opportunity of appearing before the Committee.

Lord Murray therefore remained in this position, that whereas his colleagues had appeared, were examined on oath and cross-examined, he had never testified, though admittedly he had made a very full apology to this House, and Lord Lansdowne was kind enough to say " his sincerity must have impressed all who listened to it. We have had a good many Ministerial apologies lately. They have been of frequent occurrence, and I will pay the noble Lord the compliment of saying that I thought his apology was probably the best apology of the lot. At any rate, the noble Lord did not follow the example of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and compare himself to St. Sebastian, or any other saint in the calendar." But apology and defence were two different things. " An apology cannot be a defence because an apology is an admission that there is something wrong."

Unsolved Problems

Lord Lansdowne declared that neither the apology they had heard nor the Report of the Commons Committee justified the House of Lords in abstaining from inviting Lord Murray to come before a Committee of his brother peers. After all, like his colleagues, he had large dealings in speculative securities, and accepted with them

profitable information from persons in contractual relations with the Government, and like them withheld knowledge of these things from the House of Commons. He had been Chief Whip and " unhampered custodian " of the Party funds and in a sense of the consciences of members of Parliament whose business he regulated. " A Government official who occupies that position in the House has very remarkable and exceptional opportunities, and it seems to me that an official who exercises powers of that kind ought to be more careful than anybody else before he involves himself in the kind of difficulties which Lord Murray and his colleagues have found themselves involved in." Among the questions requiring elucidation mentioned by Lord Lansdowne were the limits within which Party funds should be used for speculative purposes and the desirability of investing those funds " in companies allied to companies which are in contractual relations with the Government of the day." Closely connected with that was the investment of about £21,000 in Home Railways Stock during the coal strike, which his Majesty's Ministers were endeavouring to terminate. " Then is not some explanation called for in regard to the undisputed fact that Lord Murray on April 17 bought these American Marconi shares at £2 for himself, and, I think, the very next day, bought the same description of shares for his Party at £3 5s. ? " They were equally entitled to know whether Lord Murray when investing for the Party obtained all the shares he asked for, or like the rest of the public was only allotted 15 per cent. of the amount for which he had applied. " Then I do not know . . . in what circumstances Lord Murray authorised the purchase of 3000 more shares on May 22 by his colleague, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Then we have also noticed a reference to some arrangement under which these Ministers apparently took part in a kind of pool, under which the shares were held with an engagement that they should not sell them, or at any rate sell more than part, during a certain period of time." There were likewise large transactions involving some £70,000 in connection with the Party funds about the time of the Coronation " about which a little more light might be desirable."

have noted found artless expression in the Radical Plutocracy, while the Coalition Press overflowed with terror and fury at the possibility of the "clean up" long ago promised by Lord Murray of Elibank.

What does it mean?

To unsophisticated onlookers like ourselves this indignation is inconceivable if we accept Lord Crewe's statement that there is nothing new to be revealed, for *ex hypothesi*, the more thoroughly the truth is probed, and the more widely the facts are known, the more will l'Affaire Marconi redound to the credit of the Government in general and of the speculators in particular, upon whose character and conduct, as we know from the utterances and action of Mr. Asquith and the enthusiasm of the National Liberal Club, no shadow of stain now rests. To Lord Murray the decision of his peers must be peculiarly welcome, as otherwise he would have no serious opportunity of telling his own version of the story narrated by Mr. George and Sir Rufus Isaacs. And yet we have the *Westminster Gazette*, which is understood to be in the secrets of the Government, positively spitting with rage and fear, in no less than five "sea-green incorruptible" "Notes of the Day," which encourage us in the first place to ask a question exercising many people, viz. whose views does the *Westminster Gazette* express? Editors are frequently ciphers nowadays. Whether this is the case in the office of the organ of the Radical Plutocracy we do not know. It has recently celebrated its twenty-first birthday and is very proud of its record, but there is a singular silence as to its owners and controllers. Is it the property of that eminent patriot the Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred Moritz Mond, Bart., P.C., M.P., or of that no less fervent democrat, Sir Charles Solomon Henry, Bart., or does it move within the orbit of Lord Cowdray, distinguished in many ways, incidentally as the partner or co-Director of Lord Murray of Elibank? We are entitled to identify the enraged, who abuse Lord Lansdowne for disappointing their expectations as a whitewasher. Then, again, that northern trustee of purity and progress, eloquent on the subject of "Cobdenism and cleanliness" and "Protection and corruption," the *Manchester Guardian*, is no less incensed that truth should be afforded a chance.

In fact, the attitude of the Coalition *pace* Lord Crewe is only intelligible on the assumption that so far only a small percentage of the facts have yet emerged into daylight, and that among well-informed partisans there is a dread of further revelations, which, as we began by saying, may not inconceivably eclipse Ministerial dread of Dissolution. Bear in mind that the Prime Minister was the principal patron of the Festival of Truth when he allowed his colleagues to mislead the House of Commons in the expectation that their speculations would never be disclosed. When disclosure and discredit came, Mr. Asquith flatly refused to make any further enquiries among his colleagues as to whether others had indulged in any Marconi speculations, presumably because he shrewdly suspected that further investigation involved further revelations fatal to the great Ministry of Mendacity, which, be it never forgotten, was solemnly pledged to the public by the historic utterance of the Postmaster-General (October 12, 1912):

What do they fear?

> Neither I myself nor any of my colleagues have at any time held one shilling's worth of shares in this Company, directly or indirectly, or have derived one penny profit from the fluctuations in their prices. It seems shameful that political feeling can carry so far, that lying tongues can be found to speak and ears found to listen to such wicked and utterly baseless slanders such as these. This Committee (*i.e.* the Marconi Committee) which will be appointed, will enquire into every aspect of this question, and members of the Government will be most ready to appear before it. Every member of the House may have full confidence that while every part of this transaction will come under the searchlight of examination, it will be shown that there is no uncleanliness in any quarter.

We are familiar with the stock Radical answer. We had it from Lord Crewe. We can find it whenever the *Westminster Gazette* has been forced to break its "iron boycott" of this question. "There is no serious connection between one Marconi Company and another. Beyond the common name they are scarcely on bowing terms." When the first revelations came with the *Matin* case, the *Westminster Gazette* actually committed itself to this proposition: "*Except that the American Marconi Company happens to share with the British the quite honourable name of Signor Marconi, the transaction would call for no comment on public grounds.*" Therefore any number of Ministers may have speculated to any extent in "associated" Marconi Companies without transgressing the Coalition creed, or arousing any comment from

the Editor of the *Westminster Gazette*. On the other hand, the theory of the complete detachment of these Marconi Companies which would render Ministerial speculation in one "corruption" and Ministerial speculation in another unimpeachable, hardly receives encouragement from the City Editor of the *Westminster Gazette*, who informed his readers the day after the discussion in the Lords, "the market for Marconis is dull, the House of Lords proceedings having had a somewhat depressing effect on it.* Americans have fallen to 1⅝, Canadians to 9s. 9d., and the *Parent shares* (our italics) to 3⅞ only." We are only interested in the political bearing of this report, which is significant as shattering the flimsy pretexts of Lord Crewe and the Coalition Press.

Will they bolt?

We have no preconceived indeas concerning Lord Murray, and cannot imagine that he can be otherwise than delighted at the prospect of daylight, however much his former colleagues and their newspaper friends might prefer a hush-up. We would however warn the Unionist Party to be prepared for a sudden bolt on the part of the Government, who have fought tooth and nail against any "clean up" and have concentrated the gigantic resources at their disposal in preventing the public from knowing the truth at any stage of l'Affaire Marconi. Unionists continually misread their opponents because they misunderstand their character and treat an Asquith Cabinet as though it were a Gladstone Cabinet. They allow themselves to be hypnotised by great offices however small may be their occupants. They talk with bated breath of "the Prime Minister" the "Chancellor of the Exchequer," the "First Lord of the Admiralty," &c., conjuring up visions of the Grand Old Man, Pitt, or St. Vincent. They have actually to deal with a time-serving lawyer, a Welsh mountebank, a Dundee windbag—whose careers prove that they will stick at nothing. With their colleagues they constitute a Cabinet of Habakkuks. Our Habakkuks have always been terrified of Marconi not on account of the gross improprieties—we see from the Wick business that at a pinch they don't draw the line at corruption, of which they sanctimoniously profess horror—which leave them unmoved if annoyed, but simply

* Observe the "it" as covering the entire group.

because their political existence, *anglice* salaries, are bound up with it. Mr. Churchill obligingly supplied us with a measure of delinquency during his theatrical performance at the Marconi Committee (April 28, 1913), when he made a brazen effort to bring the proceedings to a close—vociferously applauded by the Coalition Press. He had been invited to dispose of a rumour connecting his name with Marconi speculations, and he thus loosed off at the astonished Committee :

> This is a very insulting charge that you have thought proper to ask me to come here to answer. I am bound to point out that it is a most insulting charge. The charge which your Committee, Sir Albert, have thought proper to summon me at a moment's notice to answer is nothing else than that having had dealings in Marconi shares, I sat silent while friends and colleagues came forward and voluntarily (*sic*) disclosed their exact position—that I sat silent while they were subjected to gross ill-usage and covered with every species of calumny and insult—that all the time I skulked in the background, keeping my guilty knowledge to myself, and desiring to conceal it from your Committee. I say it is a very insulting charge, a most grave and insulting charge, &c. &c.

Surely in the face of this explosion, if there is any intelligence left in a much-harassed Premier he will reconsider his refusal to make further enquiries among his colleagues as to any Marconi transactions they may have overlooked, as in the light of the great monument of mendacity which has been laboriously raised during the past year and a half, his continued refusal would justify the worst suspicions. We now know that prominent members of the Radical Party, aware of Ministerial Marconi speculations, deliberately withheld such information from the Committee, while journalists were bullyragged about "rumour." An ex-Minister avows that he had no intention of allowing the world to know that "the Party" as a Party was pecuniarily interested in Marconis. Will there be a real "clean up," such as Lord Murray desires, or will the Government make a bolt of it and drown dull care in a dread Dissolution ?

Ananias a Back Number

We repeat that Unionists must be prepared for all eventualities —for every conceivable surprise. Ministers are not only at the end of their tether, but they know it. However much accustomed to a diet of dirt, there are limits to the political digestion even of an Asquith Ministry. None of their predecessors would have wished to survive such ignominy as has fallen to their lot. Not

merely does any constituency consulted show its detestation of the Government of snobbery, jobbery and robbery, whether it be in the Home Counties or in the East End of London—where slimy hypocrites such as Mr. Masterman, one of Mr. George's sycophants, are sent about their business in all their premature glory as Cabinet Ministers—but the Government have been publicly convicted of corrupting the constituencies by barefaced bribery in cases where they hold seats. Moreover, they have not only been compelled to confess but humbly to apologise for their misconduct after the usual mean attempt of the delinquent to pretend he had been "misreported." Cobdenism stands for corruption, that is the long and the short of it. Our people have been reduced to such distress by sixty years of "Free Trade" that Ministers are constrained to promise to put so many pounds into electors' pockets in order to keep Scottish Radical seats. Mr. Gulland, one of the Ministerial Whips, is the hero of this episode, and presumably the National Liberal Club are only awaiting the appropriate moment to give the usual ginger ale luncheon to the winner of Wick. Pending this function we offer our hearty congratulations to Mr. Steel Maitland on the skill with which he brought down his bird—or rather many birds, as the entire Ministry are compromised by this affair, and Mr. Asquith's grovelling apology after Mr. Gulland's cowardly attempt to make the local press responsible for his corrupt conduct involves all his colleagues. There was no loophole for a wriggle because Mr. Steel Maitland thus concluded his indictment: "I therefore in spite of his attempted disclaimer, definitely charge Mr. Gulland with corruption and corruption of a kind from which it is the boast that British politics have been conspicuously free." As Mr. Steel Maitland's case was unanswerable, Mr. Asquith described Mr. Gulland's performance as "an error of judgment." Mr. George meanwhile has been convicted of telling more falsehoods in a shorter space of time than have ever been told before by any man in his position. Ananias has become a back number.

Coming Capitulation to Germany

PARLIAMENT was opened on February 10, by the King in person, accompanied by the Queen, with the usual ceremonial, the popular reception of their Majesties being if possible more cordial than ever, indicating on the part of the man in the street a realisation of the great responsibilities besetting the Sovereign at a fateful moment in the history of the Dynasty as well as of the Empire. After referring to our "friendly" relations with Foreign Powers, the Speech from the Throne expressed "much pleasure" at the impending visit of the King and Queen to the President of the French Republic. "I shall thus be afforded an opportunity of testifying to the cordial relations which exist between our two countries." The Government had been in consultation with other Powers concerning the settlement of Albania and the Ægean Islands, with a view to giving effect to the resolutions adopted by the Powers during the Conference of Ambassadors in London last year. Measures had been adopted by the International Commission of Control "for the purpose of establishing order and security, and, on the arrival of the new Ruler (of Albania) I trust that progress will be made towards the institution of an efficient and stable administration in that country." Then came a cryptic paragraph concerning somewhat mysterious negotiations with Germany and Turkey, "as regards matters of importance to the commercial and industrial interests of this country in Mesopotamia," which "are rapidly approaching a satisfactory issue, while questions which have long been pending with the Turkish Empire in respect to regions bordering on the Persian Gulf, are in a fair way towards an amicable settlement." After a long and unexampled spell of immunity from criticism, which the official world has exploited to the utmost, the public are no longer prepared to open their mouths and shut their eyes and swallow whatever the Foreign Office may give them. Any arrangements in Asia Minor with Germany, which judging from previous experience will consist of "graceful concessions" on our part, will be subjected to severe scrutiny. It is not to our interest any more than it is to Turkey's interest to have the greatest military power in Europe, bestriding a strategic railway to Baghdad, however this project may be disguised by such specious terms as "international participation" or "equality of oppor-

tunity," which cannot conceal a formidable menace to the attenuated integrity of the Turkish Empire, equally hostile to Ottoman and British interests.

"Reforming" the Lords

COMING to domestic affairs, the Royal Speech contained a paragraph which riveted attention by its unwonted gravity, and was satisfactory to this extent in that it is a confession on the part of his Majesty's Ministers, that they have completely misjudged the temper of Ireland and now frankly acknowledge their own folly in dismissing Ulster resistance as so much bluff. "I regret that the efforts which have been made to arrive at a solution by agreement of the problems connected with the Government of Ireland have, so far, not succeeded. In a matter in which the hopes and the fears of so many of my subjects are keenly concerned, and which, unless handled now with foresight, judgment, and in the spirit of mutual concession, threatens grave future difficulties, it is my most earnest wish that the good-will and co-operation of men of all parties and creeds may heal dissension and lay the foundations of a lasting settlement." It was difficult to resist a smile on reading the next paragraph in the Royal Speech, which we need scarcely say no one could dream of criticising, were it not recognised as being the handiwork of his Majesty's Misgovernment. "Proposals will be laid before you for reconstituting the Second Chamber." The notion that Messrs. Asquith and Co., who to a large extent owe their position to the huge secret funds which have been raised by the most unblushing and flagrant sale of "honours" in the history of this country, seriously contemplate cutting off this invaluable source of supplies, by reconstituting the Second Chamber either on a nominative or an elective or indeed on any other basis, which would prevent them from rewarding their snobs, can only be pronounced grotesque. The Prime Minister and his colleagues have lived for several years on the promise of reforming the House of Lords, which is no nearer realisation to-day than it was five years ago, indeed it is probably further off, because the hunger for hereditary "honours" has been developed among opulent and hungry Radical Plutocrats to such a point as to make their disappointment dangerous to the Government. The Speech recited various

other measures to be presented to Parliament including the usual doses of "social reform."

New Departure

EVEN Front Benchers were conscious that the customary conventionalities were wholly unsuitable at the opening of this fateful Session, and after Mr. Asquith's recently ennobled brother-in-law, Lord Glenconner, had moved the address in reply to the Speech from the Throne in the House of Lords, which found a seconder in the person of "the Earl of Carrick"—whoever he may be—instead of the usual discursive debate on things in general and nothing in particular, Lord Midleton (Mr. Broderick) moved an amendment to the Address humbly representing "that it would be disastrous to proceed further with the Government of Ireland Bill, until it has been submitted to the judgment of the people." For this welcome infringement of Front Bench Freemasonry—which we may hope has received its quietus from Lord Lansdowne's Marconi speech—we have to thank Lord Willoughby de Broke, Lord Ampthill, Lord Stanhope, and Lord Arran, who realised that the time had come for Back Benchers to bestir themselves unless the House of Lords was to sink into insignificance. As always Lord Midleton spoke effectively and presented his case in a lucid and cogent manner which was not in the least degree weakened by the attempted reply of Lord Morley of Blackburn, the selected spokesman of the Government. With the rest of the community we are somewhat weary of Front Bench oratory, however irreproachable in style. The attitude of the average Mandarin towards serious political issues no longer commends itself to men of intelligence, and there are increasing indications on both sides of politics of something approaching a revolt against the elaborate parliamentary imposture maintained for the benefit of certain personal vested interests engaged in a game, doubtless fascinating to the players, which is rapidly losing its attractions for the country, to whom Parliament and Humbug are becoming synonymous terms. Lord Willoughby de Broke described the Speech from the Throne as a piteous appeal to Unionists to help the Government out of a difficulty of their own creation. What were the alternatives to a General Election as advocated in the Opposition amendment? Ministers must either force their Bill on the North

of Ireland, or else seek a settlement by consent. They had only just discovered that Ulster was really in earnest, and her existence was now recognised in their speeches. The present situation was caused by the Parliament Act, which had resolved constitutional government in this country into a mere question of powder and shot.

Right or Wrong?

LORD WILLOUGHBY declared they were asked to utilise the armed forces of the Crown to carry out the decrees of the dominant political Caucus. "It would be a great deal better if some Ministers went over to Ireland and took the same risks as the soldiers they proposed to employ, than that they should sit in their offices with their portfolios in one hand and their Marconi shares in the other." In emphatically protesting against this degrading employment of our troops, the speaker appealed to the Peers to deal with the Army Annual Act in such a way as to make the Army unavailable for purely Caucus purposes. We note with satisfaction in these days of "rot" that the speaker denounced the policy of the exclusion of Ulster as a basis of settlement by consent, as it admitted the principle of a Bill destructive of the Union which the Unionist Party were pledged to maintain. "The electors as a whole were apathetic about Home Rule as they were apathetic about a good many other questions. He believed the electorate were dissatisfied with both Houses of Parliament and with all parties in the State. They thought the Government was dishonest, and the Opposition was not particularly whole-hearted about anything. The electorate were profoundly dissatisfied with the Government, the Opposition and the Labour Party, for not having properly explored and pronounced their condemnation on the private financial speculations of Cabinet Ministers." Lord Willoughby de Broke, who represents a great many people on this question, roundly declared that if the next General Election were won by the Radicals "they were perfectly entitled if they liked, to construe that as an act of declaration of war by the vast majority of the English people against Ulster and in favour of Home Rule. If that took place, he himself, as an independent Unionist, would certainly still be on the side of the Ulster people. He did not think any number

of General Elections could turn right into wrong or wrong into right. Home Rule would be quite as great an evil after the next General Election; but of course he could not pledge the official Unionist Party, and he understood that Mr. Bonar Law said that the active resistance of the Unionist Party would be withdrawn if the next General Election went against them."

Duke of Portland

THE Duke of Portland followed with a fresh and interesting speech, giving an account of a recent visit to the North of Ireland for the purpose of making a first-hand study of the situation on the spot. The ways of newspapers are mysterious. They usually report speeches in inverse proportion to their intrinsic interest, thus we find Front Bench flapdoodle set forth at portentous length covering column after column and containing nothing but the dull old hackneyed stuff of which the public are sick to death. But when you find a man like the Duke of Portland, who really has something to say, his observations are squeezed into a corner merely because he has escaped the misfortune of what is facetiously called "high office" in one or other of the various Misgovernments which have afflicted this country in recent years. Like other visitors to Ulster, he was greatly impressed by the evident determination of the people not to submit to Home Rule, and he charged the Government with wilfully misleading public opinion in this island as to the preparations of Ulster, and if in consequence bloodshed ensued the blame would fall on the Government and the Chief Secretary. "Those who relied on the false information which was being spread would have a rude awakening when the time came for the determined men of Ulster to carry out their just resolve." He was told in Belfast that that city would sooner be bombarded than submit to Home Rule, the hatred of which had broken down all barriers, and drill and drill alone occupied the attention of Ulster, whose people made no demand for ascendancy over others. "They were merely determined to guard their own freedom and to preserve their rights. If these people were negroes in Africa or Jews in Russia all political parties in this country would extend sympathy and support to them. Why should the sympathy and support be withheld from our own kith and kin? Why should

these loyal subjects be made mere pawns in a paltry party game?" The Duke of Portland's excuse for addressing the House was that "never in his life had he been so gravely impressed, for he believed we were confronted with the imminent prospect not only of civil war but of the break-up and ruin of the Empire. The way out of the difficulty in which the Government had placed themselves was an appeal to the country . . . they were face to face with angry, desperate men who were out for a fight to the finish. . . . 'Wait and see' had always been a fatal policy, and it was doubly so now."

Conciliation in extremis

On the following day (February 11) the Debate in the House of Lords was resumed by Lord Loreburn, the ex-Lord Chancellor, whose ill-health most unfortunately constrained him to relinquish the Woolsack in favour of Lord Haldane, though it is arguable that Lord Loreburn was animated by purely patriotic motives in providing an opportunity of emancipating the War Office from the most mischievous War Minister of modern times. Lord Loreburn is a robust Radical of the old school, a lifelong partisan, a prejudiced and even bitter opponent, but altogether above the dirty tricks which form the stock in trade of the new Radicalism as developed by the callous cynic at the head of the Government. We have no means of knowing Lord Loreburn's private opinions concerning his late colleagues, but we should judge from his record and general demeanour that they are not substantially different from our own. Formerly a convinced and uncompromising Nationalist, Lord Loreburn is prepared nowadays to play the part of conciliator, and the irritation caused by his intervention in Ministerial circles affords us at any rate a measure of his sincerity even though we retain the view that this issue can only be settled by a fight to a finish here and now and a complete defeat of one side or the other. In a genuine speech the ex-Lord Chancellor declared that "every instinct of prudence and good sense" pointed to the duty of arriving at a settlement by consent, and when he was told it was impossible he replied that it would not be impossible provided there were good-will, which led him to suggest our old friend Federation as a solution, and he craved in aid something which Mr. Austen Chamberlain is alleged to

have said. Unfortunately he could not resign himself to abandon the Bill for which as a recent member of the Government he bears his share of responsibility, though it is surprising that a man of his acumen should describe this preposterous measure as "a stepping-stone towards a system such as I have described" —*i.e.* Home Rule all round. "If there is anything in it incompatible with a Federal solution, then it can be eliminated or amended." We agree with Lord Loreburn in regarding the exclusion of Ulster as an impossible form of settlement, but his suggestion of giving a majority in the Ulster area a veto on all new legislation affecting that province is an utterly illusory safeguard if you once surrender the control of the executive to a Molly Maguire Government controlled by Devlin and seated in Dublin, and holding the balance of power at Westminster. The speaker seemed to be conscious of the difficulty, as he added: "You might require that there should be a Minister charged to administer all the Departments, or any special parts that were thought right, in the Ulster area which would be acceptable to the majority of the members of that area. You might have a Board of Patronage, to be appointed by any impartial authority, and surely there must be one just man in Ireland."

Exit Union of Hearts

THE vaunted Union of Hearts of which we used to hear so much now sings very small when a lifelong advocate of Home Rule, and promoter of innumerable Home Rule Bills placing all Ireland under the Molly Maguires, is reduced to suggesting ingenious devices to emancipate Ulster coupled with the expression of a pious hope that there may be one just man in Ireland! Lord Loreburn piteously appealed to Irishmen to meet "for common counsel and cooperation, and thereby by degrees it may be, efface the estrangement which has hitherto prevailed among them, and when the term of years appointed under this Act should have elapsed, then some future Parliament, in an atmosphere less heated by passion than, I am afraid, is likely to be the case now, will be able to reconsider the whole subject, and I have no doubt after some years of experience, there will be no longer this desire on the part of the people of Ulster to withdraw from the community." This sounds like the despairing cry of a drowning man who realises

at last that the raft on which he hoped to find shelter is an optical illusion. It would be comic were the consequences less tragic that such well-meaning men should have devoted their lives to advocating a policy which they now realise can only end in tears and blood because they wilfully shut their eyes to obvious facts which strike one in the face. Lord Salisbury said the last word on Home Rule many years ago when he described it as allowing "three men to trample on two men," and now that at last we are face to face not with a mere Home Rule Bill but with a Home Rule Act, the honest portion of the blind leaders of the blind realise that their entire Irish policy was fundamentally misconceived. They summon their opponents to pull them out of the quagmire. Lord Loreburn believes in Federation, on which the word in season will be found in an able and incisive article elsewhere from the pen of Mr. Ian Colvin. But faith in Federalism will not help us in connection with a measure which contains little or no element of Federalism. It is an Ascendancy Bill, a Civil War Bill, a measure to place the Loyalists of Ireland under the Disloyalists, who are in a position to kick out Messrs. Asquith and Co. the second they cease to "toe the line" to our Dollar Dictator, who is none the less a dollar dictator because for the moment he is also a canting hypocrite.

Collapse of "Conversations"

LORD LOREBURN wound up by the sterile declaration that it is everybody's duty to contribute his ideas and suggestions to the common pot. We agree, and have done our best month by month for many years on Radical Policy on which Lord Loreburn tardily acknowledges that his former colleagues are hopelessly astray. He tells us :

> It is not enough to say "you have introduced three Bills—we will have none of them—pray proceed and bring forward a number more Bills or proposals, while we say absolutely nothing and do not contribute by our wisdom to the enlightenment of the community." The time has come when the stage of reticence ought to be abandoned, and when everybody should bring forward their views, as I have endeavoured briefly to state mine. If that is done, I am perfectly certain that in the multitude of counsellors there will be wisdom. Neither this that I have presented (*i.e.* Federalism), nor the Government Bill, nor the Government suggestions, whatever they may be, will have any real prospect, at all events for a considerable time, of restoring peace to Ireland unless there be a spirit of conciliation and of good will. The spirit is every-

thing, and I hope that your lordships will contribute to the formation of public opinion in that respect.

Lord Lansdowne, who must have welcomed the innovation of moving an amendment to the Address providing a definite subject of discussion, thus exempting the Leader of the Opposition from those vacuous speeches surveying mankind from China to Peru with which parliamentary Sessions habitually opened, thus described the situation: "The conversations of which we have heard so much have failed. That is a matter of notoriety. And although we must, of course, respect the bond of secrecy under which those conversations took place, one is at least justified in saying that if they failed it was not from any want of good-will or good temper on either side but obviously because fundamental differences were encountered—differences which were fatal to agreement whether negotiation was carried on from one platform to another platform or from one armchair to another armchair." That is common sense. He doubted whether Ministers even yet realised the extreme urgency of the Ulster problem. It was indeed a terrible thing that they should now be talking of the imminence of civil war knowing that the facts justified their apprehension, while language was used by Ministers quite inconsistent with the belief in the nearness of danger. The present Home Rule Bill had never been seen by the electors of this country and yet it would revolutionise the constituent parts of the United Kingdom. It embodied a policy twice rejected by the electorate and one disapproved by the majority of the English electors. It imposed new financial obligations upon the people of this country, and was believed by a great many of the best judges to be an unworkable measure, "and any one who has taken the trouble to read the Reports of the Primrose Committee will remain of that opinion."

"Exclusion"

Lord Lansdowne reviewed the military situation in Ulster and discussed the proposed federal solution, repeating his former opinion:

If the complete exclusion of Ulster were to be offered to us; if it were to be accompanied, as it must be accompanied, by a consequential alteration and revision of the present Bill; if it were accompanied, as I think it must also be accompanied, by new precautions for safeguarding the interests of those

Unionists who do not happen to be within the excluded area, then I am prepared to consider, subject, of course, to such matters as the drafting of the clause and so forth—I am prepared to consider a proposal of that kind. And for this reason only—not that I like it on its merits, but because it seems to me, at any rate, preferable to the Bill now before Parliament and preferable to the other and much more dire alternative of civil war.

After dismissing the so-called Colonial precedents, Lord Lansdowne ended by pressing his demand for a General Election. "Whatever your scheme is, in whatever garb you propose to dress your Home Rule policy, send it to the people and ask them what they think about it." Past experience negatived the suggestion that anything serious would happen in Ireland in the event of the defeat of Home Rule at the polls, which appears to be about the last semblance of an argument left to bankrupt Separatism. As Lord Lansdowne observed: "Home Rule was dangled before the Nationalists in 1886 and 1893. In spite of that, when the present Government came into office in 1906 the Chief Secretary announced that he had found Ireland more calm and contented than, I think, for the last 600 years, or something of that kind. And Ireland remained calm and contented without Home Rule between 1906 and 1910, and she would be calm and contented at this moment had you not made this proposal. The mischief arose at that disastrous moment when, in circumstances often referred to, you became unwilling converts to Home Rule." There is, as already pointed out, every reason to believe that a bargain was struck between hostile sections of the Coalition in 1910 and in all probability Mr. Redmond possesses some document in the handwriting of Mr. Asquith or some agent of Mr. Asquith, the publication of which, in the event of the Radical Party betraying Home Rule, would be not less damaging than some of the Marconi disclosures. Mr. Bonar Law has more than once hinted at a written compact, and as a Scotsman he is anything but rash. Lord Lansdowne recalled certain suggestive utterances at the date of this deal. In April 1910, Mr. Clancy, a prominent Irish Nationalist, said:

I rise on behalf of the Party with which I am connected to say that we intend to vote for the second reading of the Bill (the Finance Bill, *i.e.* Mr. Lloyd George's People's Budget)—and I may say at once that the reason why I do so and why we do so is entirely unconnected with the merits or demerits of the Bill. I frankly confess that up to a recent date I felt convinced that we should be obliged to take an opposite

course, but happily we find ourselves in a position to take the course which I have announced. The unmistakable declaration of the Prime Minister on Thursday night has in my opinion completely altered the situation.

Mr. Hobhouse, now the Postmaster-General, *vice* Mr. Herbert Samuel, promoted or deposed as the case may be, used these words at about the same date. "Next year we must pay our debts to the Nationalist members who were good enough to vote for a Budget they detested and knew would be an injury to their country." That is the genesis of the Home Rule Bill which has brought this country to the verge of civil war. The Opposition should long since have demanded the impeachment of Mr. Asquith for the traitor that he is—some of them prefer dining or golfing with him.

"A Second Poland"

We need not trouble the reader with the oily optimism of Lord Haldane, who spoke "as per usual." The more or less unreported Back Bench Peers are infinitely more interesting at a crisis, for the simple reason that they mean what they say and say what they mean, especially those who come from Ireland. Moreover they usually take much less than an hour to say it, unlike the typical Front Bencher, who regards anything shorter as *infra dig.* Lord Oranmore and Browne reminded the House that this was not only an Ulster question, and when he heard the official speeches he asked whether the Unionists of the south and west were to be sacrificed "at this unholy altar of compromise." The exclusion of Ulster was no alternative to a General Election, though Unionists in the south and west might be no worse off, but better off if Ulster were excluded, as the Nationalist spider would do her best to attract the Ulster fly into her web, and there would be ample hostages in the north for making the position more secure in the south. Moreover the Nationalists were not likely to accept such an arrangement without a largely increased subsidy, which would render it less necessary for them to levy vindictive taxation. It would not be a very agreeable fate, but it would be enviable compared to their condition should the present Home Rule Bill become law. If they agreed to abide by the result of a General Election, would the Nationalists also be prepared to abide by it? If the country decided against

them the Unionists of the south and west would have no option but to accept the verdict, and Ulster Unionists would find it difficult to maintain their present attitude. Lord Massereene pointed out what cannot be emphasised too often, however much it may be resented by the majority of the modern Peerage who capitulated in 1911, that the present crisis was due to the Parliament Act. Lord Wicklow affirmed that though Irish loyalists in the south and west were unable to organise they detested Home Rule as much as Ulster Unionists, and probably had more to fear from the measure than anybody else. Lord Clanwilliam, in an able and effective speech, insisted that should the Government persist in their plans Ulster would become "a second Poland." Lord Stanhope, who has early acquired the ear of the House of Lords owing to his knowledge, industry, and courage, happily described the attitude of Irishmen towards Home Rule by a story he had from a friend in the south of Ireland, who asked one of his tenants: "I suppose you are in favour of Home Rule?" The answer was characteristic: "Well, you see, sir, Home Rule is like Heaven. We all want to get there, but when it gets near we want to put it off for a while." Although Peers had no constituencies they had consciences, and they could not seriously believe that the exclusion of Ulster offered any prospect of lasting settlement. Not one honest man imagined that Home Rule would bring either peace or prosperity to Ireland, and in any event neither House of Parliament had any right to carry a great constitutional change without being absolutely convinced of the approval of the nation.

Ulster Covenant

Lord Crawford, better known as Lord Balcarres, who, though his lot has been cast among Mandarins, is something more than a Mandarin, delivered a vigorous attack on the Government policy, miserably reported in that portion of the Unionist Press which appears to hold a permanent brief for the Ministry. He called attention not only to the rigorous search for arms imported into the north of Ireland as contrasted with the indifference to a similar importation in the south and west, while he declared that "letters passing through the post to well-known persons in Ulster were opened, and there was a regular system of espionage"—exactly what one would expect under the Samuelian regime. Lord

Crawford's indictment of the Post Office was not disposed of by the artless assertion of Lord Beauchamp—who is, we believe, a Cabinet Minister—that the accusation was "new to him." Many things are doubtless new to Lord Beauchamp which are stale to other people. Lord Arran, whose admirable protests against any violation of the Ulster Covenant, by whomsoever they may be, have been read with approval by our readers this winter, reiterated his protest against any such betrayal. "If Ulster remained true to herself and elected to sink or swim with the remainder of Ireland, there remained no choice for the Government but dissolution or civil war." As the text of the covenant cannot be too widely known we reproduce it as a reminder to any weaklings, if there be such, who might be disposed to take their oath lightly.

OATH OF ULSTER COVENANTORS

Being convinced in our consciences that Home Rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster, as well as of the whole of Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious feeling, destructive of our citizenship, and perilous to the unity of the Empire, we, whose names are underwritten, men of Ulster, loyal subjects of H.M. King George V, humbly relying on the God whom our fathers in days of stress and trial confidently trusted, do hereby pledge ourselves in solemn covenant throughout this our time of threatened calamity to stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our children our cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom *and in using all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland*. And in the event of such a Parliament being thrust upon us, we further solemnly and mutually pledge ourselves to resist its authority. In sure confidence that God will defend the right, we hereto subscribe our names. And further we individually declare that we have not already signed this covenant.

Lord Roberts' Declaration

The third day's Debate in the House of Lords, though largely absorbed by Front Benchers, was nevertheless rendered memorable by the declaration of Lord Roberts, which was the most pregnant and much the shortest contribution to the discussion. "I am glad to have an opportunity to state that I entirely endorse the letter

which Lord Wolseley wrote to the Duke of Cambridge in 1893. It is unthinkable that the British Army should be called upon to fight against the Ulster volunteers. As Lord Wolseley said in his letter, to do so would ruin the British Army." As a large section of the Radical Party work year in year out by day and by night to cripple the British Navy and to destroy the British Army, it has often occurred to us that one of the greatest attractions of Home Rule to the National Suicide Club is that it is the surest way of wrecking our Army and of destroying the discipline of the Fleet, thus rendering Germany's task infinitely easier than it is already. We should never forget, if we would understand the present political situation, that the Radical Party is largely inspired and still more largely financed by aliens, many of German extraction, who regard themselves as a sort of Advance Guard for the Fatherland, and who under the hypocritical pretext of a love of peace seek to disarm us in order to facilitate German aggrandisement. After some curious arithmetic from Lord Macdonnell, whose unfortunate record in Ireland will not soon be forgotten, apparently designed to show that the main object of establishing Nationalist Government in Dublin was to increase the number of official billets allotted to Protestants, Lord Ampthill restated with that convincing sincerity of which we have had striking and triumphant testimony this month, the impossibility of any compromise being attempted by any group of politicians without the country being consulted. Politicians must sometimes come back to first principles, and no Unionist can afford to forget that Unionism means the maintenance of the Union which cannot be undermined or whittled away without a gross breach of faith and an outrage against constitutional government, a very negation of democracy, and a dangerous usurpation by politicians of sovereign Power. "Let the compromise, if one was found, be discussed openly and on the understanding that when it had been agreed to by the parties to it the people would be consulted at a General Election." The Duke of Bedford, a thoughtful man of natural independence who is always worth hearing and has made a special study of military questions, described the actual situation in Ireland and in Great Britain which has been forgotten by some of our controversialists. The British

Army this spring would number 100,000 men and boys, mostly boys, over which Ulster would have a great advantage because whereas the Regular Army was scattered over the United Kingdom, the hundred thousand volunteers were all in Ulster. This is indeed the nemesis of anti-militarism as embodied in the Haldane policy of talking big about a Nation in Arms, while reducing the number of men under arms. The Duke of Bedford declared that after providing for all the garrisons and the defence of Great Britain and allowing for the inevitable waste, the Government could not dispatch a force of more than 10,000 men.

Sir Edward Grey had told them that the Government meant to meet violence with violence. What were they going to do with the garrison which they had in Belfast? It was quite a small garrison—only one brigade. It was quite obvious that that brigade would have to surrender. That would be disastrous. If it were withdrawn, Belfast would be left in the possession of Ulster. They could not hope to overawe Ulster with anything less than four mobilised Divisions, and he doubted whether the Government were ready to mobilise the Army for that purpose. Again it was obvious that if they sent troops to Ulster they could only send them for one purpose—to take action against Ulster. There they ran the risk of making an explosion that would be felt not only in Ireland but all over the British Empire. He was himself a member of the British League for the Support of Ulster. He felt it his duty to stand by Ulster, come what may, provided the Bill was not submitted to the country.

A PLAIN statement of fact like this closing with such a declaration is worth floods of oratory to a nation threatened with civil war.

Government Defeat

Lord Clonbrock associated himself with the protest against the exclusion of Ulster and the abandonment of Southern Unionists. Lord Sydenham, better known to the public as Sir George Clarke, a man of strong Liberal proclivities without being a hidebound partisan, declared that he had never taken part in Party politics, but in his view Ulster would not voluntarily accept the present Home Rule Bill, adding "we could not use force to coerce them. He did not mean physically it was impossible. . . . It was physically easy, but the moral law was higher than the physical law, and they all knew in their hearts they could not coerce Ulster by military force." Therefore the Bill as it stood "was already dead." The speaker suggested the usual three courses, namely to federalise the Bill, or to drop the Bill in favour of some settlement by consent, or thirdly to revive the Councils

Bill of 1901 "which was a real measure of devolution." It was indeed to devolution that Lord Sydenham pinned his faith, and though we do not agree with devolutionists any more than with federalisers, they are entitled to be heard and their testimony is valuable as demonstrating the irretrievable ruin of Home Rule. In a spirited speech Lord Farnham dwelt on the changed tone of the Government since last year when they used to be told that there was no opposition to Home Rule outside Ulster and that Ulster opposition was confined to individual and Orange bigots. Ministers now knew that besides having to "toe the line" they had been tricked all along by their master, who had persuaded them that there was no serious opposition to Home Rule in Ireland. Their Bill was looked upon in one part of the country with armed hostility and with suspicion and doubt elsewhere. They were now trying to trick the Opposition into accepting the principle of Home Rule. "It would be a great triumph for the Ancient Order of Hibernians when they forced the English whom they hated to use the soldiers whom they loathed to shoot down the loyal garrison in Ulster whom they could neither buy nor overcome." Lord Farnham described the position of Ulster as perfectly clear. "They said now, as they had always said, that they were prepared to resort to arms rather than submit to the Dublin Parliament. The Government had only three courses open :

(1) To attempt to put down Ulster by force ;
(2) To exclude Ulster from the Bill ;
(3) To appeal to the people.

The last was the only course which had any chance of leading to a permanent settlement of the question, and it was the only one which could commend itself to the Unionist Party." Lord Leitrim asked the pertinent question as to why, if Ministers believed in Home Rule *per se*, they did not bring it forward during the period when they had a large majority in the House of Commons irrespective of the Nationalist Party. It was only when they lost their independence that they took up this question, which was only urgent in the sense that it was urgent to keep Ministers in office. Lord Farnham added that it should please the Lord Chancellor (Lord Haldane) to see the

military organisation of Ulster which was in every sense Territorial. The attitude of these gallant men was responsible for the change in the tone and atmosphere of both Houses of Parliament in the present Home Rule Debates. Lord Curzon wound up on behalf of the Opposition, and Lord Crewe on behalf of the Government, the former speaking with his usual oratorical skill and the latter with his customary ineptitude. If we do not dwell upon these speeches it is because they have already been set forth *verbatim et literatim* in the Press and, as we have said before, the utterances of unprofessional politicians are more interesting at a grave crisis. On a division, Lord Midleton's amendment to the Address was carried by the adequate majority of nearly five to one, namely 243 to 55.

In the Commons

WE cannot deluge our readers with Parliamentary Debates, of which the past month has provided a plethora. The Opposition in the House of Commons followed the same course as in the House of Lords, Mr. Long being the mover of a similar amendment to that of Lord Midleton demanding an immediate dissolution, which he proposed in a clear and forcible speech, though it was not free from the Front Bench failing of taking the other Front Bench much too seriously, and treating Artful Dodgers, Dundee Windbags, Callous Cynics, and the rest of the *posse comitatus* who make up the great Ministry of Mendacity and Mountebanks as "responsible statesmen" open to argument and appeal when all their thoughts are concentrated on the continuance of their salaries. The trickster at the head of our Marconi Ministry was as ponderous, and what the Lobby gossips call as "impressive," as ever. Time will show whether he succeeded in making a fool of his political opponents, many of whom, it must be confessed, "ask for it." The flattery of sycophants and those unfortunate social amenities between the two Front Benches, of which the Radicals reap the exclusive profit, render it virtually impossible for a man in Mr. Asquith's position to know how he is regarded by the self-respecting part of his fellow countrymen, and so we find him interpolating in his speeches such an observation as the following: "Of course you may say if you like that I was speaking insincerely and dishonestly." (Roars of dissent from Unionist Mandarins.) As

though the present Prime Minister ever spoke otherwise than insincerely and dishonestly. There is not one single topic on the agenda of the day upon which he has not put his corrupting stigma, and if the Unionist Party are still prepared to swallow any statement, promise, pledge, assertion, asseveration not made on oath by the head of the Government, our Party may as well put up the shutters without further ado. No man has treated the Ulster movement both publicly and privately with greater contempt than Mr. Asquith, who has never been able to conceal his scorn for men prepared to make sacrifices even to the point of death for any cause in which they believe. If Ulster were inhabited by Asquiths there would have been no Ulster movement, as Asquiths are totally unable to conceive that there should exist anywhere on the face of the earth people so different from themselves as these dour, determined, unbending Covenanters, embracing every class of the community and not seeking any fee or reward for their exertions—considerations which alone stimulate Asquith activities.

Mr. Asquith

Mr. Asquith wearied his audience by reciting numerous extracts from former speeches designed to show that the Government secured a mandate in 1910 for promoting civil war in 1913, and he thought the occasion appropriate for an elaborate mot such as would doubtless sound well at the High Table of Balliol, or some other home of pedantry. "There is a story which is current in circles to which hon. gentlemen opposite belong that we in the course of that election indulged in a gigantic system of mystification. I do not think that in all the annals of anthropology there has ever been a case in which a myth has so quickly crystallised into a creed." Then came the usual by-election arithmetic with the usual omission of seats lost by the Government, and after much more of the same sorry stuff he came to the point of the amendment with its demand for a dissolution which *ex hypothesi* would prevent the country from concentrating upon the Irish question. But if the electors cannot concentrate upon the Irish question at the next election, how can they be represented to have concentrated on the Irish question at the last election, at which " Down with the Lords " was the

main issue, understood, be it remembered, as an undertaking to replace the hereditary House by a reformed House—one of many Ministerial promises still unfulfilled. The objections to a General Election were, apart from this inability to concentrate, which is a new democratic doctrine, that in the first place it would be an admission on the part of the House of Commons that so far as Home Rule was concerned "the Parliament Act was an absolute nullity. That stands to demonstration." There were only three conceivable results, namely, a stalemate or even division between the Parties, or a Unionist victory which would not end the Irish difficulty. Thirdly, and it was significant that Mr. Asquith put this possibility last, Ministers might obtain another majority, and what would be the situation.

Is Ulster going to lay down her arms and acquiesce? I should be very much surprised to hear an affirmative answer from those who represent her, and I will say this. In logic why should they? For once, I think they would be logical, because, of course, they would say, believing as they say they do—and I am quite prepared to credit them with being perfectly sincere—that the grant of Home Rule to Ireland means oppression, the sacrifice of religious and political freedom to them, why should they abandon that belief, because a certain number of British electors, imperfectly informed and interested in a number of subjects like the Insurance Act, the land problem, and Tariff Reform resolve to put a Liberal Government into power. And then, what about the British Unionists? . . . What would be their attitude if this prayer for a dissolution were granted and we came back again? Would they acquiesce in the passing of the Government of Ireland Bill?

SIR EDWARD CARSON: Would you acquiesce in dropping Home Rule if we came back?

Like many other people Mr. Asquith finds it easier to ask than to answer questions, and could only feebly retort that the positions were different. "They (the Unionists) have got control, at the other end of this corridor, of another Chamber; we have not." Therefore he repeated his question: "Supposing a dissolution were to result in a majority for the present Government and its policy, have we any guarantee—can you give us any guarantee?—that the measure approved by the electors would pass into law? Observe that when I say 'pass into law' I mean pass into law, not so disfigured and mutilated and emasculated that it is a totally different thing to that which the electors approved. I do not believe any such guarantee can be given. I should be the last person to blame the right hon. gentlemen who sit upon the Bench

opposite if they refused to give it." One may even say that Mr. Asquith would be appalled at any such undertaking because it would rob him of the last shadow of a pretext for declining a dissolution, and dissolution is the one governing dread—unless, as we pointed out on a previous page, a greater dread supervenes —of the present Government, not merely because it involves the risk of those salaries which play a dominating part in the lives of "nuts," but also because something was put on paper in 1910 which delivered the Coalition Cabinet tied and bound to the Molly Maguires, who have as complete control of their destinies as the larger Marconi interests had control of their destinies at another stage.

A Bogus Pacifist

Mr. Asquith may be described as the permanent "prisoner" of one or other section of his Party, and no one can understand the present situation or any of the preposterous things that are done unless he realises the full meaning of the sinister term which the Chancellor of the Exchequer is so ready to apply to dukes, and which is the only accurate description of the present regime, namely, "Government by Blackmail." Therefore as even Mr. Asquith can no longer shut his eyes to the fact that the Home Rule Bill is a Civil War Bill, while he is debarred from facing the dread alternative of a dissolution, he comes forward in the new rôle of peacemaker—a bogus Pacifist.

I invite the assent of the House, and, if I may say so, even of hon. gentlemen opposite, that if this matter is to be settled—and nobody is more desirous than I am that it should be settled—by something in the nature of general agreement, it would be much better settled than by a dissolution, here and now. Allusions are made in the gracious Speech from the Throne to conversations which have taken place during the autumn and winter between political leaders. These conversations were and must remain, in the strictest sense, under the seal of confidence, because except under such a seal conversations of that kind are obviously impossible: and in anything I say now, or hereafter, as to the settlement of this matter, I must not be taken as referring, and I shall not refer in any way to what may or may not have passed between myself and the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Bonar Law).

Mr. Asquith added: "There was one satisfactory feature—I am not sure that the Leader of the Opposition will not agree

with me—there was one satisfactory feature, at any rate, of these conversations, and it was this: that the Press of this country was without a single exception absolutely and entirely at sea from beginning to end as to what was and what was not going on." Mr. Asquith is evidently not a reader of the *Morning Post*, or even he would scarcely have dared to make that statement. Though he was very proud of the opportunity of conversing with Mr. Bonar Law, the Prime Minister could not pretend that any "definite results" had been reached, for which relief much thanks, as we can imagine what those "definite results" might have been, and it is something to know that so far the pass has not been sold by one Front Bench to another. We distrust and dislike any confidential relations, conversations, communications, negotiations, conferences, or whatever they may be called, between two parties who meet on unequal terms. Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law are more or less masters in their own house, although in the case of anything really outrageous their mastery could be successfully challenged. But Mr. Asquith is not even master in his own Cabinet, for the simple reason that he has no convictions or opinions upon any question, and even if he had effective control of his colleagues and could pledge them, all the world knows that he is kept in office on condition that he "toes the line" to Mr. John Redmond. Therefore any attempt at settlement between the leaders of the two Parties is absurd, because they occupy utterly unequal positions. One side might be able to deliver the goods, the other could not. We are in favour of deciding the question of Home Rule once and for all, here and now, by fighting to a finish, which must involve the total defeat of one or other Party. It would be worth while to run the risk of Home Rule ascendancy in order to secure the chance of destroying Home Rule.

Exploiting the King

MR. ASQUITH, who used to be so contemptuous of anybody who differed from him as to the ease of establishing a Parliament in Dublin "subject and subordinate to the Imperial Parliament," now deeply regrets that no agreement has yet been arrived at. "I do not despair at this moment of the possibility of an agreement. I think that

the language used in the Speech from the Throne is, if I may say so with respect, language that ought to find an echo in every quarter of the House, and, so far as I am concerned, speaking for myself and my colleagues, and I believe for my friends behind me, but certainly speaking for myself and my colleagues, I will use no last word in regard to this matter of settlement." Note the unblushing impudence with which the present Ministry exploit the Sovereign. Constitutionally, as we are for ever being informed, the Speech from the Throne is the handiwork of Ministers, so *ex hypothesi* Mr. Asquith is merely glorifying his own penmanship. Alternatively this particular paragraph which has attracted general attention through its unusual gravity and seeming sincerity proceeds from the Sovereign, on which assumption Mr. Asquith and his colleagues are prepared to use the personal opinions of the King as a lever for forcing his opponents into some kind of settlement. Is this constitutional? Before discussing this paragraph are we not entitled to know who is its real author? If it was written by Ministers it is not worth the paper on which it was written. But if it proceeds from the King it would be impossible to exaggerate its importance, for it is the first acknowledgment we have from the present Government that the King after all is not a cipher, but a factor, and a decisive factor, at this great crisis in the fate of the country. That being so the petition for a Dissolution before Civil War becomes more irresistible than ever, and outside the ranks of place-at-any-price politicians it is impossible to find any one who does not devoutly hope that his Majesty will assert himself to the extent of refusing to countenance civil war without the express sanction of his people. The *Daily Express* has done a great work in promoting this petition as also in killing Lloyd Georgeism by ridicule. Mr. Asquith concluded his windy oration by talking all round the Ulster question without saying anything in particular or committing his colleagues, who, as we know, are not free agents in the matter, his sole object being to secure another pause or truce at a critical moment in the fortunes of the Government, when the co-operation of the Opposition is required to vote the necessary supplies to carry on the Government, a fact of which Unionist leaders appear to be unconscious, or they would not so readily walk into a palpable

trap. The Prime Minister professed to "recognise to the full, as the situation has developed, that we cannot divest ourselves of responsibility in this matter, and by responsibility I mean the responsibility of initiative in the way of suggestion." The right reply is that as Ministers have brought the country to the verge of civil war and there is no escape for them from an impossible impasse, they should be left to stew in their own juice. Mr. Asquith permitted himself to say, as though he were master of the situation and not his master's voice: "I must make it perfectly clear that, in the first place, whatever steps we take in the way of suggestion must not be construed and cannot fairly be construed—there is not a man on this bench who would not repudiate that construction—as an admission on our part that a Bill which has twice received the assent of this House is a defective Bill." On the contrary it is "a sound statesmanlike and workable measure . . . which provides and was honestly intended to provide, and, as we believe, has adequately provided, against the dangers either of religious or political oppression," &c. Yet this perfect Bill would appear in the interests of peace to be relegated to a state of suspended animation, though its temporary postponement is merely one of those dirty tricks with which the name of Asquith will be for all time associated. It is "as the price of peace that any suggestion we make will be put forward."

End of an Imposture

At last the head of the Government is forced to admit what we have contended throughout from the very first moment that Sir Edward Carson and his friends began the organisation of the Provisional Government in Ireland, that Home Rule brings not peace but a sword. Thus ends the greatest political imposture of our time. "Every one of us must desire to avoid civil war and bloodshed and there is nothing we will not do consistent with the maintenance of our fundamental principles in regard to the solution of this question to avoid that terrible calamity. But I read the term peace and the expression pacific settlement in a larger and wider sense, and I cannot but think that it must be within the resources of British statesmanship, which has already solved so many

problems as intractable and as formidable in dimensions as this is in all parts of the world and under the most diverse conditions." There was plenty more verbiage about an "insolvency of statesmanship," and "honest mind," "goodwill," no "undue delay," but as was anticipated by all Unionists who do not live for the purpose of being made fools of by the other side there were no positive proposals, and the "new atmosphere" out of which Radicals and mugwumps are making some capital at pending by-elections without very brilliant results, is a mere figment of the imagination. As Mr. Asquith ingenuously observed, "There are certain financial exigencies which we are obliged to dispose of in order to keep within the law before we can make any real progress." In some dim and distant future "suggestions which will certainly be honestly put forward and which we believe will be regarded by all fair-minded men as, at any rate, an attempt—a serious attempt—to arrive at an agreement in this matter which will consult not only the interests but the susceptibilities of all concerned." Our Panama Premier, the embodiment of insincerity, had the effrontery to add, "I have seldom said anything with more sincere conviction in this House than when I say that, so far as I and my colleagues are concerned, we will not close the avenue—however unpromising for the moment entrance upon it may appear—which directly or indirectly holds out the hope of leading to concord and to settlement." Mr. Austen Chamberlain concluded an able restatement of the Unionist position by demanding two plain answers to two plain questions. "It is not a time for holding things back and manœuvring. It is a time for taking the House of Commons and the people into your confidence and dealing frankly and fairly with all who are concerned. I ask two questions. There is no difficulty about answering them. Are you prepared to exclude Ulster? Did the Prime Minister mean that he would exclude Ulster or did he not? And the second question I put is: Will you secure to Ulster the same rights, privileges, and duties as are enjoyed by Great Britain?" The speaker did not recognise the exclusion of Ulster as a settlement of the Irish question as it did not make the Bill any juster or fairer to the loyalists of the south and west, or more safe or prudent for

Great Britain, adding: "I think that the exclusion of Ulster would have one positive advantage, that it would be a statutory denial and negation of the claim of Ireland to be regarded as an independent nation." One of the innumerable lawyers who are as thick as leaves in Vallombrosa in the present Cabinet, Sir John Simon, the successor of Sir Rufus Isaacs, opened the adjourned Debate the following day (February 11) with one of his smooth and specious speeches which never carry any controversy any further and are only designed to leave the impression that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds so long as we are ruled by forensic talent, a precisely opposite opinion to that held by the mass of the community.

Dwindling Marconi Majority

HAPPILY Sir Edward Carson, though himself a lawyer, possibly because he is a lawyer and is up to all the tricks of his great Trade Union, is taken in neither by Asquithese nor Simonese, and in his blunt human manner came straight to the point. Ministers were merely manœuvring for position. They were attempting to create by empty generalities "an atmosphere of reasonableness, knowing well that in a case of this kind we can deal with nothing until we come down to the concrete ground and find ourselves faced with actual proposals in black and white." The position of Irish Unionists was intolerable; they were to stay quietly and patiently and vote the Estimates, the pay of the Army, which was to be concentrated on the coercion of Ulster.

> The position becomes daily more intolerable and difficult in Ulster itself, where there are increasing sacrifices from day to day made not by great or rich men, but more and more by the democracy, whose whole minds are turned practically upon nothing else but this question, whom at all events you ought to have some consideration for and not say "You men of Ulster remain quiet and be quite satisfied, for when we have done our necessary financial business we will see what we can do to relieve ourselves from the grave difficulties that face us in the future." The financial business need not be interrupted. There is only one way that I know in which you can put these proposals into the Bill. At all events it is a way: that is, by an amending Bill. Put your amending Bill on the Table of the House and let us have the proposals you propose to make, and we will consider them.

The Opposition should never depart from this impregnable position, and should not allow itself to be drawn into the discussion of some future mirage, for if the Government is honest—a grotesque supposition we grant—they could put down their plan to-day just as well as any other day. As Sir Edward Carson, who is always on the bull's eye, observed: "They are always talking of concessions to Ulster. Ulster is not asking for concessions. Ulster is asking to be left alone." He might even have added: "Ireland is asking to be left alone." Many Nationalists so-called regard the prospect of government by the Ancient Order of Hibernians, which would be the quintessence of Tammany Hall with almost as much repugnance as the men of Ulster regard the Molly Maguires. There we can leave the Debate on Mr. Long's amendment, which was rejected by something less than the usual mechanical majority, namely, 333 to 255—majority 78. Mr. Bonar Law concluded one of his most searching and powerful speeches by reminding Ministers that they could not escape their responsibility. "If you go on there will inevitably be bloodshed in Ulster, and then, whatever you may think now, there must be an appeal to the people, and how will they regard you? You who have brought about that bloodshed because you preferred to face civil war rather than face the people. In my belief, and I do not believe there is a man on that Bench (*i.e.* the Government Bench) who differs from me, if that happened your Party would not be defeated, it would be annihilated." Their speeches showed that Ministers knew "that the game is up." Their present policy is impossible, and they have no alternative but to placate Ulster by drastic amendment or submit themselves to the judgment of the people. We go a step further and say that Dissolution is the only remedy for any Government in the plight to which our Panama politicians have reduced themselves.

Mexico

ALTHOUGH large discounts are necessary on all news from Mexico owing to the great financial interests strongly represented in the Press on both sides of the Atlantic which are anxious to use British policy to force American hands—at whatever cost to Anglo-American

relations—it would be idle and mischievous to attempt to disguise the seriousness of the situation. The Mexican crisis is drifting towards that dangerous condition when peace may be at the mercy of an incident, as, for example, on the eve of the American war in Cuba. The "court martial" and "execution" of Mr. Benton, a British subject, by a guerilla leader, General Villa, a protégé of the United States, wears a sinister aspect which is not lessened by the optimistic helplessness of Sir Edward Grey. Mexico has been the grave of many hopes and of not a few reputations.

THE NAVY, PARLIAMENT, AND THE NATION

Because this realm of ours is rent with internal discord, none the less real though the surface remain at present comparatively calm, the question of the maintenance of the Fleet becomes the more important. As matters stand, the nation is ignorant of what are the requirements of the Navy, both now and for the future. The naval policy of the Government, according to the official statements of the First Lord, is based upon a system of percentages, so bewildering, subject to so many qualifications, and bearing so little apparent relation to the actual requirements of Imperial defence as a whole, that the public have long ago given up trying to understand it. The naval policy of the Opposition does not exist. With the exception of a limited protest, itself calculated to help the Government out of difficulties created entirely by their own maladministration, and made during the latest "panic" in 1909, the Unionist Party have virtually acquiesced in the Radical conduct of naval affairs. They have had seven years in which to develop a naval policy and a naval standard based on Imperial requirements, and they have done nothing. For, the recent Front-Bench declaration that the policy of the Unionist Party consisted in "a standard of two keels to one as against the next strongest Power," really means nothing; since it is founded on no intelligible principle, has no beginning, and, under existing conditions, is impossible to carry into execution. In the same breath, Mr. Churchill is promised the support of the Unionist Party "if he did his full duty."

Politically, that is the situation. A more ridiculous posture of affairs never existed. It is a pity that politics and the Navy should ever be associated; but under the system of governance prevailing at present that association is inevitable. It is an

avowed Liberal principle to reduce expenditure upon armaments, irrespective of all other considerations. In other words, it is a Party principle. It is therefore foolish to pretend that the Navy is "not a Party question." The Unionist principle used to be to maintain naval defence at an adequate standard, irrespective of expenditure; the theory being that a sufficient naval defence was the essential condition of the national existence. Unionists, however, abandoned that principle when, in view of an approaching General Election, they made large reductions, both in future requirements and in present necessities, in the Estimates for 1905–1906. They have since alleged that it was their duty to refrain from criticising the naval policy of the Government, because to criticise it would be to drag the Navy into Party politics. Of course they would be accused of so doing; but that is another matter. The result is that the very large number of people in this country who care very little for politics but a great deal for the right organisation of the Fleet have dismissed the Unionist Party from their calculations.

A by-product of this singular confusion is the attempt being made by a clique to retain the present First Lord of the Admiralty permanently in his present position. Fulsome eulogies of Mr. Churchill appear in what are or have been known as Unionist newspapers. Other journals amiably suggest that Mr. Churchill should be elected leader of "a National Party," whatever that may be. Front-Bench Unionists declare that Mr. Churchill must be "supported." Against whom? The First Lord is a member of the Cabinet, and so long as he remains a member of the Cabinet, he represents the Government, which shares his responsibility. To support Mr. Churchill is therefore to support the Government. Or do Mr. Churchill's Unionist friends intend to "support" Mr. Churchill against that section of the Radical Party, led by a few rich aliens, which is making a good deal of noise about the Estimates? It is very kind of the Unionists, but they need not be alarmed.

But what is much more important than the Unionist politicians in Parliament is that the public should be precisely informed of the truth about the Navy. The question is not whether Mr. Churchill is "a strong man," or "a misguided patriot,"

or any other kind of foolishness, but what he has done, is doing, and proposes to do. In March of 1912, and subsequently, the First Lord made certain definite statements of naval policy. The first thing to ascertain is what these are. The second, what they involve.

The statements of requirements are as follows:

"The British programme, as revised, of the six years under review—1912–13 to 1917–18—will aggregate twenty-five ships against fourteen (of Germany). Nine of those British vessels have already (1913) been laid down and sixteen remain to be built. Germany has begun five of her programme and nine remain. Two ships will be added to this total for every extra vessel laid down by Germany. *Additional* to this total will be any ships which we may have to build in consequence of new naval developments in the Mediterranean."

Mr. Churchill also stated that *additional* to this total would be the *Malaya* (contributed by the Malay States), and the three proposed Canadian ships, which were necessary. And he stated that the margin over Germany must be 60 per cent. of heavy ships, of which 10 per cent. would be regarded as available, not for Germany, but for a "world-wide defence," which expression presumably includes the Mediterranean. Upon another occasion Mr. Churchill said that "our position in the Mediterranean must remain one of national and international importance, and we shall maintain it there, both on land and sea, to as full an extent as we have ever done in the past."

So far the statement is fairly explicit. It sounds well; it breathes determination. But what does it involve? The Estimates of 1914–15 must provide for the needs of 1917. Taking Mr. Churchill's own statement, let us see for what they must provide. In making the necessary calculations, it is assumed that the battle-cruiser *Australia* is omitted as being the property of the Commonwealth.

First, with regard to Germany alone. In the spring of 1917, Germany will have, under the ordinary law, twenty-seven battleships, and one "amendment" ship: total, twenty-eight. Therefore Great Britain should have a 60 per cent. superiority over the twenty-seven, and a 100 per cent. over the one: total, forty-

five. Excluding the *Malaya* and *New Zealand*, the case stands as follows:

Battleships	
At present built, building, or sanctioned	39
Proposed programme 1914–15	4
	43

As it is practically certain that no more than four ships will be ordered this year, the result is two battleships short. Including the *Malaya* and *New Zealand*, contrary to the official statement with regard to the *Malaya* and to fair dealing with the Dominion New Zealand in the case of the ship of that name, the number is made up to the 60 per cent. total, forty-five. Only, therefore, by an alteration of the official programme, can the standard be attained. But we are not considering alterations, but what is involved in the programme.

As the *Malaya* and *New Zealand* [a] are not to be included, and as the proposed Canadian ships [b] are stated to be required, the case stands as follows:

	Battleships
Required by Spring of 1917:	
Sixty per cent. and 100 per cent. superiority over Germany	45
Actually in view for Spring of 1917	43
Balance of requirements for Spring 1917:	
[a] Two battleships (instead of *Malaya* and *New Zealand*)	2
[b] Three battleships instead of three Canadian ships	3
Total	5

So far, then, on Mr. Churchill's own showing, we are five battleships short. But the First Lord also stated that a Fleet was to be placed in the Mediterranean, which shall be as powerful as any British Fleet ever stationed there, and that an Imperial squadron was to be based upon Gibraltar, consisting of the *New Zealand*, the *Malaya*, and the three proposed Canadian ships. The complete programme thus stands as follows:

Required by Spring of 1917	Battleships
In Home waters, 50 per cent. superiority over Germany	42
Mediterranean Fleet, to match Italy and Austria	17
Imperial Squadron based on Gibraltar	5
	64

Actually in view for Spring of 1917:

In Home waters, 50 per cent. superiority over Germany	42
Mediterranean Fleet, balance after providing 50 per cent. over Germany	1
Imperial squadron, *Malaya* and *New Zealand*	2
Deficiency	19
	45

The result shows that on Mr. Churchill's reckoning, this country will be nineteen battleships short in 1917. But as capital ships are useless without cruisers, and torpedo craft, to the seventeen battleships required in the Mediterranean, and to the Imperial squadron at Gibraltar, should be added:

Mediterranean, cruisers	34
,, 2 destroyer flotillas	24
Imperial squadron, 1 destroyer flotilla	12
	70 vessels.

Mr. Churchill's statement, literally interpreted, thus involves, this year, the ordering of nineteen additional battleships, thirty-four additional cruisers, and thirty-six additional destroyers, a total of eighty-nine vessels. He could not, of course, obtain them even if he tried.

Why, then, did he make the statement?

There are only two answers to that question. One is that his estimate was wildly incorrect, the other is that he has utterly failed to provide for the security of the Empire. In either event, his incompetence is sufficiently proved.

The extent to which Mr. Churchill has actually carried his proposals into execution, assuming four battleships to be ordered in 1914–15, is the attainment of a 50 per cent. superiority over Germany, leaving the *Malaya* and *New Zealand*, and possibly one battleship as well, available for "world-wide defence." The whole calculation, of course, is reckoned in terms of "Dreadnoughts"; but that limitation is Mr. Churchill's own. It is not here suggested that his statement of naval requirements is adequate or inadequate; the point is, what it actually involves, as compared with what is actually being provided.

Hitherto, the First Lord's amazing divagations have been received by the Unionist Party with a kind of stupefied admiration.

Mr. Balfour did indeed once commit himself so far as to remark that he thought the margin was being cut a little fine. Apart from that harmless observation, there is nothing to be learned from the Unionist " leaders " except a kind of mechanical reiteration of the cryptic formula, two keels to one. Are Unionists seriously intending to demand either eleven or thirteen (according as the *Malaya* and *New Zealand* are excluded or included) additional battleships this year, besides the four ships understood to be promised? If not, what do they mean?

No situation could more vividly illustrate the extraordinary confusion of thought prevailing with regard to the maintenance of the first line of defence. It here falls to be observed that, had the shipbuilding programme published in 1909 at the request of the London Chamber of Commerce by Lord Charles Beresford been adopted, the present dangerous state of affairs would have been prevented. It was in no sense a Party proposal; being, in fact, majestically ignored by the Unionist Party. Had the Government accepted it, they would not only have placed naval defence on a sound basis but they would have saved the country money and themselves considerable embarrassment. The opportunity has gone for ever, and the Navy Estimates have risen, and will continue to rise, and the additional expenditure will not purchase the security which might have been bought for less money in 1909.

But Mr. Churchill's administration is not distinguished solely by the promulgation of delusive standards, false criteria, and promises made to be broken. Quite recently, in consequence of his flagrant interference with the discipline of the Fleet, the Sea Lords of the Admiralty made it a condition of their remaining in office that the First Lord should for the future refrain from a repetition of his conduct. During the discussion in the Press of a scandalous remark made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to a casual interviewer, Mr. Churchill was busy at the Admiralty cutting down the Estimates upon items of current expenditure, the principal item being coal. The results will be that the exercises and cruises of the Fleet will be curtailed; and there will be no naval manœuvres this year; although, it is said, there will be a Review; an old and a favourite device of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone to distract attention from other matters.

But, most important of all, there is Mr. Churchill's action with regard to oil-fuel for the Navy. Needless to say, the extraordinary developments of the oil-fuel mystery passed almost without comment by the Opposition; and the country is committed, not only to an expenditure defying calculation, but to the possibility, if not the certainty, of a large proportion of the active Fleet being immobilised shortly after the outbreak of war, for lack of oil.

The history of the introduction of oil-fuel into the Navy is curious. There is of course much connected with it not yet revealed. But the main facts are known. Experiments in burning oil-fuel in warships had been conducted for some years previous to 1904, when Sir John Fisher became First Sea Lord. In the same or the following year eight ocean-going destroyers and twelve torpedo boats were fitted to burn oil-fuel only. In 1906 and 1907 two large destroyers and twenty-four torpedo boats were so fitted. Then, for some unexplained reason, no boats were built to burn oil for about two years. In 1909, when Sir John Fisher retired, the building of oil-destroyers began again upon an extensive scale, and has continued since.

In 1912, for the 1912–13 Estimates, five battleships and eight light cruisers, and in the following year, eight more light cruisers were designed to burn oil-fuel only, without a word of explanation to Parliament. On July 30, 1912, Lord Fisher was appointed President of the Royal Commission on Oil Fuel. Observe the coincidence of the dates. Five capital ships and eight light cruisers had been ordered, to burn oil only, *before* the Royal Commission was appointed. But presumably the sole object of that Commission was to discover whether or not there was or might be sufficient oil available for the purpose. Nor was it that the subject had not been investigated. At least one report had previously been made to the Admiralty. The interim reports of the Royal Commission are kept secret. *But the ships are built.*

Last year, in introducing the Navy Estimates, Mr. Churchill announced (what had previously been published in the Press) that the price of oil was very high and that there were difficulties in obtaining it. He subsequently stated that the Admiralty actually proposed to acquire and to work oil-fields. So low has

Parliament fallen, that this amazing announcement was received by the House as a matter of course. Any one acquainted with the vast commercial interests of the oil syndicates may reckon for himself the amount of capital required for such an enterprise: say fifty millions for a beginning.

Shortly afterwards, the Admiralty gave orders that some forty torpedo-boats on the East Coast should be virtually taken out of active commission. The immobilisation has thus begun already. The inference is inevitable. It is that the Admiralty cannot obtain the supply of oil required for peace purposes and at the same time accumulate a war reserve. That is the most favourable inference. As a matter of fact, there is no certainty whatever that they can obtain a sufficient reserve or anything like it, although the flash-point has been reduced from 200° F., hitherto the recognised safety limit, to 150° F. A flotilla of twenty destroyers on manœuvres or exercises burns 1000 tons of oil a day. About one hundred and twenty destroyers and torpedo-boats are fitted to burn oil only. In the five new battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class designed to burn oil only, each ship would burn, upon a normal routine of cruising and manœuvres, about 20,000 tons a year.

The present price of oil is 90s. a ton, and the freight is not less than 40s. The cost per ton is therefore at least £5 10s. The cost of coal per ton is 14s. or 15s. The calorific value of oil as compared with coal is as 25 to 16. The coal is available in any quantity at Home. The oil is not available. There are five battleships, sixteen light cruisers, and about one hundred and twenty destroyers and torpedo-boats (of which some forty are already practically out of action) fitted or being fitted for oil only. That is the position.

Few things are more remarkable than the loud silence surrounding the oil mystery. Why was capital amounting to thirteen to fifteen millions sunk in vessels, excluding small craft, fitted to burn oil only, before there was any certainty, or even any probability, of the oil being obtainable, and before storage of sufficient capacity had been built? Why was this momentous change made in secret? Why was it made before the Royal Commission on Oil Fuel was even appointed? Why was Lord Fisher selected to preside over that Commission? Was Lord Murray furnished

with credentials by the Government on his Central American trip? Was he supplied with public money for the purpose of his negotiations? What will be done with five battleships and sixteen light cruisers if the oil for peace purposes and the larger amount for war purposes cannot be *obtained*? By what right did the Government enter upon this gigantic gamble without the consent of Parliament? How is it proposed to transport oil, which is contraband of war, across the seas in time of war?

These and other pertinent questions are elaborately avoided by the Press, with one or two exceptions, and by Parliament. The proposition set before a bewildered public is, not a thorough investigation of the oil transactions of the Government but, the suggestion that the Minister mainly responsible for them should be placed outside criticism and beyond removal.

Is it any wonder that the Navy Estimates should increase? Or that they should increase without any corresponding addition to fighting power?

Under the present Administration, the public are kept in ignorance of the requirements of Imperial defence. They are annually asked to vote huge sums of money; but as they are never informed of the principles of the organisation and distribution of the Fleet, they are quite unable to judge whether or not they are getting value for their money. The statement, explanatory of the Navy Estimates, annually issued explains nothing. The Estimates themselves are published in a form which is unintelligible to the layman. The First Lord's declarations of policy are irreconcilable with his practice. As, by virtue of successive Orders in Council, the First Lord is supreme at the Board of Admiralty, the public have no means of knowing whether or not his statements represent the opinion of his professional advisers. If those statements have the sanction of the Sea Lords, it would seem that their lordships hold very singular and highly variable views.

It would appear to be hardly worth while, under existing circumstances, to suggest that a Royal Commission should be appointed to enquire into the whole question of Imperial Naval Defence, and the system of administration at the Admiralty with regard to organisation for war. Nevertheless, there seems no other remedy for a very dangerous condition of affairs. Such

a Commission should include representatives of the Dominions; for it can hardly be doubted that, while with the co-operation of the Dominions it is possible to restore the supremacy of British sea-power, without such co-operation it is impossible. There is, first of all, the question of the naval bases and naval stations abroad, dismantled by the present Government. In default of their restoration, the action of the Fleet in distant waters would be seriously crippled. There is the question of the proper utilisation of the older valuable ships possessed by this country laid up and officially stated to be "obsolescent." Money which is saved in their maintenance in commission is spent on new ships, so that the fighting strength of the Navy remains numerically the same. It would be perfectly possible to equip a sufficient Fleet for the Mediterranean at this moment with ships now rusting in harbour, if there were enough officers and men to furnish them withal.

Such an Imperial Commission would deal with the question of properly protecting the trade routes. Above all, it would formulate a definite and an intelligible standard of naval strength. The present Government have of course refused to hold another conference on naval affairs with the Dominions; with the result that Australia and New Zealand are creating independent navies. They will never return to the old system. But, together with Canada and South Africa, they might very well consent to adopt a new system. A suggestion with regard to formulating a new system was admirably presented not long ago by Lieutenant Hordern, R.N., in the course of a paper read before the Royal United Services Institution. Briefly, the proposal was that an Imperial Board of Admiralty should be constituted, whose business should be solely organisation for war; and that the business of supply should be conducted by a Navy Board in each country.

The alternative is to continue the government of the Navy by political intrigue, with its accompaniments of periods of dangerous reductions followed by panic and wasteful expenditure; a system which may be briefly described as paying for what you do not get and which will end either in bankruptcy or in catastrophe. But probably the catastrophe will precede the bankruptcy. In the meantime, up go the taxes. Also the price of oil.

DREADNOUGHT

THE DEAD HAND OF FEDERALISM

Of all checks on democracy federalism has been the most efficacious.—ACTON.

Federal Government means weak Government.—DICEY.

UNTIL lately John Bull was in the happy case of a man who does not know he has a constitution. He was often reminded by foreigners that he had a very good one, and he usually replied that he had received a good start from his parents. It is true he suffered occasionally from a twinge of gout and occasional indigestion, probably induced by bad cooking. These were minor ills, and did not give him any serious inconvenience. But of late he has put himself into the hands of the physicians, and they have discovered that his constitution is all wrong and must be operated upon in the most drastic manner. Already they have cut out the upper intestine to induce a freer habit of body and propose to get rid of the gout by amputating the right leg. Thus John Bull is now in a very unhappy frame of mind—much like the philosopher described by Carlyle who spent his time in contemplating his navel. He is priming himself with information about all manner of foreign cures and his very latest fad is a patent American specific called Federalism.

Not to break the back of the metaphor, I would venture to remind the reader in plain language that we are at present changing our Constitution in two ways. We have deprived our Upper Chamber of its power of veto; to do this we have written a part of our Constitution; we are about to introduce the federal system, as far at least as Ireland is concerned, which entails the writing of another chapter; and we are speaking of extending the federal system to the other geographical divisions of the United Kingdom—which, if we do, we must embody in a Constitution written in every part.

Now the chief danger is that the Constitution is considered a dull subject: if it were proposed to change the rules of Association football by abolishing the referee and multiplying and dividing the players into four, six, or eight teams instead of two, only two teams playing over the whole ground and the rest having knock-up games in the corners, there would be a good deal of heart-searching in the country. But as the question is only one of how the nation is to be governed, people are content to leave the matter to experts—or, as it is in practice, to quacks, cranks, and Radicals. When John Bull wakes up to find that he has been changed in the night into a rather bad imitation of Uncle Sam he will no doubt be considerably disturbed: it will then be too late; the mischief will be done.

For my part I believe that people commonly err in the view that the Constitution is a dull subject; indeed I am sure that if it were fairly put to them, the public—and the working man as much as any—would see that this question of the Constitution is not only interesting in itself but has the most direct sort of bearing on their interests, their safety, their everyday life.

Let us try then to look this question of Union *versus* Federalism squarely in the face. We know that at one time we had a federal system of sorts in the United Kingdom (in so far, that is to say, as that we had State Parliaments in Ireland and Scotland), and that we have now a Union. It is now proposed that we should go back to the Federal system once again. It is worth asking, then, in the first place, why we adopted Union and why we abandoned State Legislatures. And as we are dealing chiefly with Federalism as applied to the particular case of Ireland, I may confine myself to the Union with Ireland—although we should find if we enquired further that the earlier Union with Scotland had much the same justification. There were several reasons, then, for the Union with Ireland. There was the commercial reason, and it is notable that Pitt first tried to reach union by way of a commercial Treaty. The English Parliament looked with jealousy upon Irish manufactures; the Irish Parliament with fear upon English imports. There was war between Irish linen and Manchester cotton, a war of bounties and import duties in which Ireland, being the weaker,

was badly worsted. Then there was the constant strife between Catholic and Protestant.

> Session after session [said Lord Clare to the Irish Parliament in his speech in favour of Union *] you have been compelled to enact laws of unexampled rigour and novelty to repress the horrible excesses of the mass of your people. . . . Look to your civil and religious discussions. Look to the fury of political faction and the torrents of human blood that stain the face of your country. . . .

Pitt thought, and most Irishmen thought with him, that the best way of moderating these feuds was to engage Ireland in the larger life of the United Kingdom. The Irish Catholics, in particular, wanted Union because they saw in Union their best chance of emancipation. And we might boil these views down to the axiom—which I shall illustrate later—that fanaticism is more apt to run riot in a provincial or State Parliament than in a larger and more diverse assembly. It is one of the sad fatalities of our history that the promise of Catholic emancipation after Union remained unfulfilled, owing to the harsh necessities of war and ill-grounded suspicion, until the concession could not allay the rancour of hope too long deferred.

But the main reason for the Union more directly concerns our argument. I take it to be stated in this sentence of Pitt's great speech on Union in the House of Commons on April 21, 1800:

> We must consider it as a measure of great national policy, the object of which is effectually to counteract the restless machinations of an inveterate enemy who has uniformly and anxiously endeavoured to effect a separation between the two countries whose connection is as necessary for the safety of the one as it is for the prosperity of the other.

And in the same passage he said that the object of the measure was "to place under one public will the direction of the whole force of the Empire."

In this Pitt was merely following the example of the enemy. Centralisation in England was forced by centralisation across the Channel.

> France [says Dr. Holland Rose †] was the first state which succeeded in concentrating political power at the capital, and the new polity endued her with a strength sufficient to break in pieces the chaotic systems of her neighbours. . . . Everywhere the new unifying impulse undermined or swept away local parliaments or provincial estates. Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity in practice meant a single, democratic,

* February 10, 1800. † *William Pitt and the Great War*, p. 420.

and centralised Government. In self-defence the Powers threatened by France borrowed her political weapons.

Pitt when he formed the Union knew that Napoleon's design was to strike at England through Ireland; for that purpose Bruix's great fleet lay at Brest. He knew also that he could not concentrate the entire resources of the kingdom to meet the blow as long as a separate Administration and Parliament in Ireland harassed and hindered his national policy. When a nation is fighting for its life, every ounce of its power—military and financial—should be at the command of the National government. This concentration federalism prevents.* Pitt's experience may be expressed in a second axiom tersely put by Dicey: "Federal government means weak government."

Federalism, then, was abandoned in these islands mainly because it was found to mean weakness in time of war. Are we now so safe from war that we can afford to ignore this precept of our history? It seems to me that preparation against war is still the main business and should rule the policy of the Imperial Government. If federalism were good in all other respects but dangerous to our chances of victory in war, then federalism would still be condemned because defeat in war would not merely affect the welfare but the existence of the nation and the Empire.

But we have seen also that Federalism failed in practice because it encouraged religious and racial intolerance in Ireland, and because it led to fiscal conflicts between Ireland and England. As to the first, it was found that in the Irish Government either the Catholic faction or the Protestant faction must rule, and that when either had the upper hand it used intolerance and persecution towards the other. The hope of Union was that these narrow spites and jealousies might be merged in the broad stream of the main national life, and as a matter of fact the disabilities of the Catholics were abolished by the Union Parliament. Let me take a later example of the greater intolerance of a local than of a national government.

* Even when the Powers left to the subordinate Government are limited to local matters, this objection remains, for it cannot be said beforehand that any department of life has no bearing upon national power in war. Power over local roads and railways, if in the hands of a local government, might be injurious to the concentration plans of a national government. In California the right of a state to cut the hair of prisoners in its gaols became an international question.

When popular government was given to the Orange River Colony after the war, the British were in a small minority, and the Dutch used their power to force British children to learn not only the Dutch language but part of their lessons by the medium of Dutch. The law was so oppressive that about 80 per cent. of the teachers and most of the school inspectors resigned, and the British Colonists started to organise private schools. When the Union Constitution was set up, one of the few powers which remained to the State Parliaments was elementary education, and the Orange Free State insisted on its right to administer its intolerant law. But the Union Constitution was based on equal rights and complete liberty as to language and the Union Parliament regarded the Orange Free State law as an infringement of these rights and liberties. This conflict between the Orange Free State and the Union Constitution occupied almost the whole of a long session of the Union Parliament, a circumstance which illustrates, by the way, how the time of a Central Parliament may be wasted in correcting the eccentricities of its subordinate Parliaments. In the end a Select Committee of the Union Parliament was appointed, and it recommended an improvement in the Orange Free State law. This improvement the Prime Minister of the Union had the greatest difficulty in inducing the Government of the Free State to accept. General Botha would, in fact, have been powerless in the matter but for the circumstance that under the Union Constitution the Union Parliament has the power to take over the administration of primary education from the State Parliament. As it was, General Botha's interference on behalf of tolerance was the main cause of the rise of the Hertzog Party, which is a Party representing the State right to be intolerant towards the British. General Hertzog's policy might be expressed thus: Let the Dutch Afrikander rule and let there be no co-operation between Dutch and British.

The history of the conflict between Washington and the State of California on the treatment of the Chinese is more familiar, and I need not refer to it here except to say that it points the same moral. But with this difference. The Federal Government, like the Union Government, has a more tolerant inclination than its State Government, but Washington lacks the power to coerce California, with the result that the Chinese grievances are

never settled—if settled at all—without an infinite amount of friction and a great loss of dignity and prestige to the United States as an international Power.

On this point, then, I might sum up that local governments are more liable to the vice of intolerance than central governments. And the more complete the federalism, the more difficult it becomes for the Central Government to modify that intolerance.

As to the bearing of Federalism on freedom of commerce, I take it to be obvious that the fewer Customs Houses there are inside the boundaries of the United Kingdom the better for trade. The provision in the Home Rule Bill by which a Customs barrier will separate Ireland from England is so bad that most people suppose it will be dropped. But we have to take it as it stands, and as it stands the Bill permits the building of such a fence although it limits the height and prescribes the material. In this respect the federal system set up under the Bill is different from that of the United States, Germany, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and most other federal or semi-federal constitutions. Free trade between the States is usually the beginning of a federalism and the end of separation. Germany began with a Customs Union; so did South Africa. In both the Customs Union was regarded by the statesmen concerned as more important than the Federal or Union Constitution. If Free Trade marks the end of separatism, a separate Customs Union marks the beginning.

But this question of Federalism and Commerce opens upon the larger question: Is Federalism efficient as a system of government?

In considering this very big question it is well to remember that we moderns try to do far more by government than our fathers did or tried to do. Indeed we are fast going back to the mediæval idea of the State as regulating everything. Thus, for example, the Imperial Government has taken over a very large part of the insurance and friendly society business of this country by providing Old Age Pensions and State Insurance. It has already created a system of minimum wages in several industries, and it now proposes to fix wages in agriculture. From this to nationalisation of land, railways and other industries is a very big step, but there is already an organised party which would like to take it. And it may be noted in passing that this party

of Socialists and "Advanced Radicals" is among the most ardent in pushing the United Kingdom into federalism.

To such people I commend the following passage from Dicey :*

Federalism, as it defines, and therefore limits, the powers of each department of the administration, is unfavourable to the interference of the activity of government. Hence a federal government can hardly render services to the nation by undertaking for the national benefit functions which may be performed by individuals. This may be a merit of the federal system ; it is, however, a merit which does not commend itself to modern democrats, and no more curious instance can be found of the inconsistent currents of popular opinion which may at the same time pervade a nation or a generation than the coincidence in England of a vague admiration for federalism alongside with a far more decided feeling against the doctrines of so-called *laissez faire*. A system meant to maintain the *status quo* in politics is incompatible with schemes for wide social innovation. *Federalism tends to produce Conservatism.*

But Radicals will no doubt say that they do not like Dicey as an authority. I wonder if they would trust Lord Acton, that learned Whig who went through the archives of history with a microscope, searching for the precious principle of liberty, as a prospector goes up a stream on his knees looking for traces of gold. I am not of those who admire Lord Acton, either as an historian or as a political philosopher. He seems to me to make the common mistake of his school, that liberty in mankind is a natural condition, which belongs to the poor and weak among nations and is denied to the great. I would rather say that the liberties of a nation can only be secured by their power to preserve them, and that chains are the natural consequence of weakness.† But Lord Acton, being a good Whig, liked freedom, if I may so put it, on the chain. He did not trust Democracy except when controlled by "checks and balances." For that reason he was a great admirer of Federalism. Thus, for example, he says in one of his Lectures on the French Revolution (p. 105):

The Americans were aware that Democracy might be weak and unintelligent but also that it might be despotic and oppressive, and they found out the way to limit it by the federal system, which suffers it to exist nowhere in its plenitude. They deprived their state governments of the powers that were enumerated and the central

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* *The Law and the Constitution* (seventh edition, London, 1908), pp. 168–169.

† "A generous spirit," says Lord Acton, "prefers that his country should be poor and weak, and of no account, but free, rather than powerful, prosperous, and enslaved." Very pretty ; but can a poor and weak country secure itself against becoming the slave of a powerful and prosperous country ?

government of the powers that were reserved. As the Romans knew how monarchy would become innocuous by being divided, the Americans solved the more artful problem of dividing democracy into two.

And again he says, in his essay on Freedom in Antiquity:

If the distribution of power among the several parts of the State is the most efficient restraint on monarchy, the distribution of power among several states is the best check on Democracy.

And still again, in a review of May's *Democracy in Europe:*

The federal system limits and restrains the sovereign power by dividing it, and by assigning to government only certain defined rights. It is the only method of curbing not only the majority, but the power of the whole people, and it affords the strongest basis for a second chamber, which has been found the essential security for freedom in every genuine democracy.

Here we find the true Whig and Liberal ground for admiring Federalism. It is a check; it is a balance; it prevents anybody doing anything; it is a good substitute for the House of Lords. That it may reduce a nation to weakness and impotence in war does not matter, because the Liberal mind never can really believe in war—even as a possibility.

But if the old-fashioned Liberal may admire Federalism as a way of preventing anybody from doing anything, that is not a reason why the Tory, who desires his country to be strong, should admire it; still less is it a reason why Socialists and advanced Radicals, who believe in State action by the majority, should fall down and worship at this dull and dismal shrine.

They certainly do not like federalism where they have it. Take, for example, the government of London, a beautiful example of federalism. Mr. Balfour, who is a very clever man, saw that the County Council might, in the hands of the Labour-Socialist Party, make things very uncomfortable for the ratepayers. They would do things and they would almost certainly do things wrong. He therefore created the Borough Councils, and gave them power over their local affairs, reserving to the County Council certain powers over the whole area. What is the result? The Progressive Party in the County Council find themselves hampered at every turn by the Borough Councils. They are shackled by Federalism. They want to do away with the Borough Councils; they want to do away also with the City Corporation. In fact they are the enemies of Federalism

in municipal government, because they find that Federalism means weakness. But the ratepayers prefer that the County Council should remain weak, and they like this federal check upon their power. The result is that the Progressive Party desires and is yet afraid openly to attack the Borough Councils—a sad and sorry plight, the plight of reformers in federal chains. Democracy is stultified by its machinery. And a very good thing too—as most of us will say who pay rates.

Another case in point—Federalism in Australia. Australia, we know, is a democratic country; but it is also a federal country. Its six States are all, save Tasmania, stretched along some thousands of miles of the same seaboard, and they all compete against one another for oversea trade. They are therefore naturally hostile and suspicious of their rights and dignities, and when the need for common action compelled them to join forces they chose a loose form of Federalism, which delegated only certain powers to the Commonwealth Parliament and reserved the balance of undefined powers to the States. Thus the Commonwealth was created, and the Labour Party set out to capture it. They succeeded. They obtained a substantial majority in both Houses, formed their red-tie Government, "and now," said they, "we will proceed to do things. We will make Australia the earthly paradise of our dreams. We will destroy trusts, we will nationalise monopolies, we will raise wages, we will give the land to the people, we will do all those things which our beautiful Labour-Socialist-Trade Unionist programme contains."

Alas, for blighted hopes! They had forgotten one thing. They had forgotten that they were under a federal Constitution. The legendary sufferings of Laocoön and his sons in the grip of the serpents were as nothing to the stifling and agonising experience of Mr. Fisher and his colleagues in the grip of the Federal Constitution. They could do nothing, or next to nothing, in the way of social reform: in whatever direction they tried to go they were stopped by the barbed-wire fence of State rights, and if they tried to climb over that fence a stern policeman in the shape of the High Court pulled them back by the slack of their breeches.

Manfully for some years they battered their heads against the federal wall; they had even wild thoughts of reconstituting

their High Court so as to obtain a Labour majority. But at last, sore and stiff, they decided that they must amend the Constitution. Nothing easier, it might be thought, with a majority in both Houses. By no means. Australia has a written Con-titution, and this written Constitution provides that there shall e no change in its terms unless not only a majority of both Iouses but a majority of the electors give their consent. No hange can be made in the Constitution without a referendum. Iopefully the Labour Government began. Two Bills were repared, the Legislative Powers Bill and a Bill for the Taking ver of Monopolies. They were passed by both Houses of Parlia-nent, and in April 1911 they were submitted to the people in wo Referenda. They were defeated by large majorities in all he States except Western Australia.

You might expect that such a blow in the solar plexus would ave settled any party: Mr. Fisher and his colleague Mr. Hughes ame up again, shaken but smiling. No doubt they were egged n by their backers and bottle-holders—the Labour Conference r Trade Union Caucus which in January 1912 decided that they nust go in again. They went in. This time they prepared no ewer than six Bills, of which the following are the short titles:

(1) *Constitution Alteration (Trade and Commerce)*, 1912.
(2) *Constitution Alteration (Corporations)*. 1912.
(3) *Constitution Alteration (Industrial Matters)*. 1912.
(4) *Constitution Alteration (Railway Disputes)*, 1912.
(5) *Constitution Alteration (Trusts)*. 1912.
(6) *Constitution Alteration (Naturalisation of Monopolies)*.

These Bills, as may be guessed by their names, were designed o take over from the States and concentrate in the hands of the 'entral Parliament the power over the whole domain of industrial nd commercial life. In fact they would have been a long step owards unification or union. And although the Labour Party of he Commonwealth are afraid to say it, the *Sydney Bulletin* has aid openly that the aim of Labour is a practical Union of Aus-tralia. The six Bills, of course, went through the two Houses n great style and again the electors were asked for their assent. ix referenda, or referendums, as they are called in Australia, vere sent to every voter,* and between them they provided

* An example of what the referendum enthusiast calls simplifying the issue.

planks enough for six general elections. Socialism *versus* individualism, unification *versus* federalism, State rights *versus* Commonwealth, trusts *versus* the small man—these were a few of the issues on which the battle was fought.

So complicated indeed was this referendum that a pamphlet explaining the whole thing, one half written by the Government and the other half by the Opposition, was circulated with the voting papers by the Commonwealth Electoral Office. This pamphlet is one of the curiosities of political literature. Mr. Hughes and Mr. Deakin, with all the ebullient rhetoric for which they are justly famous, and assisted by all the arts of headline and attractive tabulation of argument, declaim from their respective tubs.

The Labour half of the pamphlet proclaims the impotence of Australian federalism:

> The Federal Parliament cannot deal with the most important problems that confront modern society. It cannot deal with trusts, combines, and monopolies. It cannot protect the consumer from extortion, nor ensure to the worker a fair and reasonable wage for his labour. It cannot even make a general company law or a comprehensive navigation law. The states are quite unable to deal with these matters; the national Parliament is powerless. But the people must be protected, and in order to protect them the Constitution must be amended.

But let us take the amendments one by one. The first was to give the Commonwealth power over trade and commerce. "Without this amendment," they said, "effective legislation with respect to trusts, combines, and monopolies will be—even if the others are carried—almost impossible." And why? Obviously because if a trust is persecuted in one state it can skip over to another: national trade must be taken as a whole if legislation is to be effective:

> It is just as impossible in commerce to draw a line of demarcation based on local geographical conditions as it would be to commit to the care of one physician a man's body and to the care of another physician his limbs. Each is really part of one organic whole; and the result of the attempts has been perfectly endless litigation and uncertainty.

The second amendment was to give the Commonwealth power over corporations or companies:

> It is surely an anomalous and dangerous thing that companies should be beyond effective control by the law when commerce has developed to such large dimensions, when accumulated wealth has such mighty power, and when combines of wealthy

men—usually operating as companies—largely control, direct, and own that wealth.

And again: "Laws dealing with trusts and combines must prove quite ineffective unless there is power to deal with companies."

And here is an example from the United States:

Quite recently the Standard Oil and Tobacco Trusts were solemnly dissolved by the Court. But the various Companies forming the Trust made "a gentlemen's agreement" and went on in the same old way—pocketed millions as a result of the Court's penalty, and snapped their fingers at the Federal laws which could not touch them at all.

In the game of hide and seek, there is nothing a big trust likes so much as the pillars and posts, the nooks and crannies, afforded by the varying laws and multiple parliaments of a federal country.

Amendment No. 3 proposed to give the Commonwealth power in industrial matters. "The old order of things," says the manifesto, "when the masses took what was given to them and bowed their heads humbly, is gone for ever. The people have opened their eyes. They demand what they have every right to get—a fair and reasonable wage for their labour." Yet: "The Federal Parliament cannot make any laws on industrial matters." The Labour Party in Australia, by the way, "are for the settlement of industrial disputes by compulsory arbitration"—a form of slavery dear to those who believe in State Socialism—but here again the Federal Parliament had no power: "It must," the pamphlet exclaims, "have the power to prevent disputes arising and spreading; it must be able to deal with the conditions that cause disputes; it must have the power to make a common rule."

No. 4 was to get power to deal with industrial disputes on railways by fixing wages and labour conditions through a federal court. Now here is a beautiful example of the tangle into which Federalism gets. The Australian Railways belong to the States and are financed and managed by the States. Yet the Commonwealth proposed to fix wages and labour conditions on these railways without taking over the financial or administrative responsibility. The States, in fact, were to pay the piper, but the Commonwealth was to call the tune.

Amendment No. 5 brings us to trusts. We are told :

The Trusts are more powerful in America than in any other country ! The cos of living has increased much faster in America than elsewhere ! !* What mor convincing proof can there be that the power of the Trusts is the dominating facto in the increased cost of living ? And we have copied the American Constitution These facts should make every Australian think very hard.

They should also make every English working man thinl very hard before he consents to a first step towards Britisl federalism. Is it not possible—indeed, is it not likely ?—that th Trusts behind the Liberal Party, acutely conscious of the dange under a simple and powerful Constitution like our own when th English people wake up to the necessity of dealing with them should be pushing forward the Liberal Party into the complicate impotence of Federalism under the guise of doing justice t Ireland ?

At any rate, federalism in Australia confessed itself powerles to deal with trusts : the States could not deal with them, th Commonwealth could not deal with them : " Unless the Trust are to rule the people, we must amend the Constitution so tha the people may rule the Trusts."

No. 6 dealt with the " Nationalisation of Monopolies." Th Commonwealth asked for power to declare what was a monopol and to take over that monopoly. The pamphlet tells a plaintiv story of how the High Court had prevented the Labour Part from laying its Socialist hands upon the " Coal Vend " whicl " controlled over 90 per cent. of the coal-supply of Newcastle," and had agreed with the " Shipping Combine "—which " con trolled over 90 per cent. of the freight "—" that they would sel coal to nobody but them, and the Shipping Combine had agree to buy no coal from anybody but the Vend or to carry anybod else's coal ; the Court held that there was no monopoly ! " " I seems quite clear, therefore," the manifesto proceeds, " that i such an interpretation is to limit the people's power no Monopol could ever be dealt with."

This, by the way, is an example of another feature of Fede ralism, that it transfers much of the power of Parliament t

* The meretricious punctuation is transferred from the pamphlet ; but I hav not asked the printers of the *National Review* to reproduce all the emphasis of Anti podal typography.

the Courts which govern the interpretation of the written Constitution, and decide as to the limitations and extensions of power. As Professor Dicey puts it in his incisive way, "Federalism substitutes litigation for legislation."

After illustrating and enforcing in this way the arguments for their six Bills the Labour Party went on to hammer the Opposition and defend their general policy. They deny, of course, that their proposals mean unification, but they go on to attack State rights under the suggestive heading: "State Rights: and People's Wrongs."

> Why [they ask] are all the great trusts, combines, monopolies, and vested interests of Australia banded together against them? Why are they spending their money largely to defeat them? This State rights cry is just the cry of vested interests, who fear lest the people should escape from their clutches.

And the case of the Australian Labour Party ends in the following remarkable passage, which I advise the British Labour Party to study:

> The Federal Constitution adopted in order to enlarge the self-governing powers of the people actually fetters them. They cannot protect themselves against the greatest dangers which menace civilised man. In regard to the things that really matter they are powerless. The wages and conditions of labour, the opportunities for employment, the cost of the necessaries of life, are the things that mould the daily lives of the overwhelming majority of mankind. They are the things that really matter to us all. *And yet with respect to them the Constitution binds the people, and they are helpless!* Such a position is untenable. The people must have these powers. They must be able to control trusts, to ensure to all a fair and reasonable wage, to ensure the primary producer a fair and reasonable price for his produce, to protect themselves against the extortion of the Trusts, and to maintain Industrial Peace. The proposed amendments will enable the people to do all these things.

Now I do not propose to give the answers to these arguments supplied by the latter half of the pamphlet which is written by the Opposition. Sufficient to say generally that it takes the line that a Constitution only twelve years old should not be so drastically amended; that it warns the electors that the changes would lead to endless litigation and confusion; that the Labour Party would use them to promote Socialism; that they were "a long stride in the direction of Unification" and that "Unification is centralisation." Not that the Liberals were content with the Constitution. On the contrary, "Liberals are prepared to frame and support the amendments of the Constitution already offered

by their leaders." But they did not like the Labour Amendments or trust the Labour Party.

The Referenda, as we know, went against the Amendments and the Labour Party were defeated by a very small majority at the general elections. But I am certain of this, that even if the Amendments had been carried, the modified Federalism which would have remained would still have been a source of endless confusion and litigation, resulting in something near to legislative impotence. And for this reason, that life does not correspond to these arbitrary divisions of powers. The problems of real life overlap such divisions, and State and Commonwealth legislation would still have conflicted at every turn. As the *Sydney Bulletin* confessed, Unification is the real goal of the Australian Labour-Socialist cause.

But the British Labour Party may say: "How does all this affect us? We are only committed to the Irish Home Rule Bill, quite a different thing from a Federal Constitution." Let us see. The Home Rule Bill establishes a Parliament and Executive in Ireland with control over all undefined and unreserved subjects. Ireland in this respect will resemble a State of Australia, except that Ireland will also have power over Post Office and Customs (as the Bill now stands). But there is this difference, that the Bill states that nothing in it shall diminish the present powers of the Imperial Parliament. Does the Labour Party still hug the delusion that this clause can be effective? Let them think of what happened in South Africa. British subjects—Labour leaders—were deported, that is punished, without trial. No more gross affront to the principles of Liberalism was ever committed. General Smuts, we might say, spat in the face of the Imperial Government. If I know anything of South African politics, his intention was to arouse a conflict between the Union Government and the Imperial Government so as to dish General Hertzog, who accuses the Botha administration of being too Imperialist. But what did the Imperial Government do? It did nothing: it had the power under the Union Constitution: indeed nothing in the Union Constitution can diminish the essential and inalienable sovereignty of the British Crown in South Africa. But Mr. Harcourt confessed he could do nothing, for the good and practical reason that if General Botha were to

resign there was no one to take his place. And, in the same way, if Mr. Redmond were to resign, there would be no alternative Government in Ireland. Therefore, practically speaking, the Imperial Parliament deprives itself of power over Ireland when it delegates its powers to the Irish Parliament.

The Labour Party know all about the International Association for Labour Legislation. It is a body after their own hearts, and, as a matter of fact, one of their own members, Mr. Arthur Henderson, is Treasurer of the British Section. Let them study its report on the Berne Conference. To that Conference the Governments of thirteen countries sent delegates to discuss the possibility of concluding an international agreement prohibiting the night-work of boys and fixing a ten-hour working day for women and young persons. The result, says the report, was "a disappointment, to put it mildly." It was indeed a "complete fiasco." And why?

> Instead of using the Conference as a means of raising the standard of industrial legislation—of procuring progress by international co-operation—the Conference searched for and found the lowest possible standard of regulation, so as to cause little or no disturbance to the laws already in operation in the different countries. The general attitude was one of immobility. Our law is such-and-such—and therefore the Convention must go no further: such was the essence of the speeches of the delegates.

That is exactly how Federalism works: one State proposes to go on; but another State lags behind, and the strength of the federal chain is the weakest link. Let us suppose the United Kingdom under a federal Constitution. England and Scotland are agreed on a forward policy of "Social Uplift." But Ireland, being Conservative, declines to go with them. Dare they proceed alone? If they do and their policy adds to the cost of production, Ireland becomes an Alsatia for all the manufacturers who object to a rise in the cost of production. They transfer their factories to Ireland, and dodge the social legislation of the two other countries while enjoying their market.

The International Association for Labour Legislation (British Section) realised this danger. Their view of the subject will be found on pages 8 and 9 of their report for 1912–1913. "The Home Rule Bill," it is stated, "proposed to vest these powers" (legislation for the protection of workers in factories and work shops) "exclusively with the Irish Legislature." "Strictly from

the point of view of the Association, factory legislation ought to be the function of the widest possible authority." "But the Committee was found to represent so many different shades of opinion on this question as it affects Irish Home Rule in particular that the matter was dropped by mutual consent." *

The Committee consoled itself by remarking rather weakly that "possibly, as regards Ireland, the question is, in practice, not of the foremost importance." And it proceeds to make the following good resolution:

> When Home Rule for England, Scotland, and Wales becomes a practical question, it will be a matter of great importance to allow the Federal Government power to legislate on industrial affairs, while leaving the several kingdoms free to go beyond the minimum federal requirements, if desired. Otherwise the United Kingdom will find herself in the position of the United States, which can take no part in international labour conventions, since the federal authority, which alone can conclude a treaty, has not the corresponding power to impose a uniform minimum of industrial conditions in the various states.

But surely, even if one State is exempted, England would lose that power; and not only so but the industrial parts of England, Scotland, and Wales would be placed at a heavy disadvantage (from the employers' point of view) as against the industrial part of Ireland—the Alsatia, as it would become, of sweated labour.

The Association would have our federal system imitate Germany and Switzerland, where there is reported to be a "satisfactory" co-ordination of the work of local and federal Parliaments. In fact, they desire unity for labour legislation while allowing Federalism in matters which do not affect them. But how can they have unity in labour legislation with Ireland left out?

Federalism makes all social legislation almost impossible, because it divides legislative authority. It makes Socialism quite impossible. I wonder how the Fabian Society, which works underground, reconciles Federalism to its highly developed social conscience. What does Mr. Sidney Webb think of it? Mr. Bernard Shaw pretends to be a great Socialist. He swallowed Henry George and Karl Marx in his youth, holus-bolus, and that great economic feast provided him for the rest of his life. He

* In the next paragraph we are told that "during the twelve months under review" the Executive Committee was "strengthened by the addition of Mr. J. Devlin, M.P.," which explains a good deal.

has never had the courage to apply his experience fairly and squarely to this youthful illusion. He poses as an intellectual stalwart. I find in his plays all the evidence of an intellectual coward. His practice is to pose a big question in the first two acts and run away from it in the third. I offer him a good subject for a play: The United Kingdom under a Federal Constitution and the Socialist Party in power in the Central Parliament. They are burning to carry out their programme. They start in high hopes. But the State Parliaments are in the way. Ireland openly bids for the English manufacturer by offering him a refuge from Socialism. The other States refuse to go forward because Ireland may rob them of their industries. And at last Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, a very old man, turns in despair upon the Federal Constitution which he has helped to erect, and exclaims in the words of Mr. Fisher:

"The Constitution binds the people and they are helpless!"

I accuse the Labour Party of sinning against the light, for they must know the history of their "comrades" in Australia. I accuse Mr. Ramsay Macdonald of selling the Labour cause for the Irish vote in the English constituencies.

But what have Unionists to say of Federalism? They may be tempted to favour it. "Federalism," says Dicey, "tends to produce Conservatism." True, but at what cost? "Federalism," says Dicey, "means weak Government." Are Unionists prepared to sell the pass of our national strength because they are afraid of Socialism? Are they also to be driven by the trusts and the moneyed interests into legislative impotence out of fear of regulation or confiscation? For my part I regard Socialism as an impossible dream, an already outworn superstition. We cannot change the structure of a living society in that way, even if we would. Co-operation, the exact opposite of Socialism, may gradually and beneficently transform our present economic system; profit-sharing and co-partnership may mitigate the harshness of individualism. But they are changes which cannot come through legislation, but by a natural and free growth. And they will spread only in so far as they are more efficient than the present system. They will spread gradually and slowly. The transformation of society by legislation is not possible; but by giving up our legislative and

administrative powers we may succeed in weakening the central government and the nation as a fighting unit. A nation at bay fights with every ounce of its power—with teeth and claws. We have this advantage over Germany that we are a Union, whereas they are a federation. We have thus a greater power of concentration of all our financial resources than they can possess. Are we, out of fear of this preposterous menace of an impossible Socialism, to give up the one advantage we now possess over the German Empire?

Alexander Hamilton was a soldier and statesman of genius—a big man. He has been cited as a Federalist, because the *Federalist* was mainly his work. But I take him to be a Unionist who defended the American Constitution only because it was the nearest to Union that the thirteen states could then be persuaded to go. In his heart he was an opponent of State power, and on all occasions took the side of Union against State rights. He defended the Constitution against Separatists and Confederates, not against Unionists. "It is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them."* He would have abolished the States altogether if he could: "In my private opinion," he said, "I have no scruple in declaring, supported as I am by so many of the wise and good, that the British Government is the best in the world and that I doubt much whether anything short of it will do in America." Let us set that declaration of one of the greatest of Americans, against the theoretical enthusiasm of such cold and fish-like Whigs as Bryce and Acton, who have learnt nothing of life but from books, nor have ever realised, as Hamilton realised, that strength to defend national existence is the master-test of all statesmanship.

Let Unionists then stand on the Union. It is firm ground, and offers a strong appeal not only to patriotism, but also to democracy, for the democrat and the patriot both stand to lose by the legislative and administrative impotence of Federalism.

IAN D. COLVIN

* *The Federalist*, No. 23.

THE FIGHT FOR CLEAN GOVERNMENT

I. THE CHARGES AND ALLEGATIONS

By the courtesy of the *Morning Post* we are permitted to reproduce the following letter, which appeared in the columns of our contemporary on February 9—the eve of the opening of Parliament. Our readers may find it convenient for reference in coming controversies:

To the Editor of the Morning Post

Sir,—It is difficult to regard as serious the statement apparently issued on behalf of Lord Murray of Elibank—shortly after he landed from the *George Washington*—that he would content himself with a statement in the House of Lords on the Marconi scandal. It would be still more surprising if the Peers consented to regard any speech as satisfactory in the light of past events, which only need the briefest recapitulation in order to demonstrate that more serious procedure is urgently demanded in the public interests. After the manner in which the House of Commons was tricked by Mr. Asquith's colleagues with the expressed approval of the Prime Minister, the House of Lords will necessarily cultivate a spirit of healthy scepticism towards any utterance by any member or past member of the present Government.

I will take one illustration—Mr. Herbert Samuel, the Postmaster-General, who is not associated with any Marconi speculations and is regarded among his own Party as accurate to the point of purism. During the never-to-be-forgotten debate in the House of Commons on October 11, 1912—generally known as the Festival of Truth—Mr. Samuel, as the appointed mouthpiece of the Cabinet, made this earnest and emphatic declaration,

which was almost universally accepted as finally dissipating the "sinister rumours" which had passed from one set of "foul lips" to another, connecting the names of Ministers with Marconi speculations. I quote the Official Report:

Neither I myself nor any of my colleagues have at any time held one shilling's worth of shares in this Company, directly or indirectly, or have derived one penny profit from the fluctuations in their prices. It seems shameful that political feeling can carry so far, that lying tongues can be found to speak and ears found to listen to such wicked and utterly baseless slanders such as these. This Committee (*i.e.* the Marconi Committee) which will be appointed will enquire into every aspect of this question, and members of the Government will be most ready to appear before it. Every member of the House may have full confidence that while every part of this transaction will come under the searchlight of examination, it will be shown that there is no uncleanliness in any quarter.

The House which heard this solemn asseveration was convinced that calumny had once more been astray, the Press was enthusiastic over a triumphant vindication of Cæsar's wives, and the public mind was set at rest. In those days no impossible distinctions were drawn between "associated" Marconi Companies forming one group under common control, pursuing a common policy, working the same patents, the shares of which rose and fell in sympathy. Any one who persisted in believing, despite this and equally emphatic declarations by the Attorney-General and the Chancellor of the Exchequer during the same debate, that any Ministers had speculated in any Marconi shares was regarded by all Parties as little better than a lunatic.

As it proved, Mr. Samuel's statement had misled and deceived the House of Commons, being false in the ordinary sense of that term as understood by the extra parliamentary public, and the speaker, not being a fool, must have appreciated its real character, as must also the colleagues who sanctioned and approved it. When he told the House of Commons that these "utterly baseless slanders" had originated with "lying tongues" addressing "wicked ears," Mr. Samuel had long been aware that Cabinet Ministers were holders of Marconi shares. He was also aware of the real origin of the rumours, which had doubtless swollen in the process of circulation. His informant was the Master of Elibank, then Chief Whip of the Party. Mr. Samuel's sworn testimony, shattering his triumphant speech, is on record in the Blue-book containing the evidence given before the Marconi

Select Committee, which he astonished by informing that some time at the end of July or the beginning of August 1912, the Master of Elibank had told him of his transactions in American Marconi shares, when motions were being put down in opposition to the Marconi contract. Here are Mr. Samuel's words:

I was rather surprised at those motions, and did not understand them, and I went to the Chief Whip (the Master of Elibank) and said to him: "What does all this mean? Have you any information?" And I was pressing him very strongly to give me an early opportunity to bring the contract on for debate in the House. He (*i.e.* the Master of Elibank, now Lord Murray) said to me that he thought that these motions were not due to any objection to the contract as such, but to rumours with respect to Ministers' shares, and he thought I ought to know that, while so far as he was aware there was absolutely no truth in any of these rumours at all he himself Mr. Lloyd George, and Sir Rufus Isaacs had bought a comparatively small holding in American Marconis. I (*i.e.* Mr. Herbert Samuel) did not attach very great importance to it at the time.

When, ultimately, thanks to an unforeseen chapter of accidents, the jealously guarded secret of Ministerial Marconi speculations was revealed, and those implicated were constrained to explain away their utterances in the House of Commons, they defended themselves on the express ground that statements on such matters were inappropriate on the floor of the House, where they could not be tested by cross-examination, but they had been yearning all the winter to unburden themselves before the Select Committee, and they professed resentment at the delay in hearing their evidence, though, as all the world knows, they could have appeared before that Committee almost any day they chose on writing to the Chairman informing him of their American venture. The *Westminster Gazette*, the semi-official organ of the Government, which is ever ready with a plausible excuse for any action of any Minister, on the bursting of the *Matin* bombshell, endeavoured to extenuate the *suppressio veri et suggestio falsi* of the speeches on the Festival of Truth on the ground that "there is much to be said for the view that the proper place for a disclosure of this kind (*i.e.* of the American gamble) was either before the House of Commons Committee or before a Court of Law, *where statements can be made on oath*" [my italics].*

Surely what was sauce for the Ministerial goose is sauce for the ex-Ministerial gander. If Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Rufus

* See *Westminster Gazette*, March 20, 1913.

Isaacs, and Mr. Herbert Samuel were entitled to mislead the House of Commons in their Marconi speeches, Lord Murray of Elibank would be equally entitled to mislead the House of Lords on the many matters which require "cleaning up"—to use his own expressive phrase. If Ministers are only to be believed when speaking on oath, as their principal mouthpiece in the Press appears to suggest, surely the only way to extract the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, from their colleague and accomplice Lord Murray, is to spare him the temptation of making a speech without any moral sanction, and to insist on his testifying under the sanction of an oath.

As I have previously insisted, before the painful revelations as to the moral code governing the Government, no distinctions were drawn between the different Marconi Companies. This is conclusively established by the questions addressed to successive witnesses by the Chairman of the Marconi Select Committee, Sir Albert Spicer, long before the disclosure of the great American gamble. Thus, on February 12 (1913) I was asked by Sir Albert Spicer: "Have you any letters or copies of letters bearing on the rumours that Ministers were financially interested *in any of the Marconi Companies?*" [My italics.] This proves that the Chairman and the rest of the Committee, of whom a majority were supporters of the present Government, drew no distinctions between the companies and regarded with horror the rumour that any Minister might have speculated in any of them. I believe that every witness was asked a similar question, which was not considered insulting in the case of Sir David de Villiers Graaff (South African Minister of Posts and Telegraphs), who, so long ago as November 18, 1912, was asked by the Chairman: "Have you or any members of your family now, or have they at any time, had any financial interest, directly or indirectly, in a Marconi syndicate or company or any company or syndicate *in this country or elsewhere in any way connected therewith?*"

Mr. Madge, the Admiralty expert (November 28), was asked a similar question. Mr. Wilkins, of the Treasury, was also asked (December 18, 1912): "Have you or any members of your family now, or have you or they at any time, had any financial interest, direct or indirect, in the Marconi Syndicate or Company, *or any company or syndicate in this country or elsewhere, in any*

way connected therewith?"[1] Nor were Members of Parliament spared this searching question, and we can readily imagine the consternation which would have been caused had any of them been compelled to admit that they were large speculators in any Marconi Company, whether British, American, Spanish, Canadian, &c.

As so many and systematic attempts have been made in Parliament, in the Press, and elsewhere, to throw dust in the eyes of the public, I think it desirable to state in a positive form so that all who run may read, some of the charges and allegations which may fairly be made against Lord Murray of Elibank, which members of both Houses of Parliament will agree, in view of the disingenuousness with which we have been treated throughout this scandal by the Government and the principal culprits concerned, cannot be disposed of by any speech in the House of Lords or elsewhere.

Charges and Allegations against Lord Murray

(1) That Lord Murray, then Master of Elibank, Chief Whip and Patronage Secretary, upon whom would devolve the arrangements for securing the Parliamentary ratification of the Marconi contract, in acquiring 1000 shares at a privileged price in an "associated" Marconi Company on inside information supplied by the General Manager of the Marconi Company, was guilty of gross impropriety.

(2) Ministers taking valuable tips from Government contractors violate a universally accepted rule which as applied to lesser people involves official degradation or dismissal, even though the offender's intentions may be pure as the driven snow.

(3) After secretly securing his private American Marconi shares on April 17 at £2 the Master of Elibank bought a large block of 2500 American Marconis on April 18 for the Radical Party, of which he was the uncontrolled trustee, at £3 5s., the prevailing market price, through the Party brokers, costing over £8000. The knowledge that Ministers were "in Marconis" could not fail to appreciate their own property, and was probably a considerable factor in promoting the short-lived but highly profitable boom to insiders and correspondingly disastrous slump to outsiders. Ministerial and Party investments, increased

during the month of May, in a Marconi Company prior to the completion and ratification of the contract must have contributed to paralyse the Government in its relations with the contracting Company and made it to the direct pecuniary interest of the Party to ratify the Marconi contract.

(4) It was established in evidence before the Select Committee that ordinary applicants for American Marconis only succeeded in securing approximately 15 per cent. of their demand. Unless the Master of Elibank was a privileged applicant in obtaining 2500 shares, he must have applied for about six times as many as he got, *i.e.* 15,000 shares, which would have involved pledging the Party funds to the extent of nearly £50,000.

(5) In conjunction with Mr. Lloyd George the Master of Elibank bought 3000 additional American Marconis on May 22, 1912, on private account. This was a pure gamble, as neither was in a position to pay for them and they were not paid for so late as March 1913. Whether they have been paid for in the interval is not known. At the date of this speculation the two Ministers could command official information as to the probable time of the publication and ratification of the Marconi contract, which had it then come about would have caused a sympathetic rise in the shares of "associated" companies.

(6) In August 1912, the Master of Elibank appears to have participated in a Ministerial intrigue, in conjunction with Mr. Samuel, to which Mr. Asquith can scarcely have been a stranger, to hustle the Marconi contract through the House of Commons (in spite of the Prime Minister's pledge that it should be submitted to a Select Committee) at a time when the Chief Whip had urgent private reasons for burying the whole business. Such conduct on the part of the Master of Elibank would appear to fall within the limits of the definition of corruption accepted by Sir Rufus Isaacs. "By corruption I understand this to be meant: that you allowed your personal interests to influence your official conduct or your public duty. That is what I understand to be corruption."

(7) The Master of Elibank forsook politics for business early in August 1912, though whether because he dreaded appearing before the Select Committee or on account of the Fenner fiasco, which occurred in July 1912, it is impossible to say. The Master

of Elibank's trusteeship had cost his Party between £30,000 and £40,000—apart from any losses on American Marconis . . . .*

(8) The Master of Elibank, whose father was already a Peer, became a Peer under circumstances clamouring for investigation. Mr. Lloyd George refuses to say whether he was aware that the Party was "in Marconis." Was the Chancellor of the Exchequer aware of the catastrophe to the Party war-chest? Was Mr. Asquith aware of the Chief Whip's record as a Trustee when he recommended his Majesty to confer a second Peerage on the same family within fifteen months of the first?

(9) Lord Murray remained silent while his colleagues grossly deceived the House of Commons on October 11, 1912.

(10) Lord Murray as an ex-Chief Whip was under a special obligation to assist the Select Committee by writing to the Chairman or the Clerk directly it was constituted requesting to be heard on his various Marconi ventures, all the more as the Committee had commenced proceedings by publicly advertising for information, and from the outset displayed equal interest in all the Marconi Companies.

(11) Lord Murray continued to neglect this plain duty, though according to the sworn statement of his brother, Captain Murray, he was in this country for "very nearly" two months of the Committee's sittings.

(12) Lord Murray went abroad directly the first journalists had been summoned—a curious coincidence—and the rumours concerning Ministerial speculations were about to be investigated by the Committee.

(13) Lord Murray subsequently declined the Committee's invitation to return.

(14) Had Lord Murray desired to encourage the worst suspicions concerning his former colleagues in reference to matters Marconi he could scarcely have acted differently. Taken with other circumstances, Lord Murray's conduct has given the public grave reason to believe that further disagreeable revelations may be in store—a feeling confirmed by the attitude of Mr. Asquith, who has refused even to make any enquiries as to other Ministerial Marconi speculations, in spite of the fact that

* The rest of this charge is omitted, as since its publication Fenner has been arrested in Paris and his affairs are consequently *sub judice*.

he had permitted Mr. Samuel to make the deceptive declaration already quoted, which Mr. Asquith then knew to be false.

(15) Lord Murray is called upon to account for the huge accumulation of secret Party funds on the eve of the Coronation in 1911 on a date when the "Honours" list would presumably be under discussion, as also to explain how he came to invest £21,000 of Party funds in Home Rails Ordinary while his colleagues were engaged in settling the coal strike, which might be expected to affect the market value of these shares.

(16) It must not be assumed that the foregoing charges and allegations exhaust the case either against Lord Murray or his colleagues. After successive shocks to the public conscience we must be prepared for all eventualities on the part of Ministers already convicted of such an unspeakable outrage as the private communication of their misdeeds to two carefully selected members of the Select Committee, obviously with the intention of keeping the enquiry off ground dangerous to themselves, and the demonstration of virtue made by the Postmaster-General in disrating a minor official of the Post Office for doing on a trifling scale what he then knew, though the public did not, that his colleagues had done on a great scale.—Yours, &c.,

L. J. Maxse,
Editor and Proprietor of the *National Review*

II. LORD MURRAY'S STATEMENT

THANKS to the initiative of Lord Ampthill the issue of Clean Government was raised in the House of Lords on February 17 on the following motion:

That a Select Committee be appointed to enquire into certain charges and allegations made in the public Press against a member of this House—namely, the Lord Murray of Elibank—and into all matters relating thereto; and that the said Committee be authorised to hear counsel and to examine witnesses on oath, and that the evidence taken from time to time before the said Committee be printed for the use of members of the House.

It was known that Lord Murray of Elibank would ask leave to make a personal statement which, by custom would take precedence of Lord Ampthill's motion, and it is only right and fair to give the text of that statement which was read from typoscript.

"Before the noble Lord, Lord Ampthill, submits his motion I would ask your lordships' leave to make a personal statement, since in any case, as your lordships are aware, it was my wish and intention to make such a statement at the earliest possible moment. I am indebted to the courtesy of the House for permitting me to do so. It is not necessary for me to recapitulate the whole story which was stated to the public last year. The facts are known; there is nothing new to be revealed, and I can do no more than entirely confirm the evidence as to my share in the American Marconi transactions which was given by my brother, Captain Murray, and by others, before the Committee of the House of Commons. Let me assure the House that with the exception of the transactions concerning myself already given in evidence and known to the public, I have never been interested, directly or indirectly, in any form whatever, in any other American Marconis, and never at any time in the English Marconi or any other Marconi or wireless company. I feel, however, that there are certain actions of mine which I should explain. I may perhaps remind this House that, however open to criticism may have been my actions, the members of the Select Committee of the House of Commons and the members from both sides in that House, repudiated the suggestion that

those who purchased these shares were guilty of any dishonourable or corrupt intention. May I remind your lordships that when I bought these shares in the American Company there was no suggestion against the *bona fides* of the negotiations between the Government and the English Marconi Company, and whatever suspicions may have been subsequently engendered either by rumour or public controversy, it certainly did not occur to me at the time that there could be any doubt as to the propriety of my being interested in the American Company. It was some time after the Government had accepted the tender of the English Company for the contract, a fact which was published in the newspapers, that I first heard of the American Company, and, convinced as I was that the American Company had nothing whatever to do with the Government contract, it did not occur to me that my conduct in purchasing these shares was open to blame. It may be that the name "Marconi," common to both the English and American Companies, caused some confusion in the public mind, although there was in reality a clear distinction between the two Companies.

"Looking back on all these events, I think it might have occurred, and it ought to have occurred to me, that my action was open to criticism. I deeply regret that I did not give more consideration to the matter and view it from all its possible aspects instead of merely in the light in which it then presented itself to me. But my error, such as it was, was an error of judgment and not of intention. I now come to the other suggested ground of criticism. My action in having purchased the American Marconi shares for the Liberal Party has been attacked. I freely admit that there is good ground for criticism from those in whose favour the fund was to be used. I bought these shares in the open market, and although not a trustee stock I had every reason to believe that the purchase would prove sound and remunerative. I fully admit that that purchase was an error of judgment. I regret this purchase as well as the purchase on my private account, and, so far as in me lies, I have myself assumed the burden, by taking over the shares at the price paid for them at the date of purchase and, as the House will appreciate, at a very considerable personal loss. Here I must emphatically state that none of my colleagues were acquainted with this purchase. I

never had at any time mentioned the investments of Party funds to them. I must also say that I did not inform my successor, Mr. Illingworth, of these particular transactions or mention the shares to him when handing over in August 1912, as, in view of the criticisms which had then become current, I did not feel it right to saddle my successor with any responsibility whatever for that purchase, for which I accept entire and exclusive responsibility. The only person I informed was one of the solicitors of the Party, in order that there should be a record of the transaction. Further, it has been said that but for the failure of a stockbroker nothing probably would have been known by the public about the Party transaction in American Marconis. I admit to your lordships that that is so. I must, however, remind this House that I knew in August that the Committee was to be appointed—in fact, I made the public announcement myself on behalf of the Government—and that my private transactions with my late colleagues would be stated in the Committee. I certainly never purposed that it should be withheld from the Committee that I had had transactions in American Marconi shares.

"If, as I am sure, there was nothing dishonourable in my private transactions, equally free from dishonour were the transactions with the Party funds. On reflection I consider that the course of action I took was not wise or correct, and I deeply regret it. May I now touch upon this personal note and say, that always amongst the deepest of my regrets will be the thought that my action should have caused any embarrassment to the Party with which over many years I have worked in such intimate relationship. There are moments in most men's lives, if not in every man's life, more especially in the lives of very busy men, when all the possibilities of some action are not so clear as they become in calm retrospect, or in the light of a searching, and, perhaps, not always too friendly, scrutiny; and I must trust that those who have committed themselves to strong, and perhaps harsh, comment, will recognise that it is difficult to avoid making mistakes. The mistakes I made in both cases I freely and regretfully admit, but I venture to feel that when these mistakes are understood there is nothing in them which a fair judgment will hold to reflect in any degree upon the honour and integrity of our public life. Perhaps I may be permitted to conclude by

saying that, as it has been suggested that my resignation of my post as Patronage Secretary in August 1912, was in some way associated with the transactions to which I have referred, I have the authority of the Prime Minister to inform your lordships that as far back as February 1912, before I ever heard of Marconis, for private and business reasons I had intended to retire from active political life, and had placed my resignation in his hands. I am authorised to say that it was in compliance, and only in compliance, with the Prime Minister's request, that I remained in office till the close of the Summer Session. These facts are known to many of my friends, including the noble Marquess, Lord Crewe. I beg to thank your lordships for your indulgent hearing."

When Lord Murray had read his statement Lord Lansdowne made a few noncommittal observations on the gravity of the occasion and the need for deliberation, concluding with an appeal to Lord Ampthill "not to press his motion this evening, but to withdraw it on the distinct understanding that it holds the field, and that after a short interval he will be entirely at liberty to bring it forward again." After a few inaudible words from Lord Crewe, the titular leader of the House of Lords, the crowded and disappointed audience were refreshed by this manly straightforward and unanswerable speech of Lord Ampthill's, which made a profound impression on those who heard it and on the public who read it next day. It effectually cleared the air of that miasma which has prevented many people from performing a plain duty. Even the hostile "hush-up" Press could not conceal the effect of this word in season which the country had long been awaiting from men in authority. Lord Ampthill said:

"My noble friend, Lord Lansdowne, has not convinced me that it is necessary to postpone the motion, but let me say at once that I feel bound to obey his wishes, which are endorsed by the Leader of the House. If I rightly understood my noble friend, he asked me to withdraw my motion, but I do not think that can be what he intended. I stand subject to correction, but if I rightly apprehend the procedure of this House, if a motion is withdrawn it cannot be revived. I imagine that what he wishes me to do is to stand aside in order that the feeling of the House might be ascertained, and that the motion should remain

on the Notice paper till a more convenient day. I hope it will be to the convenience of the House if I proceed with it either to-morrow or on the following day. But now, having said that the noble Marquess has not persuaded me that it is necessary to postpone this motion, I feel under an obligation to explain why that is so.

"The object of the motion is to give Lord Murray the same opportunity as was given to his colleagues in the House of Commons—the opportunity which they themselves demanded and which the House of Commons thought it right to give them. If I understood Lord Murray rightly, it is the opportunity which he himself fully expected to have, because in one part of his speech he said, 'When these mistakes are fully understood.' Clearly he was anticipating that the time would come when he would have an opportunity of 'making the mistakes fully understood.' Now, my motion does not ask your lordships to sit in judgment here and now, either to condemn or condone what Lord Murray is alleged to have done. Its object is to ensure that opinion on all these charges and allegations should be formed in that clearer, calmer atmosphere which is that adopted in this House. The object is that the truth may be ascertained in the only way in which it can possibly be ascertained—that is to say, in some place where statements can be made on oath and tested by cross-examination, and that the truth so ascertained should be put down in black and white in the form of a report to your lordships' House. If and when such report comes before your lordships' House, then I can well understand a demand for more time for consideration before discussion, but I cannot see why the suggestion that the truth should be ascertained requires any lengthened deliberation. Indeed, I had hoped your lordships had already made up your minds to give Lord Murray this opportunity; for to do so would not commit this House to any judgment whatever on the charges and allegations. It seems to me, and it seems to those whom I have had the advantage of consulting, that that is the only possible and the only fair course.

"Surely there can be no two opinions that those charges and allegations cannot be ignored without inflicting irreparable discredit on this House. They have to be either proved or disproved, and I do not hesitate to say even now that the state-

ment to which we have just listened has not had that effect one way or the other. That is why I cannot see why we need hesitate to decide that the truth should be ascertained in whatever way may be most convenient. Now that Lord Murray is in our midst we have got to express an opinion as a corporate body on transactions which have actually taken place and concerning which there is no question or doubt whatever—transactions which, whatever may be said about them, are in the opinion of the public at large demoralising to the public service, discreditable to the Government, and dishonouring to Parliament. If any one thinks otherwise let him say so, and he will see what other people outside the two Houses of Parliament think about his opinion. If Lord Murray had chosen to go before the Select Committee of the House of Commons we should have had nothing more to say; we should have had no right to say anything more. The whole matter would have been at an end and he would have shared in the lenient verdict that was passed on his colleagues. But since Lord Murray has by the action of the Government, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, been transferred to this House, the responsibility is placed upon us of doing that which has been left undone. I am bound to say that if this House were to do nothing it is absolutely certain that your lordships' House would be held to condone every one of the offences which are alleged to have been committed by the noble lord and his colleagues. What we want is the opinion of this House based on fair and careful establishment of the facts and of the circumstances; for that opinion will affect matters infinitely more important than the personal reputation of Lord Murray. The opinion of this House will affect great matters of principle vital to the good government and the welfare of the nation; and, therefore, I shall feel absolutely bound to persist with this motion without any avoidable delay. I move to postpone the motion to Thursday next."

III. THE BEGINNING OF THE "CLEAN-UP"

WITHIN forty-eight hours of the brief discussion recorded in the preceding pages came the remarkable turn of the wheel narrated elsewhere (" Episodes of the Month "). Lord Lansdowne, the Leader of the Opposition, and virtual Leader of the House of Lords, adopted Lord Ampthill's motion which he moved in an irresistible speech which completely cowed Lord Crewe and Co., who adopted an attitude of " willing to wound but afraid to strike."

The net result is the collapse of the extensive and protracted conspiracy against truth and the promise of a genuine enquiry, which is all that reasonable men have ever asked for. L'affaire Marconi now enters on a new and, let us hope final, phase, and as was pointed out in the House of Lords by the spokesman of the Government, Lord Crewe, " the matter in all its details once more becomes in a sense *sub judice*." I feel sure that under the circumstances the readers of this Review would not regard it as becoming at this juncture to publish another instalment of the articles with which I have in season and out of season sought to elucidate the affair. But like Lord Crewe, in the course of his announcement that the Government would boycott the enquiry they dare not resist, " there are however one or two observations which I desire to make," and which in view of Ministerial determination to withhold all assistance—possibly involving a prohibition on members of the House of Commons from testifying—it is necessary to make.

For the blunders of stupid men the world is always prepared, but the blunders of clever men, or those who pass for being clever or at any rate slim, continue to surprise us in spite of their perpetual recurrence. Among the congeries of mysteries which constitute the " Great Marconi Mystery " is the total inability of the implicated parties to make an *amende honorable* even when they have no alternative. I make no pretence of being behind the political scenes or of being in a position to guess at what is passing through the minds of Front Benchers, but every one with any knowledge of the English character—and the House of Lords

remains an essentially English institution in spite of recent creations—can see for himself that Lord Murray had an extraordinarily easy task that fateful afternoon when he made his "personal statement," and I am not ashamed to say that it was with fear and trembling that I went to hear it, knowing how easily a generous assembly of English gentlemen could have been bamboozled. One could not resist imagining what one would have said in his place. At least two speeches were open to him, either of which would have served their temporary purpose, and no member or ex-member of the Asquith Ministry ever looks beyond the exigencies of the moment.

(Speech No. 1.) "My Lords, before Lord Ampthill moves his *motion*, I ask to be allowed to say a few words which will only occupy a few seconds and will, I apprehend, spare Lord Ampthill and your lordships the trouble of pursuing a repugnant topic. I share to the full the view entertained by this House and the public as to the gravity of the charges and allegations made against me, and I intend to bring my traducers to book before the only satisfactory tribunal, for which purpose I am seeking leave of the Attorney-General to institute criminal proceedings for libel, as no civil action will meet such a scanadalous case. I pledge myself to do everything that lies in my power to get this case into Court at the earliest possible moment, and under the circumstances I ask to be excused from making any further observations this afternoon."

There would have been only one answer to such an appeal—general congratulations to the new Peer on his zeal in vindicating his honour and that of his Order. I only feared such a declaration not because I should be afraid of going into Court as defendant, but because the law's delays are proverbial, and with all the goodwill in the world on the part of the plaintiff or prosecutor, many months might conceivably have elapsed if the Government thought it against their interests to allow an early hearing.

(Speech No. 2.) "My Lords, I ask to be allowed to make a personal statement in the nature of a confession, as I fully recognise that my conduct has been in many respects unworthy of a member of your lordships' House, detrimental to the public service and injurious to the best interest of the country. Looking back after a period of calm reflection, I can only say that I cannot

understand or explain how I came to make the series of impossible blunders with which my name has been associated, beginning with my disastrous investment in the American Marconi Company, on information which I was aware came from the General Manager of the English Marconi Company engaged at the time in negotiating a contract with the Government of which I was a member, which would in any event require the ratification of the House of Commons, the arrangements for which would lie in my province. I will not waste your time by splitting hairs as to imaginary differences between 'associated' Companies. It was grossly improper for any Minister to touch any Marconi Company. It was worse to conceal the transaction by the devious methods familiar to your lordships, nor can I excuse myself for buying at different prices for myself and as a Trustee, though I hoped at the time that the Party funds would not lose, and I have made good the loss actually sustained. For these and other indefensible actions I offer a humble apology to this House. I am unable to make serious replies to the majority of the allegations and can only say like many better men before me—*Peccavi.* If it is any satisfaction to your lordships I am prepared to appear before any Committee and testify on oath, but I do not conceive that any member of the most generous Assembly in the world will wish to inflict this additional humiliation upon me."

Sympathetic murmurs would have reverberated through the gilded Chamber and there the matter would have ended, which would have been most unfortunate as public interests demand that it be probed to the bottom and all the facts disclosed. Instead of these hypothetical utterances we had that amazing jejune typoscript—printed on a previous page—bearing all the traces of composite composition as no single individual however stupid—and we are not dealing with stupidity—could have perpetrated so many blunders within such narrow compass. One can only guess at the genesis of the document which may conceivably have been drafted in the Palazzo Lloyd George at Walton Heath, by sympathetic colleagues. It had presumably been submitted to the callous cynic at the head of the Government before it was read to the House of Lords, and *ex hypothesi* it received the imprimatur of Lord Crewe, who professed to be perfectly

satisfied with its terms. The author, or authors, whoever they may be, could not have been more proud of their progeny. The psychology of the Marconi temperament is a tempting topic. Men who have absorbed this particular atmosphere, or who have been absorbed by it, see things differently from anybody else and are perpetually digging pits into which they tumble. I do not wish to labour the matter, but no man can unravel the Marconi Mystery unless he understands what for convenience may be called "the Marconi mind," though an apology is due to a distinguished scientist for converting his surname into an adjective. For a Peer to crave in aid the verdict of the Select Committee of the House of Commons whose deliberations he had declined to assist though he was under a special obligation to do so, and who refused to accept its invitation to return, is an instance in point of this curious psychology. For a man who has held the great office of Chief Whip and was pronounced by his Party to be the most wonderful Whip the world had ever seen, to inform the House of Lords in cold blood that it had never occurred to him that there could be any impropriety in investing his own money or that of the Party in one of the Marconi Companies before the contract was even presented to the House of Commons, still less ratified, is another such instance. As likewise the light-hearted effort to present his conduct as a mere "error of judgment and not of intention." And then having dwelt on the innocence and propriety of putting the Party into American Marconis, almost in the next sentence he informs the House that he carefully avoided mentioning this innocent and most proper investment to his successor Mr. Illingworth when he handed over his functions and a portion of the funds. One is obliged to borrow the French word *épatant* to describe this "explanation." Still more stupefying is the admission "that but for the failure of a stockbroker nothing probably would have been known by the public about the Party transaction in American Marconis." And this from the Chief Whip of the day who boasts in the next sentence that it was he who announced the appointment of the Select Committee which was to investigate all these matters, and by which journalists were brow-beaten for repeating rumours which Lord Murray himself knew to be facts. He always intended to withhold from the cognisance of the Committee

—that had advertised for information, and which was appointed after Mr. Herbert Samuel's historic declaration (printed on a previous page) as to there being no uncleanliness in any quarter, which everybody interpreted as meaning, including the Select Committee itself, no Ministerial speculations in any Marconi Companies—that the Party itself was "in Marconis." In the face of this one need not credit the statement that Lord Murray "never purposed that it should be withheld from the Committee that I had had (private) transactions in American Marconi shares," all the more as he left the country the moment the Committee approached the subject of the rumours concerning Ministers. On re-reading Lord Murray's statement, one is almost tempted to say "An enemy hath done this thing" so disastrous is it from his own standpoint as the only semblance of apology which he offered his hearers was lest "my action should have caused any embarrassment *to the Party* with which for many years I have worked in such intimate relations."

There was no attempted answer to any of the specific charges and allegations except upon a single point, namely that the Master of Elibank's resignation of the office of Patronage Secretary in August 1912 had no connection with any of these transactions, as it had been decided so long ago as February 1912 when he "had placed his resignation in the hands of the Prime Minister" as was well known to Lord Crewe. The Liberal Party in Midlothian was kept in the dark all these months of the impending exit from politics of their member, with the result that when the time came the Opposition was able to capture a famous Radical citadel. Certainly the poor old Party of Progress suffers grievously at the hands of its Trustees and Big Whigs. At the date of his real retirement (February 1912) the Master of Elibank informed the House of Lords that he had never heard of Marconis, which shows that he has not even taken the trouble to read the evidence before the Select Committee, as in the month preceding February, *i.e.* January 8, 1912, the following telegram was despatched to the Party Broker Fenner:

Montmorency, London.

My address, Villa Dragonier, Cap Martin, Alps (*sic*) Maritimes. Write me how things are looking.

ALEXANDER MURRAY.

Fenner's reply dated January 9, 1912, contains the following sentence:

> Another share which has marked a very substantial rise during the last few months *is that of the Marconi Company* [my italics]. With these exceptions markets generally have tended downwards.

I would not labour a lapse of memory, but defective memory is a symptom of Marconitis, which may be described *inter alia* as an inability to make an accurate statement. How far is it contagious? Is Lord Crewe afflicted or is he merely repeating what afflicted colleagues have told him? Unlike the *Daily Mail*, which might almost be described as the *Elibank Echo*, he recognises that the investment of Party funds in Home Rails while Ministers were settling the coal strike would require explanation. "Take, for instance, this question of the *supposed* [my italics] purchase of Home Rails during the coal strike owing to the knowledge possessed by the Patronage Secretary that the Government was somehow going to settle the strike, and therefore the securities would appreciate in value. As a matter of fact, Lord Murray could have had no connection whatsoever with that transaction, because he was absent ill during the whole time of the coal strike. He was absent altogether for six weeks, and could have had no knowledge of what was going on." I should much have preferred to adjourn the controversy to the Enquiry, but there is some risk of the Government seeking escape from its thickening perils by a Dissolution, and after all here we have a definite public statement intended to influence opinion by the Government spokesman in the Lords under the protection of Parliamentary privilege. If Lord Crewe means anything he means that the Home Rails allegation, the "supposed purchase," is a cock-and-bull story disposed of by the illness of the Chief Whip at the date in question, March 6, 1912, which incapacitated him from transacting any business. If he was too ill to know that his colleagues were "settling" the coal strike, a fact continuously advertised in every newspaper in the land, *ex hypothesi* he was too ill to speculate on the Stock Exchange, and somebody else must have been using his name in vain, and what is more serious, paying up £21,000 out of the Party funds. The order for purchasing these Home Rails was thus acknowledged in a

letter from the firm and is supported by the evidence of the counterfoils of the contract notes.

The Right Hon. The Master of Elibank, P.C., M.P. *March 6, 1912.*
12 Downing Street, S.W.

DEAR SIR,—In accordance with your instructions, I have to-day forwarded to . . . . .* contract notes for the purchase of :

£10,000 Midland Rly. Deferred Converted Ordinary Stock @ 71¾.
£20,000 North British Rly. Deferred Converted Ordinary Stock @ 31¾.
£2000 " " " " " " @ 31 11/16.
£5000 Great Western Rly. Consolidated Ordinary Stock @ 118, and
£1000 " " " " " " @ 117⅞.

These Stocks will be registered in the same names as usual [my italics] unless I hear from you to the contrary.

I am, dear Sir,
Yours faithfully.†

P.S. The sum invested by the above is £21,365 10s. 6d.

The covering letter to the Master of Elibank's secretary of the same date, March 6, 1912, from the Party brokers runs as follows :

——— *March 6, 1912.*
12 Downing Street, S.W.

DEAR SIR,—At the request of the Master of Elibank, I am forwarding you contract notes as under :

For the purchase of :
£10,000 Midland Rly. Deferred Converted Ordinary Stock @ 71¾.
£20,000 North British Rly. Deferred Converted Ordinary Stock @ 31¾.
£2000 " " " " " " " " @ 31 11/16.
£5000 Great Western Rly. Consolidated Ordinary Stock @ 118, and
£1000 " " " " " " @ 117⅞.

I am, dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,

A week later the transaction is completed so far as the Master of Elibank is concerned by the following letter from his secretary :

12 DOWNING STREET, S.W.,
March 13, 1912.

DEAR MR. FENNER,—I am requested by the Master of Elibank, who is out of town, to send you two cheques in settlement of account herewith. I have added 10s. to the account, which I think you will find in order, and in agreement with the contract notes.

Yours faithfully,

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* There is no significance in this blank. I have no desire to bring in the names of private secretaries or others.

† These are reproductions of Press copies of letters which apparently were taken before the original letters were signed. This explains their being unsigned. The letters from 12 Downing Street are written on stamped official paper and signed by a private secretary of the Chief Whip.

Then follows a letter from the broker:

March 14, 1912.

DEAR MR. ———,—I thank you for your letter of yesterday, enclosing two cheques value £21,365 16s. 6d., and note that you have added 10s. to the account, which owing to a clerical error was wrongly rendered.

Yours truly,

———

12 Downing Street, S.W.

A few days later the broker writes as follows:

March 23, 1912.

The Right Hon. The Master of Elibank, P.C., M.P.,
Juniper Bank, Walkerburn.

DEAR SIR,—On looking carefully through the dividends paid by the North British, I find that the yield is under 4 per cent., and I exceedingly regret my error. I have, therefore, sold the Stock, and purchased Great Northern Deferred, which yields just about 5 per cent., and is as good a Stock, if not better. This change is made without any expense to you whatever, and subject to your approval. If, therefore, I do not hear from you, I shall conclude that you approve of my action.

Markets here are inclined to be good—I think with the first sign of any Strike settlement we should see a general rise all round.

Home Railways are dull, merely on account of absence of business, and, of course, reduced traffics.

Mining Shares and Oil Shares are extremely strong, and a fair business doing. I am inclined to believe that the Oil Market will be the next feature of the Stock Exchange.

I am, dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,

The reader will have noted that in the Party brokers' letter of March 6 it was stated that the £21,000 of Railway Stock "will be registered in the same names as usual" unless other orders were given. What were these names? Mr. Illingworth, the present Chief Ministerial Whip, obligingly explained to the Marconi Committee that he was a co-trustee of the Party funds but completely ignorant of their administration, otherwise one might have been disposed to suggest if the Master of Elibank, as Lord Crewe suggests, was unable to attend to business, that this was Mr. Illingworth's "spec."

I should not have reproduced these documents at this moment but for Lord Crewe's careless suggestion that the Home Rails investment is an invention. What importance attaches to his further allegation that there was no accumulation of Party funds

on the eve of his Majesty's Coronation, which according to Lord Crewe was celebrated by the sale of a large block of Consols? His words are worth quoting as all Ministerial statements must be placed under a microscope that will detect mental reservations. "I do know that on that particular occasion considerable, or large, blocks of Consols were sold, and reinvested in smaller amounts in various other securities." What a reflection on the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that in the year of a great Free Trade boom his colleagues should dispose of "considerable" or "large" blocks of Consols in order to get their property outside the orbit of Georgian finance by transferring it to Havana, Vera Cruz or Manchuria. U.S. Brazil Four per cent. Loan a superior investment to British Consols! Many hard things have been said upon Georgian finance by his opponents, but there has been nothing so eloquent as these apprehensions of his admirers. Lord Crewe has opened a new chapter in the fall in Consols and that flight of capital which arouses Mr. Asquith's admiration.

A friend in need is a friend indeed. The *National Review* has been a real friend to his Majesty's Ministers throughout this Marconi business, as from the outset it called their attention to rumours affecting their reputations, and Mr. Lawson's very first article published in October 1912 brought in all the Marconi Companies, calling special attention to the American Company in which a scandalous gamble occurred. It appeared a few days prior to the Festival of Truth and afforded the Marconi trio an admirable opportunity of owning up, but unfortunately for them and for the country cowardly counsels prevailed, and they devoted their talents to subterfuge, prevarication and concealment ending in moral catastrophe, accompanied by lemonade luncheons and professional promotion. During the sittings of the Marconi Committee after the painful disclosures in the *Matin* case, other Ministers who might have trodden an equally slippery path to the American "investors" were repeatedly urged to "own up" like men, but they elected to remain silent and no member of the Government voluntarily testified. Those who appeared were summoned. The rest remained away. Are we to believe that among the innumerable absentee Ministers none had ever made such entirely

proper and suitable investments—meet for the highest dignitaries in the Church or on the Bench according to Mr. Falconer —as American, Canadian, Spanish or other Marconi Companies? It is a large order, and our credulity has already been heavily taxed. *It is almost an insult to the intelligence of* the Government. They have one last opportunity provided by the Lords Enquiry. It will be interesting to see which, if any, hero avails himself of it, or whether other speculators will "skulk in the background"—to borrow Mr. Churchill's phrase—until they in their turn are found out.

L. J. MAXSE

A CHRISTMAS HOLIDAY IN TUNISIA

It is five days to the desert from London, via Tunis. If when you get to Tunis the sea is flat, and you feel a sudden impulse, as I did, to visit Malta, you must allow another day and two long nights. Leave Tunis at 4 P.M. and you will be in La Valetta by 7.30 A.M.; leave again that afternoon at 4 P.M. and you will be back in Tunis for breakfast. Is it worth while? Certainly I found it so. It is good to pay six English pennies in the heart of the Mediterranean to the boatman who takes you from the ship to the landing-stage, better still to see British ships of war in both harbours of Valetta; it is good to drive out to St. Paul's Bay, and visit the place where two seas met, and the vessel was battered to pieces by the waves; good to read the legend over the Post Office, "Here Napoleon as General of the French Republic spent seven eventful days in 1798;" good to stand on the front bastion of the harbour by the Doric temple built in memory of Sir John Alexander Ball, first English Governor; good to visit the church where the Knights of St. John are buried, especially if an English soldier guides you there, and refuses to be rewarded for his pains; and best of all to read the inscription on the Guard House opposite the palace:

MAGNÆ ET INVICTÆ BRITANNIÆ
MILITENSIUM AMOR ET EUROPÆ VOX
HAS INSULAS CONFIRMAVIT.

And all this may be done, without much hurry or inconvenience, in the space of seven hours. But if this excursion seems too heroic or too fatuous, miss it out, and the five days will be spent as follows:

The first night is passed in the train between Paris and Marseilles, the second in a cabin of the *Carthage* (built, by the way, at Newcastle-on-Tyne), the third in one of the hotels of Tunis,

the fourth in the train, and the fifth in the beautiful oasis of Nefta after a ride of twenty-four kilometres from Tozeur, where very gladly, as well as inevitably, you leave the train. The night is not spent without anxiety if there are any signs of rising wind, for wind is worse than rain in the desert, and you are likely enough to have a fair sample of each in the Tunisian Sahara between December and April. The guide will have been told to be ready at four, but at seven you will have to send messenger after messenger in search of him, and when he arrives he will silence your furious protests by a wildly improbable tale that his horse and camel broke lose at midnight and that he has been hunting for them ever since. And all the while the camel will look on with his imperturbable, and in this case most justifiable, disdain. We thought ourselves lucky to be off by eight, none too early, as we had forty-two kilometres to ride, and the donkeys objected to more than five kilometres an hour. We were a party of four, our two selves on donkeys, our cuisinier on a mule, and the guide, the show-figure of our squadron in his blue burnous, mounted on an Arab horse. He had a habit of lagging behind and rejoining us at full gallop; the first time that this happened the mule was startled and unseated the cuisinier, a stout good-natured Arab of forty-five, whose only demerit was that he repented having come with us almost as soon as he had started.

We rode on uneventfully till one, meeting only a single Arab boy with four donkeys bound on a quest for wood, which is found in queer shapes and sizes through some parts of the Sahara, and is sold for about a franc for a donkey's load. After lunch, just as we were mounting, we were startled by the shouts of a breathless man who appeared to have arisen out of the ground or to have fallen from the sky. He turned out to be our chamelier who had started with the baggage the night before. "Our camel," so the cuisinier interpreted, "had fallen some two kilometres away and was unable to rise." Our horseman was despatched to the scene of action or suffering, and we sat there helplessly awaiting the event, with only a faint hope of reaching our borgj or caravanserai before night fell. But "fears may be liars," as we shortly proved; our Arab was back again with good news, in less than half an hour. Our camel was not dead or even ill: he had found it eating heartily, but unwilling or unable to rise until its load was readjusted, a task which naturally enough had proved too hard

for an unassisted chamelier. We reached our borgj before sunset after all, but had to light a fire signal of alfa grass from the dome of the roof to guide our offending camel to his night's rest. The moment the sheaf of grass was lit on the summit of the dome by a small boy belonging to the borgj, who clambered up with difficulty, the camel characteristically enough appeared looking even more unconcerned than usual. I should mention that size is extraordinarily deceptive in the desert; half a mile away a borgj looks about the size of St. Paul's; when you reach it you find that it consists of two or three small rooms, a yard, and half a dozen stalls for mules and horses. In the room or rooms set apart for travellers or tourists (the indigènes are not admitted to these) there is a fireplace, two chairs, and a table. The French Government provides these resting-places free of charge at intervals of sixteen to twenty miles along the caravan route; the guardian is usually a retired soldier who does his best to make you comfortable, supplies a cheerful wood fire, and is grateful for two or three francs, which he well deserves.

The next stage was only twenty-seven kilometres; the wind, which had been in our faces the day before, changed its mind suddenly and blew us along so that we reached our borgj early, but not too early, for the weather grew more and more threatening, and we were thankful to be within four walls while the wind was howling outside. Just before dawn the wind sank suddenly, and a glorious sunrise sent us on our way rejoicing. We lunched in an oasis (the first we had seen since leaving Nefta) which had been planted only fifteen years ago, and reached our borgj on the outskirts of a populous village soon after three. Presently half a dozen unattractive natives called upon us bringing with them a child of four incomparably ragged but less unattractive in appearance than the rest. The child, they said, was an orphan, and they wished it to be better dressed; accordingly they proposed that we should give them two francs to secure this laudable object. I was firm in resisting the proposal. Tourists, I knew from my guide-book, create beggars. In Algeria this is a *fait accompli*, but in Tunisia (except in Tunis) beggars are still comparatively rare. Unfortunately my companion was infirm, or firm if she prefers it (you will have divined the sex) in the view opposed to mine. Finally the cuisinier suggested (knowing of course that my view

was the right one but bowing to the inevitable) that the two francs should not be entrusted to the deputation, but that we should purchase the garments at Eloued and deliver them when we returned in four days. This view prevailed, and a noble sunset seemed to approve our generosity. So to sleep, with the thought that Eloued was only twenty-one kilometres distant, and that we should be sure to be there for an early lunch. But we had reckoned without the wind. Before we had ridden an hour the desert was fairly moving, the sand streaming from every height. Once our donkeys, with the wind driving in their faces, firmly refused to attempt one of the steeper crests till our guide dismounted, and working with both hands for all he was worth made the ascent somewhat easier. It was far from being a real sand storm, but it was quite sufficiently unpleasant; from head to foot we were plastered with sand, and our composure, to say the least, was ruffled. Even in the streets of Eloued the sand was driving furiously, and the usually unwelcome douane was to us a real haven of rest. And here I should like to say that the behaviour of all the officials in Tunisia contrasts very favourably with that of their confrères in France. In particular this douanier was most friendly, and made us very comfortable in his sheltered courtyard, most courteously refusing any reward. I may add that twice at least the guards on the train after taking a great deal of trouble, refused to accept anything, and, more wonderful still, at Nefta an Arab boy who accompanied us to the "Sources" declined the coin I offered him, and left us with a friendly farewell.

From the douane we went to the guide's house, where our host at Nefta had assured us, for reasons of his own, we should be far more comfortable than at the hotel. The house proved to be a single tiny room, which you could not enter upright, with no window, and no furniture; the only contents a carpet of dirty sand. "Aude hospes contennere opes" is all very well, but we preferred to try the hotel. Eloued, in the opinion of its citizens, is as big as London; it stretches, they say, more than twenty kilometres, and the name they interpret as meaning a great river of men. There are more, they say, than seventy thousand inhabitants; six thousand seven hundred says my guide-book. Anyhow, the semicircle of houses and colonnades around the market-place is really rather noble, and the saucer-like hollows full of palm trees, whose tops are level with your feet as you stand

on the saucer's rim, have a wonderful charm of their own. The clothes for the Arab child were not forgotten, and as they only cost three francs there was not much to grumble at. On our way back to Nefta we had three and a half lovely days; the other half day was windy and unpleasant. The clothes were a great success. We were met by the deputation, and the child; the clothes were given, and the child retired behind a wall, to reappear after a few moments transformed. It really looked delightful, all in white, and I felt some temptation to congratulate my companion, but feeling it would be a bad precedent, refrained. And my turn came before long, for first the deputation refused to leave the borgj except under compulsion, and secondly the most unpleasant member of the group shortly returned and took up his station at the door, demanding money, on the ground that we had given a present to a child, and that he was at least twenty years older. However, he too went, under compulsion. And after supper, when we went out for a stroll, my companion insisted on avoiding the village, and when I enquired why, said curtly, "For fear of being mobbed." So I was satisfied.

Sunset on the sand dunes is very wonderful As we walked along a high ridge, the side facing the sun was burnished gold, and at every step we raised a shower of golden dust; the other side was white and cold as death. And up the next ridge to eastward of us we saw waves of light flushing, and just before the sunset waves of green light melting into rose.

On the last day of our return journey, having settled to make an early start, we woke our guide at three, the camel was off by four, and we ourselves half an hour later. It is easy to wake when you like in a borgj: the difficulty is to keep asleep, for the floors are hard and the nights cold.

After three hours riding (during which my saddle came off in the dark) we saw the sunrise at last, and our Arabs dismounted, made a fire by setting light to a bush of alfa grass, and thrust their chilled feet into the blaze. When three hours away from Nefta we came across a party of Americans on their way to Biskra enjoying their first lunch in the desert. Their caravan of camels dwarfed us into insignificance; Jacob and all his belongings going into Egypt can hardly have made a more imposing show. Anyhow, they were all enjoying themselves to the utmost, as Americans always seem able to do, and they gave us

a particularly friendly welcome. On the luncheon cloth basked and sprawled their mascot, a fascinating puppy, who was enjoying his first experience of the world. Nefta, surrounded, as it seemed, by a blue sea, looked very beautiful in the distance, but the sea becomes flakes of salt as you approach it, and Nefta itself to two weary riders seemed absolutely unapproachable. But we got there, not without some loss of temper, at last.

Next morning we rode to Tozeur, and spent four good hours on the way, for we had no skill or spur which could induce our donkeys to trot, and our Arab boy, throned on our luggage, and borne by a real pig of a mule, was unable to give effectual aid. But the hotel, built in Arab fashion round a courtyard, was most prepossessing, and lunch made amends for everything. We left Tozeur by the only train of the day at 3 23 and reached Metlaoni, famous for its phosphate mines, about 5; tea, owing to a thoughtful telegram, was waiting for us in the train into which we changed. The Seldja gorge was far beyond our hopes. It impressed us much more than the "stupendous and magnificent" (*see* the guide-books) Gorge du Chabet el Akra, partly because we saw it in the most favourable light, for the moon had risen and the sun had only just gone down. The line skirts the mountains for some minutes, looking in vain for an opening, then makes up its mind and plunges into a tunnel where a river has made a way. We emerge in a deep ravine, with now a precipitous mountain wall almost touching the carriage, now the vista of some moonlit ravine running at right angles to ours. We cross and recross the river, and the long train of trucks, with two carriages attached as an afterthought, moves so slowly that we have far more time for realising the scene than we should have had in a motor. In twenty minutes we are in the plain again, and at 12.50 A.M. we are at Sbeitla. It takes a minute or two to induce the hotel keeper to believe that we mean to visit the ruins by moonlight, and to start at 6.53 A.M. in order to avoid the (to us) undesirable alternative of spending the next day at Sbeitla, and leaving by the midnight train by which we came. We dared, too, to hope that Melrose is not the only ruin which is best visited by moonlight, and the moon was almost full. Eventually our host gave us the key of his house, that we might let ourselves in when we pleased, and promised faithfully to call us at 6. "Je me charge de cela," were his farewell words.

Sbeitla (Suffetula) was once the short-lived capital of Tunisia, but the Arabs destroyed it pretty thoroughly in the sixth century. Fortunately one considerable group of buildings survives. About a kilometre from the station you come to a noble triumphal arch, and less than a kilometre beyond this is another arch through which you pass into an enclosed square rather larger than the schoolyard at Eton. The enclosing walls seemed to be some fifteen feet in height; remembering the schoolyard, imagine three temples standing side by side in place of Lupton's tower. The temples are small; the largest, at a guess, four times the size of the temple of Athena Nike on the Acropolis: the central temple is separated by about ten feet from those on either side. I have visited Athens, Baalbec, Karnak; and Sbeitla, though it cannot vie with these, may at least be named in their company. Having seen the temples, we hardly hoped for another thrill, but we wandered on till the silence was broken by the furious barking of two dogs who resented our approach. Still we persevered, and presently we were rewarded by coming to a little river spanned by a Roman bridge. It is true we could step across the river, but it was a real river all the same, running and tinkling and sparkling in the moonlight, and I read afterwards that Sfax, more than a hundred miles away, gets its water-supply from here. Meanwhile the dogs had roused their master, the guardian of the place, and he came out from a neighbouring ruinous hovel to greet us, and earn his franc, at 2.30 A.M., as if it was the most natural thing in the world that we should be there at such a time. His wife soon joined him, and grinned a silent welcome. We could gladly have dispensed with a guide, but we felt that we owed him something for disturbing his sleep, so we let him have his way. He led us to a little baptistery of which he had the key; it is in the form of a cross; there is one like it in the museum at Tunis, but this being *in situ* had a charm of its own. We then paid him lavishly, still feeling a little guilty for having woken him, and made our way once more back to the three temples to which we wished to say good-bye. And so back to our hotel. It seemed useless at 3.30 to undress, but as I lay upon my bed I thought to myself that I was glad the train left before daylight, for I could not have borne to risk spoiling the recollection of the moonlit temples and river by another visit in the common light of day. I awoke and struck a match at 4.30, and 5.20, and when I next awoke

people were moving about the house and it was 6.50. The innkeeper came when I shouted, followed by his wife; the *garcon*, she said very coolly, had overslept himself, there was no doubt we had missed the train. It was too bad to be kept another day at Sbeitla, for the profit of the hotel, and intolerable that such a simple and shameless plot should succeed; I shouted to my companion in the next room, explained the facts, and then we ran for it. The station was only fifty yards away; the guard did his best for us; and eventually when the train left five minutes late we and all our luggage were inside it. Unfortunately there was no time to explain to the innkeeper what we thought of him and of his wife, who, I believe, was the worse of the two; for at the last moment, as we left the hotel, when she saw that there was just a chance of our catching the train, she had the malicious cunning to suggest that there was plenty of time and that we need not hurry. Alas! for the shamelessness of greed.

At 11.30 Kairouan was in sight, but we had to change and wait two hours at a little station ten miles away. Being unwashed and unfed we were glad of the rest, and lay in the shadow of a great cactus after a vain search for Barbary figs, which I have found on a previous occasion as late as January. The Hotel de France at Kairouan is kept by delightful people, who gave us the warmest welcome, and it is quite surprising how great a difference that makes. A camel fight was to take place almost immediately; we missed it by drinking our coffee too leisurely, and only arrived in time to see the victorious camel ridden off by his owner escorted by a crowd of his triumphant backers. We did not much regret missing the fight; the camels looked a good deal distressed, though they are said to enjoy the fighting, and their tongues were swollen to the size of an Eton football, so that whenever they put them out to cool them it seemed to us impossible that they should succeed in drawing them in again. You cannot wonder that the children in Kairouan are cruel to animals (I forbear to give illustrations), for this sport of camel fighting is the favourite spectacle of the town. Our object was now to see the sunset from the great mosque. We walked outside the walls and were surprised to see a football match in progress between two sides of French and Arabs, who, by the by, fraternise admirably. This too we left, and reached the great mosque in good time. The full moon was rising over the plain, and the sun setting on the

mountains as we reached the summit of the minaret; and at our feet between the sun and the moon lay Kairouan. The holy city might have just descended from heaven; seen from above it shows no stain upon its spotless surface; each of its hundred domes is white, but hardly whiter than the flat roofs that surround them. The mountains that stand about the city on one side seem very close in that clear atmosphere: they are in reality twenty to thirty miles away. On the other side stretches an illimitable plain. As we see it to-day it shows no green except the cactus, for there has been little rain this autumn, but the city stands out all the more brightly against the contrasting brown. The smoke that hangs over the city is as white and soft as the wings of sleep. Long after sunset we descend, finding our way down the stairs by lighting matches at intervals, and emerge into the great court which is full of peace. The design of the mosque is simple and noble. A spacious flagged court, in which the mouths of cisterns show here and there, surrounded on three sides by a colonnade, with a great minaret on the north side; on the south side the sanctuary, a forest of pillars (five hundred we were told) among which the new-lit lamps are shining softly as we pass. And afterwards we go out again down the rue Saussier, the crowded thoroughfare of Kairouan, where the Arabs sit above their wares, dates and oranges, brown loaves and strings of figs, stuffs and rugs of many colours, baskets and pitchers, all illumined by the lamps of their booths. We miss to-night the lanterns which generally hang on wires across the street, for there is no need of them when the moon is full. One more stroll down the street to the Tunis gate, and then "with gazing most content" we turn and go to bed. And so back next day to Tunis, not to the Tunisia Palace or the Majestic Hotel, not even to the Hotel Eymon, where the one object of the host is to make you comfortable, and the surroundings are full of the colour and the character of the town, but to a house two miles from Tunis, on a south-eastward facing brow, where, as we sup on the veranda, we look out on Carthage and Sidi-bou-Said to westward, on the electric trams scattering sparks as they skirt the lake of Tunis on either side, on the twin heights of Bou-Kornein facing us, where you can gather handfuls of cyclamen in January, on the many-coloured lights of Tunis at our feet, and the solemn stars overhead.

HUGH MACNAGHTEN

AT RAVENGLASS

THE ringed plovers went north at the end of March. It was one of those days that the bellowing equinoctial gales love to bring to the south coast. The pale sunshine played hide-and-seek with the hail storms over the sea, and the sand fled in stinging clouds before that harsh east wind that the old rhyme describes as:

Neither good for man nor beast

We thought that this condemnation was too moderate, as we struggled into a sheltered angle of the rocks. But the warm corner already held other refugees. Five storm-beaten ringed plover stood on the stones by the water's edge, with their trim fawn feathers ruffled with spray, and the foam splashing over their feet. Were they grumbling at the gale which had brought them thus far on their journey northwards, and now held them storm-bound on this inhospitable coast? Not a bit of it. A gleam of sunshine broke through the clouds, and as if in answer, the first bird began piping: *Tee-tee-toy-tee*, and another and another took up the word, until all five were duetting and whistling together in the sweetest, merriest chorus of Pan-pipes ever heard on a bleak March morning. Then, with a flash of silver grey wings, they skimmed seawards, and whirled away round the Point. But the day seemed brighter for the sound of their cheery voices, and we did not grumble about the weather any more.

Instead, we said: "We too will go up north, when the days are longer."

In May we met the plover again among the multitudes of birds who fly and wade and swim along the shingle banks of Ravenglass, at the estuary of the three rivers. The rivers flow north and

south and west, until they meet on the saltings, and then all three go shouting down to the sea together. Twice a day the high tides sweep up the channel, until there is half a mile of wind-swept water between the mainland and the low range of bare dunes on the seaward side of the estuary, which is the great stronghold of the wild fowl.

Sixteen centuries ago, the Roman legions used to sail right up to the village on their way to the Great Wall, and the old name that they gave to the place still clings to the fells above the estuary: but for five hundred years the winds and waters have worked together to pile up great dunes and sandbanks along the coast, and these have been given over to the birds. At low water, every sandy spit and naked mussel-bed is crowded with gulls, and plover, and pink-shanked oyster-catchers; shelduck dibble in the ooze of the mudflats; and a stately heron or two stands sentinel at the water's edge. If you climb the sandhills and turn eastwards, you look right up the valleys of the three rivers, into the heart of the mountains. If you look westwards, you will see the Isle of Man—a blue smear on the horizon, and the choppy, troublous Irish Sea fretting and splashing on the beaches that it has laid down at the foot of the dunes. I say that you might see all this, but first of all you will not see it. That is because the shingles and the marram plots, and the ridges and the valleys of the sandhills, and the air over and under and around you, will be so full of seagulls.

A great flock of birds has a beauty and impressiveness entirely of its own. No herd of cattle, however great, no crowd of men, however imposing, can convey quite the same idea of space and multitude. Every dune top and every hollow is studded with gulls, until the whiteness of them massed together in the marram grass is like the whiteness of melting snowdrifts on the hillside, and the air also is full of them, skimming and swooping to and fro. The sound of their voices, like the roar of the tide on the bar, is mighty. Now a couple rush fifty feet upwind to buffet each other playfully and then fall apart, as a score of others whirl round them. Here a battalion stoop to their nests, poised like a troop of angels. Everywhere there is a tumultuous rush of wings, a great and sonorous clamour. And yet, although some of the birds swoop hither and thither headlong, while others hang aloft

almost motionless, breasting the wind, there is no confusion. It is like a great musical symphony made corporate, in which the leading notes, with chord and arpeggio and appoggiatura, are represented by soaring birds.

But no prose description can do justice to the magnificent rhythm of their flight, nor any verse, unless I think it might be some of Swinburne's great anapæsts:

> White glories of wings,
> As of sea-faring birds
> That flock to the springs
> Of the sunrise in herds,
> With the wind for a herdsman, and hasten or
> halt at the change of his words.
>
> At the charge of his word
> Bidding pause, bidding haste,
> When the ranks are stirred
> And the lines displaced,
> They scatter as wild swans parting adrift
> on the wan green waste.

Every now and then, as at a given signal, a silence falls on the host. With one accord they rise, and swoop noiselessly to and fro before dropping back on to their eggs again with renewed clamour. This sudden hush in the middle of such great sound and stir is like the duration of a semibreve rest in the midst of a piece of orchestral music, and is strangely impressive.

As you walk across the hills, fresh clouds of birds rise on all sides while those behind drop screaming to their nurseries, which are built so close together that it would be quite possible to pass right across the dunes and set your foot upon a clutch of eggs at each step. The air is heavy with the pungent smell of the sunshine on the nettle-beds, and also with that peculiar taint which is always so apparent near a great gathering of birds. Except for a few domestic tussles for the privilege of warming the eggs, there is no quarrelling. The male birds hold jousts on certain bare patches of sand in the midst of the colony, but their tourneys are quite harmless. The bird turns slowly round and round with outstretched head and neck, while he calls attention to his display by harsh screaming. Now and then a big stupid chick blunders into the lists, and stands bewildered, while all the doughty warriors lower their heads and boo at him, until his

mamma comes up and hustles him away from the hubbub, just as you may see a human mother dragging her youngster out of the crowd that has collected round a street fight.

The gulls, however, are merely the plebeians of the Ravenglass sandhills; the terns are the patricians—especially the Sandwich terns.

The Sandwich terns nest in small quarrelsome parties on the tops of the dunes. The slovenly hollows in the sand that contain their handsome mottled eggs are scraped so close together that when one bird turns round on her nest, her tail touches her neighbour's head, and then the couple scold and gobble at one another until they can adjust their long wings to each other's convenience. Even when the colony is at peace, which is not often, the birds keep up a subdued chorus in guttural monotone. The Sandwich tern lacks the beautiful coral bill and legs of the common tern, but still he is a handsome bird enough, with sabre wings of wondrous span, glossy crest, and ochre and ebon bill, and it was a rare treat to spend two days in watching a colony at close quarters, from the shelter of a large wicker-work crate covered with dry marram grass.

These particular Sandwich terns were nesting in the middle of a much larger colony of black-headed gulls, with whom, however, they seemed to live on good terms. The black-headed gull is not such an unprincipled buccaneer as his greater and lesser black-backed cousins, but on the second day I saw a flagrant piece of larceny committed. For some time a shabby old gull had been hopping about among the brooding terns, who of course, accustomed to the sight of his brown hood and white spectacles, paid no attention to him while he rambled among their nurseries, like a wolf in sheep's clothing. One tern left her nest unguarded for a minute. The gull sidled up and, glancing round guiltily, sucked an egg. He had reckoned without the tern's keen eyes. She and half a dozen of her clan swooped down screaming upon the thief. He, however, evaded retribution for the time being by escaping into a crowd of other gulls.

The tern was a good deal puzzled and annoyed by her broken egg. She tried to brood over it, but as it dribbled its contents over her feathers, she picked it up contemptuously and threw it aside. Immediately, amid a scream from the sympathising

neighbours, a jackdaw, one of those pests who haunted the outskirts of the gullery, swooped down and carried off the broken egg. The original robber left the neighbourhood for a time, but next day he and one or two of his companions were seen pirating the nests, not only of the common and Sandwich terns, but also of their own kind. I do not believe, however, that the black-headed gulls *as a race* are thieves. It is far more likely to be a new habit adopted by certain aberrant individuals. When thousands of birds are crowded together in one locality, the wonder is that they can find food at all, not that they turn to robbery in order to procure it.

The common terns muster in their thousands at Ravenglass. They nest on a grassy flat in the heart of the dunes, apart from the gulls and the plover and the oyster-catchers, who share the rights of the sandhills with them. It was a windy day when we went to the ternery. The winter storms had carved the dunes into abrupt fantastic shapes, and, like shaggy hair blown awry, great tussocks of marram grass waved sadly from their summits. Inland the sun was shining, but a thin film of mist blew in from the sea, and the wind drove the sand down the gullies in low clouds, until it looked almost as if we were walking knee-deep in a stream of water. We found the birds in a wide sandy basin shut in by sand hillocks. They had but newly arrived from overseas, and as it was their courting time, they spent the forenoon in hanging in a dense cloud over their future breeding-ground. Underfoot were innumerable scrapings in the sand, as though the birds were trying experiments in nest-building. Now and then a tern would alight with a flutter of long white wings, and then, as if the site did not please her, swept up to join her fellows; but for the most part the whole flock hung over our heads, uttering their monotonous and melancholy cry: "*Kree-a-kree.*" There was none of the bustle and movement of the gull colony. Each bird kept her unvarying station in the flock, and her part in the chorus. Only, as we walked onwards, the whole vast army, as if moved by some common impulse, would now and then sweep a few yards forward so as to maintain their place overhead. I cannot tell how it was, unless perhaps it might have been the influence of many hundreds of eyes all fixed intently upon us, but after a while there seemed to be something almost eerie in this immense flock of birds, with

their wailing voices, and straining, but almost immovable, wings silhouetted against the sky, and beautiful as they were, I felt that I almost hated them. They did not stoop at us, but all the while we felt that they were watching, and that if we had been birds instead of men, they would have dealt with us less patiently. One day a pair of young partridges strayed among the sandhills. Immediately the whole tern colony descended and slew them. There was no wound on the victims' bodies, but the skulls were punctured all over with stabs from the murderous bills of the terns.

The amount of mutual defence that is found in a bird community varies a good deal with different species. To a certain extent no doubt all gregarious birds have a rudimentary social system, but a few possess it in more eminent degree. Among these, terns rank high. For my part, I should class them with the starlings and the crows as one of the most intelligent, as they are one of the most social, species of British birds. These qualities indeed generally go together, for common interests are a good whetstone for the wits. It would also seem as if terns were capable of a good deal of concerted action in other directions, if we may believe a story related by Edwards of Banff and quoted by W. H. Hudson. A tern was shot and wounded, but before the gunner could retrieve it, its fellows seized it by the wing-tips and bore it out of reach away to sea.

The lesser terns, who nest on the shingle banks nearer the sea, are of more solitary habits, but they have also waspish dispositions to judge from the unmerciful way in which they harry any unwary gull or plover who wanders near their eggs. However, in their domestic life they are altogether charming. I spent the greater part of a summer's day in watching a pair of them from the shelter of that crate which had already imposed so successfully upon the Sandwich terns. The hen bird treated the crate with complete indifference, and it was one of the prettiest sights in the world to see her sail down on to her eggs and poise herself daintily upon her tiny webbed feet. Now and then she looked up and called to her mate who hovered overhead.

He replied at once by coming down close to the nest, and then began a very pretty game of pretence. The cock bird lowered his head and advanced towards his mate with little mincing steps.

She, for her part, pretended to be bored by his attentions, and strolled away, stretching her wings and pecking fretfully at the pebbles around her. Finding that she would not notice him, the cock came up to the nest, and stared at the eggs with such admiration that I thought that he was about to cover them. But at that, all make-believe was at an end. The hen bird suddenly took wing and he dashed up to join her. The pair of them rose like white butterflies in a fluttering spiral, and for the next half-hour all that could be known of them were their lover-like voices twittering overhead. Few people realise the important part that the cock bird plays in hatching the eggs and rearing the young. The relation between sire and offspring, on the whole, is much closer among birds than it is in the case of most mammals. I was often struck with this at Ravenglass, where the rabbits on the sandhills were almost as numerous as the birds. The little rabbits, after they left the nesting burrow, had to fend for, and educate, themselves. On the other hand, the gulls and plover followed their parents, and were fed and fostered at night, until they had completely outgrown the comfortable bivouac of their mother's feathers and were to all intents adult.

The bare saltings that lie on either side of the estuary were not much frequented by gulls and terns, who preferred the marram covert of the dunes, but they were a great haunt of the wading birds. In May these flats were gay with thrift and scurvy grass and heartsease flowers. Nesting-places were then at a premium, and every fifty yards some anxious peewit or ringed plover scolded you for a breach of the law of trespass. There was a dandy oyster-catcher on every hillock, and in the hollow behind, his mate slipped stealthily from her eggs at our approach. The oyster-catcher was undoubtedly the bird that was most in evidence at Ravenglass, not even excepting the gulls. All day long, and all night too, one could hear his merry rattling pipe by the waterside. Small bachelor parties gathered upon the foreshore, or limped down the sandy spits, whistling shrilly. Most of the birds, however, were very busy with their domestic concerns, and their "mock nests" were scraped everywhere among the dry seaweed. I have never watched the courtship of the oyster-catcher, but it seems likely that as with the wooing of the tufted duck, missel-thrush and lapwing, the making of a sham

nest is a regular part of the performance. The simplest way to find the real nest, with its complement of four handsome eggs is to follow the footprints of the old birds in the sand—their "feetings," as the boatmen call them—up from the water side.

Oyster-catchers, when once their suspicions have been lulled, (no easy task) are the most interesting birds to study at close quarters. In 1912 I spent two days, as an unsuspected and uninvited guest, within six feet of a nest on a windy plateau above the estuary bar. All the forenoon the hen bird brooded lovingly, rising every hour or so to readjust her eggs. Towards noon, however, she became restless, and the reason for her flutter was not far to seek. It was ebb tide, and her mate was coming to relieve guard. In due course he walked up to the nest, and she jumped up joyfully and tripped down to the beach. Meanwhile he tucked the eggs skilfully under his waistcoat and brooded faithfully for an hour. At the end of this time, the shore being covered by the inflowing tide, the hen bird returned to resume her duties, and there was a pretty little scene between the couple. They caressed each other with their scarlet bills, while they whistled together in the sweetest, softest bird music ever heard. Even after his mate was settled on her eggs once more, the male bird lingered near the place as if loath to leave it. I have seldom seen birds that I liked so well—so beautiful, so innocent, and so occupied.

While I was watching the oyster-catchers, there was a thrum of wings, and a fine sheldrake pitched close by. The sheldrake is a common bird at Ravenglass, and at low tide small parties of two or three birds can be seen waddling sedately over the mud. They breed plentifully in the rabbit burrows among the dunes, but the duck seldom succeeds in bringing her first brood to the water; for, unluckily for her, at Ravenglass her eggs have a commercial value, both for sale to visitors, and also for the pot. The duck leaves the burrow twice a day in order to feed: once early in the morning, and again late in the afternoon. As is the rule with most of her tribe, her mate calls for her at the mouth of the burrow, takes her down to the mudflats, and then escorts her back to the nest again. Often at sunset, when the tide was low, I heard their amorous voices as they flew past the boat, but as a rule the sheldrake is a wary fowl, whose intimate acquaintance you may

make only through binoculars, or (if you are of that way of thinking) from behind a trigger.

For there are divers ways of making the acquaintance of a wild bird. Some people, as I say, do so through the lens of field-glass or camera, and more along the barrels of a gun. Others again use nothing but their eyes, and this method certainly has more delights and less disappointments than either of the other two. But whichever way you make it, the privilege of the acquaintance is the same. For it is indeed a privilege to meet people who are never idle and seldom unhappy, who do not waste time in discussing their duties, or repenting of their stupidities, and who, best of all, as Walt Whitman says, are never under any circumstances respectable.

N.B.—I append a list of the birds seen on this occasion: ringed plover, heron, black-headed gull, Sandwich tern, common tern, lesser tern, green plover, oyster-catcher, sheldrake.

M. D. HAVILAND

AMERICAN AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, *February 3, 1914*

IT has long been the belief of Europe that the United States would never enter into an alliance or a political arrangement with any European nation. That has also been the belief of Americans. It was opposed to their traditional policy as well as being unnecessary. They could see no advantage in it, and Americans are like other people in that they make no bargains without expecting to gain by them. The American has no fear of invasion or conquest. The menace of a huge indemnity does not vex him. He feels himself so strong that consequences do not disturb him. Foreign affairs touch him remotely and rarely affect him personally. He could afford to plough his lonely furrow and not ask favours of the rest of the world.

Yet it has appeared to some observers that the United States must in time be influenced by the same considerations that have shaped the policies of other nations and that a political alliance between the United States and a European nation was not to be dismissed with the one word "impossible." It has more than once been pointed out in these pages that such an alliance would come when it was held to be vital to the United States, but not before. An offer of an alliance made to the United States by a European Power because it was in the interests of that Power would be rejected without much ceremony; should the United States find itself menaced and require outside assistance an alliance would no longer be repugnant.

Events of the last fortnight have strengthened that opinion. So that there shall be no misunderstanding, let no one believe that there has been talk of an alliance or that it has been suggested, but the sudden anxiety shown to remain on good terms with the world rather than to pretend contempt for its opinion and the

change in the attitude of public men indicate the future. They show that Americans realise that isolation is a poor policy, and that great and powerful as the United States is it is neither great enough nor powerful enough to flaunt the world.

Mr. Wilson inherited several serious foreign complications from both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft. There has seldom been a time when a new President was faced with so many vexing problems pressing for settlement and the world had for the United States such coldness, if not actual hostility. Latin American dislike and suspicion of the United States were increased by Mr. Roosevelt's action in taking Panama from Colombia so as to make possible the building of the canal, and refusing to make compensation. Colombia felt that as the canal was a national necessity to the United States she ought to be recompensed for the loss of her territory, and the amount to be paid should be determined by arbitration, but neither Mr. Roosevelt nor Mr. Taft would consent to arbitration, and Mr. Wilson has to suffer for the action of his predecessors. Brazil is irritated because its "valorisation" scheme to maintain the price of coffee was declared to be in violation of the American trust laws and had to be abandoned so far as the United States was concerned. Mr. Taft denounced the commercial treaty with Russia, and no treaty relations now exist between her and the United States. The friction with Japan began in Mr. Roosevelt's administration over the California school question, it was less acute while Mr. Taft was President, and it flamed up with the incoming of Mr. Wilson, when the California legislature passed the Webb Act, denying to the Japanese the right to own agricultural lands, which Japan asserts is in violation of her treaty. Mr. Wilson attempted to prevent the enactment of the Webb law by sending Mr. Bryan to California to make a personal appeal to the legislature, but his errand was fruitless. A Progressive legislature under the control of Governor Johnson, the Vice-Presidential candidate on the Progressive ticket at the last election, jammed the Bill through, saying in effect that although Japan might not like it her feelings need not be considered, and if Japan was foolish enough to resent it California would have nothing to fear.

Mr. Wilson was also confronted with the dispute with England

over the Panama Canal tolls and the critical situation existing in Mexico, both of which were thrust upon him by the Taft administration. Mr. Taft signed the law permitting the discrimination to be made against British ships and left it to his successor to reverse his action if he saw fit or to stand by it if he thought proper. Mexico also was an unwelcome legacy. Mr. Taft refused to recognise Huerta on the ground that as he was so soon to retire it was only proper that Mr. Wilson should be given a free hand in dealing with Mexico. And as if to show how little the United States cared about remaining on terms of friendship with the rest of the world, the Senate refused to ratify the arbitration treaties that had expired. Opposition was made to the British treaty on the ground that it would enable Great Britain to demand arbitration of the canal tolls; that with Japan was opposed because it was asserted it made possible the arbitration of the Webb law.

The average American is indifferent to foreign politics. He has little reverence for diplomacy, and diplomats seem to him to be regarded rather as a joke than to be taken seriously. Probably most Americans think the money spent on diplomacy is wasted and ambassadors serve little if any useful purpose; it is difficult for them to understand why the Secretary of State must send his communications through the medium of a high-priced functionary instead of writing a letter to Sir Edward Grey or cabling him if he is in a hurry. That appears to the American "good business" and democratic. Ambassadors and the etiquette of diplomacy, one often hears, are "un-American"; especially that part of diplomacy which makes secrecy necessary. Americans might think more kindly of diplomacy if it conducted its negotiations in the open with everything published in full in the newspapers.

This indifference to foreign opinion was characteristically shown when Great Britain protested against the imposition of tolls on British vessels using the Panama Canal while American coastwise vessels were to be exempt. It was clearly a violation of a treaty, and it was so admitted by a great many Americans, but that did *not* influence the men who were responsible for the legislation. When Great Britain protested that protest

was received with almost cynical amusement. It was treated as somewhat of a joke. Really what difference did it make how many objections Great Britain might see fit to make, because what could Great Britain do? She would not go to war, and she would not dislocate trade by imposing a tariff on American goods, so there was nothing to be afraid of. Some of the newspapers tried to shame the Senate into action, but the Senate is not so easily moved, and it is safe to say nothing would have been done if other things had not made the Senate see the wisdom, and perhaps necessity, of retaining the friendship of England.

One of the secrets of American diplomatic success is that the United States has generally been able to play one European nation against another. In many respects, in almost every respect, the United States is the spoiled child of fortune. She is the darling of the gods. Europe has always assiduously courted the United States, it has always been anxious to have the goodwill and friendship of the United States. The bond of fellowship between England and the United States has excited the envy of other European nations, who for political and commercial reasons have sought to convey the belief that England could obtain no greater favours than were granted to all the rest of the world. Americans have not been ignorant of the advantage this gave them. With much shrewdness England has been played against Germany, and Germany against England. The rivalry between European Powers has entered into all American political calculations in recent years. Pretending to be impartial and to accord the same treatment to all nations, I have frequently heard Americans say that if England objected to a certain proposed action it would strengthen German-American relations, or *vice versa*. In Europe American diplomacy may be laughed at as being the diplomacy of amateurs, but it is professional enough where American interests are concerned. And perhaps more than one European Chancery realises this.

When the United States first found itself involved in Mexico there was a good deal of nervousness as to the attitude of Europe. It is no secret that there was fear in some quarters that the great European Powers having large commercial interests in Mexico might force the hand of the United States. They had it in their

power to cause the United States considerable embarrassment. Suppose that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain, who have millions invested in Mexico and many of their nationals there, should have said to the United States that it must either afford protection to foreign lives and property or the Governments interested would take measures of their own. This would have placed the United States in an awkward position, as it would have compelled immediate American intervention or forced the United States to admit that the Monroe Doctrine was without vitality. Europe has shown great consideration to the United States; it has been patient and abstained from doing anything to increase American difficulties.

With Mexico threatening heavily to tax the resources of the United States—for it is the general belief that eventually American troops will have to be sent to Mexico to restore order—fear of Japan suddenly appears. No sensible person can believe that Japan would deliberately provoke hostilities with the United States, yet that is a belief generally entertained, and Americans do not talk about war with Japan lightly. They know what it would cost, and they are not confident as to the outcome. It is not material whether feeling against Japan has been aroused for purely selfish ends or whether men are honest in believing that Japan is a menace, the fact is that Japan is looked upon as an enemy. The public has been inflamed by reports of Japan giving assistance to Mexico, of the Japanese selling arms to Huerta, of a Japanese man-of-war being sent to Mexico to show that Japanese sympathy is with the Government of Mexico and opposed to that of the United States, and other equally fantastic and untrue tales. The public, of course, has no means of knowing how much of this is true and how much false. When it reads the same thing day after day, morning and evening, it is forced to believe that although allowance may be made for exaggeration the essentials cannot be challenged. As a result of this newspaper campaign the public began to ask how soon before something would happen.

Something did happen, but not in the way expected. I have referred to the indifference shown to the British Panama Canal protest and the shelving of the arbitration treaties. No sooner was it realised that it would not be comfortable for the United

qualifications, when he has sufficient money to be able to afford the luxury of an Embassy and the proper amount of brains, it does not always follow that he will be a successful diplomat. An able business man is more likely than not to be a failure as an Ambassador, the training of an Illinois lawyer or a Texas newspaper publisher is hardly of the kind to fit him to be a successful Minister at a European Court or to a South American Republic. It is an old story, and the public knows very well how its diplomatic service is rated by the rest of the world, but Americans do not care. Public opinion cannot be sufficiently aroused to make the diplomatic service a permanent institution or to pay its members salaries large enough to enable the President to appoint the best men; nor can public opinion be made to see that when a man enters the diplomatic service he ceases to be a politician and ought no more to be influenced by political, that is party, considerations than a captain on the bridge of his ship or a judge on the bench. Americans have progressed far enough to eliminate politics from the Army and Navy, the private political views of officers they keep to themselves, and the sister services take no part in politics; but public opinion is not yet advanced enough to recognise the wisdom of applying the same code to the diplomatic service. A leading newspaper defending the President says, "those who occupy the principal diplomatic stations should be in close political sympathy with the Administration," and it justifies this statement by asserting:

> The Civil Service is a splendid thing, and within proper limits its operation affords one of the greatest of all safeguards against demoralisation of government following those revolutionary changes to which our political system subjects us. *But it is possible to extend the operation of a Civil Service law too far and to over-emphasise certain features about it.* . . .
>
> Ours is a government by party, and the men who represent this country abroad as Ambassadors and Ministers must necessarily occupy the very closest and most confidential relationship with and be the mouthpiece of the leaders of the party in power.

Which is typically American but will not carry conviction to any one else.

Either Mr. Wilson is a man of the most extraordinary luck or else he is more of a statesman than any of his predecessors. The country awaited with unusual interest his recommendations for legislation to regulate the trusts, the prevention of monopoly

and the correction of commercial abuses, and it was the general expectation, as a member of Congress expressed it, that "the eight hundred or more trusts that now dominate the industries of the country will put up a fight that will try men's souls," and the President would be denounced by the newspapers recognised as the organs of capital. But what was expected did not take place.

Here was the stage set for the beginning of a great conflict (the New York *Literary Digest* comments) and the whole nation breathless with expectation. In the trust issue the Administration was about to meet its most searching test, the President was face to face with its Goliath. Yet when the message is delivered we find bankers, railroad presidents, captains of industry, and even the New York *Sun* (more friendly to capital than its opponents, and not particularly friendly to the President) joining in the chorus of approval that greets its programme for the further correction and prevention of corporation abuses—a programme, it has been pointed out, which goes even further than the anti-trust promises of the Democratic platform. And while "big business" praised, stock values sprang to higher levels.

What is the meaning of this, the *Literary Digest* says editors are asking.

Has the President surrendered to the trusts, or have the trusts surrendered to the President? How, one paper asks, can a trust programme satisfactory to and indorsed by William Jennings Bryan awaken enthusiasm in the New York *Sun*? Yet the *Sun* agrees with the President that the Government and business will meet one another henceforth in a new atmosphere, an "atmosphere of accommodation and mutual understanding"; and it declares confidently that this atmosphere "means everything at this time to the prosperity of the United States." In short, the *Sun* rejoices to find in both the tone and the substance of the message "ground for regarding it as epochal."

Business men are not disturbed by the prospect of legislation that will in some respects revolutionise existing business practices in the United States, and do not fear that the recommendations made by the President will be injurious to legitimate business. Mr. Wilson has been so successful in securing the passage of legislation since he entered the White House that it is the general belief that Congress will respond to his demand for laws to deal with the trusts and business. In some quarters there is fear expressed that Congress, for political purposes, will go further than the President desires and enact legislation of such a radical character that it will be destructive to business, but the President has shown such a complete mastery over Congress that there is little danger of Congress getting out of hand. It is certain the President will veto any Bill that goes too far or is passed for purely political

effect. The newspapers generally agree that business will be conducted hereafter on a higher plane in the United States, and that investors, both at home and abroad, will be afforded greater protection.

An experiment that will be watched with a great deal of interest, by Europe as well as the United States, is the building and operation, in the territory of Alaska, of the first railway system to be owned by the American Government. Alaska, which the United States bought from Russia in 1868 for a trifle because it was looked upon as a land of perpetual snow and ice and incapable of commercial development, and has returned its purchase price many hundred-fold, has only been scratched on the surface because it has no proper transportation facilities. There is enormous wealth buried beneath its surface, it is not only rich in gold but its soil is heavy with copper and there is coal in inexhaustible quantity; but owing to the difficulties of transport it costs more to bring the minerals to market than they are worth. Some years ago a powerful financial syndicate undertook the development of Alaska, but the public, at that time encouraged to look with suspicion on enterprise on a large scale, raised the cry of exploitation and monopoly, and the syndicate withdrew, and it has now been decided that the only way to open up Alaska is for the Government to take the work in hand. In his address, delivered at the opening of Congress, President Wilson said:

> Alaska as a storehouse should be unlocked. One key to it is a system of railways. These the Government should itself build and administer, and the ports and terminals it should itself control in the interest of all who wish to use them for the service and development of the country and its people.

In accordance with the President's recommendation the Senate has passed a Bill, which is yet to be passed by the House, appropriating $40,000,000 for railway construction. The project, naturally enough, was opposed by Senators and newspaper men who saw in it the entering wedge of Government ownership of all railways and "the first great step in the realm of paternalism; the beginning of the paternalistic or socialistic idea of complete Government ownership of all public utilities," as a Senator declared in debate. The friends of the measure defend it on the

grounds of expediency and disclaim any desire to see the Government committed to the general policy of owning or controlling the railways of the country, but Alaska being an exceptional case exceptional measures must be employed. Mr. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior, whose Department is charged with the administration of the territory, says:

> This is a new policy for the United States. Very true. This is a new part of the United States; and policies properly change with new conditions.
>
> To build and control these railroads ourselves may be an experiment, but such a plan does not suggest scandals more shameful or political conditions more unhealthy than many we have known in new parts of our country under private ownership. I believe that under this policy Alaska will develop most safely and most speedily, and its resources will most certainly become available to the whole people.

If the hopes of the supporters are justified undoubtedly a great impetus will be given to the demand for the Government ownership of all railways, which Mr. Bryan advocated some years ago and has always been popular with the more radical of his following. The arguments of the opponents that the Government never does anything as well as private enterprise, and that if the Government goes into railway construction it will be at tremendous cost and cause grave political scandals, is met by a newspaper, which tells the Opposition that if the Government ownership of railroads would really be the calamitous failure they predict, then what possible objection can they have to the demonstration of the failure in remote and isolated Alaska? On the contrary, they should warmly welcome such a demonstration of failure because it could not do other than cure the people once and for all of any hankering for public ownership of this character. "The fact that these opponents of Government ownership are so desperately set against trying it on the Alaska dog would therefore seem to indicate that they are in reality very much afraid that the experiment would turn out a success." If the experiment is a success, it is safe to predict Government ownership of railways will not end with the Alaskan venture.

California is a State where new things are always being tried. Its latest social innovation is for the city of Los Angeles to add to its list of municipal officials a "Public Defender." Every city has of course a Public Prosecutor; Los Angeles is the first

city—I believe I am correct in saying in the world—to have a law officer paid by the people to protect criminals. It has often been asserted that the poor man charged with crime, who may or may not be guilty of the offence accused, who has no money to employ lawyers and no means to secure expert or other testimony, is too often the victim of so-called justice. When he pleads poverty the presiding judge will provide him a lawyer, who is usually a youngster and takes only a perfunctory interest in the case as he must work without fee, and who is not only incapable of coping with the Public Prosecutor, usually a man of long experience, who has at his command a staff of assistants and the machinery of the highly organised police department able to secure through its detectives and in other ways the evidence necessary to convict. It is one man fighting society, and society always has the best of it.

The Public Defender is to occupy the same relation to his client that the Public Prosecutor does to society. His duty will be to devote himself as assiduously to the defence of persons charged with crime as the Public Prosecutor does to secure their conviction for the protection of the community. It will be an experiment worth watching, but one that may not prove without embarrassment to the people of Los Angeles. Suppose the Public Defender has reason to believe that a man accused of crime is guilty of the offence charged. What is his duty under the circumstances? He is not in the position of the ordinary lawyer who may refuse to accept a client's fee or whose professional conduct is regulated by his private code of morals. He is compelled to defend, because that is the obligation he assumed when he accepted the office. Must he defend at the expense of his conscience, or permit a conviction at the expense of his professional reputation?

Yet undoubtedly many men have been sent to prison not because they were guilty but because they were poor and friendless, and once a man falls into the hands of the police, we have often been told, he is marked and cannot hope to rehabilitate himself. If the Public Defender makes that infamy impossible he will have justified his appointment, and if the experiment works well in Los Angeles other cities will be sure to adopt it.

A. MAURICE LOW

GOVERNMENT BY STATISTICAL LIBEL

HOW TO MEET IT

I

One of the original members of the Royal Society, in the reign of Charles II, in dwelling on the precision of the knowledge which it is the object of scientific methods to attain, emphasised with remarkable pungency the importance of applying these methods to the social affairs of nations as well as to the operations of nature. Without precise knowledge as to social conditions it is impossible to devise any sound social policy; and at present, he said, speaking of his own time, such knowledge does not exist. There are sets of estimates or guesses, but there are no means of testing them. One man adopts one set, another man adopts another, as chance or prejudice guides him; and until knowledge numerically accurate supersedes such guesses the conclusions of social politicians, the writer wound up with saying, are *like the result obtained by the throwing of so many dice, which depends on the angle at which each cube hits the table.*

Since the days of Charles II. when these observations were made, accurate knowledge in one sense of the word has been accumulating. That is to say, masses of social facts have been carefully collected and recorded in elaborate documents; and because these documents are accessible to any one who cares to examine them, it is sometimes convenient to speak of such records as knowledge. But knowledge, in this loose sense of the word, is for practical purposes not knowledge at all. It only becomes knowledge in proportion as the living man assimilates the recorded details in so accurate and effective a way that his practical judgment as to social affairs is determined by it; and if the member of the Royal Society whose opinions have been

just quoted were to rise from his grave to-day and consider in the light of the evidences which are now accessible the kind of knowledge displayed by the prophets of "advanced social legislation," he would have good reason for thinking that knowledge of social facts is to-day more a matter of guess-work—of throwing dice on a table—than it was when organised evidence was not yet in existence.

Let us take certain examples, provided by the history of the moment and of the immediate past.

II

No piece of social legislation has been trumpeted more loudly as a measure of supreme importance to "the people" than that which imposed a special tax on "the unearned increment" of urban and suburban ground-rents. The index of its importance was stated to be two statistical facts. One was that recent experience shows the magnitude of this increment, year by year, to be enormous. The other was that, whatever may be its magnitude at the present time, similar experience shows it to be every year increasing. The most eloquent exponent of these doctrines was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but he did not stand alone. Let us consider the language which a much more cautious person—his official superior, the Prime Minister—addressed with the utmost solemnity to the House of Commons in support of him. Who can doubt, said Mr. Asquith, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is correct with regard to this peculiar revenue when it is known that the rent of land "here in London" alone is already increasing at the rate of "£1,000,000 per annum"? Here is a definite statement as to fact if ever there was one: "and it is on hard, definite facts like this," Mr. Asquith said in effect, "that I and my colleagues in this matter base our whole position." Now was this statement as to the ground-rent of London true? Was it even approximately true? The period to which Mr. Asquith was more particularly referring must have been the years 1907 and 1908–9, as compared with the year 1906. During the two years in question, as is shown by the Reports of Mr. Asquith's own Commissioners, the ground-rent of London (lands and buildings included) increased almost exactly by one million pounds. The average for each year was accordingly

£500,000. The gross increase, in other words, was not more than half of what Mr. Asquith attributed to land alone. But perhaps it may be said that Mr. Asquith meant to imply that, whatever might be the rate of increment at the actual time at which he spoke, it was increasing so rapidly that in a year or two it would reach the amount named by him. Let us turn again to the figures supplied by his own Commissioners. The gross rent of London in the year 1908 was £48,960,000. Three years later an increment was disclosed of—how much? There was no increment at all. On the contrary, the total had decreased by £280,000.* But perhaps Mr. Asquith was not specifically thinking of the case of London at all, but merely cited it as a rough and reduced illustration of what, if his figures were magnified in proper proportion, was substantially true of Great Britain as a whole. Let us turn, then, to the official figures for Great Britain taken as a whole. During the nine years following the year 1902 the average annual increment of building-rent and site-rent together was £3,900,000, which means, in respect of sites, about £780,000, or 20 per cent. less than the amount which Mr. Asquith attributed to the metropolis. But a far more important fact still remains to be noticed. If these nine years be divided into three triennial periods, the average annual increment for Great Britain as a whole was at the rate of 3·1 per cent. during the first; it was 1·8 per cent. during the second, and it had fallen to no more than 1 per cent. during the third. Thus, whatever interpretation may be placed on the Prime Minister's statement, that statement was so wildly inaccurate that it can hardly be said to have been related to facts at all. If taken in its obvious sense, it differed from the truth by something like 500 per cent. If it be taken more loosely as an indication of general tendencies, it was only related to the truth by being a direct inversion of it.

Let us now, without quitting the land question, which the present Government are seeking to invest with a new importance, consider it under a wider aspect, and see how certain of the principal facts relating to it are dealt with by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He so far in theory recognises the importance of precision that most of his arguments turn on definite statistical statements. He presents himself to the public armed with

* See 55th Report of Commissioners of Inland Revenue. Table 33.

the prestige of one who numbers a whole regiment of expert statisticians as his subordinates. He has declared that in such matters "to deceive is always a pretty contemptible device, but that to deceive the poor is the meanest device of all." It may fairly be said, therefore, that when he quotes specific figures he professes to be speaking as solemnly as he would do if he spoke on oath. Such being the case, one of the most important of the questions discussed by him is the number of persons by whom the land of this country is owned; and the imposition of his own peculiar land-taxes brought home to him the fact—familiar to all serious students—that such owners are a very numerous body. To understate the matter by something like a half, their number is very considerably in excess of one million. Technically, and in his official character, Mr. Lloyd George admitted so much himself. But technical and official utterances are for the most part lost on the electorate; and his principal appeals to the opinion on which his own position depends are reserved by him for his addresses to those whom he would call "the poor"—those to deceive whom is "the meanest device of all." Equipped, then, with the knowledge that the number of landowners in this country is considerably over one million, the Chancellor went down to Newcastle in the year 1909 and, leading up to his point with every trick of rhetorical emphasis, informed the "poor" that the number of landowners did not exceed ten thousand, and that "everybody else was a trespasser in the land of his birth." On a recent occasion, addressing "the poor" at Bedford, he returned to the same subject, and gave them a number which, though practically not much nearer the truth, was absolutely irreconcilable with that to which he had previously pledged his honour.

If such is the procedure of Cabinet Ministers themselves, who can wonder that it is repeated by hordes of irresponsible agitators all over the country, whose object is either to support the present Government or to outbid it? In a statistical Manual issued by the Labour Party the authors go into this question of the number of landowners on their own account, professing to base their results on the New Domesday Book, which was issued about the year 1874. According to that document—this is their outstanding assertion—there were, at the date of issue, in England and Wales alone 20,000,000 absolutely "landless persons." As a matter

of fact the entire population at the time barely amounted to so much as 25,000,000. A preface to the Manual in question was written by Mr. Keir Hardie, who urged the speakers of his party to "soak themselves in figures such as these." Do not, he said, quote too many of them in succession. You will only confuse your hearers. Lead up to your points in general terms, and then bring out some sensational figure to clench them. It is, Mr. Hardie continued, only a rare genius like Mr. Snowden who can excite passion by using many figures together. If you listen to him you will think you are listening to "a fairy-tale." Mr. Snowden, the subject of this somewhat ambiguous eulogy, has been doing his best to act up to his reputation. The New Domesday Book, on which he and his friends rely, disclosed one fact, as was pointed out at the time, which came as a surprise to many people—namely, that the number of separate holdings in England and Wales being very nearly one million, one family at least out of every five was the proprietor of the plot on which its own dwelling was situated. Mr. Snowden, attacking Lord Percy in the columns of the *Morning Post*, converted this evidence into the statement, which was one of his principal points, that the number of families which were freeholders of their own homes is not one out of every five, but only one out of every hundred.

Let us place the above statistical statements one after another, together with the actual facts as ascertainable by definite evidence.

The ground-rent of London is increasing at the rate of £1,000,000 a year.—*Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons.*

The gross rent of London, of which ground rent is about 33 per cent., has during the last six years not increased at all, but has declined by £280,000.—*Blue-book issued by the Government's own officials.*

The increment of ground rent generally is year by year increasing.—*Mr. Lloyd George.*

During the last ten years the annual rate of increase has decreased in the proportion of thirty-one to ten.—*Blue-book issued by the Government's own officials.*

The number of landowners in the country is considerably over one million.—*Mr. Lloyd George officially.*

Most of the land of this country is owned by twenty thousand persons.—*Mr. Lloyd George at Bedford.*

The whole of the land of the country is owned by ten thousand persons. "Everybody else is a trespasser."—*Mr. Lloyd George at Newcastle.*

Only one family out of every hundred is the freeholder of its own home. "Everybody else is a lodger."—*Mr. Snowden in the "Morning Post."*

One family out of every five is the freeholder of its own home.—*New Domesday Book.*

The New Domesday Book shows that the number of entirely landless persons is greater by five millions than the number of the entire population.—*Statistical Manual of the Labour Party.*

Monstrous statements such as these as to a single aspect of the land question illustrate the methods pursued by the party of agitation with regard to the whole field of social life and conditions. Every question is covered with a network of false statistics; and however these fallacies may contradict one another in detail, they are so far in harmony that the object and the effect of them is not to enlighten public opinion, but to inflame it; and the signal success by which such methods have been attended—we may call them the method of government by statistical libel—ought to awaken all sober-minded politicians to a truth which hitherto they have been somewhat slow in appreciating—namely that, in respect of social legislation at all events, the most dangerous enemy with which they have to contend is not false conclusions, but false premises. Let the false premises be exposed, and the false conclusions may be left to take care of themselves.

III

The Conservative mind is sluggish in accepting such a conclusion as this, for reasons which may be briefly, and I think fairly, summed up in objections such as the following, which have been frequently addressed to myself.

(1) The Conservatives, or the Moderates, who are mostly practical men, are familiar enough as it is with the main social facts of to-day. There is no lack of sufficient knowledge as to facts. Anybody, even if he cannot carry them in his head, can always look them up before making a speech, and bring out those which are requisite for his immediate purpose.

(2) But even if theoretically a more extensive and more systematised knowledge of social facts were desirable, what would be the practical use of it? Everybody knows that the opposite side tells lies; but even if the most powerful speaker and the most profound statistician in the country were to refute the statistical misstatements of his opponents one by one to day, they would be told again and believed again to-morrow. The mass of the electors will not even have heard of their refutation. You will convince nobody but the people who are on your own side already.

Let us take these objections in order.

If by "a sufficient knowledge of social facts" is meant an available fund of systematised and comprehensive information as to social and economic conditions generally (analogous to that

which any well-educated man carries in his head with regard to the configuration of Europe), the assertion that this is part of the equipment of the Moderate Party already is incorrect. This is precisely the kind of knowledge which the party of agitation affects; but the party of moderation, as a party, certainly does not possess it. It is true that when agitators like the Chancellor of the Exchequer deal with particular cases of a very limited kind—when they attack a duke for his dealings with one special plot of land with which neither he nor his family has ever had the least connection—the party of moderation can produce any number of experts who can definitely refute his mendacities and for the moment cover him with confusion. But when he or his colleagues, or their more extreme rivals, deal with facts of a character more important—facts with regard to which the truth is indeed ascertainable, but not ascertainable without patient and systematic research—no refutation of this kind is forthcoming. Thus when Mr. Snowden, a few years ago, opened a debate in the House of Commons on the problems of contemporary poverty, his entire argument grouped itself round a series of statistical statements, which went off like so many crackers. Every one of these was so frantically incorrect as to be farcical; but only one of these was called in question by anybody, and it was called in question not by a Conservative, but by an official of the Liberal Government. "I cannot," said this gentleman, "carry the exact figures in my head, but the speaker has overstated them by at least three hundred million pounds." Then the matter dropped. Conservative critics were silent; and the Conservative press complimented Mr. Snowden on the extreme self-restraint of his tone. Similarly when Mr. Asquith made his memorable statement as to the increment of London ground-rent, no Conservative so much as cast a doubt on it. Why was there this silence? Simply because the Moderate Party generally were not in possession of an available fund of knowledge which would have enabled them to recognise at once that such statements were ridiculous.

To the second of the objections which I have indicated—namely that, however full might be the knowledge at the disposal of the Moderate Party, the mere exposures which it would enable them to make of the mendacities of their opponents would be ineffectual—the following answers are to be given. The mere

demonstrations that such and such individually fallacious figures are paraded by the party of agitation as the basis of their more important proposals would, without doubt, be ineffectual. It may be proved by A that B, as often as he opens his mouth, is lying; but this does not prove that A is speaking the truth. The masses will say that both tell lies for their own purposes, but that those of B are on the whole more near to the truth than those of A. So far as it goes, this objection is reasonable; but it does not meet the argument that is being urged here. It was observed by Cardinal Newman that by merely negative criticism a lie may be *refuted*, but that it can only be *expelled* by the establishment of the corresponding truth. What is here urged is that the Conservative Party requires a body of positive knowledge with regard to social conditions which shall be as extensive in its ramifications as are the fallacies of the party of agitation, which shall be so authenticated as not to be open to doubt and so recorded that even the busiest of practical politicians may be able to assimilate it with reasonable ease and complete intellectual comprehension, and be ready, when it is necessary to insist on this or that particular fact or group of facts, to insist on it not as a piece of isolated information which he has learnt by rote, but as part of a system of facts which all hang together. A party which equips itself with knowledge of this kind will be able not only to *refute* piecemeal the fallacies of the party of agitation, but will be able to *expel* them bodily by building up in their place a solid structure of truth.

Even so, it may be said that the promulgation of truth will be ineffectual, because, however clearly and authoritatively correct facts may be stated, they will make little impression on those to whom such facts are unwelcome. I answer that this is true if the promulgation of truth is confined to a few speakers and intermittent occasions; but if the requisite facts are made accessible to a whole body of active workers and speakers, whether in or out of Parliament—if they are constantly expounded and reiterated all over the kingdom, not by isolated speakers but by thousands speaking in concert, and if those who assert them can confidently challenge contradiction, then in time the required end will be gained.

The practical question is how such knowledge is to be dis-
... it, in the first place, is a most laborious

work. The raw materials of it are scattered over thousands of pages, official and otherwise. These, if they are to be practically useful, must be analysed, digested, and reproduced in such brief and absolutely clear forms that the ordinary practical man will be able at once to understand them. Such considerations have seemed to me of such urgent importance that I have myself endeavoured to translate them into some practical result. For the last two years I have, from the offices of the Liberty and Property Defence League (whose secretary, Mr. F. Millar, at 25 Victoria Street, S.W., will give applicants all information as to the matter), been issuing a series of inter-connected statistical monographs, which by this time cover nearly the whole field of social controversy, each of which deals with some special question (*e.g.* the national income, its sources and its distribution; the meaning of the Income-tax returns; the ratio of profits to wages; unearned increment over a series of years; &c. &c.) and gives with regard to it, in condensed forms, the latest available evidence. I propose to reissue these during the current year in a new and improved form. The broad and salient figures will in each case be first summarised, these being printed on only one side of a page, so that a speaker may detach them and use them in lieu of notes. These summary figures will then be followed by detailed analyses and explanations, which will show their exact meaning and the manner in which they have been reached. Thus the opening monograph of the new series will, as a specimen of this arrangement, contain a summary of the national income, divided into different amounts, according to their respective sources, beginning with three figures which represent respectively the net agricultural rental, the net ground rental, and the net building rental going respectively to persons with more than £160 a year. On a following page these figures will be analysed, and it will be shown how they are reached by a minute analysis of the series of figures given in the Income-tax returns under Schedule A; and it is proposed to follow the same procedure throughout. These monographs have already been used by some hundreds of politicians, writers, debaters, and associations. Should the use of them become more extensive, it is hoped that they will help to create a general atmosphere of knowledge in which the fallacies of agitators will cease to be mischievous because they will be unable to live in it. W. H. MALLOCK

THE ARTIST AS AUTOCRAT

I

The apostle of Futurism, Signor Marinetti, told us the other day that noise must now be considered as an essential element of Art; and the loud pæans, trumpetings, drum-tappings, war-whoops, which herald sundry manifestations of modern Art, and the promulgation of its edicts, certainly lend colour to the theory. Art has been variously depicted by imaginary writers in the past as a shrinking Vestal, as a timid rustic maiden with dainty limbs and sad, wondering blue eyes, a poor little gipsy, an impassioned vagrant who loves to dream alone in shelter of the hedges under the stars; but these fancy portraits are becoming every day more difficult to recognise. The Vestal is quitting the seclusion of her temple; the rural wanderer among hedgerows and green fields is getting involved in the rush to the towns; the simple, single-minded gipsy has developed into an over-civilised being of rare and baffling complexity; there is a hideous possibility of the timid, modest maiden growing up into a shrill-voiced virago, and joining the militants.

Modern Art, so far from being timid or shrinking, is becoming distinctly aggressive. It hurls defiance at its enemies; it seeks openly to affront, to shock, and disconcert us. It no longer pleads gently for recognition, but demands it with the airs and tone of a dictator. "Humility," says an eminent critic, "may be carried too far"; and for once the artist (in the larger sense of the word) agrees with the critic. Both have decided that it is time to raise their voices in assertion of Art's supremacy and authority over the world at large; and, if they cannot always achieve the "tremendous roar" which the Futurist tells us is part of his inner sensitivity, they at least contrive sometimes to raise a very considerable hubbub. They will have us believe that

artists are the elect spirits of the world, something outside Nature, something quite different from, and emphatically superior to, the common run of workaday men and women. To be the humblest member of the artistic fraternity is better than being the most successful member of any other; and, by way of proving his contentions, the "advanced" artist tells us, in speech and in print, a great deal about himself, of his susceptibility to profound emotion, his peculiar and surprising mentality, the workings and ramifications of what he calls his "abstract interior." He proclaims, and calls modern literature as witness on his behalf, that the artist-critic is he who should be held to represent "the flawless type" in humanity; the most sterile emotions which Art evokes in him are superior to the noblest dreams of the merely practical person. Culture is the substance whereof religion is merely the shadow, as I fancy Walt Whitman said. Art is the most vital function in the national life. It is a mystery whereof only initiates may hold the key: it is that which raises human nature nearest the celestial perfection; and certain people who preach or practise it feel themselves qualified to dictate to us our sympathies and tastes with all the assurance of a supernaturally illumined judgment.

The artist of these later days is fond of proclaiming himself a rebel. But there are rebels and rebels, and some of us are in revolt against the pretensions of Art. We think the lady doth protest too much. We humbly suggest that it is just possible that Art and artists are over-estimating their importance in the scheme of creation, and that they are putting forward claims which border on the extravagant. Take, for instance, the much-debated question of the connection between the spheres of Art and morals, a problem that always fascinates me, though I am well aware that some people find it excessively boring. The position of those who assert that æsthetic values can be wholly dissociated from ethical or utilitarian ones has always seemed to me to be quite untenable, because, if we are right in assuming that there is no absolute standard of merit or excellence in Art, standards of morality and social utility are bound sooner or later to assert themselves. Surely, there is a teleology of æsthetic as of other things: Art must be socially serviceable or the reverse, and its functions never have been, throughout history, exclusively

æsthetic. It is a force exerting influence; and the true artist cannot, however much he may wish to do so, limit his achievement to the mere representation of beauty.

I will not weary my readers with a dissertation on the relations between Art and morals—they have been pretty much those of cat and dog for some time past, and the Art-for-Art's-sake men tell us that these relations are permanent and inevitable; but there is one aspect of the question which is generally overlooked, and which requires to be stated. If the æsthete were content with merely separating the spheres of beauty and ethics we might be content to leave him in possession of the field, but he goes much further than that. He definitely places Art above law, above morals, and beyond criticism. Misapplying the theories of Schelling and his brother German philosophers, he regards æsthetic as a larger ethic and capable of replacing ethic, which is, in his view, merely a branch of æsthetic. The Good is stated to be, in some unexplained way, an emanation from the Beautiful, and æsthetic law "nothing but a finer justice." Descending from the cloudland of metaphysics to the region of concrete reality, he says that he recks not of virtue or vice, but complacently assures us that he is "above all that." The artist, by sheer virtue of his art, has a right to be as wicked as he pleases, for "the great poet and artist can do no wrong." All Art is perfectly useless, and everything is a legitimate subject for Art. Art with a moral purpose is bad Art, and the man who puts an ethical bias into his work is held to be committing a grave æsthetic offence.

A healthy mind is the mark of a Philistine: disease possesses more insight than health or sanity, and is æsthetically superior. The highest Art, in fact, is a manifestation of disease, like the pearl in the oyster. To be a real artistic genius in these days it seems necessary to have some "*coin maladif*," some screw loose in one's physical or mental composition: the bee of degeneration must be buzzing in your psychological bonnet. And it is the *coin maladif* which is the true source of inspiration. "The more ill I am the more of an artist do I become," said an artist of one of our new freak schools. Nietzsche, we learn from a recently published book on Art, found sweetness and spirituality to be almost inseparable from extreme poverty of blood and muscle,

while headache and nausea promoted unusual dialectical clearness. "We authors," a French decadent wrote, "are sewermen and gardeners; we draw delectable things from putrefaction." The smaller men at once proceed to imitate these tactics, because there is always money in the artistry of obscenity or corruption: they cheerfully go, like their French masters, to "sniff unknown dunghills," and the results are usually deplorable. The author who seeks to make his readers tingle with erotic ecstasy, but, being guiltless of the antiseptic or any other style, merely achieves commonplace indecency, always insists on the artistic purpose of his work. He is bound, he says, to uphold "the moral dignity of his creed" against "the low ideals of narrow and vulgar morality"; and he claims that the law has no right to interfere with him. Truth and sincerity in Art, it is held, absolve him from all other moral responsibilities; and if, after publishing his physiologico-pornographic masterpiece, he is unlucky enough to run up against some crusty, absurdly out-of-date old judge, who gives him six months for his pains, he is at once enrolled among the noble army of martyrs to Art.

The modern martyr to Art is far from being a silent witness to the truth that is in him. When the Censor is bold enough to ban an improper play, when a library (exercising its undoubted right to stock what wares it chooses) refuses to supply its customers with a salacious book, Art preens her feathers and cries out that she has been grossly insulted. The iconoclastic dramatist writes "a stinger" to the Press; the best-selling novelist, whose sale is doubled by the gratuitous advertisement he has received, ungratefully raps the offenders sharply over the knuckles. The Philistine, who is nauseated by literature that is "strong" to the point of being gamey—*faisandée* is, I believe, the correct French word—is informed that it is not the literature, but his nose, that is at fault.

Some folk the other day had the temerity to express the opinion that certain music-hall performances were the reverse of decent. Immediately there was a tremendous outcry. Superior people read the public a series of lectures on its presumption. It was a question, not of morals, but of Art, a well-known essayist declared; and vulgarity was the serpent whose head ought to be crushed. It would seem, therefore, that if a fat, half-naked

woman performs on the stage an indecent dance, and the critic or manager assures us that the lady is an artist (not merely an *artiste*, mark you, as of yore) and her capering high Art, those who object to the performance must be stigmatised as vulgarians and their mouths stopped. In Germany, as we read the other day, a lady danced absolutely naked on the stage, and the experiment was justified on æsthetic grounds because it gave the populace an opportunity of admiring the beauty of the human form! If all our dancing ladies had beautiful figures there might be something in the contention from a general point of view, but unfortunately they haven't; and I really think there ought to be a censorship over the figures of dancers as well as their costumes. The man who could bring about this reform might possibly be promoting morality: he would certainly be doing a great service to Art.

I am not discussing the propriety of the "turns" which formed the subject of the recent controversy. I visited the music-hall in question, and my blunted moral sense failed to detect anything of an objectionable character. I simply wish to consider the matter on broad, general grounds, and to suggest that the ordinary citizen, who is no prude, should be allowed full liberty to make his protest against what in his opinion violates decorum and good taste. I would vindicate the right of those people who, more virtuous than myself, regard a play or a dance as immoral to object to it on that score, and that score alone, and to apply the ethical test, as well as the artistic one, to the question whether the performance is one suitable for public exhibition. I would say, further, even at the risk of being dubbed a hopeless vulgarian, that, when the claims of Art are found to conflict with those of morality, it is not ethic, but æsthetic, that will have to go to the wall: the private conscience must give way to the communal.

One might suppose, from the hubbub in the Press, that the liberties and prerogatives of Art were being seriously threatened. Every sensible person knows that this is not so. There may still be those who, like Ruskin and Tolstoi, would make Art the handmaid of religion; an enthusiast here and there would possibly like to enslave the artist, and make him (in the words of Swinburne) grind moral corn in the Philistine mills; but such

people, in an age of toleration like ours, can be safely disregarded. It may suit the decadent to represent modern Puritanism as a sort of Cerberus standing on guard "at the portals of Philistia," and barking at the Beautiful as she approaches in suppliant guise, but Art knows perfectly well that Puritanism of this type is nowadays quite fangless.

Meanwhile John Bull, that "cloudy-browed, thick-soled, opaque Practicality, with no logic-utterance," as Carlyle calls him, goes serenely on his way, undisturbed by the clamour around him. Nebulous theories—designed to *mystifier le bourgeois*, and at the same time to exalt the artist—which seek to prove that our ideas of right originate in our conceptions of beauty, Wilde-and-water disquisitions on Art's lofty mission, the scorn and contempt heaped by interested persons upon the Philistine, affect him not at all. He is less eloquent than the silver-tongued scribes and facile logicians who attack him, but he possesses "a Congruity with the Unuttered": as the plain man would say, he has a strong vein of healthy common sense. He knows that there is quite as much cant about Art as there is cant about morality; that the name of Art may be, and often is, used as a cover for mere beastliness, and that mediocrity leans, as on a crutch, upon the bizarre, the unnatural, and the obscene. He will allow plenty of licence to the real artist, but he is not disposed to make fine distinctions between artistic and inartistic nastiness, or to regard the former as necessarily inviolate. He does not see why certain anarchists who regard themselves as high-priests of Art should be allowed to have a sort of Tom Tiddler's ground of their own, a protected territory where the King's writ does not run and everything is permissible. He rejects the demand preferred by a small section of the public that they should be allowed the privilege of being exempt from judgments and criteria and restrictions to which all other men in every sphere of action and conduct are subject. And it is obvious that, if Art really possesses the mysterious attributes and tremendous powers with which its votaries invest it, it would be a very serious matter indeed if it were allowed to remain outside, and above, the law. Respect for decency and morality is, after all, mainly a kind of system of communal hygiene, and such regulations as are in force must be of universal application.

II

In the domain of what are known as the fine arts the authority and prerogatives claimed in these days by Art are perhaps even more remarkable. We must, as I have said, revere it as an esoteric mystery impenetrable save by those who possess the key to its secret methods and processes. We must not complain when artists isolate themselves as a brotherhood wholly distinct from the mass of those uninitiated beings whom an illustrious R.A.—now, alas! no longer with us—designated as "the common people." And the desire to maintain this brotherhood inviolate and uncontaminated by the vulgar herd seems to increase as the years roll on. Art is growing as exclusive, as particular about the company it keeps, as any Society lady possibly can be: it is as much afraid of compromising itself æsthetically as she is from the social point of view. It appears to be bent on organising itself into a narrow oligarchy, and setting itself up as a tribunal of taste from which there shall be no appeal. The only judgments which it recognises as valid or, indeed, as warranted are those pronounced by members of its own camarilla.

The appreciations of the outside world, its praise or dispraise, are held in light esteem by the esoteric craftsman of to-day. He says in effect:

> *Equitibus cano*: I make my appeal to the upper crust of the Art-world, to experts and to the "finest-nurtured," those *schöne Geister* who alone possess fine eyes and exquisite faculties of intuitive appreciation. We, the trained and privileged few, form a natural aristocracy of Art to whose edicts the uncultured world will, if it is wise, bow and make submission. My audience is a selected one, because my work possesses qualities which only initiates are capable of understanding. It is good because it is not easily apprehended, or, *vice versâ*, it is incomprehensible to the vulgar because it is good. I accept the Philistine's cheques gratefully, but to his censure or approval I am wholly indifferent. My personality and mentality are a sealed book to him; he is incapable of grasping my methods, and I esteem it a favour when he abstains from giving his opinion on the results

So it has come about that the temple of Art is now a Holy of Holies closed to all laymen and probationers, and those who minister to the majestic goddess must be recognised as the sole repositories of the æsthetic secrets of the universe. They form a priesthood to whose care all prudent persons will entrust their artistic souls and consciences. And this churchdom of Art, like

most other churchdoms, seeks to establish a priestly tyranny; but it lies under one serious disability—it possesses no fixed dogmas. It is apt to assume pontifical authority, while wholly lacking pontifical sanctions. A hundred different popes may be heard enunciating a hundred contradictory doctrines. They all unite, however, in insisting upon the supreme importance of Art and artists and the necessity of limiting the right of private lay judgment: my artist friends are continually impressing this latter vital point upon my mind. The weapons commonly employed for the purpose of enforcing their authority are those of intellectual intimidation, keen mockery, and bitter gibes. The Philistine must be schooled into silence. If he will not do as the expert bids him, admire what his mentor admires, and thrill when he thrills, he must be scourged with the whip of caustic criticism or vituperative scorn and constrained by the threat of æsthetic ostracism.

The victims of this tyranny may wince under it, but they usually end by submitting with more or less good grace. Many a worthy citizen in the centres of nascent "culture" (these are by no means coextensive with the suburbs, as so many people suppose) lives in daily terror of being dragged before the dread tribunal of taste which modern Art has set up. He does not care—why should he care?—for the latest manifestations of perverted skill and ingenuity in picture-making or sculpture, but he dares not say so. If he does, he is liable to be branded as an æsthetic leper: he is an afflicted person, and his affliction is such as no physician can cure. What is the poor man to do? He is sadly bewildered by the multitude of counsellors who seek to instruct him in matters of taste, lost in a maze of conflicting systems and schools, and hopelessly muddled by much unintelligible jargon. He knows that there are as many fashions in Art as there are in frocks, and that the gods of to-day may be the gazing-stocks of to-morrow; but he also knows that his wife and daughters would as lief have him called a thief as a Philistine, and he probably deems it wiser to toe the line with the artistic orthodoxy of the moment. In former times, before æsthetic enjoyment had so largely become a manufactured article, a man was content to look at a picture and admire or dislike it as his reason and natural instincts dictated: nowadays the dictation

comes from without and not, as it ought to come, from within. The result is that he either becomes indifferent, or else, what is far worse, he seeks peace by simulating an interest and an admiration which he does not really feel.

Either alternative is fatal to the best interests of Art. The policy of exclusion which so many artists are now pursuing is simply suicidal. An inaccessible art, an art that is not based on wide emotional sympathy, is an art doomed to speedy extinction. If it would live it must be capable of interesting and affecting a large number of people, and no man can possibly be an interested spectator of art without also being a critic; in other words, he must be registering all the time his mental sensations and impressions, and it is absurd to deny him the right of expressing what he feels. You cannot expect anybody to have any concern or curiosity about matters on which he is not allowed to have an opinion of his own. The artist, therefore, would be well advised to shed his aristocratic aloofness: he should take the public into his confidence, admit them, so to speak, within the fraternity of his art, and allow them to share the joy and pride which he feels in his work. Let him remember that he must have an audience to address, and that without an audience his art would be futile and valueless. His relation to the spectator should be simply that of man speaking to his fellow man, and hoping to be understood; he should not pose as a modern mystery-man or wonder-worker, a sort of John Wellington Wells who is a dealer in magic and spells—an augur who winks to his brother augur and chuckles over those cabalistic secrets hidden from the popular ken, which are summed up in the awe-inspiring word "technique."

It remains to examine as briefly as possible the basis of the artist's or expert's claim to exercise supreme authority in moulding as he pleases the æsthetic likes and dislikes of the public. We must ask him to show us his credentials. When, with an air of one speaking *ex cathedrâ*, he boldly enunciates principles, formulas, and canons of taste which appear to us to have no general validity, and proceeds to sit upon us when we venture to differ, we must ask him whether the standards which he sets up as fixed and irreversible have any more solid foundation than his own personal whim. I have studied the subject for many years, and I am bound to confess that I have never yet been able to

achieve discovery of that "basic concept of the significance and function of art" which a recent critic declares is essential to intelligent criticism. Other people, much cleverer than myself, have been searching for this concept for hundreds of years, but their quest has been, is still, and probably always will be, a vain one. Hunting the Snark is a profitable occupation compared with the pursuit after a philosophic groundwork for taste, or the origin of our notions concerning the Beautiful. Heaven alone knows the why and wherefore of our æsthetic preferences and aversions; and, though Jones may think that he has found a basic concept for his art, he can never be sure that his basis is any sounder than Smith's, which is totally different.

There does not exist, to the best of my belief, a single human being who knows wherein good art really exists, though there are quite a number of people who talk as though they did know. To my poor untutored eye the whole field of artistic criticism appears as a vast morass enveloped in fog. The so-called science of æsthetics looms indistinctly as a mighty chaos of contradictions —German metaphysicians spinning, and getting entangled in, their own verbal cobwebs; French and English æsthetes, Russian idealists, Scandinavian critics and professors, weaving their controversial ropes of sand, each confuting the other and raising a babel of conflicting voices, but all combining together to create a most admired polyglot disorder. On one point only, as I have indicated, do they mainly agree, namely, in asserting the greatness of Art and those who produce it, and in saying what an excellent thing it would be if "poor noisy Caliban" (that is to say, uninstructed lay opinion) could have his ugly mouth stopped.

On this latter point I must beg emphatically to disagree with them. I have no wish to exalt sciolism at the expense of laboriously acquired knowledge and experience, but I would liberate the æsthetic consciousness and create free trade in taste. I would have Art make its appeal to everybody, and give the perceptions of the natural man a chance. I would ask the artist of every type and school to shake off the absurd and immoral notion that his business is only with cognoscenti; the critic to shed the frills of an artificial and over-peremptory virtuosity, and both of them to cease from intimidating the poor layman, who, when all is said and done, may be a man naturally

endowed with an ingrained feeling for beauty. [illegible], wisest of fine art amateurs, who has anticipated much of what is most authoritative and valuable in the æsthetic pronouncements of our day, told us that the best critic is the man in whom simple tastes, and susceptibility to all the great human influences, overpower the accidents of a special and local culture; and in these later times Oscar Wilde, aiming as usual at paradox, for once at least hit truth when he said that it is exactly because a man cannot do a thing that he is the proper judge of it.

III

The conclusion of the matter would seem to be that the expert is an admirable counsellor, but that as despot he is distinctly dangerous: his tyranny, whenever he seeks to set one up, must be overthrown. The "eternal public" may not always be right, as some sage has said it is; but we may as well recognise at once that it, and it alone, forms in every case the final court of appeal. Therefore, when the artist (once more in the word's wider sense) or the critic seeks to restrict my liberty of private judgment; when the æsthete places Art on a pinnacle above morality, and asserts that the claims of his artistry outweigh those of ordinary decency; when he tells me that there are neither beautiful nor ugly subjects, everything being a fit subject for art, and that he feels himself at liberty to treat them exactly as he chooses; when, in a word, he would dispense with ethical and social sanctions, and claims the right to do just as he likes, to be sole judge in his own cause, and forbids the public to intervene; when the painter would inhibit me from expressing an opinion on the wares he invites me to purchase; when the critic-instructor tries to make me admire what I do not admire, or to buy what I do not want to buy; when he dubs me a vulgarian or a Philistine, and threatens me with æsthetic excommunication, because my views on art happen to be different from his; when he seeks to interfere with my enjoying beautiful things in my own artless, unsophisticated fashion—when Art speaks to me like this, holding over me the rod of an authority I dispute, I would respectfully say to it in the classic words of Mark Twain, and with all the politeness at my command, "Depart thou to Hades!"

Hugh E. M. [illegible]

RHODES SCHOLARS AT OXFORD

It is now ten years since the Rhodes Scholarship scheme was inaugurated, and during that time between four and five hundred Rhodes scholars have passed through Oxford.

In an article which proposes to review the work and achievements of the Rhodes scholars it is well to note three capital points of interest. First, the vindication or no of the qualities which are the supposed attributes of Rhodes scholars; secondly, the fulfilment at Oxford, so far as experience and reflection can discover, of the ideals which inspired Mr. Rhodes; finally, to indicate the lines of work upon which Rhodes scholars are entering. Now, in the selection of a scholar, Rhodes desired that "regard should be had to (1) literary and scholastic attainments; (2) his fondness for and success in manly outdoor sports; (3) his qualities of manhood, truth, courage, devotion to duty, sympathy for and protection of the weak, kindliness, unselfishness, and fellowship; and (4) his exhibition during schooldays of moral force of character and instincts to lead and to take an interest in his schoolmates." These qualifications are broad, exacting, and amply inquisitorial. The successful scholar has an arduous rôle to sustain.

In athletics the following statistics will show the number of Rhodes scholars who have represented Oxford against Cambridge each year, and also the several branches of sport in which they have excelled. Up to the present they have provided two Rowing blues, and one Association football blue; while in hockey they have not as yet been represented:

	Rugby	Athletics	Cricket	Lawn Tennis	Lacrosse
1906-7 . . .	6	6	0	4	6
1907-8 . . .	4	5	1	2	7
1908-9 . . .	4	5	1	1	6
1909-10 . . .	4	2	2	3	6
1910-11 . . .	5	3	2	2	8
1911-12 . . .	9	4	1	1	10

endowed with an ingrained feeling for beauty. Emerson, wisest of fine art amateurs, who has anticipated much of what is most authoritative and valuable in the æsthetic pronouncements of our day, told us that the best critic is the man in whom simple tastes, and susceptibility to all the great human influences, overpower the accidents of a special and local culture; and in these later times Oscar Wilde, aiming as usual at paradox, for once at least hit truth when he said that it is exactly because a man cannot do a thing that he is the proper judge of it.

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1910–11 . . .	5	3	2	2	8
1911–12 . . .	5	4	1	1	10

The above figures show that the Rhodes scholars have met with a fair measure of success, but achieved no singular triumph; and least of all have they effected that complete revolution in Oxford athletics which was at one time so confidently predicted. In no single sphere, except lacrosse, have they monopolised athletic honours; they have maintained their own and done nothing more. Yet the public press from time to time is agitated with controversy over the greater age of the Rhodes scholars and other prodigious advantages which they are supposed to enjoy. This lamentation has an element of justice, yet it is just sufficiently misleading to obscure the truth. What success the Rhodes scholar has attained, especially in athletics, is due almost entirely to a superior system of training and is not justly ascribable to the fact of his greater age. In cricket, football, rowing and boxing, where the English undergraduate has had adequate and proficient instruction, he has proved himself the equal, and in several instances the superior of his overseas rival. But the Englishman has failed in athletics because he has lost interest in them and is denied the encouragement of capable instruction. In this connection it is idle to lament the disadvantage of immaturity, and, while the present laxity obtains, quite hopeless to expect national success in the wider sphere of Olympic competition. Commentators, on the other hand, have paid a singular disregard to some very real disabilities of Rhodes scholars. These considerations are advanced in no spirit of apology, were it needed, but merely to give some light and exacter knowledge to an issue always popular and at times smartly controversial. Many Australians, as regards their "sports" qualification, have satisfied the scholarship conditions by their success in football. Perhaps football has been their sole athletic qualification. Now, Rugby football is only played in two Australian States, and if the Rhodes scholar happens to have come from any one of the other four his football ability is of no use to him whatever simply because it is a game peculiarly Australian in origin and character. The same consideration applies still more forcibly in the case of "Soccer"—a game almost entirely unknown to the Australian public. The same consideration is applicable to the American as regards cricket, football, hockey, rowing, &c.; to the South African for rowing,

hockey, and lacrosse; while the Canadian is almost exclusively confined to lacrosse.

To turn to the academic record. The following statistics give the approximate results in the schools for the years 1907–1913 inclusive:

	No. of Candidates	First Classes	Second Classes	Third Classes	Fourth Classes	Diplomas	Advanced Degrees	Failures
1907	53	8	18	14	14	5	2	4
1908	62	4	19	15	15	5	9	7
1909	46	3	15	6	6	5	8	5
1910	74	4	20	14	14	8	9	5
1911	59	2	21	10	10	10	9	5
1912	59	4	19	9	9	10	11	4
1913	78	10	21	15	5	9	16	2

Perhaps the more marked features of the above statistics are the comparatively few first-class and the great preponderance of second-class honours. On the whole, the results are really disappointing. Why haven't Rhodes scholars taken more first-class honours? Various explanatory causes have been suggested, some of the more important of which are: (1) that the chosen candidate is rarely the most scholarly; (2) that his preliminary education is unsuited for the Oxford final honour schools; (3) unsuitability of the type of man to whom the scholarship appeals; (4) the conditions of work at Oxford; (5) the antithesis of the Oxford educational ideal to that of their own country. Some of these suggestions are undeniably weighty; others trivial. I will briefly allude to those which I consider the more important. It is quite manifest that if the conditions of the Scholarship are closely observed the selection of the cleverest men will prove the exception and not the rule. It has assuredly been the rule in the past that the cleverest men will fail to satisfy the "sports" requirement, and while the present conditions obtain, the average normal, all-round man will more often prove the successful candidate. In other words, the coexistence of the best academic quality with the other necessary attributes will be essentially a singular phenomenon. The average Rhodes scholar is, and should be, a typical representative. Such, I believe, was the type of man whom Rhodes really desired to endow. A high American authority has stated that the comparative failure of the Americans to attain the highest honours is due to the

inadequacy of their preparatory training. He further says that the necessity of Greek, which is not encouraged in America, has deterred many of the better scholars from applying. "The product and exponent of our educational system," says a writer in the *Montreal University Magazine*, "is sent to a school whose ideals are the antithesis of his own. The radical advocate of the technical and practical is face to face with the conservative hobbyist—the devotee of the liberal education. The function of the Rhodes scholar is to reconcile the two warring systems in his own person. He must be the Conservative Radical, the practical Liberal—the old and the new. Miracles have been expected of him, and miracles have been worked, but often have failed because of unbelief. Every miracle has been a complete triumph över natural force, for the law of nature has been rigidly enforced. The Rhodes scholar, product of one environment, must straight away adapt himself to a new condition of existence at an age when habits of mind and body are becoming settled. In England, the classic land of compromise, there is no compromise with custom. The Rhodes scholar, not the Englishman, must adapt himself."

Lastly, as to the conditions of work at Oxford. The difficulties which beset the Rhodes scholar are also quite familiar to the English undergraduate—only they take an acuter form. The novelty and diversion of social Oxford are to him an awakening life. Uninformed, he enters an unknown land and discovers no old familiar sign; all is new, of strangest mark, absorbing the sense. He wanders in a realm of high and elusive peaks, treading warily, picking his careful steps, fearful of consequences. He is curious to learn her secret charm, eager to find her high allurement. He has known nothing to compare with it in his own distant home. College life there was more contracted, more practical, something monastical, perhaps even dismal. It is, I say, a new environment, and he lacks the easy graduation of the public school. In the vacation, again, Rhodes scholars spend a good deal of their time in foreign travel. They realise they are over here for a short three years, and are naturally anxious to see as much of the Old World as they possibly can. The educative value of travel is unimpeachable, but it is not conducive to a high place in the class lists; and yet there can be little doubt as to the propriety of this policy. The

elemental idea of the Rhodes Scholarship was the creation of a broad-minded, liberal-thinking, and world-wide citizen—a man of large and expansive sympathy, hostile to narrowness; and surely there can be no exercise more calculated to engender this breadth of spirit than liberal and discreet travel. Nevertheless, the two ideals, if not actively hostile, are the reverse of agreeing partners. In this connection it is perhaps necessary to remark—for it is a fact but little known—that the valuable and enduring work for an Oxford degree is done in the vacation and not during term-time. The climate, the social and athletic duties, are wholly unfavourable to consistent reading; while lecture-attendance, except in rarest cases, is a weary condescension, of ancient practice but remotest profit. The tutorial system—often severely and unjustly maligned—has many marks of excellence. A good tutor, energetic, amiable and not too voluble, is a priceless asset. But his function, again, is essentially directorial. He advises, selects your books, and suggests mode of action; he is a help, an encouragement. His advice is the counsellor of the vacation, the solace in some remote hamlet, far from the hurly-burly, the madding crowd.

But is a discussion of the academic aspect of the Rhodes ideal, in the higher purpose, of truest relevance? Ought not the enquiry turn rather upon the Rhodes scholar as a man, as a social unit? Is the Rhodes scholar tempering the prejudices and dissolving those barriers which Rhodes so vigorously abhorred? Is he resolving some harmony, discovering the essential unity, underlying even diverse character? In other words, is the Rhodes scholar "fitting into" the Oxford system—is he understood—popular? According as that question is answered depends the success or failure of the Rhodes ideal. The "freshman," and particularly the Rhodes scholar "freshman," will find much to astonish him in his earliest contact with his *alma-mater*. He will find that the Oxford social system is full of social conventions. These, at times, are so indistinct that he must be continually on his guard if he would avoid breaking them. It is well for the aspiring undergraduate to be patient of correction; it is prudential of the ambitious one to be conventional. Undergraduates disliked by Oxford are in the category of the unnamable. The social cleavage between men of different years, though not insisted upon strikes a Rhodes scholar as the most

pertinent feature of the Oxford social system. It is precisely in his attitude towards these social institutions that the Rhodes scholar has achieved his most notable success. He has been surprised, and even astonished, at their importance, yet he has refrained from hostile criticism—from even the hint or suggestion of ridicule. He has approached Oxford fitly, in a temper of compromise, in the accommodating spirit. It is right and well that it is so. If the Colonial or American is to draw from Oxford his greatest fund of benefit, he must make it his constant endeavour to adapt himself to English ways and modes of conduct. This does not necessarily involve the abandonment of national and individual characteristics, but it does require the exercise of a smooth and accommodating spirit. If he who comes from over the seas, either as a Rhodes scholar or as an individual and personal unit, can by a happy discrimination, contrive to harmonise his fondest prepossessions with the customs and graces of English habit and comportment, he will achieve a notable success, not merely in the realm of personal merit but in the wider sphere of international comity. Our overseas undergraduate then becomes an ambassador of peace and the unconscious propagator of order, goodwill and true amity among nations. That is the capital and ideal function of the Rhodes scholar; that is the alpha and omega of Rhodes's dearest wish. Oxford is tolerant to all comers. She never asks questions about your morality; she is only concerned about your manners, and she immediately sits in judgment on them. Formal manners are laid aside, but essential courtesy is severely exacted. The "freshman" must feel the pulse of the society; a breach of its unwritten law is promptly punished. Her verdict is pronounced in clear, precise, and ringing tones, leaping the bounds of college wall and exacting the homage of private minds: exalting where her vanity is pleased, destroying where her sovereignty is impugned—a judgment universal, immutable and not to be impeached. A man may be dull, insignificant, slovenly if he will; but he must not be presumptuous; a hint of ill-form is scowled upon, and the offender must purge his fault. Undergraduates have been expelled from the tolerance of Oxford, and the process of extrusion has been ruthless in its severity. It would be difficult to define the precise offence; it is *felt* that he has offended, and the offence is inexpiable. They have shown themselves

unworthy to enjoy communal privileges; they had progressed too swiftly; they were too eager to "make good"; they lacked the tact to appreciate the fine shades of Oxford etiquette. Such an expanse of power is the necessary attribute of any great corporation. A society such as Oxford must be constantly searched and assiduously guarded. Laughter, clapping of hands, the frankest intercourse and unquestioning comradeship are precious plants, the fruits of life, and must be tended with a mother's care. The soil must be cleansed, fallowed and made wholesome, else noxious weeds creep in and the good seeds are perverted or wholly blighted. And what soil is more exposed to insidious growths, or what fertility, in wealth of great and stately office, to compare with it?

The homage of the Rhodes scholar to this phase of Oxford life has secured him her indulgence and affection. He has bowed to the cult of her social code, relaxed the rigour of former law, mollified and softened the bent of austere mood. Her pleasure has become his pleasure, her pain his pain, united in happiness, solacing in distress—a mutual and beneficent sympathy. And it is well that it is so; for as soon as love ceases and hostility creeps in so soon does an ideal and prodigious experiment lean to dissolution.

Finally, it remains to tabulate the lines of work taken up by the Rhodes scholars who have left Oxford during the six years 1906–1911 inclusive:

Education	123
Law	34
Civil Service (Colonial, American, and German)	25
Religious work	20
Medicine	15
Business	14
Mining and Engineering	8
Journalism	5
Agriculture	6
Forestry	5
Indian Civil Service	3
Diplomatic Service (German)	3
" " (U.S.A.)	1
Consular Service (British)	1
Miscellaneous	7
Unsettled and unknown	6

There is no profit in attempting to estimate the relative value of

these several spheres. Such a feat would be impossible, and were it possible it would be inadvisable. The success of the Rhodes ideal depends upon profounder hazard—the personal product—the man; a temper conciliatory, amiable and tolerant; a sympathy quick, well-tuned, subdued to harmony; a mind giving and receiving doubts but to debate, explain, conclude. The man and not his sphere controls the destiny of the Rhodes ideal.

T. F. ROCKLIFF

THE SERVICES AND THE SITUATION

So much has lately been written on the subject of the probable attitude of the Navy and Army in the case of civil war in Ulster, that it does not seem out of place to call attention to the state of affairs that has rendered such surmises possible.

A few years ago the very idea that the Army could even hesitate before carrying out the orders of the Executive would have been rejected as absurd by the most far-seeing men. Responsible citizens in the year 1903 would never have believed in even the possibility of such an eventuality arising within their lifetime, and yet in one short decade we find serious journals and reviews calmly and gravely discussing as to whether under certain circumstances officers will resign their commissions rather than carry out their orders.

Up to recently the fundamental principle that the law had to be obeyed and authority upheld was recognised on all sides as the basis of civilised society, but lately this foundation-stone has been severely shaken by the new doctrine that to uphold authority is to trample on the rights of man—and woman; with the result that all the old landmarks are being removed, that universal chaos reigns, and that society is fast drifting into a state of moral disintegration in which every one is a law unto himself.

At the present time the first impulse of any one confronted by some distasteful law appears to be to look round for others of the same way of thinking and to band himself with them in an attitude of active or passive resistance which would have received very different treatment in the more healthy times of yore than it does to-day. Be it a suffragette sent to prison for arson or window-breaking, be it a demagogue condemned to hard labour for seditious language, or a Nonconformist whose

religious scruples prevent his paying tithes, the smallest display of resistance on their part is apparently enough to obtain them their instant release. The constant repetition of such cases naturally brings into contempt the law, whose majesty is fast fading into a Victorian legend to bow to which is to proclaim oneself a hopeless Philistine.

How comes it that so great a revolution has taken place in so short a time?

The chief reason is undoubtedly to be found in the utter disregard and undermining of all authority caused by our present system of Party government, which, bending to every wave of ill-considered popular feeling, has forfeited the respect of all thinking men.

Authority to be respected must be respectable, and it would be a bold man who at the present moment would apply that adjective either to the Parliament that makes the laws or to the Government that administers them. Never has the old Teutonic principle that a man is not called upon to execute that in the framing and projecting of which his voice has not been heard been more openly violated. Under the lash of the Party whip ill-considered and badly framed Acts are hurriedly passed through a gagged and mutilated Parliament by caucus-elected members with a view rather to the catching of votes or the discomfiture of the Opposition than to the good of the nation. There is hardly a principle that is not sacrificed to some shameful Party bargain—not a shady action but is condoned to suit some Party convenience. Honours are openly bought and sold for Party advantage, until the very word "Honour" has become so prostituted as to mean "Dishonour," and Right and Wrong have been so ingeniously intermingled that all honest men feel that in order to steer a true course they must needs keep their consciences alive and their brains clear.

Our ears are unfortunately becoming but too well accustomed to such epithets as "traitor" and the like being hurled across the floor of the House of Commons, but when on the ringing down of the curtain we see the actors of the parliamentary stage dispersing in amity to the more congenial atmosphere of the golf course or gambling-rooms of foreign casinos, and there take their pleasures in friendly intercourse, we gauge the unreality

that the representation we have witnessed was not, as we thought, a tragedy, but a badly acted farce, which bears as much resemblance to reality as does a sham fight to the battle of Waterloo.

Years of such tactics have produced a lowering of the standard of political morality, have obscured the vision of the voter, and are engendering universal contempt for the politician.

And what of those whom this system of parliamentary government has brought to the head of affairs? Aristotle's definition: * "The virtue of the perfect citizen is this: that he is able both to govern admirably and to be governed admirably," and again: "Wherefore this also has been rightly said, that they only can govern well who themselves are governed," can hardly be applied to the men who, arrived at the highest offices of the State, complacently boast of having been poachers and passive resisters. Venal demagogues, political adventurers, middle-class mediocrities—are these thy gods, O Israel? Are these the leaders whom the England of the Chathams and the Pitts, the Cannings, the Peels, and the Palmerstons has elected to be governed by?

Let us now consider the sailor and the soldier and how they have been influenced by this general demoralisation. Theirs undoubtedly is the foothold that has been less affected than any other. Years of discipline and tradition still have their effect upon the Navy and the Army, though the recent meddlesome interference of the political heads of the Services have not been without their results even in this direction. Until recently politics had in no wise made themselves felt in the government of the Services, and their political chiefs were content, so far as their departments were concerned, to confine themselves to administration; but this, like most other Ministerial traditions, has been thrown to one side, and the Party views of Ministers are now allowed to obtrude themselves into every sphere, causing a daily growing antagonism between the civilian and professional elements of the offices over which they preside and universal exasperation amongst the officers.

Unversed in the art of political intrigue and untainted as yet by the almost universal worship of the golden calf, these latter generally spend their lives in the strict performance of their duties, and probably but few people realise how hard and

* Third Book of Politics.

monotonous such a life can be or how small are its rewards. The Services are not, like a political career, stepping-stones to places of high emolument under the Crown, and their members have little to look forward to other than the barren satisfaction of having served their country. The pay is small and very inadequate to the requirements of modern life; the honours, which might formerly be looked to as the crowning of a successful career, are now so lavishly distributed as to rob them of all value. Nelson's saying, "A peerage or Westminster Abbey," must sound but strange in the ears of a generation accustomed to see the former recruited from amongst the ranks of Semitic financiers, undistinguished plutocrats, and enterprising journalists; and the latter peopled with commonplace politicians like Campbell-Bannerman. Truly the great hero would be acquitted nowadays of any aspirations to figure in flesh and blood amongst the first, or in stone amongst the second.

Strong in the knowledge of their own useful lives, these men have hitherto been content to leave matters political in the hands of others whom they believed to be actuated by a sense of justice and responsibility equal to their own; whilst they assumed that, however dissimilar their methods of arriving at it might be, the good of the country was the common ideal for which they were striving.

But recent events have brought about a rude awakening. Themselves men of unsullied probity, they view with horror the political and financial corruption with all its tendrils of scandal and suspicion which has lately been revealed. The scales have now fallen from their eyes and the realities of modern political life have been laid bare to their gaze in all their sordidness, converting their former faith and trust into doubt and suspicion. Every action now appears to them in a new light, every change prompted by some underlying motive. Whispers are heard on all sides of illicit profit-makings in connection with the introduction of every new scientific discovery. Nay, even the impassioned harangues of Ministers introducing the Estimates are received with scepticism as to how far they are prompted by a genuine desire for the country's safety or the augmentation of the dividend-paying capacity of armament firms. Officers resent the fact that men to whose names suspicion can be attached should have the

that any such should have in their power the well-being of the Services to which they belong, and they are indignant to think that owing to their enforced association with such as these it was considered necessary on a recent occasion to proclaim to an astonished world that men of their own order were free from motives of personal profit in connection with their professional duties.

The highly educated officers see with amazement and despair the structure of British solidarity shaking beneath these upheavals; the less but still well-educated rank and file are vaguely aware that around them is taking place a deterioration for which they can hardly account, and with growing contempt all ranks look on and wonder, and the more thoughtful are beginning to realise that perhaps in them, and in them alone, lies the salvation of our unhappy country. To them, indeed, civil war means something more than a mere pawn on the political chess-board. Their consciences are touched by the thought of it, and it can be no cause for surprise if they should hesitate as to the direction in which their duty lies.

To obey or not to obey

> —that is the question,
> Whether tis nobler in the mind to suffer
> The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
> Or to take arms against a sea of troubles
> And by opposing end them?

One would almost think that Shakespeare had foreseen the present situation when he put those words into Hamlet's mouth, so aptly do they apply to the question in point. On one side lies the road along which their training and discipline would lead them; on the other, the narrow path which conscience whispers is the right way. Whatever the end of this mental conflict may be, its very existence can but have the effect of proving to these men that if indeed it comes to civil war, in their hands and their hands only will lie the ultimate issue, not of the actual conflict itself—of that there can be no doubt—but of that far larger stake—the very fate of the Empire.

But the politicians, intent only on the Party game, seem blind to what is going on around them—blind to the gulf ever widening between them and the rest of the nation—blind to the rising distrust which they and their tactics evoke. Having for years

tions made of Ireland the victim of purely English Party quarrels, they are now, in their lust for power, ready to sacrifice to that same Moloch—Party—everything else that the majority of Englishmen hold dear—the Church, the Navy, the Army, the Law—even Liberty itself, should they consider that by so doing they would gain a few years of office. Oblivious, or perhaps ignorant, of the teachings of history, that silent instructress of nations, they do not seem to realise that when all moral barriers have been swept away, *physical* force alone will survive, and that to those in whose hands lies *disciplined* force will be the power. So it always has been and so it always will be.

What may be the outcome of the ensuing struggle no man can foretell. That it will create a situation without precedent is certain. Should civil war break out, shattering, as it assuredly must, society to its very foundations and sweeping away many of our existing institutions, those most likely to survive are the Navy and the Army; and even here there is like to be a rift, for a large proportion of them would be found arrayed in direct antagonism to the Government in power, though all would remain loyal to the Sovereign. For the first time for more than two hundred years the members of the Services would have forced upon them the necessity of choosing between two paths. Whatever the consequences may be, there is one certainty: the guilt will lie not at their door, but at that of the men who for personal ends and Party ambitions have not hesitated to awaken dormant animosities and rekindle the dying embers of racial and religious hatreds.

But when the crisis now daily looming nearer is upon us, and the nation, at length awakened from its day-dreams of impossible Utopias, finds itself face to face with anarchy, to whom will it turn in its hour of need? Will it be to the hysterical politician whose sway is founded on mob-fickleness, or to the virile man of action whose title to rule is his capacity to do so? There can be little doubt of the answer; and who knows but that in this twentieth century of ours and in this peace-loving country the man may yet arise who will find as short a way to deal with parliamentary government as did Oliver Cromwell? And who shall say that even this prospect is not better than the present?

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GREATER BRITAIN AND INDIA

CANADIAN AFFAIRS

I

THE Debate on the Address in the Dominion House of Commons was hardly as interesting as usual, but it served to indicate the line which the Opposition will take in its efforts to get the ear of the constituencies. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's oration contained the following allusion to the Naval Aid Bill, which was not mentioned in the Speech from the Throne:

> The Bill was never founded upon principle. It was not even based on emergency. It was merely a measure of expediency. The Premier had talked of war clouds and brewing storms. Who speaks to-day of emergency? The storms vanished and the sky is clear. The Lord Chancellor declared in Canada that the feeling between Britain and Germany was absolutely cordial, and less than two weeks ago this was reiterated most forcefully. The world is now beginning to understand how panics are engineered and civilised countries deceived concerning so-called emergencies, and how such an appalling plot had been arranged by armour-plate makers and manufacturers of war materials.

The Opposition leader went on to read the disclosures of a Mr. A. G. Gardiner (presumably the editor of the *Daily News*) in regard to the engineering of war panics. I should be sorry to think that Sir Wilfrid takes the revelations of the Cocoa and Nickel Press journalists too seriously, but there can be no doubt whatever that a large number of Canadian Liberals are influenced by widely disseminated excerpts from "Suicide Club" pronouncements. Indeed, but for the folly of these fatuous creatures the Opposition could hardly have made out a case for holding up the Naval Aid Bill. If Canada's three "Dreadnoughts" were in process of construction the burden of the British taxpayer would obviously have been lightened, and there can be no denying

that the German and pro-German members of the Suicide Club are directly responsible—as much so as those Canadian Liberals who think that defencelessness is the cheapest form of defence for their own country and for the Empire—for the refusal of this measure of relief. Here is a point which should be brought home to the British elector.

In his reply to the Opposition leader Mr. R. L. Borden explained why there had been no mention of the Naval Aid Bill in the Speech from the Throne:

> Until a majority of the Senate in the course of events come into accord with the wishes of the majority of this House, it is useless for us to reintroduce this Bill. The Senate has now thrown out four measures passed by the Commons—the Highways Bill, the Tariff Commission Bill, the Intercolonial Branch Lines Bill, and the Naval Aid Bill. Canada has less control over the Senate when it sets itself up in opposition to the Commons than any other country in the world has over its Upper Chamber. If the Senate is disposed to force upon the Government the question of amending the constitution of the Upper Chamber and the manner of appointment thereto, the Government are ready to accept the issue.

As regards the Naval Aid Bill, the Prime Minister went on to point out, there was little doubt that its acceptance would have had an immense influence in bringing about a cessation of the competition in naval armaments. The reasons for the defeat of the Bill were not clearly understood in foreign countries, and the mischievous and disloyal act of the Senate was regarded abroad as a clear intimation to the world that Great Britain must stand alone in the matter of providing for her own defence and the defence of the Empire. By the rivals and enemies of Great Britain the action of the Senate had been applauded; by the friends of Great Britain it had been deplored. It had been publicly avowed in the Liberal Press and by the Liberal leaders that the Bill, if reintroduced, would again be thrown out. Under these circumstances the Government did not propose to give the Senate another opportunity of advertising Canada in that way. As soon as possible, however, a vote would be put through Parliament providing for the cost of the vessels which Great Britain had undertaken to build for Canada. When that moment arrived, the Government would confer with the Admiralty, and if it approved that a general naval holiday had begun, such action as the situation demanded would be taken.

2

The progressive prosperity of the Dominion has been checked for the time being, and it is evident from the speeches of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his leading supporters that the Opposition intend to make Party capital out of this fact. To judge by the tone of Sir Wilfrid's exhortations, Canada is on the brink of bankruptcy—though the situation is certainly not worse than it was in 1908, when there was much difficulty in obtaining capital for new undertakings and, as I saw for myself, there was a certain amount of unemployment in all the large cities from coast to coast. Such pronouncements are naturally resented by Canadian business men, who know that easier money and the natural buoyancy of the Canadian people have already brought about a marked recovery. Sir Wilfrid Laurier is not a man of business nor in touch with business men, and his exaggerated estimate of the "hard times" from which Canada is emerging is a left-handed kind of advertisement which shall certainly not be reproduced in this place. The following excerpt from an excellent leader in the *Toronto Globe*, the chief organ of the Liberal Party, is virtually a refutation of his jeremiads:

> Money is easier. Europe's hoarded gold begins to emerge into activity now that the war clouds have passed by. The investor seeks to put his money out to the best advantage, and is looking around for safe openings at good interest. One of the large Toronto bond houses recently received a request from Britain for Canadian municipal debentures. In response to letters and telegrams sent out to many of the more important municipalities it was discovered that there are very few securities for sale.
>
> The money pinch of last year deterred many cities and towns from embarking upon admittedly necessary public works, and they were put off till a more convenient season. How great has been the sweep of this forced economy is indicated by the fact that the December bank statement shows a decrease of loans to municipalities of $5,000,000. The avidity with which good bond issues are snapped up is shown in the experience of Brantford, which opened tenders for $115,000 of 5 per cents. the other day and received sixteen offers, four of them above par.
>
> The conditions prevailing in the bond market warrant the immediate construction of all necessary civic works held up because of the money stringency. There is no longer any danger that bonds will remain unsold. One of the most careful financial experts of Toronto assures the *Globe* that the problem is no longer one of how to place good civic bonds, but of where to get them. This sudden change in conditions does not justify plunging. The bond buyers expect that the activities of Canadian municipalities will be limited to necessary works for immediate use, and there are plenty of such works awaiting the advent of favourable conditions. They may be proceeded [illegible]

with confidently. The orders for steel, and cement, and lumber, and other raw materials and supplies will do much toward starting the wheels of industry and preventing a further drift toward curtailment and unemployment in factory and workshop.

The enforced economy of the past has had salutary effects, especially in the West, where it has practically put an end to gambling in fictitious land values. That the evil results of the period of depression which is now coming to an end are still apparent cannot be denied. The latest figures issued by the Trade and Commerce Department are a criterion of the general set-back. The total trade of Canada for 1913, exclusive of coin and bullion, was $1,119,578,117, an increase over 1912 of $121,022,956. Of this increase $23,469,290 was in imports and $94,237,185 in exports, two-thirds of the latter amount being an increase in agricultural products. To get at the meaning of these remarkable figures it is necessary to compare them with those for 1911 and 1912. The total trade for 1912 was greater than that for 1911 by $200,946,019, increased imports accounting for $132,948,466, and increased exports for $62,534,066. The effect of the depression of last year is shown (1) in a checking of the rate of increase of Canada's total trade, and (2) in a larger increase of exports than of imports, owing to the shrinking demand of the Home Market for domestic products and produce. In a word, Canada during the last nine months or so has been buying less and selling as usual. These statistics show that Canada has suffered not from any decrease of her aggregate trade (one must go back to the Mackenzie Free Trade regime for a calamity of that kind) but from a temporary slowing-down of the rate of increase. Owing to low prices the augmented volume of the Western crops did not prove as important a factor of alleviation as had been hoped. The West, however, is not disheartened in the least, as is strikingly shown by the unusually large increase in the acreage prepared last autumn for the staple crops. There is always a certain amount of unemployment in Canada during the winter, when those who have saved nothing during open months are apt to find existence difficulty indeed. At the present moment there may be between 17,000 and 18,000 unemployed men in Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver,

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EPISODES OF THE MONTH

Salaries or Conscience

UNLESS Popular and Parliamentary Government—by no means synonymous terms—are to disappear from these islands the public are entitled to knowledge of all the facts constituting the sinister mystery now afflicting this unfortunate country. We are under the harrow of an Oligarchy without any moral authority whatsoever, which while professing to act in the name of the people nevertheless has an insurmountable repugnance to consult the people before plunging the United Kingdom into the horrors of a civil war. It is a baffling enigma demanding solution. The pretexts put forward by Ministers are not even plausible; they would scarcely pass muster at the National Liberal Club. If his Majesty's Ministers believe a tithe of what they say they would welcome the opportunity of submitting a policy which *ex hypothesi* commends itself to the "considered judgment" of the nation, from whom they would necessarily secure a sweeping verdict and return in a month or six weeks fortified with the necessary power to place Ulster under the heel of her mortal enemies. Are Messrs. Asquith and Co. restrained by the conviction that the country is against them and their policy, and the dread of losing the sumptuous salaries which loom so large in their extravagant lives, or is there some still stronger motive? They are

one and all materialists, and £100 a week dwarfs every other consideration in the mind of the mere materialist. There would be weeping and gnashing of teeth in Ministerial circles at the prospect of foregoing the amenities of life in the shape of magnificent motors and splendid suppers at the Ritz and other "temples of luxury" where jaded democrats recruit the energies expended in the people's cause. We probably never had such a luxury-loving Ministry, and unless rumour is unusually inaccurate our leading demagogues in the intervals of "slating" the "idle rich" do themselves "devilish well," to use a homely phrase. It would be a catastrophe to relapse from £100 a week to £10 a week, though they might presumably rely upon their plutocratic friends, to whom they have done many a good turn, to put them into one or other "soft thing" where they might hope to reap a little of that "unearned increment" which even Mr. George does not wholly disdain when it comes his way.

Blackmailers and Blackmailed

It is the general opinion that the Asquith Government will eat any amount of dirt before risking their salaries at a General Election. But, as we have frequently hinted, and as is now positively stated, the Prime Minister has an additional reason for his cynical conduct in plunging the community into civil war without affording it a chance of saying "Yea" or "Nay," while the right of the King to any opinion upon the disruption of his kingdom is as fiercely contested as is the right of the people. We are in the grip of a group of Jacobins. The crisis is without any parallel, and the explanation of the abasement of the Asquith Cabinet is not far to seek. We should be the last to question the potency of the salary argument, and when reinforced, as in this case, it becomes irresistible. In a word, we are governed by a combination of Blackmailers and Blackmailed. We apologise for shocking our readers' susceptibilities by resorting to Limehouse language, but blackmail is the real key to the situation. It accounts for the truculence of one party to an unholy Compact, and for the ignominy of the other. This blackmail will assuredly be the death of the Radical Rump, because the Blackmailers insist on their pound of flesh, which can only be secured through "death, disaster, and damnation" to the rest of the

Coalition. That Ministers are not what may be called natural Home Rulers, *i.e.* convinced Home Rulers, is demonstrated by their failure to pass any Home Rule measure in the Parliament of 1906–10, when they were unchallenged masters of the situation, being absolutely independent of Irish Nationalist support, which Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey had both regarded as an essential condition for dealing with the Irish question. At the first election of 1910 the Radical Party lost over one hundred seats, and—their independence. They could not carry the People's Budget or any other outstanding item in the Newcastle programme, or indeed remain in power for a day except on sufferance of the Irish Nationalists. It was then that Mr. Asquith was tempted—and, needless to say, fell. The story is succinctly told in the *Daily Express* (March 23), which frequently hits the bull's-eye—unlike several other half-penny newspapers, which shall be nameless, though they could be easily named. In the words of our contemporary, this Compact was "so astounding, so utterly at variance with all sense of patriotism, justice, and concern for the welfare of the people, that we should hesitate to give it publicity were we not justified by the undoubted accuracy and proof of our statements." The *Daily Express* added: "The Compact is in writing. Mr. Redmond holds his copy. He is in a position to make use of it at any time it may suit his purpose to do so." It is thus described: "The Nationalists on their part agreed to support, vote for, and assist in every way in the passage of all Liberal measures. They even went so far as to swallow the Budget, to which they were opposed to a man. In return Mr. Asquith agreed to force Home Rule on the nation in spite of any and all opposition." The following statement fits in with all the facts that have transpired, and explains the present plight of the Government: "It was further agreed that if Ulster showed fight the Government would eventually extend the privilege of exclusion for a limited period, but beyond that it was stipulated in the Compact not to budge an inch. The offer of exclusion for a limited term is the last word of the Compact. Beyond that Mr. Redmond's terms do not permit Mr. Asquith to go. Now comes Settling Day."

THE foregoing epitome, which does not pretend to be more than an epitome, not only explains many present puzzles but several past puzzles. The farce of the Conference of 1910 during the months following the death of King Edward, who was harried into his grave by political intriguers, becomes clearer than ever. The proceedings were bound to be abortive from the outset, being initiated by the Government simply and solely in order that the people might forget the circumstances attending the death of a beloved Sovereign, and directly that object had been attained Mr. Redmond, who by this time had his document in his pocket and had spent a profitable interval in collecting dollars from American Anglophobes, ordered his puppet Premier to ring down the curtain, which was forthwith done. It was at that moment that currency was given to the famous and fateful phrase which compendiously describes the entire record of the Asquith Government, namely "Toe the line," which was not, as some people seem to imagine, an invention of the enemy because Mr. Redmond was its author, and with such a letter in his pocket as the *Daily Express* has sketched, he was entitled to treat the British Prime Minister as a man who under all circumstances must "toe the line" as the price of remaining in office. Everything that has happened since, including the almost death-like silence on the subject of Home Rule at the second General Election in 1910, the passing of the Parliament Bill which effectively destroyed not the Lords' Veto of which we have heard so much, but the People's Veto of which we have heard so little, and thus enabled Home Rule to be placed on the Statute-book in the form desired by the Molly Maguires without the electorate being afforded any opportunity of expressing their opinions on the subject, even though, as every one with any knowledge of Ulster was aware, such a measure must inevitably involve civil war—all this was in accordance with the Compact. Mr. Asquith, who knows no more about Ireland than he does of Timbuctoo, doubtless took it from Mr. Redmond that there was no Ulster question and that Ulster resistance was mere bluff, so he informed Scottish hecklers in the winter of 1910 that the contingency of employing British troops against Ulster would not arise. The essence of the arrangement was that on the one hand Messrs. Asquith and Co. should be kept in office by the Irish

Key to Enigma

Nationalist vote and that on the other hand the United Kingdom should be dismembered without a General Election or any form of Referendum. That is the A B C and the X Y Z of the whole problem. The Compact explains all the amazing events of the last four years, from the passing of a Budget odious and injurious to Ireland to the latest attempt to bluff the British Army into shooting down Ulstermen.

The "Westminster's" Wriggling

We do not for one moment suggest that any Unionist Member of Parliament should waste his breath by asking Mr. Asquith about the document of which Mr. Redmond is alleged to have a copy, as he would merely be asking the Prime Minister to add another brick to the mighty monument of mendacity which has been reared under his auspices. At need it will have been "mislaid," as in the case of a famous letter upon which the fate of the present Government at one moment depended. We do, however, strongly urge that the public shall be placed in possession of the real facts and that from every platform and in every genuine Unionist paper this infamous Compact shall be exposed and denounced. The country, the King, and the Constitution were all sold to the Molly Maguires in 1910 in order that certain needy, greedy, seedy politicians should retain their salaries, and the goods have now to be delivered in the shape of civil war, which was at all times an inevitable result of Home Rule. The extraordinary events of the past month are only compatible with the existence of a written Compact between the Blackmailers and the Blackmailed. There are no limits to the amount of dirt which an Asquith can eat, and needs must where the devil drives. The *Westminster Gazette*, whether it be controlled by Sir Charles Solomon Henry, Bart., by the Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred Moritz Mond, Bart., P.C., or Lord Cowdray, the oil magnate, is ever ready with a glib *démenti* of any statement inconvenient to our Cabinet of Caillaux, but it evidently feels unequal to the task of denying the statement of Mr. Harold Cox, who in commenting on the Sea-green Incorruptible's observation that the "Liberal Party has clear obligations to the Irish" naturally interprets our slippery contemporary as holding "that a bargain between the Government and the Irish Nationalists overrides the right of the whole nation

to be consulted on a grave constitutional issue." All our chemical or oil contemporary can screw itself up to reply is that "for our part it seems to us that all this talk about a bargain is beside the mark. *Ex hypothesi* the Liberal Party is trying to pass the Home Rule Bill in order to satisfy Irish Nationalist feeling, and it is impossible to suggest that there is anything wrong or humiliating in having regard to Irish Nationalist opinion at this or any other stage." We can scarcely conceive anything more wicked or humiliating than that a British Government, by virtue of a Compact with a faction whose votes are necessary to keep that Government in office, should drag the country into a civil war without even affording the people an opportunity of saying "Aye" or "No." This is the kernel of the question, as the *Westminster Gazette* well knows, and no wriggling will serve its purpose. As we have seen, the *Daily Express* bluntly states: "The Compact is in writing. Mr. Redmond holds his copy. He is in a position to make use of it at any time it may serve his purpose to do so."

The Compact in Operation

THE past month has disclosed the operation of the Compact in such fashion that all who run may read. The Blackmailed in the first instance made a miserable effort to fool the public by bogus concessions which contributed less than nothing towards the solution of the Irish embroglio and then followed up their fiasco by a frantic and furious effort to appease the Blackmailers which was so badly bungled as to bring the Coalition to the very edge of catastrophe. Needless to say, Mr. Asquith, one of the fine flowers of Balliol culture, has been conspicuously contemptible throughout this further crisis, which is exclusively attributable to his cowardice, which allows the worst members of his combination to go as they please. There can only be one result of allowing the pace of a Cabinet to be set by Rats and Renegades. Amid the usual flourish of trumpets, to which the usual "Unionist" organs contributed their usual quota of noise, the Prime Minister, so-called, appeared in the House of Commons to move the second reading of the Home Rule Bill (March 9), upon which certain marvellous "proposals" which would commend themselves to everybody, and over which we should all fall upon one another's necks,

were to be grafted. In order to encourage us to take them seriously the Churchill and Lloyd George sections of the Unionist Press gave out that their own particular heroes, the master minds of the Ministry, who were recently compared in a "Unionist" paper to Cromwell, Disraeli and Gladstone, had been at work upon the problem, and if we only possessed our souls in patience we should hear what we should hear. We did. All we got, as everybody anticipated who kept his head and who does not take his marching orders from the billionaire Press, was another speech from Mr. Asquith containing such truly childish suggestions that even our conciliation-mongers were outraged. Never was there a more *ridiculus mus*. But it was all in accordance with the Compact, so there was no occasion to be surprised, for the Compact precludes, and always will preclude, any serious concessions, unless, of course, as is now on the cards, the plight of the Coalition becomes so alarming as to frighten the Blackmailers into abating their demand. The Molly Maguires may realise that it is a case of half a loaf or no bread, and then a very serious situation would arise as the Irish question must be fought to a finish here and now, and for the purpose of finally crushing the disruption movement we would run the risk of being defeated by it. When the Molly Maguires lose their nerve they will consent to the boná-fide exclusion of Ulster, not a temporary make-believe but a permanent arrangement, and wreak their vengeance on scattered and defenceless loyalists throughout the south and west of Ireland.

A Bogus Policy

THEIR agent, Mr. Asquith, got up in the House of Commons with his tongue in his cheek when he propounded the "plan" which embodied the collective wisdom of a "toe-the-line" Cabinet under iron discipline. After gaily admitting that the present Bill would produce civil strife in Ulster—a substantial admission on the part of a time-serving lawyer who in public and in private has poured ridicule upon the Ulster cause, being unable to conceive the possibility of any man making a sacrifice for anything he believes in, for the simple reason that the present Prime Minister believes in nothing, not even in himself—the speaker added that the failure of Home Rule would produce a formidable situation

in the rest of Ireland, a statement which is unsupported by corroborative evidence. Indeed those who know the south and west aver the contrary, and maintain that there will be almost as much quiet satisfaction in the Home Rule area at the defeat of Home Rule as there would be demonstrative joy in the Ulster area over the same event. A compromise was consequently in Mr. Asquith's opinion desirable, namely, the acceptance of a Home Rule Parliament and Government by the Unionists and some special treatment for Ulster by the Home Rulers. The Compact, unfortunately—or shall we say fortunately, because the exclusion of Ulster is an odious policy—does not, as we have stated, permit serious compromise, as became apparent after Mr. Asquith had discarded Sir Edward Grey's feeble suggestion of "Home Rule within Home Rule" and produced his own derisory scheme. We quote his own words so that our readers may form their own opinion of this statesmanlike solution, supposed to be the *via media* which is to lead us into the Promised Land of peace, contentment, and happiness:

> Any county in the province of Ulster is to be excluded for a certain period, if on a poll being taken of the Parliamentary electors in the county before the Bill comes into operation, a majority—a bare majority—vote in favour of exclusion. The poll will be taken in a county if a requisition is presented signed by, say, one-tenth of the electors, and presented, say, within three months of the date of the passing of the Bill. The poll will be taken for the county as a whole without regard to its parliamentary divisions. The persons entitled to vote are those entitled to vote at parliamentary elections, and the question to be put will be this—the phraseology may be varied, but in substance it will be this: "Are you in favour of the exclusion of the county from the Government of Ireland Act, 1914, for a period of years, or are you against such exclusion?"

Time Limit

FOR the moment one might have been taken in, but Mr. Asquith added that the period was to be six years from the first meeting of the Irish Legislature in Dublin, after which the excluded counties would not, as simpletons might have surmised, be afforded a fresh opportunity of expressing their views as to their future fate, but they would pass automatically under the heel of their enemies, *i.e.* the Dublin Parliament, "unless the Imperial Parliament otherwise determines." Meanwhile they would remain represented at Westminster in undiminished numbers, and the Irish Executive would

have no authority over them. "When these counties have been excluded, there must be adjustment, administrative and financial, in the application of the Bill to the rest of Ireland. It is not on those points that the chance of a peaceful settlement really depends. If the broad principle is agreed on, then I think it is much better we should not commit ourselves to a cut-and-dried method at this moment." These proposals were put forward simply as the price of peace, and even in the mind of their author appeared to have no merits of their own and would be received without enthusiasm in any quarter, though they were entitled to deliberate and dispassionate consideration. They were thus summarised by the Premier, who spoke strictly by the card, the card being the Compact, which makes him what the French call "a prisoner" of the Molly Maguires, who, as we have seen, at the date of the Compact agreed that at a pinch sham concessions might be paraded.

> To the Home Ruler, Irish or British, they may involve, at any rate, the postponement of a symmetrical system of self-government, and to the Unionist, Irish and British, they will necessitate an unwelcome acceptance of an Irish Government in Dublin. But, on the other hand, they hold out to the Home Ruler a prospect of an undivided Ireland, brought in time to its full measure of development not by coercion but by consent; and to the man of Ulster they offer, in the first instance, a free choice, and afterwards the certainty that their status cannot be changed without the assent, expressed or implied, of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. I speak after long and anxious consideration. There is no arrangement for an agreed settlement in which the balance of give and take is likely to be more full and adequate. This is a test case. The best traditions of our fathers, no less than the undisclosed and fateful issues of the present, are speaking to us to-day in imperious accents and asking us to pursue if we can the way of unity and peace.

Mr. Bonar Law at once put his finger on the fatal flaw in this revised version of the Home Rule Bill, which invited Ulster to accept automatic inclusion after six years. In other words, the Ulstermen were to destroy their organisation, to leave their fortress, to come out into the open on this summons from the enemy, which in effect said, "When you are weak you will be compelled to do that which to-day, when you are strong, you cannot be compelled to do." This was the gist of the Unionist Leader's declaration after the usual polite preliminaries, including conventional compliments to the Prime Minister on his "lucidity" and "goodwill." To outsiders who, happily for themselves, have

no part in the parliamentary game, the two qualities in which Mr. Asquith is most lacking are lucidity of mind, whatever technical lucidity of expression there may be, and "goodwill" if goodwill means "good faith," though another quality is yet more conspicuously absent, namely, courage. Mr. Bonar Law had listened

with deep interest but with deep anxiety; and I may add that that anxiety was increased as the plan of the Government was developed. If this is the offer of which the Chief Secretary [Mr. Birrell] said that it had to be taken or left—if these proposals, precisely in the form in which the right hon. gentleman has put them before the House, represent the last word of the Government—I am afraid they possibly may represent the last word; I am afraid they may, because we have the authority of the hon. gentleman the member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) for the statement that they are the last word of the Nationalist Party—if they are the last word, then the position seems to me to be a very grave one.

One Way Out

AMONG the many merits of Mr. Bonar Law, to whose fearless leadership at this crisis of our fate the country is under the deepest obligation, is that, though as a Front Benchman he finds himself constrained to deal in the counters that form the currency of Front Benchers, he never loses sight of the realities among which, as he has frequently indicated, is the unholy Compact between the Nationalist Blackmailers and the Blackmailed Radicals after the loss of 100 seats at the first election of 1910. Mr. Bonar Law reminded the House of Commons of the unusual and indeed "somewhat alarming language in the Speech from the Throne" at the opening of the Session. The Government alone had the power to avoid the threatened evil, and they could avoid it "not only without the sacrifice of honour, but without the sacrifice even of dignity, and they can avert it independently of any action, wise or unwise, on the part of the Opposition." There were two issues from the impasse, of which the first was the satisfaction and conciliation of Ulster. "That is one way we—and I think it is well to make this clear, if I can—the members of the Unionist Party here, are opposed—and I am sure the right hon. gentleman will not object to my saying it, or will not think that it is unconciliatory—to Home Rule, with or without exclusion." The Opposition also held that "the Government have no right to make a change like this until they have received the clear sanction of the electors.

We hold that they have not up to now received that sanction, and we believe they never could receive it. That is our position." On the other hand, "There has never been any suggestion that we here in England or Scotland would resist the proposals of the Government, either passively or actively. There has never been any such threat. The threat, or rather the determination to resist, comes from Ulster and from Ulster alone. Our share in it has only been this, as we have stated, that if Ulster does resist, as we believe, until the matter is decided by the people, they are right in doing, we will support them. I really do not see what other course was possible to us." Holding that view not as a matter of opinion but as a conviction "which touches the deepest feelings of which we are capable, we are surely bound by every obligation of honour and of duty not to allow these people to be unjustly oppressed, if it is in our power to prevent them from being oppressed. That is admitted. If, therefore, you satisfy Ulster, automatically the danger of civil tumult disappears, and however wrong we may consider you are in pressing your proposals forward before you have submitted them to the country, you can carry them independently of us without any danger of civil strife." We hear so much of the "lucidity" of a confused mind that it is refreshing to come upon the lucidity of a clear mind such as Mr. Bonar Law's. He proceeded to point out how the Government could satisfy Ulster and should satisfy Ulster without any sacrifice of principle. "The only ground on which I have been able to understand the way in which the Government propose to deal with Ulster is on the assumption that they have entirely misunderstood the facts of the situation."

A Lost Opportunity

It was possible, and indeed probable, that Mr. Asquith really believed that the hostility of Ulster had died down during the last twenty years and they would accept his Bill, which was only being opposed by British Unionists for Party purposes, and Mr. Bonar Law could understand the proposals being pressed. But he (the Prime Minister) cannot have that opinion now. He must now realise both the reality and the intensity of the hostility of Ulster, and that change in the situation ought, I think, of necessity to make a change in his plans. In my belief it would have

been no sign of weakness—on the contrary, it would hav been a proof of greatness—if the right hon. gentleman had tol us to-day, 'I was mistaken; I am determined, if I can ge the support of the House and the country, to give Home Rul to the part of Ireland which desires it, but I shall not mak myself responsible for forcing it upon a great community whic is unalterably opposed to it.'" If Mr. Asquith satisfied Ulste the difficulties would disappear, but how could the presen proposals achieve that object? The Unionist Leader added:

> I am not entitled to speak for Ulster and I am not going to speak for Ulster. M right hon. friend beside me (Sir E. Carson) is entitled more than any other man to spea for Ulster, and I have no doubt that he will say what his view of these proposals is. feel bound, as I think the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Asquith) will have gathered . . . t say at once that if he adheres to the condition which is laid down—the condition, th is, that this portion of Ulster is to be given the option to remain out of it, if it desire, but at the end of six years they have to come in, even though their hostilit is as great or greater than it is to-day, and even though the result of the working the Nationalist Parliament might have convinced them by actual experience that the hostility was justified—if the Government adhere to that condition, I really cann see how it is possible that the proposals can be accepted.

Two other Ways Out

THE test of the sincerity of the Government and their allies to meet the demands of the people of Ulster would be supplied by the strictness with which they adhered to thi impossible condition of a time limit at the end o which there would be automatic inclusion. Thi was the touchstone as to their good faith. "If they adhere to this, then I am afraid we must come—and in my case I come very reluctantly—to the conclusion that the right hon. gentleman the Chief Secretary, in one of those moments of incurable franknes which he so constantly laments when he told us that this was the offer which would be made to Ulster and which Ulster would refuse, knew what he was talking about." If they adhered to a condition which every member of Parliament would in his heart feel to be utterly unreasonable, it would be because they had made an offer which they knew could not be accepted and was only inspired by tactical reasons. Mr. Bonar Law indicated another way by which the Government could dispose of the difficulty independently of the Opposition, namely, by submitting the question to the decision of the electorate.

I know that hon. and right hon. gentlemen opposite constantly tell us, and it is said also by their Press, that we are using Ulster only as a pawn in the Party game, and that what we desire is simply to defeat the Parliament Act. That statement is not true, and it can be proved to demonstration it is not true. If the Government had chosen, before this Session opened, to submit their proposals to the country, and if the country had been behind them, the Parliament Act would not have been interfered with. The powers of the House of Lords would not have been revived and if, under these circumstances, they say that to appeal to the country means defeating the Parliament Act, then their claim is clear. It means this: that what they understand by the Parliament Act is that they have the right to do anything which seems good to them, even though they know it is against the will of the electorate.

We make no apology for reproducing these extracts from Mr. Bonar Law's speech because, though they may be familiar to our readers at Home, it is highly desirable, owing to the misleading cablegrams which we may be sure are sent abroad, especially to the Dominions, by correspondents who derive their inspiration from the Falconers, the Handel Booths and the Isaacs of the National Liberal Club, that the attitude of the Unionist Party should be appreciated throughout the Empire. Mr. Bonar Law concluded by reminding the House of Commons that the Government are still in a position to submit the Home Rule Bill to the country without in any way destroying the Parliament Act, and he went great lengths in trying to meet them, though without result, for the simple reason that every serious proposal is vetoed by the Compact of 1910. Take Mr. Bonar Law's offer, which was subsequently repeated in the most formal and explicit manner:

If they (the Government) are not willing to have a General Election for any reason, for the reason perhaps which has been partly explained by the Prime Minister, that he thinks that while the country is hostile to his Government it is favourable to his policy—if he does not want to have an election, there is another method, and he has himself, in the proposal which he outlined to-day, shown clearly what that method is. He has shown how easy it is to take a Referendum in Ulster, but this is not a question which affects Ulster only. It affects the whole of the United Kingdom almost as much and if it is right to have the decision of the people of Ulster, why is it wrong to have the decision of the people of the United Kingdom? If the Government choose, they can take the proposals which the right hon. gentleman has outlined to-day, they can put them in a Bill, they can carry it through this House, and they can attach to it a clause that it is to be submitted to the people of this country for a plain "Yes or "No," and that if they say "Yes" there is to be no question of the House of Lords, and that t is to be presented forthwith for the Royal Assent. It is quite true that to adopt that course the House of Lords must allow the Bill to go through. That is quite

true. I cannot speak for the House of Lords, but I say this—that I am as sure as I can be of anything that if such a course is taken the House of Lords will accept the Bill. I am sure of it. . . . If they take that course they will at once put themselves in the right, and they will put their opponents in the wrong. So far as I myself am personally concerned, I say here and now, if they take that course, I shall do everything in my power to enable them to carry it into effect. The position really is so clear that I am not afraid of its being confused before the people of the country. If you can satisfy Ulster, well and good. If you cannot, then the issue is plain. You have no right to carry these proposals unless you have the people of this country behind them. If they are behind them, you can carry them smoothly and rapidly and without difficulty. If you refuse to take that course, it can only be because you know that you have not the support of the country.

Sir E. Carson's Moderation

MR. JOHN REDMOND, the Leader of the Molly Maguire Nationalists, a first-rate second-class actor, played his part to perfection, pretending to be displeased, affecting reluctant acquiescence in proposals drafted by himself or submitted to him before they were presented to the House; while Mr. William O'Brien, the Leader of that portion of the Nationalist Party who are not Molly Maguires, also elected to treat Mr. Asquith's proposals seriously, denouncing them as "hateful," and ironically congratulating Mr. Bonar Law on "the official recognition of his new Orange Free State." Sir Edward Carson, heavily handicapped by ill-health, rose to the height of his great responsibilities as Ulster Leader, replying to Mr. Asquith's statement that the Home Rule Bill remained a sound and statesmanlike measure, that nothing had happened since its introduction "in the slightest degree to abate one jot or tittle of our hostility and loathing to the whole principle of this Bill. And let me say this, that that loathing is not merely the loathing of the people of Ulster, it is the loathing of every Unionist, Protestant and Catholic, throughout the whole of the south and west of Ireland." Mr. Asquith had spoken of the road to settlement. "So far as settlement is concerned, in the sense that we are to agree to Home Rule for the rest of Ireland for any benefits that may be given to Ulster, we will never agree to the sacrifice of the people of the south and west, whatever may be the benefits which may be offered to Ulster." Sir Edward Carson approached the question in a different way.

If I am asked to accept these proposals or recommend them—I have no power to accept them—if I am asked to recommend them, I should like to know, am I to recommend them as the price of our agreeing to this Bill for the rest of Ireland, or an acceptance of the principle of it, because, if so, I shall never do so. On the other hand, if you want to disarm Ulster in the sense that Ulster will not resist your proposals by force, if you want to bring about such a state of affairs that you may commence your Parliament, wherever it is in Ireland, in peace and quietness, that is a different proposition.

One might accept that and go on by all constitutional means resisting the Bill; and in that respect some advance had been made that afternoon by the acknowledgment of the principle of exclusion. "That, in my opinion, is an important matter, because the moment you admit the principle of exclusion the details of the principle may be a matter that may be worked out by negotiation; but there has been added on to the admission of that principle of exclusion a term which, I believe, has been added in order that it may make it impossible for us even to enter into any such negotiations." Ulster demanded that the question of exclusion should be settled now and for ever. "We do not want sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years. Just look at what is offered to us. We are to come into a sort of probation for six years; we are to stand down watching the Irish Parliament for a period of six years. Can the imagination of the right hon. gentleman look at the picture of what will exist in Ulster during those six years? . . . If this six years are to stand, all the old questions will remain. At every election the test will be: 'If you are returned, will you support a Bill to prolong the period of six years or to make it perpetual?'" After riddling this ridiculous time limit, Sir Edward Carson took upon himself the risk—because there is always a great risk in suggesting any compromise when men's passions are inflamed—of making a bonâ fide offer to the Government.

For my own part, if you take your time limit away, I would feel it my duty to go over to Ulster and to call a convention, much as I think the system you propose for segregating the various counties is impracticable, which I think I could easily show, though I do not think it is relevant to the argument I now have in hand. But with this time limit in, and Ulster ready, as I believe it, for any exigency at the present moment, I shall not go to Ulster. Take away the time limit, and instead put the limit of Parliament as elected by the people whenever they may determine, having regard to the

feelings of Ulster itself, and then I shall go to Ulster, and I make that offer to the right hon. gentleman.

Sir Edward Carson imagined that what he said might be a relief to Irish Nationalists, but he could not help that.

Insult to Ulster

I have no doubt if I were playing this game as tactics, if I were agreeable to allow those in Ireland who trust me to be made a pawn in a political game, I would say, "Well, let us have these things put upon paper, and probably the Nationalists will fall out amongst themselves." I would make pretence that we might accept all this in Ulster, but I have refused to play this game from the beginning as a game of tactics. I do not profess to be a tactician, but if I were a tactician, with the seriousness of the question and the love I have of my own countrymen, I would think myself contemptible if I allowed them to be drawn into a mere Party game on the one side or the other. You may think I am wrong in not going to Ulster with this proposition. I can only say if I have not interpreted Ulster feelings aright, Ulster people are quite welcome to-morrow themselves without me, and quite independent enough, to call a convention. Certainly if they differ from me upon this matter I should without feeling the slightest bitterness, or that they had treated me in the slightest degree unkindly or ungratefully, step aside as willingly as I step forward to-day to do what they ask.

We shall only understand the latest version of Asquith Home Rule by always bearing in mind that no step may be taken by the blackmailed without the assent of the blackmailers, and the ignominious proposal to treat Ulster as a public house with a time limit was drafted in consort with, if it did not actually emanate from, the sinister triumvirate who hold the Government by the throat: Messrs. Redmond, Dillon and Devlin. Never has a more idiotic or insulting proposal been made to a high-spirited nationality by men professing to believe in the principle of nationality. It was self-evident that Ministers were playing with the question, and as the peace of Ireland was jeopardised by this further manifestation of the power of the blackmailers, Mr. Bonar Law a few days later moved a vote of censure on the Government in a speech which went an alarming way to meet the Government, if there were a serious Govermnent to meet; but as the Leader of the Opposition's magnanimous proposals ran counter to the Compact there was never any serious prospect of their acceptance, although no one doubts the good faith with which they were put forward, though many people on our side regret the offer. Mr. Bonar Law has, however, if possible, put him-

self and the Unionist Party in a still more unassailable position and Mr. Asquith in a correspondingly hopeless position. To-day only a paid Radical can approve the conduct of the Prime Minister in rejecting these counter proposals. It is right to take risks in politics as in war, and therefore Mr. Bonar Law is to be congratulated, though in the history of politics no man has ever gone so far to help his opponents out of the morass. Never again can he be accused of seeking a personal or Party advantage out of this appalling crisis.

Parliament a Back Number

LET the Dominions, whose news, as we have said, frequently percolates through the distorting medium of the National Liberal Club, take note of the amazing offers of Mr. Bonar Law, which were not merely rejected with contumely but were met by a dastardly conspiracy of Cabinet Ministers to organise a Pogrom in Ulster. Let us say at once that we are entirely opposed to the practice of running after the Coalition with proposals of any kind. They are not worth it, and it is misleading to the people as it suggests that we are dealing with free agents, which, as we all know, is contrary to the fact. We are dealing with Mr. Redmond's puppets, and everyone who can see the ignominy of running after Mr. Redmond should be able to appreciate the greater ignominy of running after Mr. Asquith. Unionist duty at this crisis is exclusively confined to exposing the sinister operations of the Pogrom Party to the people at large, who are daily fed with lies by the Pogrom Press. It is a pure waste of time talking at Westminster. Unionist speeches merely provoke Radical lies. All the talking should be done on platforms. No one nowadays reads these columns upon columns of "our parliamentary intelligence," but every great political centre is interested in a visit of a prominent public man however feeble and uninspiring he may be. Why, even such utterly discredited demagogues as the Windbag and the Artful Dodger continue to collect audiences at Bradford and Huddersfield. No one pays any attention to anything they may say in Parliament, as they have long since discovered. They do their mischief at week-ends. The Unionist Party should counteract these marplots—it is

dangerous to leave the field free to unscrupulous opponents at a time like this. This is common comment among Unionist workers who know that one speech in the provinces is worth ten speeches in Parliament. If Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Edward Carson made a resolution never to speak for more than ten minutes in the House of Commons and to devote their serious efforts to other audiences, the effect on public opinion would astonish them. But Front Benchers have been brought up in certain traditions, and it is difficult to shake their prejudices about "the House," even when the House has fallen into general disrepute. Mr. Bonar Law's vote of censure (March 19) took the following form:

> "That this House, having heard the statements of the Prime Minister, regrets the refusal of the Government to formulate their suggestions for the amendment of the Government of Ireland Bill, and is of opinion that these suggestions ought to be formulated before the resumption of the Second Reading of the Bill."

Beginning of Pogrom Plot

The Unionist Leader emphasised his former criticism as to the unreasonableness of proposing to settle the Ulster question by local Referendum, while denying a Referendum to the people of this country on the Home Rule Bill, which made him inclined to look at the conduct of the Government "as a tactical manœuvre in the Party game." Mr. Bonar Law perhaps hardly realised at the time of speaking the unerring accuracy of this observation. At that moment the Pogrom plot was afoot. The speaker informed the plotters, "If the Government can succeed in preventing unconstitutional and armed resistance in Ulster by their proposals, well and good. I, for one, shall be glad; but if they cannot, then there is still a way of escape open to them, and a way of escape which, in my belief, they could take not only without any sacrifice of principle, but without any loss of dignity." If the Government thought it was not right to have a General Election because it would be risky and humiliating "before they had got any fruits from their Parliament Act, if that is the reason which influences them, or if they think—and it is quite possible they think—the Prime Minister

has said it—if they think that a General Election now—and, after all, there is a good deal of interest about Ireland, and the Prime Minister himself on at least one occasion in a letter to a candidate mentioned Home Rule—if he thinks that now the verdict would not decide the question of Home Rule, although he is quite sure it decided it in December 1910, when he did not mention it to any candidate or hardly in any speech, and not in his election address—if that is his view, well, there is another alternative." The Government had themselves pointed out that alternative. "They have suggested that this question should be settled so far as Ulster is concerned by taking the opinion of the people of Ulster. If that is a right method in regard to Ulster, it cannot be a very wrong method when applied to the electors of the whole of the United Kingdom." The Opposition Leader wound up by making "as formally and as solemnly as I can—an offer which I hope the right hon. gentleman will not reject without at least some consideration. If he chooses to put his new suggestions into his Home Rule Bill, and submits these suggestions to the country by a Referendum, and the country decides in favour of them, then I have the authority of Lord Lansdowne to say now that, so far as his influence in the House of Lords goes, that body will offer no impediment to carrying out completely, without alteration and without delay, the decision of the will of the people of this country. How can that be regarded as otherwise than a reasonable proposal. Was it really maintained that Ministers had a right to make this great change without the country behind them?' Did Mr. Asquith maintain "that the country was behind him four years ago on this question, which, of course, I utterly deny; but does he maintain that they were behind him four years ago, and that therefore he has a right to do it even though they are against him now? Surely that is not a position that could be taken up by any Government in any free country. If in the face of the calamities which are really in front of us, and which I think the Prime Minister realises as fully as I do myself, if he refuses to take a course so easy and so obvious . . . it can only be because, in the words of the First Lord of the Admiralty, he prefers that the question should be settled by bullets rather than by votes." This passage was indeed prophetic.

No less notable was Mr. Bonar Law's allusion to the Army made, be it remembered, before the disclosure of the Pogrom plot:

The Army and Civil War

"And what about the Army? We really now have got to a stage when we must face facts. What about the Army? If it is only a question of disorder, the Army, I am sure, will obey you, and I am sure that it ought to obey you; but, if it really is a question of civil war, soldiers are citizens like the rest of us. It never has been otherwise in any country at any time. If it is civil war, whether it is right or wrong—and I say nothing about it, whether it is right or wrong—the Army will be divided, and you will have destroyed the force, such as it is, on which we depend for the defence of this country."

Mr. Bonar Law warned the Government that even though at the present moment "No great masses of men on either side" might be prepared to take up arms in Great Britain, the first blood shed in Ulster would have the same effect as the firing of the first shot in the American Civil War. The Rats and Renegades on the Treasury Bench smiled derisively. Anything, war, or civil war, to save their salaries. They became momentarily restive at the subsequent dialogue between the titular head of the Government and the Unionist leader, who, we must reiterate, went an alarming way in his conscientious anxiety to help the Government out of the pit of their own digging in the interests of peace. Never again can Radical mud-slingers accuse Mr. Bonar Law of seeking partisan advantage from the present crisis. He has done his utmost without counting the possible cost to his Party to save the country from the Pogrom Party, and if civil war comes it will be because the £100-a-weekers and the £8-a-weekers know no other way of saving their salaries. In his best heavy father style Mr. Asquith cross-examined Mr. Bonar Law about the Referendum, and the tables were so completely turned on the cross-examiner, who was once more exposed for the fraud that he is, that he hastily changed the subject, but not until he had shown his hand. He asked Mr. Bonar Law: "Suppose that Referendum (*i.e.* a General Referendum) were to produce a majority in favour of our proposal? Am I to take it that, in the view of the right hon. gentleman and his colleagues,

that would carry with it authority, if necessary, to coerce Ulster ? "
We quote the Official Report.

" Mr. Bonar Law indicated assent.

The Prime Minister : The right hon. gentleman was prepared, speaking in the name of the Unionist Party, to say that if a Referendum is now taken in advance, and the answer given by the people of the United Kingdom is in favour of our proposals, he is prepared to go the length of coercing Ulster.

Mr. Bonar Law : Not on our part.

The Prime Minister : Well, he is prepared to say we shall be justified in doing it.

Mr. Bonar Law indicated assent."

Mr. Asquith Unmasked

Mr. Asquith was evidently completely taken aback by this frank answer, which was unintelligible to a master of mental reservations, and after fumbling about he could only say, " I take note of this proposal, made with the authority of the Unionist Party, that this matter should be submitted to a Referendum. I want to ask one or two questions upon that. What is it that is to be submitted ? "

" Mr. Bonar Law : The Bill.

The Prime Minister : The Bill as it stands ?

Mr. Bonar Law : With the alterations.

The Prime Minister : With the suggested alterations ?

Mr. Bonar Law : Yes !

The Prime Minister : And to what constituency is the appeal to be made ? Is it to be to the electorate of the United Kingdom as it stands, or is it to be put, as I think was not only suggested, but more than suggested, by Lord Lansdowne and by the right hon. gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) some years ago, to a constituency in which there is single and not plural voting ? That is a relevant question.

Mr. Bonar Law : I will answer it at once, if you like. We should be quite willing to accept it without any plural voting."

Mr. Asquith was aghast and the Pogrom Party in the depths, so he fell back on another line of retreat. As he could do nothing with Mr. Bonar Law he would try Sir Edward Carson, whom he

thus challenged. "Would Ulster accept the decision?" Surely in vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird. Sir Edward Carson was not the man to walk into any palpable trap, and he replied: "Does the Prime Minister give me a firm offer? If so, I will answer it." All the contemptibleness of Mr. Asquith's shifty character was revealed by his answer, which is thus recorded in the Official Report.

"THE PRIME MINISTER: This is not my offer, but I want to know what the consequences would be.

SIR E. CARSON: Is not that a hypothetical question? Where are the details?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I understand it is not answered. (Hon. Members: "Wait and see!") I will point out, further, what I have had to point out on many occasions before—I do not say it by way of reducing the idea of a Referendum in political matters to an absurdity—but let me point out this, that when we attempt to take a Referendum on a matter of this kind, it is a complete delusion to suppose that the elector will isolate his judgment with regard to one issue and will not have regard to the general political situation."

In other words, after luring the Opposition into making very serious concessions on the pretext that he is acting in good faith, the Prime Minister shabbily withdraws from the dialogue without making any serious proposal, and he a professed friend of peace. Doubtless the Pogromites were pulling at his coat-tails and were determined that their little plot should not be spoilt. Sir Edward Carson had probably wind of the hellish scheme on foot and at the earliest possible moment withdrew from the House with other Ulster Unionist members, knowing that his presence would be required in Belfast to defeat the machinations of the Admiralty and the War Office. In his own words; "I had intended to intervene at a later stage of this Debate, but in consequence of many things that have happened, and not least of all in consequence of what I might call the trifling with this subject by the Prime Minister and the provocation, which he has endorsed, by the First Lord of the Admiralty last Saturday, I feel that I ought not to be here, but in Belfast."

It is not possible to give the reader any full or detailed account of the Pogrom policy for which every preparation had been made by the Rats and Renegades of the Admiralty and War Office, while Mr. Asquith was dallying with the Opposition and pretending to be anxious for the peaceful settlement of the crisis of which he is the architect. We do not at the time of writing know all the facts and the situation is reported as varying hourly, though there is one unchanging and unchangeable element in the grim determination of the limpets to cling to the spoils of office. It was a very pretty little plot as born in the fertile brains of Messrs. Churchill, George and Co., but unfortunately for its authors, it required a big man for its successful execution, and there was nothing bigger available than our Welsh mountebank or the Dundee Windbag. A Napoleonic conception in the hands of a Churchill was bound to result in fiasco, and yet on paper it seemed a dead certainty to our pinchbeck Machiavellis. Ulster was to be provoked by public insults into premature aggression, and then, having put herself in the wrong in the eyes of the United Kingdom, was to be crushed by an overwhelming display of naval and military force, or of at any rate a force that could be represented in the Pogrom press as overwhelming. The insults were, needless to say, forthcoming from the most blatant bounders in public life, namely Mr. Churchill, who "bounded" at Bradford, where under the auspices of Mr. Illingworth, the Chief Whip of the Pogrom Party, he declared that there were worse things than bloodshed and challenged Ulster to put these matters to the proof; while Mr. Lloyd George subsequently "bounded" at Huddersfield in similar style. Sir Edward Carson, with his usual acumen, detected the *agent provocateur* on the Bradford platform; while Mr. Redmond, who was "in the know," took the opportunity of advocating "force" as the real remedy for the Irish difficulty. In order to intimidate and demoralise exasperated Ulster the Pogrom Party decided to issue warrants for the arrest of the Ulster Leaders, while still more significant was the ostentatious advertisement of the sudden movement of troops and ships to the North—a foretaste of what was to come, and it is now known that a formidable naval demonstration against Belfast was one item in the programme.

Pinchbeck Machiavellis

"Rushing" the Army

Orders had been sent to the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland (Sir Arthur Paget) to explain the plan of campaign to the officers in his command, who instantly realised that they were expected to be the instruments of the *agents provocateurs* who were flinging their challenges about from the comfortable seclusion of Yorkshire platforms. Being men of honour, they refused to be accomplices in this dastardly business. They had not joined the Army for the purpose of provoking the working men of Belfast to attack them in order that a civil war might be started to suit the purposes of a particular political caucus. We should be the very last to say a word calculated to impair the sense of duty and discipline of a soldier carrying out lawful orders, but the soldier is also a citizen, and he does not surrender his right of private judgment when he is asked to commit a great crime in order to save the bacon of a group of transient politicians who for the time being have captured the Government of the country. In the next number we hope to tell the whole story, of which so far only fragments have transpired. Ministerial plans had been so carefully laid that there was no anticipation of any hitch. The Unionist Party has been especially scrupulous in avoiding introducing the Army into Party politics, though it was known that upon the attitude of the Army the fate of Ulster and of the United Kingdom depended in the last resort. Mr. Asquith apparently played his usual rôle of detached and uninterested spectator. If the plot had succeeded the Pogrom would have become the "considered and deliberate policy of his Majesty's Ministers." As it failed the Prime Minister repudiated it, disclaiming all knowledge of his colleagues' projects and preparations. Mr. Asquith has the merit of always being himself. He leaves no room for illusion as to his rôle at any juncture. The Government were thunderstruck on hearing from the Irish Commander-in-Chief that the officers in his command refused to be the tools of Pogrom politicians. The one calm spot in Ireland was Ulster. Dublin was in a ferment during the week-end of March 21 to 23, but the agitation of Dublin was nothing to the hysterical excitement in ministerial circles in London. Mr. Asquith actually abandoned his week-end holiday. Truly the skies had fallen. The facts trickled out very slowly to the

public, which is still, at the moment of going to press, ignorant as to this amazing episode, to which a worse complexion is given by successive Ministerial statements which confirm what we have continually contended, namely, that it is wrong to believe any word said by any Minister on any subject.

The undisputed facts are that directly General Gough, commanding the Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh, realised what was expected of him, he resigned his command, his action being supported by almost all the officers in the Brigade. That the "White Paper" which purported to contain the communications on this vital matter has been cooked is obvious from its omissions, but the fact remains that on March 14, when the Pogrom policy had been decided upon, Sir Arthur Paget was informed by the War Office of contemplated and, needless to say, purely imaginary attacks which were expected to be made on Government arms and stores in different parts of Ulster, and the printed communication was accompanied by private instructions to the General to "rush" the Army by fair means or foul into the Pogrom. There is a blank of six days in the published communications, as it was only on March 20 that General Paget telegraphed (received 11.35 P.M.): "Regret to report Brigadier and fifty-seven officers, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, prefer to accept dismissal if ordered north." While another telegram ran as follows: "Officer commanding 5th Lancers states that all officers except two and one doubtful are resigning their commissions to-day. I much fear same conditions in 16th Lancers. Fear men will refuse to move." This "White Paper" was only published after Mr. Asquith's lost week-end. Prior to its appearance he had been "gingered up" to issue a statement of a somewhat unusual character in order to allay public apprehension, which appeared on the same day as the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Pogrom speech advocating civil war. Needless to say, Mr. Asquith has since run away from this statement, but it remains on record to add to the general confusion and almost everything that purports to be a statement of fact is in the nature of a falsehood, though whether it is his own or his colleague's falsehood we have no means of knowing. The public were invited to believe in the first place that the

General Gough

recent movements of troops in Ireland "were purely of a precautionary character" the intention being "to give additional protection to the arms, ammunition, and military stores which are scattered about the country and might become the object of a raid." The answer was supplied by the fact that some of the places to which troops were allotted were destitute of Government stores and therefore could neither require protection nor afford any temptation to raid. "As for the so-called naval movements, they simply consisted in the use of two small cruisers to convey a detachment of troops to Carrickfergus without the necessity of marching them through the streets of Belfast. No further movements of troops are in contemplation." As we have already said, preparations had been fully made for a naval demonstration against Ulster and considerable movements of troops had been in contemplation. We need pay equally little attention to Mr. Asquith's allegation that there never has been "the very slightest foundation in fact" for the rumour as to the issue of warrants for the arrest of the Ulster Leaders. Mr. Asquith's final paragraph was to deny "that the Government contemplates instituting a general inquisition into the intentions of officers in the event of their being asked to take up arms against Ulster. No such action is intended. if only for the reason that the employment of troops against Ulster is a contingency which the Government hope may never arise."

The Soldier's Charter

SUCH was the repudiation of the Pogrom policy, but its authors remain and will revive their sinister project at the first convenient opportunity. Here we may take up the parable from the "White Paper," which indicates the pressure brought to bear by one of Mr. Churchill's co-conspirators, "Colonel" Seely, as he calls himself. His answer to General Paget's report as to the refusal of General Gough and other officers to play the *agent provocateur* was despatched at midnight March 20, and gave the Irish Commander-in-Chief authority "to suspend from duty any senior officers who have tendered their resignations, or in any other manner disputed your authority"; while General Gough and the officers commanding the 5th and 16th Lancers were ordered to report themselves "at the War Office without delay. . . . They

should be relieved of their commands, and officers are being sent to relieve them at once. Resignations of all officers should be refused." What a comment on the Asquith *communiqué*. The vital omissions from the "White Paper" are indicated by a despatch from General Gough, dated Curragh, March 20, 1914, which can only be described as reflecting the greatest credit on the General and those associated with him, and if there be any Unionists who funk this issue on the platform we can only say that we are sorry to belong to a party which contains such mean-spirited persons, not that we believe in the existence of any such "rot." With admirable propriety General Gough writes, and we make no apology for reproducing the text of this momentous document:

Headquarters, Irish Command.

With reference to the communication from the War Office conveyed to me verbally by the Commander-in-chief this morning, I have the honour to report the result of my interviews with the officers of my brigade.

The officers are of unanimous opinion that further information is essential before they are called upon at such short notice to take decisions so vitally affecting their whole future, and especially that a clear definition should be given of the terms "Duty as ordered," and "active operations" in Ulster.

If such duty consists of the maintenance of order and the preservation of property, all the officers in this brigade, including myself, would be prepared to carry out that duty.

But if the duty involves the *initiation* of active military operations against Ulster, the following numbers of officers by regiments would respectfully and under protest prefer to be dismissed: Brigade Staff, 2 officers; 4th Hussars, 17 out of 19 doing duty; 5th Lancers, 17 out of 20 doing duty; 16th Lancers, 16 out of 16 doing duty; 3rd Bde. R.H.A., 6 out of 13 doing duty, "including R.M."; 4th Field Troop, R.E., 1 out of 1 doing duty; 3rd Signal Troop, R.E., 1 out of 1 doing duty.

In addition the following are domiciled in Ulster and claim protection as such: 4th Hussars, 2 officers; 5th Lancers, 1 officer; 3rd Bde. R.H.A., 2 officers.

(Signed) H. P. GOUGH. Brig.-Gen., G.O.C. 3rd Cav. Bde.

Curragh, March 20, 1914.

The "White Paper" closes with communications between General Gough and the Army Council which speak for themselves.

COPY OF LETTER FROM BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. P. GOUGH, C.B., TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL

March 23, 1914

DEAR GENERAL,—On thinking over the points raised by the Secretary of State this morning, the question has arisen in my mind, and it will undoubtedly be one of the first questions asked me by my officers, when I see them, viz:

In the event of the present Home Rule Bill becoming law, can we be called upon to enforce it on Ulster under the expression of maintaining law and order ?

This point should be made quite clear in your draft letter, otherwise there will be renewed misconceptions.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) H. P. GOUGH

Brigadier-General H. De la P. Gough, C.B.

You are authorised by the Army Council to inform the Officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, that the Army Council are satisfied that the incident which has arisen in regard to their resignations has been due to a misunderstanding.

It is the duty of all soldiers to obey lawful commands given to them through the proper channel by the Army Council, either for the protection of public property and the support of the civil power in the event of disturbances or for the protection of the lives and property of the inhabitants.

This is the only point it was intended to be put to the officers in the questions of the General Officer Commanding, and the Army Council have been glad to learn from you that there never has been and never will be in the Brigade any question of disobeying such lawful orders.

His Majesty's Government must retain their right to use all the forces of the Crown in Ireland, or elsewhere, to maintain law and order and to support the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty.

But they have no intention whatever of taking advantage of this right to crush political opposition to the policy or principles of the Home Rule Bill.

J. S.
J. F.
J. S. E.

It will be noticed that the initials of Lieutenant-General Sir J. S. Ewart, Adjutant-General of the Forces, as well as those of Sir John French and Colonel Seely are appended to this document which has nevertheless been repudiated by the Government, or rather the Asquith anarchy under which we live, but *literæ scriptæ manet* and whatever may be the fortunes of political parties this will remain the charter of the British soldier when he is ordered to participate in political Pogroms. As we go to press the situation is developing, and it would be dangerous to make any prophecy except that the Government will become increasingly odious.

What of Sir E. Grey

It must not be supposed that while we are absorbed in the struggle with the beasts at Ephesus the rest of the world is standing still. Much is happening everywhere, especially in Europe, where Great Britain tends to become more and more of a negligible quantity. Sir Edward Grey maintains our paper reputation, but his policy is

seen to be more and more of a paper policy. He fondly believes that the world is governed by diplomatic documents and that victory lies with the properly pigeon-holed. It never crosses his mind that the abandonment of a splendid if perilous isolation and association with other Powers in preserving peace, and in resisting aggrandisement, presupposes that we maintain the weapons of our policy. These practical problems are left to be expounded by intelligent onlookers like Lord Percy, who makes one more illuminating effort to recall our powers that be to realities. It matters nothing to the Foreign Office that we have no intelligible naval standard, and that Foreign Powers are encouraged to believe that the maintenance of British Sea Power is beyond our strength if it is not contrary to the wishes of his Majesty's Ministers. Sir Edward Grey has stood by year after year a silent and acquiescent spectator and accomplice of "the passing of the great Fleet." He is equally indifferent about the Army. He allowed his intimate friend Lord Haldane to reduce our microscopic Regular Forces under the pretext that he would give us "a nation in arms" of nine hundred thousand men. He allows other friends, Mr. Churchill and Colonel Seely, to try and make the remnant of the Army a pawn in a dirty political game. Sir Edward Grey would cheerfully smash up the Army and cashier every officer provided his Party secured a few votes. It is high time that a sanctimonious impostor who has enjoyed the privileges of a chartered libertine should be unmasked.

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ermany's atest

ENGLAND'S danger is Germany's opportunity. Our challenger has clearly shown her hand again by elaborately organising another impudent war scare for the single purpose of frightening the taxpayer into augmenting Germany's vast army, which is more than ready r war on two fronts. The "poor dear Germany" party in is country, many of whom are of German origin, while others rough ignorance of their Busch and Bismarck walk into every utonic trap, joined in the "hue and cry," and rent the air with mentations at the perilous plight of "poor dear Germany" tween two such voracious monsters as President Poincaré nd the Emperor Nicholas—bereft of her normal supporters ustria-Hungary and Italy. Why these two powerful military

nations, which are adding huge fleets to vast armies should be, so to speak, "put out of action" as German allies by our Potsdam Party passes one's comprehension, unless it be that it suits German interests to depict her forlorn and desolate so that she may be provided with a pretext for additional armaments. Great Britain under the Windbag régime has ceased to be a profitable bogey in Germany, where people would only laugh if aggression were attributed to a Cabinet manifestly concentrated on provoking a civil war. So the cry was suddenly raised in the *Cologne Gazette* that wicked Russia was about to jump upon poor patriotic, harmless, unarmed Germany, who would never say "bo" to a goose. All the familiar apparatus laid bare in the pages of Busch was once more enlisted, and "tame" foreigners were only too ready to oblige. One origin of the scare was in all probability a desire to provoke France by threatening her ally, but the French have acquired *sang froid* under German pressure, and this latest manifestation of the *furor Teutonicus* left them completely cold. Not for the first time Bismarck's successors and imitators completely overreached themselves, as up to now the chief results of the German War Scare has been the consolidation of the Dual Alliance and the determination of Russia to make a substantial increase in her army, lest the fate befall her with which the scaremongers threatened Germany—an unprovoked attack on an unprepared neighbour.

Ferment in France

At any other moment the British Press, especially the Potsdam section of the British Press, would be full of recent events in France, and the occasion would have been improved in our best Sunday-school manner. Unfortunately, the deplorable plight to which our own affairs have been reduced has tended to limit the output of admonitions addressed to our nearest neighbours. We do not propose to lift the veil or draw the moral of the Caillaux episode. We have a Cabinet of Caillaux to cope with in this country, though so far they have not thrown up a Mme. Caillaux, who went and emptied five chambers of a revolver into M. Gaston Calmette, the much respected Editor of the *Figaro*, who had waged a relentless campaign against the French Lloyd George from patriotic

motives. M. Calmette went too far in publishing a private letter from M. Caillaux to a lady. This was an excess of zeal, and moreover was unnecessary to establish his case, because the exposure of M. Caillaux' conduct in the crisis of 1911, when as Premier he carried on a private intrigue with Germany behind the back of his own Cabinet and his own Foreign Minister, would appear to have been sufficient to secure his downfall in addition to other discreditable matters. However, Mme. Caillaux imagined that she could save her husband by shooting his assailant, but she has only complicated matters. M. Caillaux has resigned the Ministry of Finance and announces his retirement from public life; but that sort of politician always crops up again like a bad penny. M. Monis has also resigned, having been mixed up in the Rochette scandal, when a powerful Ministerial effort was made to postpone proceedings against that fraudulent financier. Like Mr. Lloyd George, M. Caillaux, who has publicly expressed his admiration for our Chancellor of the Exchequer, is a wealthy, luxurious Socialist who misses some obvious opportunities of practising what he preaches. The Doumergue Ministry is severely shaken and the immediate political prospect is uncertain. However, we can't talk.

President Wilson's Forlorn Hope

As our readers are aware, while not undervaluing the maintenance of as cordial relations with the United States as circumstances permit, we advocate in season and out of season an attitude of reserve on Anglo-American problems. It would be difficult to say who have done most harm—American Anglophobes or British Gushpots of the Professor Viscount Bryce or the Viscount Professor Bryce order, who imagine that all will be well provided we slobber over "our American cousins." There is nothing the Americans hate more, as they regard all such manifestations as evidence of British insincerity. It is essential to see the Americans as they really are. They have great qualities, but their professional politicians are in some ways as bad as ours with this notable difference, viz. that whereas the Asquiths, Churchills and Georges miss no opportunity of injuring the vital interests of the State because they are mere political adventurers without a single spark of patriotism, American public men are so patriotic that they

"see red" at the mere suggestion that their Government is "truckling to the foreigner." We therefore strongly advise our readers not to anticipate any serious results from the honourable and high-minded effort of President Wilson to persuade Congress to abandon the Preferential system of tolls in the Panama Canal for the benefit of American shipping and in violation of their treaty with us. The professional politicians of Washington regard treaties as existing for the purpose of being broken whenever they conflict with anything that can be colourably described as American interests. They are the antithesis of our demagogues, to whom "British interests" are anathema. We shall all watch President Wilson's struggle with the Legislature with immense interest and unlimited admiration but with no hope of his ultimate success. His conscience will be his only reward, coupled with the knowledge that a Presidential protest against wanton treaty-breaking in itself does something to enhance the moral prestige of a nation whose material prestige stands sufficiently high to enable her to do the right thing now that it has been pointed out by the Head of the State.

"The Comfortable Classes"

WE confess to liking the underlying idea of Lord Willoughby de Broke's project that the comfortable classes—defined as persons with over £400 a year—should set an example to the rest of the community by submitting themselves to military training. Example is worth any amount of precept, and although we have the greatest possible respect for several of the speakers who opposed the Bill in the House of Lords, we cannot help regretting that it did not enjoy the support of the National Service League—still more that it was rejected. After all it is for the more comfortable classes to lead the way in civic duty, and there is nothing undemocratic, as was suggested, in their giving the democracy a lead in the elementary obligations of citizenship. There is a touch of the Japanese Samurai about this proposal, and we trust that Lord Willoughby will not allow himself to be discouraged by an initial failure. It will grow on people the more they think of it, and the case presented in the excellent speeches of Lord Lovat and Lord Stanhope will have to be answered. One of the strongest prejudices against National

Service in these unrestful days is the fear of working men that all the hard, disagreeable work would fall on the masses while the classes would swagger it as officers. It is utterly absurd but prevalent, and the best answer would be some such scheme as Lord Willoughby's, which would convince the people that no class was seeking an advantage at the people's expense. The objection that the less comfortable classes would dislike the comfortable classes to arm and organise is easily answered. All could come in whenever they pleased and make the system truly National. No one can be allowed to adopt the dog-in-the-manger attitude of refusing to play the citizen himself and withholding from others the right to do so.

The Murray Committee

In spite of the passive opposition of the Government in general and the active intriguing of a particular Minister, assisted by the hysterical remonstrances of the Radical Press, Lord Lansdowne was completely successful in appointing a Committee of Peers of the character he foreshadowed, viz. judicial in experience and small in numbers, to investigate the charges and allegations made in the public press against Lord Murray of Elibank, and the Obstructionists could conceal neither their astonishment nor their indignation when the Committee was constituted as follows: Lord Halsbury, Lord Loreburn, Lord Desart, Lord Sanderson, and Lord Charnwood. Observe the difference between the procedure of the two Houses. The Commons are a purely partisan body. A Commons Committee is accordingly packed with partisans who never pretend to be anything else. There is a Coalition majority in the Lower House—to give it its proper name—and its Marconi Committee was consequently controlled by a Coalition majority run by Messrs. Handel Booth and Falconer, primed at need by Ministers. It was a prolonged public scandal. In the House of Lords, on the other hand, there is a Unionist majority of at least eight to one, but when it comes to the appointment of a Committee to investigate a subject which, the attitude of the Radical Press showed, excited Party passion, Party politics are forgotten, and that small Committee who on Commons principles would have consisted of four Unionists and one Liberal is actually composed of two Liberals, two Peers who sit on the Cross Benches,

only one active Unionist, and he a great judge before he is anything else. It would be unbecoming to make any observations on the course of the Enquiry, which is drawing to a close at the time of writing, so we will content ourselves with saying that the community is deeply indebted to those who are responsible for the formation of such a Committee, as also to the Committee for discharging an onerous public duty. The House of Lords has still a good deal to teach the House of Commons, and it is very regrettable that it does not interfere more actively in questions of conduct as well as policy.

Mr. Snowden's Onslaught

THERE was a speech delivered during the Debate on the Naval Estimates (March 18) in the House of Commons of more than passing interest, although it elicited little comment from the Unionist Press, because it indicates a line of criticism of which, whatever may be the fortunes of political parties, we are likely to hear a good deal more in the future. Indeed this particular attack on the Estimates has already been exploited by the National Suicide Club and the National Suicide Press. To some extent it breaks new ground. We refer to the speech of Mr. Philip Snowden, one of the very few Labour members of the present Parliament who does his own thinking, and in consequence of this exceptional exercise he counts for more than the average Tame cat of the Coalition, which occasionally speaks one way and always votes the other, like the overwhelming majority of his colleagues. After wasting a good deal of time on the naval *mirage* created by our egregious First Lord of the Admiralty the speaker came to his *bête noire*, the so-called "armament ring," about which so much is being written in various organs with which our readers are probably unfamiliar that we make no apology for reproducing the substance of the arraignment. As the speaker amiably suggested that journalists are not wholly disinterested in their advocacy of expenditure on armaments because they may be shareholders in firms in contractual relations with the Admiralty and War Office, the present writer takes this opportunity of declaring that he has never had and has not to-day and has no intention of having at any future time

any financial interest whatsoever in any armament firm, and does not stand to make or lose a single penny by naval or military expenditure or retrenchment. This is not claimed as a virtue but is simply stated as a fact. That is the first answer to the scandalous observation of Lord Welby, quoted with approval by Mr. Snowden. "*We are in the hands of an organisation of* crooks. They are politicians, generals, manufacturers of armaments, and journalists. All of them are anxious for unlimited expenditure, and go on inventing scares to terrify the public and to terrify Ministers of the Crown." The speaker had consulted a slang dictionary to ascertain the meaning of "crooks." "I think that the definition of a 'crook' is—it is an ugly word—a 'thief,' a 'swindler,' a 'man who gains his ends by crooked ways.'" Let us translate Lord Welby's words. He says: "We are in the hands of an organisation of thieves! swindlers! They are politicians, generals, manufacturers of armaments, and all of them are anxious for unlimited expenditure, all go on *inventing scares to terrify the public and to terrify the Ministers* of the Crown." In the words of the speaker, "that is an extremely serious charge to be made by a responsible ex-public servant like Lord Welby." It certainly is, because if Lord Welby *permitted himself to say anything of the kind he should consult* a mad doctor.

The "Armament Ring"

HOWEVER, Lord Welby is the peg on which Mr. Snowden hung his indictment of the "armament ring," the sinister author of all our misfortunes. There was a scare in 1909, which was not the first scare, as there had been half a dozen previous scares, all engineered during a period of trade depression for the purpose of forcing Governments to spend money on armaments, in support of which a passage was actually quoted from Lord Cawdor's address as President of the Institute of Naval Architects in the beginning of 1909: "During the past twelve months, with the exception of the *Vanguard* building at Barrow, not one British battleship has been laid down in a private shipbuilding yard at Home." Those were the happy days when Messrs. Churchill and Co. appeared to be arranging for the transfer of Neptune's

trident to the Mailed Fist without even a struggle. The Naval Annual had made a similar statement to Lord Cawdor, while Sir Charles Maclaren, who, being a Radical, is *ex hypothesi* a man of virtue, though chairman and director of armament firms, declared at the annual meeting of John Brown and Co.—which is on the Snowden black list—"things were bad twelve months ago, and he was sorry to say they were bad still. He had seen no evidence of improvement during the past twelve months, and really there was very little evidence of distinct improvement in the immediate future." Meanwhile the astute Mr. Snowden, the Sherlock Holmes on the track of the "armament ring," discovered that during this period of exceptional depression these wicked firms were all engaged in increasing their capital, "putting down new slipways, preparing for the time which they knew, from past experience and their knowledge of instruments they were able to work, would come sooner or later." Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. equipped a new gun-mounting shop "with three erecting pits and ample storage room for ordnance"; the Coventry Ordnance Works Ltd. had completed in 1908 their great gun-mounting establishment at Scotstoun; while Messrs. Beardmore and Co., with the aid of Vickers, had been making extensions at Parkhead Works.

The Mulliner Episode

WE confess to having been unaware of these developments until Mr. Snowden narrated them in the House of Commons, and we can only express our gratitude as members of the public for the foresight shown by these firms at a time when the Government were lamentably lacking in their duty. They realised that the danger-point was approaching, and that even professional Pacifists would be compelled to take note of the German menace and to act accordingly. But to Mr. Snowden there is something Machiavellian in this intelligent anticipation. "All this time these men and their representatives were working behind the scenes. The House will remember the Mulliner incident. Mr. Mulliner was a Director of the Coventry Ordnance Works. What is the Coventry Ordnance Works? It is another name for John Brown and Co. The Cammell Laird Co. and the John Brown Co. own half the shares." Then followed the appalling disclosure

that Mr. Mulliner had been writing to the Government for three years prior to 1909 urging them to spend more money upon armaments and calling attention to the prodigious development of German sea-power. In so doing he rendered conspicuous public service, and his information was so striking that even Ministers and ex-Ministers could not turn a deaf ear to him. Mr. Snowden would be furious if any Department refused to listen to anything he had got to say as to some incident in a Blackburn slum. This is Mr. Snowden's polite account of the episode:

> I do not suppose that it is a very usual practice for Cabinet Ministers to interview commercial travellers and touts, but they made a departure on this occasion, and after three years of importunity, they enlisted the services of this gentleman, who was received by the Prime Minister and other Members of the Cabinet; and then the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. McKenna) came down to this House with that bogus story about the acceleration of the German programme, and it has since come to light that their only authority was the man whose works were standing idle at that time, and who was so anxious to get Government work.

It would be difficult to conceive a meaner or more misleading statement. Then the speaker regaled his audience with a spicy account of the increase in the profits of various firms, which may be dismissed as an ordinary incident under a Government without any settled Naval policy, alternating between apathy and panic, lean years and fat years, taking no forethought for the morrow. We grant that nothing could be more wasteful than the British system, which is due to the Party necessity which at one time prevents Ministers from building ships of which we stand in urgent need, while at another time illusory promises are held out of retrenchment, which the speaker knows to be impossible.

The Harvey Trust

After dwelling on the cosmopolitan character of the "Combine," Mr. Snowden announced that Lord Sandhurst, the Lord Chamberlain, was Trustee for the debenture-holders in Vickers, while Mr. Stuart-Wortley was a debenture-holder for Vickers and also debenture trustee for Cammell Laird and Co., while as regards the shareholders: "It would be too long for me to give more than a very short selection from the list, but I find that hon. members in this house are very largely concerned;

indeed it would be impossible to throw a stone on the Benches opposite (the Unionist Benches) without hitting a member who is not a shareholder in one or other of these firms." To the "Ministerial cheers" provoked by this sally Mr. Snowden replied: "I am sorry for the sudden hilarity of my hon. friends, for the shareholders in these armament firms are not confined to Unionist members: I find that the bishops are very well represented. Among the shareholders in Beardmore's I find the name of an hon. member opposite (Sir J. Lonsdale) as the holder of 5000 shares." While Sir J. Compton Rickett, the President of the Free Church Council, was a substantial holder in John Brown's and in Cammell Laird's, in which other members for Sheffield were also interested. Mr. Snowden continued: "It would hardly be fair to ignore the Liberals altogether. I find that a director of Palmer's is Lord Aberconway, and that a Liberal member of this House is one of his co-directors, the member for the Bosworth Division of Leicester (Mr. H. D. McLaren). I spoke of the 'internationalism' of this, and I find the shareholders in Cammell Laird include a considerable number of names with which I am not familiar. Another shareholder in Cammell Laird is the representative of the Northern Division of Manchester (Sir C. E. Swann)." Then he described the "Harvey Trust" which was formed a few years ago and represented the most up-to-date and complete form of capitalist organisation ever seen. "Its internationalism is complete. It was formed for the purpose of working certain rights in the manufacture of armour plate, and it combined together the interests in Britain of Vickers, Armstrong's, Beardmore's, John Brown's, Fairfield, Cammell Laird, the Projectile Company, Palmers', and Hadfields-Coventry, of half a dozen of the leading firms in the United States, of firms in France, Italy, and Germany (Krupps). The directors were representatives of Beardmore's, John Brown's, Armstrong's, Vickers', Cammell Laird's, the French Steel Company, Schneider's, and others." Among the shareholders in the Harvey Trust were the present Colonial Secretary as well as the Postmaster-General, and in such a cosmopolitan combination it was only natural that a large number of foreign names should appear.

ANOTHER feature to which Mr. Snowden called attention was the number of men whom the armament firms had taken from the service of the Crown, in which connection he quoted the following passage from a paper called *Arms and Explosives* :

Public Servants and Contractors

Contractors naturally are very keen to avail themselves of the services of prominent officers who have been associated with the work in which the contractors are interested. The chief thing is that they know the ropes, since the retired officer, who keeps in touch with his own comrades, is able to lessen some of these inconveniences, either by gaining early information of coming events, or by securing the ear of one who would not afford like favours to a civilian. . . . Kissing undoubtedly goes by favour, and some of the things that happen might be characterised as corruption. Still, judged by all fair tests the result is good. The organisations of facilities for supply is maintained through times of peace on an efficient and economical basis. Manufacturers do not make huge profits, and they are enabled to survey from year to year, and to be on hand in the case of national emergency.

Among other cases of transfer from the public service to the "armament ring" was that of Sir George Murray, late Permanent Secretary of the Treasury.

Nothing can be more disastrous for the financial reputation of this country than that there should be a suspicion—I do not put it any higher—of the strict probity of men who are in the position of permanent head of our great Departments. One cannot avoid suspicion being expressed in some quarters when a highly placed public servant takes his pension and immediately after takes his seat upon a board having the closest business relation with the Government. Why did he go to the board of Armstrong's? He is not an engineering expert ; he is not a naval expert. I add, in the words of *Arms and Explosives*, "He knows the ropes" He keeps in touch with his old comrades He can smooth away any inconveniences. I will not, as this paper does, characterise it as corruption.

Then there was the case of Rear-Admiral Ottley, who had been our Naval Attaché in many countries and was at one time Secretary of the Committee for Imperial Defence, whence he went to the directorship of a big armament firm.

Now we are arming against Italy, and this man, ex-secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, director of Armstrong, Whitworth and Company, is also a director of Armstrong's Italian firm, Armstrong Pozzuoli, on the Italian coast. How can it be possible that naval secrets can be retained? Armstrong, Whitworth and Company, of Newcastle and of Italy are in possession of the most confidential facts in relation to the doings of both the Italian Government and the British Government, and it would require a great amount of business probity to prevent them disclosing the facts from the one firm to the other.

Then there was the interesting case of Sir Lieutenant Trevor

Dawson [*sic*], Managing Director of Vickers, also director of a steel foundry in Japan and on the board of William Beardmore and Co. "Yet the Navy talk about tendering for contracts. How can you get a contract from Vickers? You are getting it from Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., and from William Beardmore and Co. The whole thing is a farce. I need not go through the list. There are dozens of them. There is not, as a matter of fact, a single firm doing contract work for the Government which has not either upon its board or in its service a man who has been in the service of the Government and who knows the ropes, and who, in the words of that extract from *Arms and Explosives*, is likely to be able to gain that various information which will be useful."

The Answer

THE first answer to Mr. Snowden's general indictment of the "Armament Ring" is that British capital can render no greater service to the country and the Empire than by financing the great firms, on the maintenance of whose plant and output our national security and indeed independent existence depends. No man can apply his money to more useful purpose, and if he secures a satisfactory return on his investment so much the better. But in order to be fair the dividends over a long period should be taken. There is, however, one topic on which our readers will probably find themselves to some extent in agreement with Mr. Snowden while repudiating his main criticism. In the first place the international character of these great combinations requires careful watching. No patriotic Englishman would or should put his money into any concern engaged in supplying any war materials to Germany. That goes without saying. Germany is the enemy and the only Power who seriously threatens the peace of Europe. She is the cause of all the unrest. The position of our allies and potential allies is vastly different. It is to our interest that they should put forward their maximum strength at the approaching Armageddon. If our Government cannot be induced to do its duty the Governments of France and Russia show signs of doing theirs, and any services rendered by British capital and British skill to the development of Franco-Russian sea power or military power is all to the good. But what of the allies of Germany, Austria-

Hungary and Italy, who under German pressure are building great fleets of Dreadnoughts which for all practical purposes must be ranked as German "Dreadnoughts" and will be ranged against us and our allies whenever the German Emperor gives the signal? Mr. Snowden has done well to call attention to this delicate, not to say disagreeable, business, and it would be as well that it should be further investigated. British capital for British armaments, British capital for the armaments of British allies are sound investments, but British capital for the armaments of British enemies or for the armaments of the allies of British enemies has a somewhat disquieting aspect. The construction of any part of the Mediterranean branch of the German Navy, whether it be labelled "Austro-Hungarian" or "Italian" is scarcely an enterprise attractive to the patriotic British investor.

THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

The understanding of the problems involved by a great European war is rendered especially difficult in this country not only because the mass of the people regard war in general as some remote event about which no man can know anything definite, but also because naval and military warfare are regarded as entirely separate from one another, foreign policy is viewed as distinct from naval and military policy and the internal organisation of the State for war is almost ignored.

It was in order to counteract this evil that the Committee of Imperial Defence was constituted. Members of the Government, of the Admiralty, and of the War Office were to meet and discuss measures of preparation for war with a view to co-ordinating military, naval, foreign and domestic policy for that object. Now this object is, according to the greatest thinker on war that ever lived, Clausewitz, the most important that any Government has to fulfil. War being the ultimate argument of the State, on the result of the appeal to which its very existence depends, it follows that its ability to carry it on successfully transcends in importance all other considerations.

Unfortunately, with us, preparation for and enquiry into the problems of national defence too often take the form not of adapting our organisation to the reality but of transforming the reality into an illusion in order that it may fit our shams. The Imperial Defence Committee has no doubt done much useful work; it has, however, failed to justify its existence, for it has provided no solution whatever of the problems which will confront us in the next great war. Nor will those problems ever be understood until we have in this country a definite doctrine of national defence such as all other countries possess.

It is generally admitted that a war between any two of the Great Powers will involve all the others owing to the fact that their interests will be so vitally affected that they cannot afford to hold aloof. It is because they have realised this that they are now grouped in two rival alliances. It is important to grasp the steps which have led to this situation. In the year 1806 Prussia sustained a disastrous defeat at the hands of Napoleon, followed by a period of six years of material suffering and moral degradation such as no other country has experienced in modern times. But it was not alone the Prussians, a naturally proud race, who were affected by the disaster; there soon spread throughout the whole of Germany a sense of humiliation and a longing for a fuller expression of their common nationality. This was not exactly a popular movement in its origin, it came from thinkers, poets and philosophers who played upon the natural resentment of the people, not so much at alien rule, for they were used to that, but at the exactions and injustice of the French. This led to the great rising of all the German states in 1813. Prussia was the natural leader of this movement, its Royal House became the rallying-point for all Germans who embraced the ideal expressed by the philosopher Hegel that the life of the individual is nothing as compared with the life of the State, that "it is in the accomplishment of his duties as citizen that the individual realises the best and highest expression of his existence." Patriotism became a religion, taught not only in the pulpit but by professors in the universities and by the greatest literary men of the day. The lack of national self-respect which had been responsible in so large a degree for the collapse of Prussia was soon transformed into an egotism which saw in the German race alone the elements essential to the progress of mankind and which were lacking in their view in the Latin races. The inferiority of these latter, and the greatness of Germany and her destiny, formed the theme of the historians of the next generation. The poets whose fiery verses had inspired the men of the War of Liberation were succeeded by Ranke, Sybel, Mommsen, and Treitschke, whose work was of almost equal value to that of Moltke and Bismarck in preparing the way for the creation of the German Empire. They erected a new philosophy of history, its sole object being to exalt the German nation

and to show how important a part had been played by war. This especially was the doctrine of Treitschke, called by Bernhardi the great educator of the Prussian nation. To what lengths he went may be seen by the following quotation: "There is a divine call wherever a favourable occasion is presented of attacking a neighbour and of extending one's own frontiers." History has thus been made to serve the purpose of the State, for these ideas have been sedulously fostered in the schools and are impressed on the public mind by monuments representing German victories or great celebrations of these events such as was held last year at Leipzig, attended by the Emperor and other German princes. The effect of all this teaching is to give all German subjects, however great may be the differences between them, a conviction that their common safety is bound up with the welfare of the State, of the Hohenzollern dynasty, and of the army. To a great extent this feeling is shared by the Socialists whose sentiments are never anti-national. It was Bebel's proudest boast that he had advocated German unity long before Bismarck and the Junkers had ever contemplated such an ideal. At the time of the Agadir incident, while loudly denouncing the diplomacy which had produced the crisis, he declared that if France and Great Britain were seeking to prevent Germany acquiring that "place in the sun" which was her right, the Socialists of Germany would not fail in their duty to the Fatherland.

Perhaps the most important factor in producing this national solidarity has been the institution of universal service which has now existed in Prussia for a hundred years. In origin a democratic army, the result of a *levée-en-masse*, it at first inspired the greatest distrust among the military men of other nations. Wellington saw in its partially trained levies nothing but a danger to the State, but it proved instead its salvation during the Revolution of 1848. It has stood for law, order, discipline, duty, self-sacrifice, in a word for all those ideals which Hegel preached; it is the embodiment of national sentiment, the visible symbol of their deliverance from a foreign yoke and the unity and greatness which they now enjoy. Without it Germany would be a geographical expression and nothing more.

The first great step in achieving unity was taken by Bismarck in 1864. There is no need to deal here with the three wars of

1864, 1866, and 1870, whereby Prussia first fought Austria for the hegemony of Germany and then put the seal on that federation by proclaiming the King of Prussia Emperor at Versailles. The importance of these events for us lies in the profound change created by them in the relations of European Powers to one another. Although the change was not generally realised at the time it dealt a death-blow to the balance of power and put an end for ever to that ideal of the "Concert of Europe," the disappearance of which still causes so much lamentation among our Radical theorists. They might as well cry for the moon, for our failure to intervene on behalf of Denmark in 1864, our intense desire to avoid war, the failure of Europe to prevent the overthrow of the balance, has resulted in a situation where there can be no united action among the Powers, no appeal to a Concert, no real security for the smaller nations, and where recourse must be had to a desperate competition in armaments. If only our peace fanatics could grasp the true causes of the phenomena they deplore we should not hear so much of the futility of war or of the glories of "splendid isolation." The very word "Concert" presupposes the common interest of all the Great Powers in checking aggression and in protecting the smaller states. It means the same as the balance of power. But concerted action against an aggressor is impossible if by means of a policy of "blood and iron" a nation has once become the most important military Power in Europe and then proceeds to safeguard its position by means of alliances, for it compels other nations to safeguard themselves in the same manner. Henceforth there is no principle except that might is right. Germany is supported by Austria at the Algeciras Conference in the most outrageous claims; Austria finds "a friend in shining armour" when it becomes convenient to tear up the Berlin Treaty. Treaties are of no value if they interfere with national aspirations and there is no check on those who ignore them. There has never been a time when such obligations have been worth less, nor when force has been held in such high honour. And this is the time when some would have us believe that an era of peace is about to dawn, as if it were possible to gather "grapes of thorns or figs of thistles"!

A further change came over the situation in 1900 with the

Preamble and programme of the German Navy Act. The naval competition drove us into the *Entente* with France. Then the result of German history, of her policy in the past, and of her mode of thinking was seen. In her view she was surrounded by a ring of enemies, her legitimate desire for expansion was being thwarted. It was necessary at all hazards to break the ring. The opportunity came when Russia was engaged in the war with Japan. German diplomacy was, however, at fault. Although it gained one great success in the enforced dismissal of Delcassé it had underrated the strength of the *Entente*, and as she was not as yet ready at sea to appeal to the final arbitrament of the sword she contented herself in that and succeeding crises with what "compensation" she could exact from France. While it is true that her diplomacy has been unsuccessful, it has at any rate gained for her enormous areas in Africa, and she has in a time of profound peace induced the greatest naval Power in the world to surrender its supremacy in every sea but one, and to concentrate its entire strength in home waters. This is no exaggeration, for we can no longer control the Mediterranean without French help, and the squadron based on Gibraltar will certainly be required in the North Sea.

But a new factor has arisen in the last two years as a result of the Agadir incident. A remarkable national revival has taken place in France. Gambetta's famous advice to his countrymen concerning the lost territory, "N'en parlez jamais, y-pensez toujours," has been disregarded; they not only think of it but speak of it. At the same time the Balkan War revealed the fact that the Slavonic element in Austria was so great a source of weakness that there were grave doubts as to the value of her aid to Germany in case of war. Russia's mobilisation arrangements were also being steadily improved. The result of all this on Germany may be seen in last year's Army Bill. She looks forward to war at no distant date, but it is important to realise what in her view a war will mean. The Pan-Germans have long advocated "the reuniting to the Empire of the territories and the nationalities which have been violently torn from it and which should naturally belong to it." This phrase is reminiscent of another which has caused untold bloodshed in Europe, "the natural frontiers of France." It is unnecessary to enquire into its exact meaning, but there are eleven million

Germans in Austria, two millions in Russia, and the geographical position of Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland no doubt suggests that they are by nature German. The value of such utterances is often discounted, as they are supposed to be those only of extremists and Chauvinists. This is not so, but even if it were there can be no doubt that it will be the result of German victory in the next war, for their whole doctrine of war allows of no other conclusion.

Now it must not be supposed that this doctrine is merely that of a small section of the people, that it is confined to the Junkers and Pan-Germans. The German people are reconciled to war, and once convinced that it is inevitable, will demand the full fruits of victory. The organisation of public opinion to this end has proceeded steadily. It is a form of preparation for war specially taught by Clausewitz. The doctrine on this subject is perfectly clear, logical, and to Germans convincing. An appeal to arms under present conditions involves such fearful risks that a nation once victorious must take measures to ensure that its adversary can never recover sufficiently to attack it again. There is no such thing as war with a limited object. Bismarck's idea in 1871 was to cripple France altogether for a generation. He miscalculated the marvellous recuperative power of France and therefore wished to attack her again a few years later, but was prevented then by a factor which now exists no longer, namely, concerted action by other Powers. In these days supposing a similar situation were to arise, those Powers would merely find another combination equally powerful against them as occurred in the Balkan crisis of 1908. Germany has learnt her lesson and she will not miscalculate a second time. Moreover, an indemnity, however crushing, does not permanently disable, nor does the acquisition of territory if its inhabitants remain hostile as in Alsace and Lorraine, provide other than a source of weakness. But if the victorious nation can incorporate neighbouring states in its dominions without active opposition on their part, and thereby gain frontiers which give it a vast strategical advantage, it is placed in a permanently unassailable position. Henceforth the potential enemy is at its mercy. Nobody in these days imagines that you can subjugate another country. It is out of the question for Germany to conquer France,

it is, however, perfectly practicable for her to incorporate Holland and Belgium in the German Empire, and thus gain a position where France would become a negligible factor. Now to some this may seem a wild idea. They talk glibly about national sentiment and nations fighting to the death against the aggressor. This is due to a lack of imagination. Can it really be supposed that France once crushed and forced to come to terms, the smaller nations would then take the field against the whole might of victorious Germany? If there was any intention of such self-sacrificing patriotism we should hardly see such half-hearted military measures as are now adopted by the Dutch and Belgians. Their diplomacy has made no effort to secure support against a danger admitted by all. There is no attempt on the part of the Belgians to take steps to defend their territory east of the Meuse, and it is the universal opinion of French officers that a German advance through the Ardennes and Luxemburg would not be opposed. The railways are to a great extent in German hands and the Belgian government has put no obstacle in the way of their control nor of their being linked up with the strategical lines on the other side of the frontier. The latest example of this is the line connecting Malmedy, the junction for the great camp of Elsenborn, with Stavelot on the Belgian side, a very costly undertaking having no other object than to facilitate an invasion of Belgium. If this is the case, is there any probability that when they are confronted with a *fait accompli* in the shape of a German victory, they will then risk not only making their country the seat of war but the certain disastrous consequences of defeat, when to enter the German Federation perhaps on very favourable terms will involve no loss of nationality and perhaps procure them substantial commercial advantages.

The most important point to grasp is the fact that everything will depend upon the issue of the fighting between France and Germany in the first month of war. The attitude of the other nations will entirely depend upon the result of the first engagements. France will no doubt have the whole-hearted support of Russia, but it is very probable that if she is defeated that Power will suspend her forward movement towards the German frontier. The other Powers of the Triple Alliance will have adopted a more or less waiting attitude, but after such an event

they will not hesitate to engage their forces, Austria on the Russian flank in Poland, and Italy by an invasion of France. There will be no other principle than the self-interest of each and the endeavour to extract as much benefit from the situation as possible. In these days when news travels quickly and when public excitement is at fever heat, a great German victory will have an effect throughout Europe which it is impossible to exaggerate. The future situation in the Balkans is fraught with uncertainty but it would appear that Bulgaria and Turkey will in any case be opposed to the other Balkan nations, thus neutralising the effect of Slav hostility to Austria and freeing that power from anxiety for her southern frontier. In the North Sweden will take the opportunity of attacking her old enemy Russia by an invasion of Finland, regarded by her in very much the same light as the French regard Alsace.*

It is not suggested that after the first battles on the frontier all resistance would cease and peace be concluded, but a great initial victory will, in the opinion of most Continental writers, have so powerful a moral effect and will entail such far-reaching consequences as to be in fact decisive. If successful Germany will obtain a similar position to that of France under Napoleon. Her writers on war recognise no advantage in a balance of power, nor is it compatible with victory by the Triple Alliance. The great obstacle is Great Britain, as it was in Napoleon's time, but there are many factors which suggest that a kind of federation of European countries under the leadership of Germany will not be so difficult as it proved to France a hundred years ago. The extreme difficulty of our carrying out a close naval blockade and the menace to our food-supplies involved by a German occupation of all the ports of Western Europe as well as the numerical inferiority of our Navy to the fleets which Germany might then control, will alter the naval conditions entirely, while as we have seen there is no reason to suppose anything but acquiescence on the part of the smaller nations. Napoleon's task was infinitely harder; it was nothing less than to enforce submission at the sword's point to a federation against England

* The national defence movement in Sweden has been hailed by the German Press as a sign that Sweden will not remain neutral in a European War. Sweden's position is too precarious to allow of her holding aloof.

involving ruin to Continental trade and violating all national sentiment. There is no reason to suppose that, British maritime supremacy once lost, this domination of the Continent will not prove a successful policy and a prosperous form of administration for Central Europe. The aspirations of Austria, Italy, and Russia may be satisfied by expansion in the Near East or Africa while the working-class and Socialist element would hail it as inaugurating a reign of peace and a reduction of expenditure on armaments, there being no longer a rival against whom to arm. It is possible to understand the Pan-German point of view. Believing firmly in the superiority of their country's methods of administration, culture, and ideals they regard such a mission as the noblest ever entrusted to any nation, the reward of self-sacrifice and devotion, the recompense for past suffering and humiliation.

There has been throughout history a tendency for every great military nation to attempt to assume the headship of Europe. The revival of the golden age of Charlemagne has been the dream of other conquerors than Napoleon. There are two alternatives capable of modifying the perpetual rivalry in armaments and consequent menace of war ; one is a generally recognised principle such as that of the balance of power, the other is the recognition of some one Power as the head of a European Federation. The Holy Roman Empire was so regarded in the Middle Ages ; it mattered little whether the power was actually wielded by Emperor or by Pope, it was there at any rate. And it may be argued that the latter alternative compares not unfavourably with the continual struggles, the ruinous competition in armaments which have formed a feature of the former. There is historical justification for Pan-German ideals, and there is only one reason why they should not be accepted. They would mean the end of France as a Great Power, and the dissolution of the British Empire.

Those who have any doubts as to the sentiments of the German people towards such a consummation should take to heart Clausewitz's dictum, "Public opinion is ultimately gained by great victories and by the possession of the enemy's capital." Public opinion counts for less in Germany than in almost any other country, but it is perfectly safe to predict that there will be no

doubt on this score after the first victory. Now to gain this victory which will decide the fate of Europe, the Germans intend to use a form of attack which has up to the present been uniformly successful. No answer to it has yet been found. It is hoped by an enveloping and converging attack from the north and east to overwhelm the French armies in the shortest possible time. At first sight it would seem that the French so situated should have a good chance of concentrating superior numbers against some portion of the attacking forces before the others could intervene, for they would occupy a central position between the German masses, or what is known in strategy as the "interior lines." On closer examination, however, this apparent advantage disappears. To all intents and purposes the frontage of the German masses would be continuous; it is true they would economise their forces at certain points, but these areas are protected by fortresses. There are two main groups, that of Thionville and Metz now joined by forts and forming a continuous fortified zone protecting the centre and most vulnerable portion of the German line and forming the pivot for their manœuvre, and that of Istein, Neuf-Brisach, Strasburg, Molsheim forbidding access to the Upper Rhine valley. Any advance by the French between these areas or to the north of Thionville would have its flank exposed to an attack from the troops holding them, and even a success in this quarter could have no decisive result, whereas, if the attack of the German right wing from Belgium were successful, it would be all the more annihilating if the French had committed themselves by advancing too far to the east, for the Germans would in that case be between the whole French army and Paris. It will be asked, "What then is the answer to the German form of attack?" The problem for a force acting on interior lines in these days differs from that which Napoleon solved so often and so triumphantly in this respect, that in those days there was ample space and time for manœuvring, for the converging forces had not the means of rapid transport nor of co-ordinating the movements of separate columns that we now have. Their opponent placed in a central position had time to defeat one column and then transfer his attention to the other. The French have sought inspiration in the history of Napoleon and believe that this can still be effected by other means. They rely on

placing their masses in a central position where they will wait until the enemy's movements have developed. Meanwhile strong advance-guards or covering troops will have engaged the enemy and forced him to deploy and disclose his dispositions. By this means early information will be obtained as to the enemy's strength at all points, and the Commander-in-Chief will then be enabled to decide on the most favourable point to attack and will throw his whole available strength against that point. The enemy's line once broken, his remaining forces will then be assailed in front and flank and victory will be assured. Now this plan is no doubt perfectly sound for a force so situated and greatly inferior in numbers to its opponent, but it is certainly far more hazardous than the German one; it requires far greater qualities in the Commander-in-Chief; it demands extreme mobility on the part of the troops, great marching power, and perfect staff work. It demands comparatively little initiative on the part of subordinate commanders, everything depends on the directing brain. The German is the exact converse; the forces once engaged the Commander-in-Chief exercises no initiative, everything depends on his subordinates, there is no manœuvring, merely an overwhelming, converging, overlapping attack which by its speed and suddenness will tie the enemy to his ground, destroy his initiative, and force him to act on the defensive. It is the least scientific of the two; it is a "slogging" match, a mere reliance on numbers, but it is the safer, for in the French plan everything depends upon the nerve and the brain of one man.

We can now understand why this battle should be decisive. The Germans do not fight until the chances are in their favour, but once having gone to war they act on the Napoleonic principle that great results can only be gained by taking great risks. It is an entire mistake to suppose that the German doctrine of war errs on the side of excessive caution. Bismarck and Moltke in 1870 did not know till war was declared whether the South Germans would fight. The battles of the Franco-German War are examples of audacity quite as great as those of the Napoleonic campaigns. A defeat of the German right wing in view of the probable attitude of the Dutch and Belgians in that event may involve absolute ruin, but the risk is worth the prize, for in the event of victory the French communications will be cut,

and, to use the words of a well-known French writer, "this will lead either to the investment of our armies in the open field or to throwing them back on to the fortresses where they will be ultimately enclosed, as Bazaine was in 1870." No doubt some will say that if the French did in 1870 with their raw levies continue their resistance to the invaders, why should they now collapse when they have all the resources of a nation-in-arms to draw upon? The same writer, Captain Sorb, gives the answer.* The investment of the French armies will be undertaken by the German second-line troops, the field-armies will carry out a relentless pursuit, vast stores of provisions and munitions of war will fall into their hands, time will be wanting for the reserve formations to gain any cohesion, "it is useless to insist on their extremely slight value when it is a matter of regaining success, while their utility is incontestable when it comes to the exploitation of a victory." The low opinion that Continental soldiers hold of the older reserve formations throws a curious light on the nonsense that is frequently talked about the National Reservist in this country who, it may be remarked, possesses no "formation" at all. But the difference between the situation now and that in 1870 is that there will now be no time for organising such resistance, and a modern state with a large industrial population will feel the effects of defeat far more heavily than in those days, while the disaster itself will be more overwhelming from a military point of view than those of Metz and Sedan.

The moral effect also will be far greater. In 1870 a nation intensely vain of its military prowess saw in the defeat of its armies nothing but the treason of its generals and the incompetence of the administration of the Second Empire. A national rising and Republican institutions would, it seemed to them, retrieve all. There is now no room for cherishing delusions of this kind. Republican government has become a synonym for instability and continual changes of ministry. It is true that the French under the influence of excitement or despair have sometimes shown extraordinary fortitude in adverse circumstances, but in the case under consideration the feeling that they have played their last card and lost, the consequent loss of confidance in their leaders, the influence of past disasters will all have so much

* Révue militaire générale—August 1912. "La conduite et la durée de la guerre."

weight as to preclude the idea that a retirement behind the Loire, the only possible course after an initial disaster on the frontier, would be attended with any ultimate chance of success. This is no disparagement of the French character. "To break off the fight and to retreat," says another French officer, Captain Aubert, "will, in view of our inconstant character, lead to a rout (*nous conduire à la débandade*). . . . We cannot pursue the same methods as the Germans, their less nervous temperament permitting them, like the Russians, to submit to prolonged retirements."* Whether this last estimate of the Germans is correct may, however, be doubted. The German regulations simply do not contemplate the possibility of retirement. The cult of the offensive has become so ingrained that a retreat is never carried out at manœuvres. Troops occupying a defensive position will throw up entrenchments, but somewhat illogically will not even await attack in them. As soon as the enemy has deployed, the defending force leaves its trenches and advances to meet them. Some critics see in this an element of weakness, since unforeseen circumstances compelling them to act on the defensive would perhaps throw the whole machinery out of gear, but the point to realise is that they rely on their overwhelming initiative and relentless use of the offensive to create a moral effect not only on the enemy but on the world at large which shall render further resistance ineffective. The celebrated writer on strategy, Blume, says: "The more one promptly crushes the enemy, the better one guards oneself against the interference of neutral Powers. A decisive military success has more than once compelled a third party to sheathe the sword which it was beginning to draw in favour of our enemy."

Such is the situation which will arise on the outbreak of the next war. What should be the attitude of Great Britain towards it? The German navy will, it is clear from the writings of Bernhardi and others, adopt one of two courses. If for any reason there is a dispersion of British naval strength such as to provide a favourable opportunity for a sudden and unexpected attack and to deal an initial blow whereby a portion of the British fleet can be destroyed, then the German fleet will take this oppor-

* Révue Militaire Générale.—October 1912. "La manœuvre anti-française. L'enveloppement."

tunity without any hesitation even if it involves great risks. If, on the other hand, there is a period of tension preceding the outbreak of war, and so great a concentration of British naval strength has taken place in "home waters" as to render success very doubtful, the German fleet will remain in the Baltic or in the mouth of the Elbe. In the latter case, no decisive issue can be expected on the sea for a considerable time. A close blockade cannot be enforced, and there will be a period more or less prolonged of uncertainty and anxiety, our Battle Fleet being kept at a sufficient distance to avoid danger of attack by submarines and destroyers, while watch will be kept by our own small craft on the German harbours. This will be a service where our ships will suffer far more than the German.

Meanwhile, the internal condition of this country will be most critical. On this subject there is no more authoritative writer than Major Stewart Murray, who, besides his numerous writings, was mainly instrumental in rousing public opinion to demand an enquiry into our food-supply in time of war, the result being the appointment of a Royal Commission which issued a report on "Food and Raw Material Supply in War," and was followed by a Treasury Committee's report on "War Risks of Shipping," in 1908. The evidence produced was alarming, but nothing has, of course, come of it. He summarises the effects of a European war on the internal condition of the country as being five in number.* First, the financial confusion due largely to panic and dislocation of trade. The gold reserve in the Bank of England, on which all other banks depend, only amounts to something between forty and fifty millions, a far smaller sum than that of other Great Powers, while the deposits in our banks total something like £1,000,000,000. The result will be, according to the late Sir Robert Giffen, that "should a great war break out and business be widely interrupted, the demands upon English banks, quite apart from panic at first, might easily become overwhelming, and the paltry £25,000,000 or £40,000,000, or say £50,000,000, which is all we have to show, would dwindle to nothing in a day or two." Secondly, there is "the necessary deflection of our export trade caused by the loss of the markets

* *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, December 1912, "The Internal Condition of Great Britain during a Great War."

of Germany, Italy, and Austria." The only remedy for this would be the collection of information by the Government concerning the demand for these goods among neutrals with a view to finding out how the supply can be diverted to other markets. Thirdly, there is the interruption of commerce due to fear. It is perfectly certain that in the first stage of a naval war commerce protection on the high seas will be most inadequately carried out. All German liners and merchant-men are now armed, and can easily be used for privateering. The only way to remove this fear is a scheme of national guarantee against war risks of shipping. This was recommended by the Royal Commission, but has remained unheeded. Fourthly, there is the famine price of food. It is calculated that "sugar, bacon, ham, eggs, butter, and tinned meats will disappear during the first week of war." According to the evidence of the principal corn merchants before the Royal Commission, bread will at once go up greatly in price. "About four or five weeks' supply is available at our weakest time, the rest being 'bottled up' for a rise, and another four or five weeks' supply would appear when wheat rises to 70s. or 80s. a quarter." Major Murray calculates that, in addition to the 7,000,000 persons dependent on wages of 23s. and under, there will be another 3,000,000 thrown out of work owing to the dislocation of commerce and industry. By the fourth week of the war, these 10,000,000 people will have all come on the rates. The only way to obviate this appalling state of affairs is a war organisation of the Poor Law enabling the State to give relief on a vast scale to that large section of the population which could not maintain itself under war conditions. Lastly, there is the problem of the effect of war on the working classes, a problem which can only be solved by not only supplying food but work. In a word, the successful carrying on of such a war as is here contemplated requires a vast and very carefully considered scheme of internal organisation.

All writers on these subjects agree that while these evils will be felt very acutely by all European nations, they will affect us far more than they will any other country at the commencement of war. The critical stage for us will be the first few weeks. After that conditions, provided we retain our supremacy at sea, will improve. In a very interesting article, which appeared in

the *Round Table* for March 1912, entitled "Lombard Street and War," it was pointed out that "our safety depends on our being given a breathing-space to adjust ourselves to the new conditions. If time is given there is no doubt that London has the power to draw all the gold she wants from other countries." Even if the raising of the Bank rate was not effective, "the assets of the British nation abroad are so immense that if they were under the necessity of realising them, it is difficult to suppose they could not draw gold to London." But it is just during this extremely critical period that the decisive blow will be struck on the French frontier. The Government will in all probability be faced with a naval issue as yet undecided, and a condition of complete disorganisation of the labour world at home, accompanied perhaps with bread riots.

Under these adverse circumstances, when rumours of every kind are flying about and when a condition of panic is prevailing, they will have to decide whether or not they will risk sending the whole Regular Army to assist the French on the Belgian frontier. If they do not, the issue of that battle which will transform the whole constitution of Europe, will be decided without our having struck a blow ; we shall have been forced to look on while every safeguard for our own security was being destroyed before our eyes.

Now the insistence on the necessity for this country of an Army capable of affecting the issue on the Continent, a necessity which is the very foundation of a sound system of national defence is generally met by two criticisms. We are sometimes told that we should not base our whole military organisation upon it because we are an island Power possessing a widespread Empire and our primary duty is the defence of our Imperial possessions. It is in accordance with this idea that Lord Haldane told us he had created a Territorial Army capable of undertaking the defence of this country while the Regular Army was conducting "a great war on the frontiers of our Empire." A war with Russia on the Indian frontier, a native rising on a large scale in India, or perhaps elsewhere, would fit this description. It happens, however, that we have come to the conclusion that a war with Russia must be avoided at all costs, and have therefore entered into an *Entente* with that Power and have sacrified much for that object.

Further, before such a war could break out it is obvious that the whole existing system of European alliances and *ententes* must have been broken up. France, if it had to choose between the friendship of Russia and that of England, would assuredly choose the former. But it is ridiculous to suggest that with France hostile we could despatch a host of transports to India. And what of the attitude of the Triple Alliance? The whole conception of such a military adventure is absurd; we could not as a matter of fact conduct such a war with Europe in its present state. If we were so unfortunate as to quarrel with Russia the issue would be fought out not on the frontiers of our Empire but in Europe.

But let us consider the far more probable event of a native rising on a large scale in India. This would produce the very chance Germany is looking for, the diffusion of British naval strength over a long line of sea communications with the navies of Italy and Austria stationed on the flank of that line. At home a population utterly blind to the realities of war would probably object to the embodiment of the Territorials until too late. The refusal of the Volunteers to extend their service in camp during the South African War is significant of what will occur in a similar case. Could we, as a matter of fact, undertake such a war? In view of the present condition of Europe, in view of our naval weakness, in view of our inadequate home-defence system, would not such a war involve absolute ruin? The truth is our Navy and Army are incapable of any great effort at a distance from these shores. We are dominated by the European situation; it has paralysed our offensive power, and until we can escape from it all organisation for war must be founded upon its requirements.

Another criticism directed against this reasoning is that of those who are for ever murmuring phrases about the necessity of reliance on our Navy inferring that the Navy alone can provide for our security in case of a European war. It is unnecessary to go into this fallacy, which ignores the naval consequences of a French defeat, but many people appear to have a kind of vague idea that you can either conduct a war by sea or by land, that we should therefore choose the former, and that the two are entirely distinct from one another. Now the object of going

to war is to win such a crushing victory over your enemy that he will be compelled to submit to your terms. You cannot choose where you would like to fight him ; you must fight him at the decisive point, at the point which will cripple him. In every war fought between an island Power and a Continental enemy it has been found necessary for the islanders to defeat their enemy on his own ground. The whole of English history is a proof of this. Therefore no war of this kind can be either purely naval or purely military, and all who talk about war with Germany as being a naval problem rather than a military one are talking obvious nonsense.* Further, a navy is not more important than an army ; both are indispensable in order to gain a victory, but it is the army which strikes the decisive blow, and it is the navy which enables it to strike it, first, by defeating the enemy at sea and blockading him in his harbours, and then by keeping the sea open for the reinforcements, supplies, and other requirements of the army. Once the enemy's fleets are disposed of the navy merely becomes a guard for the army's line of communications. And all the high-sounding phrases of the Blue Water School will not alter the fact that this is just exactly what the Navy has always done. First it won Trafalgar, then it proceeded to protect the lines of communication of the Army which won Vittoria and Waterloo. And Blenheim in the eighteenth century, and Waterloo in the nineteenth, saved Europe ; Trafalgar did not, nor did any other naval action. And it was because the Navy failed to protect our lines of communication that we lost the American colonies.

All this may seem a series of platitudes, but as a matter of fact this elementary truth is denied by a large number of naval men who believe that the problem is in some mysterious way their problem and who, not content with their own element, frame light-hearted schemes for throwing a few British divisions into Denmark or Schleswig-Holstein, and regard the Expeditionary Force as a matter of no importance. Unfortunately, there is

* Thus Lord Haldane, who has a remarkable facility for expressing strategical heresies, stated in the House of Lords on March 10 that "the basic principle of naval strategy was that the national defence had always rested on the Navy." In that case naval strategy is all wrong. This phrase may sound all right, but it is not true, it never has been true, it never will be true.

not one strategy for the sea and another for the land. Sound principles of strategy can only be gained by creating a school of thought, by getting both services to think alike on subjects which are equally the concern of both. A school of thought has been created in the Army by means of the Staff College; it does not seem equally apparent in the Navy.

An attempt has been made in this article to sketch the present European situation, the events which have produced it, and the foundations upon which alone a sound doctrine of national defence can be built.

It will no doubt be said that, granting its truth, it is of little practical value as the nation is not prepared to incur the sacrifices it involves. The fact that the truth will not be heeded is, however, no reason for not telling it. It is quite true that a nation situated as we are, unless it adopts a different outlook, can hardly hope to avoid a disaster. This is not pessimism; it is the recognition of facts.

If the responsibilities of Empire are greater now than they ever were; if the Continental situation is more threatening; if history shows that our immunity during the last hundred years from any attempts to destroy the balance of power is due to conditions which are gone for ever; if it shows, too, that such immunity is really an abnormal state of affairs; if everything will depend in the next war on tiding over a crisis, on making a great initial effort for which we have never been prepared in the past and are still less so to-day—if these things are true, then the only remedy must be a proportionate sacrifice on the part of the community. Failing this we too shall "go down into the pit, with the people of old time," with Tyre and Carthage, with Venice and Spain. Unfortunately, the dominant political party consists of men who are either pure vote-catchers or who hold utterly illusory ideas of the very nature of war. There is a strange tendency of the Radical mind to imagine that at successive stages of civilisation human nature and the forces which create war have changed. The past is no guide, according to this school, for the old motives for war are gone. Chivalry, conquest, glory, and religion are from this point of view as extinct as duelling, belief in magic, or Spanish Inquisitions, the relics of an age of superstition. The decay of faith in anything except money

inspires this school with great hopes for human nature in the future! Now it is a curious fact that just when religion had ceased to be a factor in causing war, another motive far more ridiculous than that which prompted the Crusades or the Thirty Years War induced a bankrupt nation to embark on an aggressive war against the whole of Europe. Its war-cry was "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, or Death." The seeds sown by that nation have been ripening ever since. One harvest was reaped in 1848, when all the countries of the Continent were involved in war and revolution. Their war-cries were, liberty, national independence, republican institutions, socialism. And the seed is still ripening and is reaping further rich harvests in the form of syndicalism and socialism, with which the masses all over Europe are becoming impregnated and are being encouraged to question all authority by Radicals who preach what they term "the gospel of divine discontent" and "unfettered democracies" and "one man one vote" and other ideas proved thousands of years ago to be absurd. And in presence of these totally unknown forces, these dangerous dogmas, this ignorant fanaticism and mistaken idealism, we are asked to believe that wars will cease, that the "mills of God" will in future grind according to Radical formulæ, and that money is no longer the root of all evil but the sole agent for the salvation of mankind.

In spite of all this there are two reasons for continuing to tell the truth. One is the possibility of a change in the sentiment of the masses; at present this seems improbable, but human nature revolts in the end against a diet of pure selfishness. This is the reason perhaps that so many turn from Liberalism to Socialism, which at least is something more than mere doles in exchange for votes. The other reason is that whatever lies in store for us, our ultimate salvation will depend upon our returning to true principles and facing the truth. In the end, whatever may happen meanwhile, we must face it. We can at least prepare the way by clearing away the illusions which lie in the path.

PERCY

THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND PARTY HONOURS

We confess that a careful perusal of the debate in the House of Lords on February 23 leaves us somewhat mystified as to the purpose of its distinguished promoter. Of Lord Selborne we would always speak with that respect which is due to an individual who has done eminent service in public life and in the private councils of his Party. He enjoys an earldom by inheritance and the blue riband by the favour of the present Government. His political infancy was spent in the Whips' room and his riper years in important office under the Crown. As High Commissioner for South Africa he obliged his colleagues by accepting the appointment and their successors by retaining it. With such a record, Lord Selborne has no need to invite the attention of the world either to his virtues or his abilities, for in every field of political and official labour they have been alike admirable and conspicuous.

Towards the close of last Session, it was rumoured that his lordship was so uneasy about the circumstances attending the grant of honours and dignities by the Crown, that nothing less than a declaration on the part of members of the House of Lords would, in his judgment, meet the urgent necessities of the case. Accordingly, after the despatch of serious business in connection with the policy of Ministers in Ireland and their speculations on the Stock Exchange, Lord Selborne placed the following notice on the Order paper of the House:

> To move to resolve that a contribution to Party funds should not be a consideration to a Minister when he recommends any name for an honour to his Majesty; that effectual

> measures should be taken in order to assure the nation that Governments, from whatever political Party they are drawn, will act according to this rule; and that this House requests the concurrence of the House of Commons in the foregoing resolution.

The debate was anticipated with interest. In some quarters it was thought that Taper and Tadpole might have to consider their position. Would Lord Selborne cite particular cases? Would he deal with facts and figures? Would he even condescend to particulars of his own experience when he was responsible for the lubrication of the Liberal Unionist machinery: or would he content himself with the expression of a pious hope that, whatever might have happened in the past, hereafter no recipient of a dignity would mark his gratitude by a pecuniary payment?

The result showed that there was no cause for anxiety. No name was questioned: not a sum was mentioned. Now and again there were symptoms that the solemnity becoming so grave an occasion would not be observed, as when certain noble lords drew freely upon their lively imaginations and posed as amateur brokers who had failed in their line of business. Decorum, however, was soon restored at the urgent entreaty of Lord Milner, and reached its height when the Leader of the House, on behalf of the Prime Minister, gave the fully expected assurance that "a contribution to Party funds has not been a consideration to him when recommending names to his Majesty for honours."

Let us now see what was the gravamen of Lord Selborne's speech, and what its conclusion. His homily was founded on "a very widely prevalent belief" that persons are often recommended for political honours whom no one would have thought of recommending if they had not contributed largely to Party funds. The evidence for this belief rested, it appeared, upon newspaper paragraphs, "numerous confidences," and the jokes of actors on the stage of light comedy. Lord Selborne frankly admitted that he could not prove a single case. After a long passage about the prestige of the Crown, a laboured reference to honourable lives, a dissertation on the growth of political organisations, and an imaginary account of the relations between a Prime Minister and his Patronage Secretary, the noble lord proceeded to make an admis-

sion and to give an illustration. These were his lordship's words: "I want to guard against the supposition that I think men who are otherwise properly and reasonably qualified to receive an honour should become disqualified because they have also contributed to Party funds." Noble lords must have been puzzled by the apparent casuistry of this statement as they turned to the language of the Resolution. Their perplexity, however, was soon relieved. They were enlightened by this amazing illustration. Lord Selborne, with a *mine de circonstance,* continued: "I will take the case of Sir John Brunner. This gentleman has done long and honourable service as the head of a great commercial enterprise, and it was very reasonable that he should have been honoured by his Sovereign." "But," added the speaker, "if there is any Party man in England it is Sir John Brunner, and although I have not the honour of being in his confidence I feel perfectly certain that he has contributed liberally to Party funds."

And so it all comes to this. There is a widespread belief that grants of honours are in some cases determined by Party contributions. It is very shocking. It pollutes the fountain of honour. It impairs the standard of public duty. It is advancing the influence of plutocracy. Something must be done to arrest the spread of the evil and to check the malign influence of the Whip upon the head of the Government—that simple statesman, the pliant tool of the astute and unscrupulous wirepuller. Let public opinion be invoked "to kill the scandal—the grievous scandal." But Sir John Brunner! Not a word against Sir John Brunner. The subscriptions to the Free Trade Union, the cheques for the General Election fund of the Liberal Party, the money sunk by his partner in the *Westminster Gazette* were really not "a consideration" to the Minister! To the Whip they were, of course, merely negligible trifles in the scale. No; according to the obliging testimony of Lord Selborne, "Sir John Brunner has done long and honourable service and is head of one of the greatest commercial enterprises in the country." He, at all events—and we think the noble lord would graciously include Sir Alfred Moritz Mond in his benediction—is outside the letter and spirit of the Resolution!

Oh! spirit of humour, where wert thou, when our good friend

Lord Selborne bent over the preparation of his speech and blundered into this hapless instance?

The political clubs echoed with laughter that night. Even the pundits and purists of Brooks's failed to maintain a decent gravity. What did it all mean? Lord Ribblesdale was at his best with an elaborate pasquinade. Lord Willoughby de Broke made, as usual, the excellent speech of an excellent sportsman. Lord Milner was earnest, and the leaders sententious. But, after all, there was nothing like the citation of Sir John Brunner to point the moral and adorn the tale!

We repeat we are still curious to know what purpose the debate was designed to serve. Surely, the framers of the resolution did not suppose it would be contested. They can never have anticipated that the leaders of either Party in the House would experience any difficulty in assenting to it. They must have been prepared for the Prime Minister's ample assurance of innocence. Did they think that Lord Marchamley or Lord Murray would feel a twinge of embarrassment, or that Lord Chilston or Lord St. Audries would turn pale when the solemn words were read from the Woolsack?

As the debate proceeded in the House of Lords, there came before our minds the part which the late Duke of Devonshire would have taken in the discussion, had the like occasion arisen during his leadership of that Assembly. No one had a larger experience of the drab side of Party or of the frailties and follies of political adherents. To a Prime Minister he once said that he could not conceive why any one wanted an honour: but, if he did, there seemed no reason why his pretensions should not be gratified. He would have agreed with the mover that any traffic in honours was to be condemned; and he would have maintained that no responsible or respectable statesman would for a moment think of countenancing such corruption. But he would have riddled the Resolution with that acute criticism of which he was so great a master. He would have rallied the soaring transcendentalists on their unproved assertions, on their mild platitudes, and their innocuous proposal. He would have pointed out that even under the most decorous system of Party management, a financial consideration would often exist in connection with the grant of a political peerage: and he would have asked how it was possible

to restrain the gratitude of the individual when once the coronet of his ambition was lodged in his wardrobe. This country was supposed to be a free country; and if a grateful millionaire would rather give his money to his Party than spend it upon a Velasquez or a racehorse, well—that was his affair. It would have been the speech of a Whig who was master of his subject: who never burdened his mind with an indignation that was too virtuous, with hopes that were unattainable or with regrets that were profitless. It would have supplied just that touch of epicurean philosophy which was wanted to steady the exaggeration of the reformer and the ardour of the enthusiast. It would have reminded Lord Selborne of the days when he studied at the feet of the Duke the great traditions of the school of Devonshire House, and when he was taught that, while a Minister should execrate corruption, he must ever remember the necessities of worldly wisdom and the virtues of common sense. For in the grammar of that school of political thought was the maxim,

Noli esse justus multum: neque plus sapias quam necesse est, ne obstupescas.

The more we consider this debate, the more we are struck by the simple faith of the excellent statesmen who took part in it and their honest desire to prescribe a lofty standard for the bestowal of honours and titular distinctions. And yet it must be remembered that even legislators are at times disposed to ignore the logic of facts in their pursuit of an ideal system, and to quit the solid earth for the hazy clouds. It may seem unkind to be unmoved by their Arcadian ditties: it may even appear rude to tell them that our political dispensation is not the Reign of the Saints; but, in truth, the incorruptibility of political nature will not be achieved by resolutions which rest upon gossip or distinctions in favour of Sir John Brunner.

Once in an age of great corruption the House of Commons passed without a dissentient voice a resolution to the effect that with the exception of the Speaker, the Judges and Ambassadors, no person employed in any civil office should receive more than £500 a year. The sinecurists and the Ministers, with great prudence offered no opposition to the proposal and quietly waited until common sense again prevailed. That time soon arrived. When in the course of a few weeks it was proposed

to give legislative force to the resolution, the clause embodying it was negatived without a division.

We may pass on to address ourselves to the situation as we believe it exists at the present time. There are those who are honestly persuaded that a Whip either corrupts every one who comes near him, or else, like Danaë, is wooed in a shower of gold and always yields to the seductive pressure of the importunate suitor. Satisfied that this is the case, and sincerely convinced that every list of honours contains the names of those who have debauched the Whip with money, or else have been debauched by him, they naturally enough allege that honours are bought and sold; that there is a traffic in titles discreditable to public life.

Now, if these allegations be well founded, the resolution of February 23 is the most feeble instrument of correction that the wit of man has ever devised. But are they well founded? We sincerely believe that they are not. No one, of course, is such a simpleton as to deny that in the race for political honours Party service and Party loyalty, coupled with wealth, stand a better chance of recognition than the like service and the like loyalty associated with comparative poverty. That has been, that is, and that always will be the way of this imperfect world. But because rich men at intervals—often types of aspiring and unquiet mediocrity—find their way into the gilded Chamber, it is unjust, both to the Minister and the Party manager, to allege that these peerages have been bought across a table in 12 Downing Street.

It is perhaps worth while to illustrate the practical working of the resolution which Lord Selborne has persuaded the House of Lords to record as the rule to be observed by the adviser of the Crown when he submits a name for the grant of an honour. We will take a case—doubtless not an uncommon one. There are two gentlemen of good position, and of private character so unblemished as to satisfy, as nearly as may be, Lord Selborne's standard of moral excellence. In their respective counties they exercise that just influence which the combination of good reputation and ample fortune will always secure. They are stout supporters of the Government of the day. They take a leading part in the political activities of their districts.

But it so happens that while one confines his subscription to the nominal sum which is the least that can with decency be given by the titular head of the provincial political organisation, the purse of the other guarantees the expenses of the local candidate, maintains the political clubs in the constituency, and handsomely aids the local Party newspaper, which otherwise would cease to exist. Nay more; at the time of a General Election the same gentleman is always ready with a large cheque for the fund which the Whip must needs collect on such an occasion. On our hypothesis, the dignity of a peerage may, with perfect propriety, be conferred upon either of these gentlemen. They are both expectant, but only one can be obliged. The Prime Minister has to decide between their respective merits. Now if he decides in favour of the gentleman whose political opinions are associated with these financial subsidies to the Party, it is idle to deny that his decision is not influenced by the fact that the candidate in this case contributes to Party funds. It is obviously "a consideration" within the meaning of the resolution. It turns the scale in the generous subscriber's favour. And yet the resolution declares that a contribution to Party funds is not to be "a consideration to a Minister when he recommends any name for an honour to his Majesty." Lord Selborne may explain as he will. He may have mental reservations. He may imagine a saving clause; but the rule he has drafted is only capable of the interpretation we have given to it. His lordship, indeed, appeared to see the absurdities which the resolution involved; but his only observation was that it was difficult to draw the line, and useless to attempt definitions!

Surely the true test is this. Either a man is a fit person to be made a peer or he is not. If he is fit, then his wealth ought not to be a bar, nor his donations to his Party a disqualification. If he is unfit, it matters not whether he be rich or poor, whether he be generous or parsimonious, whether he supports a newspaper in the interests of official Liberalism or conducts another in the service of the Labour Party.

Lord Selborne's remedy for the state of things of which he complains is the attention of public opinion, in addition to some mysterious action which he would call upon the vast body of the Privy Council to perform. He would implore his fellow citizens

to watch with care every exercise of the prerogative. Lord Milner would like to see some explanatory justification of an honour on the analogy of that which accompanies the grant of a Civil List pension—always, we are told, the delightful and informing composition of the First Lord's Private Secretary. It is an amusing scene to imagine. The Prime Minister, the Whip and the Private Secretary sitting down to devise some effective *pièce justicative* wherewith to dress up (for example) the peerage of Lord Rothermere of Hemsted.

If, as some noble lords and some rigid precisians appear to think, peerages are really bought and sold, then so great is the evil, so vile the corruption, that nothing but stern measures will be effective. It is trifling to talk of the force of public opinion: to suggest some vague recourse to the Privy Council: or to rely upon the magic qualities of an explanatory statement justifying the grant.

There are, it appears to us, two remedies for the disease, if disease there be. One is to strike boldly at Party funds. If there were no Party Exchequer, there would be no Party contributions. If there were no offices with expensive staffs, no missioners travelling up and down the country, no political literature to be distributed, no candidates to be financed, and no members to be subsidised, the need for subscriptions and donations would cease. The benefaction of the plutocrat would be treated as bribery, the mites of Liberal widows * would be even as corruption. We readily admit that the passage of a Bill to effect this purpose would be difficult. The disestablishment and disendowment of institutions is always controversial. But to the Liberal Party it would surely bring some sense of relief. Their property may not always have been invested in securities which would receive the sanction of the Court of Chancery.

In the debate in the House of Lords more than one reference was made to the growth of expenditure in connection with Party purposes. It is, we fear, only too true that in recent years the cost of political organisations has gone up by leaps and bounds, and must now be a cause of considerable embarrassment to the Party paymasters. If we seek to assign the responsibility for these swollen charges we shall rightly fix it on the unbridled action

* Lord Selborne's speech.

of some intemperate cabal which invariably comes into existence when there has been a defeat at the polls. Claiming to speak on behalf of the Party at large, these gentlemen call loudly for an improved system of organisation. An independent Committee is appointed. Its principal recommendations involve the formation of new bureaux, an increase of staff, and salaries on a higher scale. The report is adopted. Forthwith an order is given to the Whip to carry out the reforms. He may like them or he may not: at all events, he is left to finance them. Personally, we believe that the Whip would infinitely prefer to do his business with a less elaborate machine, and at a reduced cost: and that he would gladly be relieved of the various Leagues, Unions and Societies whose expenditure is frequently a charge upon Party funds. Lord Selborne in his speech spoke eloquently of the banal effects of these developments of the Party system. With a detached and pitying concern he referred to the Whip as if he were a poor relation struggling with a weary and thankless existence: and in impressive tones he denounced the alliance of the caucus and the plutocrat. Lord St. Audries might have grimly observed that there were days when with the best intentions in the world his noble friend had done something to bring the parties together.

There remains another remedy of equal efficacy but perhaps of less popularity. Let the Prime Minister, with his humble duty, submit to the Sovereign that he should abandon his prerogative of making any further grants of hereditary honours, save perhaps in the case of gentlemen who have served their country with distinction in the Naval, Military and Diplomatic professions, or in the domain of science.*

We must be forgiven if we recite the familiar precedent for the general principle of this proposal. In 1719 Lord Sunderland persuaded George I to renounce his prerogative right of making peers as soon as a very few more had been created.† A Bill of

* This limitation may be thought too narrow. It would undoubtedly disappoint the hopes of eminent persons who direct the more important Civil establishments of the State; but the practice of ennobling these officers is comparatively modern, and wholly unnecessary. With regard to the members of the legal profession, recourse might be had to the complimentary designations allowed in the case of the Scottish Judiciary.

† The Crown was to be restrained from the creation of more than six beyond the existing number of one hundred and seventy eight peerages—the power being still

which the Duke of Somerset was the ostensible author was duly brought in and was passed without difficulty through the House of Lords. Historians allow that it was supported by the wisest and best men of the day. That the prerogative had been grossly abused in the previous reign was generally admitted, and that there was ground for anxiety under the circumstances of the new dynasty could not be disputed. It is, however, unnecessary to rehearse arguments which turned on the uncertain theories of the Constitution, on the abuses which might follow from the unlimited right to increase the peerage, or on the securities necessary to restrain the perverse haughtiness of the aristocracy. These and many other considerations are now quite out of date. But the antiquarian will find the controversy fully displayed in the tracts of Addison and Steele, the former of whom obliged the Ministry with his pen in the *Old Whig*, while the latter served the cause of the Opposition in the *Plebeian*. The Bill, however, was rejected in the Commons. Walpole, who, of course, in such a matter was an expert, told the Duke of Somerset that it would be perfectly impossible to get such a measure passed through the Lower House, as many of its members were living in expectation of having the honour of a peerage conferred upon them!

With all respect, why should not Lord Selborne assume the mantle of Sunderland? Believing as he apparently does, that

> corruption like a general flood
> (So long by watchful Ministers withstood)
> Shall deluge all,

why should he not grapple boldly with the cause of the evil he appears to find in our polity? As the House of Lords in a recent debate felt no delicacy in questioning the play of the fountain of honour, so there can be no reason why their lordships should not entertain a discussion on the renunciation of the prerogative; nor why they should not carry a resolution calling upon the head of the Government to submit to the Crown the expediency of abandoning the power to create political peerages.

On the whole we are disposed to think that the scheme would

reserved of creating a new peerage whenever a peerage should become extinct; and instead of sixteen representative Peers of Scotland, it was proposed that twenty-five hereditary Peers should have seats in the House of Lords.

be difficult to resist. New peers, for example, are obviously not wanted for legislative purposes. The constitutional functions of the House of Lords are gone. The Parliament Act has reduced their ancient rights to the idle forms of a debating society; and even the political harangue of a most reverend prelate is of little more consequence than an undergraduate's oration in the Oxford Union. Moreover, if we are correctly informed, a Second Chamber of slender numbers and popularly elected is to replace an Assembly which once enjoyed the high regard of the nation, until it yielded to the factious threats of an unscrupulous Ministry and the whispered messages from the backstairs of the Palace.

For all social requirements the existing members of the House of Lords will assuredly prove sufficient. It is true that in the earlier part of the last century, a notable statistician was concerned about the supposed sterility of the peerage. He alleged that "Nature interdicts their increase." But under critical examination his case broke down. Certainly, at the present day, the expanding records of Burke give us no cause for anxiety on this head. On the contrary, it would be easy to show that the English nobility are not only not a sterile, but a distinctly prolific, part of the general community. And we are confident that even the present supply of Liberal peers and peeresses is quite adequate for the patronage of bazaars, the ambitious demands of Party hostesses, and the Boards of the promoters of public companies. Indeed the peerage has of late years grown as cheap as were the ennoblements under the French Empire.

> Where is Bohun? Where is de Vere? The lawyer, the farmer, the silk mercer lie *perdu* under the coronet, and wink to the antiquary to say nothing.*

It is strange indeed that a new peerage in these times should have any attractions. That a man should accept one is wonderful; the suggestion that he will pay for it is astounding. In former years when the blue blood of a limited aristocracy was freely adulterated with the element of the middle classes; when Canning scribbled on the hall door of the first Lord Carrington: †

* Emerson.

† We trust that Mr. Robert Smith's illustrious grandson, whose services to the present Government seem to have been adequately rewarded with a [illegible] and the

One Bobby Smith lives here,
Billy Pitt made him a Peer,
And took the pen from behind his ear;

the political purpose and the cynical contempt of the great Minister was understood by all men. Mr. Pitt had far less sympathy with the peerage than has a Radical Minister in these days who does homage to corduroy on the platform and sneers at it in Berkeley Square. To Mr. Pitt the landowner with ten thousand a year was merely what the ten-pound householder was to the Minister of a later generation. He found a class willing to serve in his political army and he paid them in the coin which they gladly accepted. With their numbers he wore down the oligarchy of the Whigs to the satisfaction of himself and the delight of his Sovereign. But now that a new creation counts for little in respectable Society and for nothing in the Senate, we may surely hope that the stream of honours will soon flow in less copious volume; and thus we may be spared the spectacle of distinguished pro-Consuls mourning over the presumed venality of a degenerate age.

FABRICIUS

THE FREE TRADERS IN 1914

In the next few years Finance is likely to be a source of growing anxiety to the Government of the day. However vital the great issues of Home Rule and the Welsh Church Bill may be, there is one question which can never be put aside, and that is the task of providing, year by year, for the increasing expenditure of the State.

The Prime Minister has just told us that "The Chancellor of the Exchequer under our present system is nearing the end of his taxing resources." If the Unionist Party should be returned to power, it would be a great help to it, in the difficult times that lie before us, to be armed, through a Tariff, with a valuable source of additional revenue, which no other great country neglects. There are of course some opponents who tell us that it is not possible to get more employment by shutting goods out, and also to get revenue from them as they come in. This is only an ingeniously deceptive arrangement of words. It has been well answered by a Free Trade authority who at the time was well known throughout the country as Mr. Ure. He told us that if duties were levied on the importation of foreign manufactures, "one half will be shut out, and we would make the goods ourselves; and the other half would come in, and we would get revenue from it." Without committing oneself necessarily to the accuracy of Mr. Ure's statement, it is at all events right to point out that if goods are made here, instead of abroad, we should add to our revenue by the tax-bearing capacity of the new works put up in this country. The increase in revenue would not be limited to the yield of the new import duties.

Mr. Lloyd George made a "non-party" speech in London some time ago. It will be remembered as the speech in which

he denounced golf and motoring, before motoring down to play golf. He told us that the presence of a vast mass of remediable poverty is common ground to both parties, and contrasted as remedies Tariff Reform with "the other side of the picture, Form IV." We have now had some years' experience of his alternative to Tariff Reform, the wonderful new Land Taxes, and we still get from him harrowing descriptions of the condition of the working classes. These accounts are an admission that his remedy, "The People's Budget," has failed; and we are now told that the Government, despairing of their old proposals, have got to find a new policy with which to get votes; or, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer more picturesquely puts it, he is going to "gild the mountain tops" with hope.

The Government have recently committed themselves to the principle of the minimum wage, thus admitting that in their opinion Free Trade has failed to provide the workers with adequate pay, and seeking the remedy in a highly protectionist expedient. In this year of so-called prosperity the *Daily News* admits that "the reward of labour has not increased with the advancing cost of living." So that the "real wages" of the working classes have diminished. With regard to prices it is interesting to notice that, after studying the problem, the Government consider that the best security for obtaining cheap and abundant quantities of cotton is to grow additional supplies, not anywhere, but within the British Empire. With this object in view they are endeavouring to develop agriculture in East Africa, by lightening the burdens of finance. There seems to be no reason why this principle should not be as sound in these islands as in Africa. We already have in the case of sugar a small working model of Tariff Reform, showing the effect of such a policy on the double problem of "real wages," which is a question both of wages and of the price of commodities. At present there is a duty of 1s. 10d. a hundredweight on sugar imported into this country, but there is no excise duty levied on sugar produced here; as a result a thing has occurred which is causing horror in the Cobden Club—a new industry is springing up. So serious is the situation that the Radical press has offered a dignified protest. The *Manchester Guardian* says that "it is highly objectionable in principle to permit the beet sugar industry to establish itself in England

after such treatment Mr. Harcourt boasts that they did not bring it forward. Were they likely to do so with a Liberal Government in power here? Mr. Harcourt would have acted more fairly to his audience if he had told them that at the very time when, according to his suggestion, the Dominions were not asking for Preference, Sir Wilfred Laurier, speaking of the people of Canada and of this country, said at the National Liberal Club: "They wanted to sell to them in preference to other nations, and they wanted to buy from them in preference to other nations."

A change has just been made in the Tariff of the United States. The *Daily Chronicle* tells us that the new duties average about 26 per cent. on the articles protected, a rate more than twice as high as the Tariff Reform proposals for this country. The *Daily Chronicle* announces the introduction of the new Tariff as "Free Trade Day in the United States." Evidently "Free Trade Day" in America is a near relation of the Insurance Act "Joy Day" in England. Inspired by this event our opponents have been passing resolutions welcoming the coming conversion of the United States to Free Trade. This is an insult to the intelligence of the League of Little Liberals. What are the facts? The Liberal Party has been steadily expecting the conversion of other nations to Free Trade for about sixty years. One party in the United States is in favour of a high Tariff, the other is in favour of a low Tariff, and their leader President Wilson, speaking of his party, says that "no thoughtful Democrat advocates Free Trade for the United States." In these circumstances the celebrations of the Liberal Party of the coming conversion of the United States to Free Trade are likely to enjoy a permanence which is so often lacking in human happiness.

Nor do we find different results elsewhere. When the present Government instituted an enquiry into the resources of the British Empire, one subject, the Fiscal question, was barred. But apparently the editing of the report was not sufficiently strict, for the Commissioners report that—"Throughout Australasia we were impressed by the desire of all classes to deal with the British Empire rather than with foreign nations. Not only is a preference given in matters of Tariff, but there is a clear and distinct preference on grounds of sentiment and of practice."

A change in our fiscal system would enable us to make a

valuable addition to our sources of revenue, it would enable us to reduce the burdens on agriculture, and it would encourage production in these islands, by putting our working classes, for the first time for nearly two generations, on even terms with their competitors in other countries. When we find even a Radical Government developing, by State aid, cotton-growing in East Africa, we feel that they must some day realise that Social Reform and Imperialism are, as Mr. Chamberlain foresaw, not antagonistic but mutually dependent. To develop cotton-growing within the Empire is to build reform at home on firmer foundations. Social Reform and Imperialism should go forward hand in hand. The time has come when we should co-operate with the Dominions in the deliberate, organised development of the great territories of the Crown.

G. C. Tryon

THE ECLIPSE OF ANANIAS

> A lie should be trampled on and extinguished wherever found. I am for fumigating the atmosphere when I suspect that falsehood, like pestilence, breathes around me.—CARLYLE.

IT was said of George Washington that he never told a lie and it can be said of Mr. Lloyd George that he rarely tells the truth. Other politicians in the past have made mistakes in their figures and facts though never with the glorious consistency of Mr. Lloyd George, whose every deliverance is followed by a rich crop of corrections and denials. But when their errors have been pointed out they have usually been willing to withdraw and apologise. The peculiar distinction of Mr. Lloyd George is that he never admits he is in the wrong. Detected in glaring mistakes, vulgar falsehoods or contemptible slanders, he does not confess his fault and make what atonement is in his power. He simply repeats his offence and launches forth upon fresh vituperation of his victims and of those who have put him to shame.

This is "the new style" which Mr. Lloyd George has imported from his provincial chapel into the politics of a great nation. As the cuttle fish conceals itself by abundant discharges of sepia, so does Mr. Lloyd George protect himself by blackening his opponents with abuse. True or not matters nothing to him. Mr. Pecksniff perpetrated his worst misdeeds under the cover of sanctimonious professions. So Mr. Lloyd George when he flings the meanest accusations poses as a saint and makes abundant parade of his own virtues. He has compared himself, or he has been compared by his faithful retainers, to the good Samaritan, St. Paul, Daniel, Moses, Samson, and St. Sebastian—whence it may be seen that he and his friends add a capacity for blasphemy and bad taste to their other democratic endowments. Perhaps this cant is what renders his conduct so specially repulsive to the

sober English mind. If he did not always affect the noblest and most disinterested motives, people might not so often detect the note of humbug and hypocrisy behind the ravings of his Limehouse and Mile End and Swindon and Glasgow tirades. Even saints should sometimes tell the truth. For as he put it himself last year in one of his stained-glass window addresses to the Sunday-school children at Llangammarch Wells: "If anything is worth quoting at all, it is worth quoting correctly. Let it be one of your mottoes in life not to be slipshod in anything but to cultivate exactness in detail." The purpose of this article is to ascertain how far Mr. Lloyd George has been faithful to his own device—"cultivate exactness."

As a young man, if we may judge by his enthusiastic biographer, Mr. Du Parcq, he was not remarkable for any extravagant devotion to exactness. This story is told in the modern Plutarch of a speech delivered to a chapel audience by a Welsh deacon, introducing Mr. Lloyd George: "In my opinion, gentlemen, that Bishop of St. Asaph's is one of the biggest liars in creashon; but, thank God, yes, thank God, we haff a match for him to-night." Nobly has Mr. Lloyd George since sustained the worthy deacon's eulogy. The venom and malice of his attack on the Clergy Discipline Bill drew down upon him the rebuke of his own leader, Mr. Gladstone. In the Agricultural Rates Bill his eye discerned only a device to put £2,250,000 into the pockets of Unionist Ministers, a cruel and baseless charge. The Boer War, he pretended, was waged by Mr. Chamberlain in order to derive personal profit as a shareholder in Messrs. Kynoch's, who happened to have manufactured some small part of the explosives employed—and this though Mr. Chamberlain long before the war had sold his Kynoch shares at a loss. He accused the British Government in this war of murdering women and children in the concentration camps when General Botha declared at the Vereeniging Conference, "we are only too thankful to know that our wives are under English protection." In Chinese indentured labour, he professed to see conditions "tantamount to slavery"; the Chinamen, he said, were "kept like dogs in a kennel" and "treated as very few men treat their beasts." He frightened his constituents with horrible pictures of "slavery on the hills of Wales." And yet when a general election had been

won by this audacious falsehood, Mr. Churchill calmly announced that the conditions of Chinese labour "do not in my opinion constitute a state of slavery"; to speak of them thus was to be guilty of "terminological inexactitude." This was not to be the last occasion on which Mr. Lloyd George was "given away" by a colleague.

With the famous Budget of 1909, he embarked upon a campaign of slander and mendacious promises which surpassed his previous efforts in that direction. The land taxes, his peculiar specific and invention, were to pay for "old age pensions and Dreadnoughts" and provide "rare and refreshing fruit" for all. They were to bring in an ample and increasing revenue, expanding year by year. They would stimulate building, lower rents, and produce universal happiness and prosperity. What has actually happened is worth noting in view of his present land campaign, which is also to create a new heaven and earth. The land value duties have yielded up to date £223,000 at a cost of £1,356,000 for valuation to the taxpayer, and an extra estimated cost to the landowner of £300,000 or more in legal advice. The country has thus been out of pocket to an extent of over £1,400,000. As for the effect on the building trade, for the six years from 1904 to 1909 the average annual increase in the number of small houses was 89,000. In the first year after the Budget it fell to 10,651. Even Mr. Lloyd George now admits that a "cottage famine" exists. Such was the result of trusting to the promises of this charlatan.

To carry his Budget, he strove to excite popular passion against his political opponents and to set class against class. His method was of primitive simplicity. He took extreme cases in order to prove the existence of abuses, and pretended that these extreme cases represented the average. He asserted in the House of Commons last month that he had to give "illustrations in order to establish the case." He did not add that this method of argument would have proved nothing even if the facts had been always correct and fairly selected. For a single instance or a couple of instances do not establish a law. Actually his facts were either wholly wrong or so misstated as to produce an entirely false impression. He fought with poisoned weapons, like a disloyal duellist.

Thus in the first and most famous of his attacks upon the landlord—the Limehouse speech of 1909—he produced a whole string of "horrible atrocities" which as he alleged had been perpetrated by that class. In not one of these examples, which he cited as "fair samples," did his statements support close examination. He charged one landowner with selling land, which appeared on the rate book at the value of only £4, for £2000 an acre for housing at Richmond. The actual sum received by the landlord was shown to be £755 an acre, about one-third the amount which he had named. He alleged that a second landlord at Llandudno had demanded £2500 an acre for a piece of land contributing only 2s. a year to the rates, for the purpose of building a police station. It immediately appeared that the landlord in question had previously given a site for a police station, which had risen so much in value that its sale would have more than paid the cost of the new site to which the station was to be moved. In a third case he accused a landlord of extorting £27,225 for a piece of land at Greenock, required by the Admiralty for a torpedo range, though the rateable value of this land was only £11 2s. It was shown that this piece of land was part of an area kept clear of buildings by the landlord for the purpose of providing the people of Greenock with a space for recreation, and that an advantageous offer for it from a manufacturing firm had already been refused.

His fourth case was the famous Gorringe affair. He alleged that Mr. Gorringe had "got a lease of premises on a few hundred a year ground rent" from the Duke of Westminster, and built up a great business, and that then, when the lease fell in, Mr. Gorringe was compelled by the cruel Duke to pay a ground rent of £4000 a year, with in addition, a fine of £50,000 and an expenditure of £50,000 on rebuilding the premises according to the Duke's plans. "A case like this," he declared amidst resounding cheers, "is not business, it is blackmail." The facts were that the ground rent previously had been, not "a few hundreds," but £3665; and that far from regarding himself as "blackmailed" or plundered, Mr. Gorringe viewed the deal as a fine stroke of business and in the prospectus which was issued when the concern was floated as a limited company, valued it as an asset worth £15,000 and claimed that "the rebuilding of the premises will

give a largely increased floor space which should produce a considerable increase in profits." Mr. Lloyd George has since run away from his own words. As Mr. F. E. Smith reminded the House of Commons in his witty speech during the Lloyd George debate, last month, he has altered his phrase, "this is not business, it is blackmail" in a revised version of his speech to "this system—it is the system I am attacking—is not business it is blackmail."

The worst of such forced retreats is that they create fresh difficulty for the slanderer. For if this system is "*blackmail*," then Mr. Lloyd George, as a member of a Government which practises it in its treatment of Crown tenants, is a blackmailer. Thus recently the Crown tenant of St. John's Lodge, Regent's Park, paying a ground rent of £233, was required to surrender 3¼ acres to the public and was then made to pay a new rent of £1270 and a fine, in addition, of £14,200. A lady in Piccadilly had her ground rent raised by the Crown from £123 to £950 and had a fine of £6600 imposed as well, all for a short lease of twenty years. Clearly Mr. Lloyd George and the Government set landowners a very bad example and have no right whatever to denounce them. But then as Sir Edward Grey was unkind enough to say—giving Mr. Lloyd George away—"I see no occasion either for praising or blaming this (Gorringe) transaction or regarding it as anything but an ordinary business transaction. . . . I do not see what else he (the Duke of Westminster) could do."

Another of his "fair samples" was produced at Carnarvon in 1909—the episode of the "very fine old castle and the tailor's shop." There was, he said, in Cardiff this castle owned by the Marquess of Bute "with 100 acres of invaluable land," rated only at £904. "Next door to this castle is a tailor's shop. It is 47 feet by 90 feet—that is a little over 400 square yards; the castle and its grounds 500,000 square yards—the tailor's shop is rated at £947." Horrible! and the tale was received with cries of "shame" and "robbers." Of course, it proved that Mr. Lloyd George was romancing. The only shop which could fairly be described as next door to the Castle was a large outfitting establishment rated at £262 10s. When this awkward fact was pointed out, it appeared that Mr. Lloyd George had really "had in mind"

a shop which "is not literally next door to Cardiff Castle" but 360 yards away. Even then his statement was grossly inaccurate, as this establishment was shown to cover 992 square yards. It was one of the largest and best businesses in South Wales, and was afterwards floated with a capital of £100,000. Mr. Lloyd George suppressed the fact that Cardiff Castle is an ancient monument, maintained rather for the good of the city than for the advantage of Lord Bute—who in any case contributed £33,000 a year to the rates, as the owner of Bute Docks, and who has also given and maintained two large public recreation grounds. But any slander is good enough to fling at a lord and a landlord.

He was yet more unfortunate in a case which he adduced at Mile End in 1910 to contrast the treatment of the peers who robbed the church in the past with that of humble criminals who did the same to-day. For the person upon whom he fastened to prove his point was no other than the "poor old shepherd of Dartmoor." "My friend, the Home Secretary and I," he cried in tearful accents, "the other day paid a visit to Dartmoor. On that bleak mist-sodden upland I saw an old man in convict garb who had been sentenced to thirteen years penal servitune because, under the influence of drink, he had broken into a church poor-box and stolen 2s." The public scented fun and it was speedily forthcoming in abundance. It presently appeared that the "poor old shepherd" was a habitual criminal, who had spent thirty-three years in prison and whose speciality was the peculiarly mean offence of robbing churches. If he took only 2s. from the poor box, it was because there was no more to take. Moreover he had not been sentenced to "thirteen years penal servitude"; that was an utter falsehood. His sentence was one of three years' imprisonment and ten years' "preventive detention" under a law passed by the excellent Home Secretary, and specially framed for such cases. The two demagogues, however, tried to "bluff" the business out. They set the "poor old man" free and sent him off to a farm where he promised to remain six months, on January 6, 1911. On January 11 he was missing, and he did not reappear till the singularly inopportune date of April 1, when he broke into Moreton Hall, and helped himself to four bottles of whisky. After this fall from grace

we cannot find that Mr. Lloyd George troubled himself further about his friend.

Bitter experience of the Insurance Act has shown what faith could be placed in Mr. Lloyd George's wild statements during the Insurance campaign. He himself has said that "to deceive the poor is the meanest device of all," and when the promises of his Whitefield's Tabernacle speech are contrasted with the miserable performance of his measure, he stands convicted of this "meanest device." The "first-class hotels" which he promised to consumptives have failed to materialise. The Fabian Report, which is certainly not unduly hostile to a Socialist Chancellor of the Exchequer, declares that "the vast majority" of the 50,000 persons insured who are suffereing from tuberculosis, "remain under the treatment of their panel doctor, living as best they can." No sanatoria for them! The "minimum benefits" on which he dilated, are now in peril in the women's societies. And as an example of his accuracy in financial forecasts, he estimated that the cost of administering the Act in 1912-13 would be £1,742,000, whereas the amount actually spent has been £3,690,000—more than double.

Was this politician, who furiously denounces landlords for obtaining "unearned increment," careful in his own case to avoid that sin, and ready to disclose the truth regarding his own dubious transactions? His words in the House of Commons, in the Marconi debate of October 11, 1912, rise up against him: "I want to know what these rumours (of Marconi dealings by Ministers) are . . . The reason why the Government wanted a frank discussion before going to Committee was because we wanted to bring here these rumours—these sinister rumours—that have been passed from one foul lip to another behind the backs of the House." No one would have supposed from this speech that Mr. Lloyd George had made £700 of "unearned increment," in a few hours by speculating in American Marconi shares, through no effort of his own. On the contrary, his words were universally taken to mean that he had had no dealings of any kind in any Marconi shares, and when the facts were dragged out piecemeal, bit by bit, months later, a tremendous shock was given to the country and his reputation was shattered for ever. Yet he showed no sign of shame. After the House of Commons

had let him off very lightly for his prevarications and suppression of truth, he proceeded to the National Liberal Club and posed as a Christian martyr and a man cruelly calumniated. "For months and months through the dark, dreary winter," he moaned, "we had to sit silent when calumny was being hurled from every quarter at our heads." Yes, he had sat silent in the House of Commons, when he ought to have confessed his offence. He had also omitted to notify the facts and ask to be examined upon them by the faithful Liberal majority on the Marconi Committee, when a mere hint would have sufficed. His mental tortures were as truly self-inflicted as the sufferings of the female lunatics who go on hunger-strike. His real misfortune was that he had been found out.

Nevertheless, he assured the public, out of all this there was to come "something that will sweeten the lives of millions who hitherto have tasted nothing but the bitterness and dust of the world." It presently became evident that the "something" was a plan for "catching votes"—as a brother Liberal Mr. Wedgwood tartly described it—and keeping Mr. Lloyd George himself in the enjoyment of the "rare and refreshing" sweets of office, despite his battered reputation and the rising storm in Ulster. It was, in fact, that great "land campaign" which is now collapsing amid general ridicule and ignominy as the result of its author's absurd misstatements and mistakes. Every one, as Mr. F. E. Smith has remarked, thinks the Chancellor of the Exchequer fair game, and tries to "pull his leg," which, indeed, is not hard as he greedily swallows any silly tale that he is told. At Bedford, instead of moving the nation to wrath he set it rocking with laughter by his now historic discovery of the affection of pheasants for mangolds, which the *Daily Express* has since so deliciously caricatured. "Here," he said in horrified tones, "is one farmer who was sowing his crop—it was a field of mangolds. The man assured me that there was not one mangold out of a dozen which was not pecked and destroyed by pheasants. . . . Where you should have got 35 tons, here you could not have more than 10 tons." Sportsmen and farmers split their sides in merriment at this anecdote, and Mr. Lloyd George grew so uncomfortable that the whole passage has been expunged from the *Daily News* collection of his orations.

The pecked mangold myth, by showing exactly how much Mr. Lloyd George knew of his subject, may be said to have smothered the land campaign in contempt. Yet this was only one among a multitude of fictions perpetrated at Bedford. He declared that "up to the present almost every housing scheme has been crippled by the extravagant price paid for land," when his own colleague, Mr. Burns, had stated truly that, if the land were given free for cottages, it would only "make a difference of a halfpenny per week in the rent," and when his own follower, Mr. Chiozza Money, had demonstrated by a fearsome array of figures that land is amazingly cheap, and not dear in this country. He alleged that whereas rents amounted to 34 millions, the wages of the agricultural labourer were only 25 millions. The actual facts are that the net rent of agricultural land in England is £24,500,000 according to the local taxation returns, while the wages paid by farmers are shown by the Board of Trade investigations to have amounted in 1907 to £42,800,000. Again, he pointed to the prosperity of agriculture in Denmark, Holland, and Belgium, adding "they have no Protection," as a retort to Tariff Reformers, only to discover that there are protective duties in Denmark on butter, cheese, salted meat, and hops; in Holland on cheese, fresh meat, and bacon, and in Belgium on butter, cheese, fresh and salted meat, cattle and flour. He stated that "the price of the land is prohibitive" in England—though for auction sales of areas of 30 acres and upwards held in London in 1911, it was only £24 4s. an acre, against an average for agricultural land of £37 and upwards in Denmark, £33 and upwards in North Holland, and £60 in Belgium. He pretended that farmers were evicted on political grounds by the landlord—a fable which he is constantly repeating—when only three cases have been unearthed by his own party in modern times, and when the Gladstone League, which exists for the special purpose of ferreting out such instances, has not been able to discover a single instance in the last decade.

But the climax was reached with the great deer forest myth—the fable that Scotland was devastated by merciless landlords to provide themselves with sport. It began in this wise at Bedford: "Millions of acres which formerly maintained the sturdiest, bravest, most gallant race under the sun—a desert.

If you will go to the north of Scotland you will find still the remains of the old crofts, but the crofters are not there. The land is trodden by deer." An earlier version at Limehouse declared that "scores of thousands of industrious, hard-working, thrifty, happy crofting farmers" had all been swept away by "landlordism, purely in order to provide a few weeks' pleasure for a few rich plutocrats." Now the facts were these: The Highland clearances were not made for deer but for sheep, and they were made, not out of pure wanton wickedness by the landlords, but because the kelp industry on which the crofters mainly subsisted had died out and the people were starving. In the second place the Royal Commission on this subject, appointed by Mr. Gladstone, reported that no single case of an eviction to create deer forests had been proved, and that deer forests employed as much permanent and more temporary labour than sheep farms. In the third place that Commission scheduled only 317,000 acres of deer forest land as available for crofts or common pastures, clearly stating that this land was not fit for new holdings and that in the whole 3,000,000 acres of deer forest there were only 2000 acres of "old arable" land.

Though his misrepresentations were pointed out, he returned to the charge at Swindon in October, declaring that "hundreds of thousands of acres"—(actually only 2000)—had been "put out of cultivation" for game, "especially in the Highlands of Scotland." He said not one word of the extraordinary clearance of a rich part of Surrey "for game," by Lord Pirrie, possibly because Lord Pirrie happens to be a Radical Peer. He asserted once more that a Highland deer forest is "a place where formerly thousands of people found a living by cultivating the soil." He gave details of the "devastation." The houses were pulled down and burnt. He told of a steamer "coasting round the shores of Sutherland. . . . The smoke was so thick coming from the burning crofts that the steersman could not see his way. . . . Mr. McPherson tells me there are 3,000,000 acres of deer forests in Scotland, and tens of thousands of people are turned out of their homes in order to get sport." He painted pictures of the glorious times when the deer forests would be reclaimed by the efforts of his Government, and used "for the people of the country" in growing food.

This was a gorgeous opening, and it was promptly taken.

Mr. Rowland Prothero suggested that the Duke of Sutherland would be only too delighted to sell Mr. Lloyd George as much deer forest as he could buy at a purely nominal price—£2 was mentioned—to try the great experiment of growing corn on wild and desolate mountain uplands, where even the deer die if they are not supplied with food by man's aid. The Duke of Sutherland nobly responded and made Mr. Lloyd George two distinct offers of land in his Sutherland deer forests, one at 22s. 6d. an acre and the other at 25s. for about 400,000 acres in all. Now, if Mr. Lloyd George had told the truth, if this area had been really capable of growing corn and maintaining in happiness and comfort "thousands of people," here was an absolutely magnificent bargain—land which after purchase by the State could be profitably let for 1s. an acre. Only if his words were entirely false, could it be professed that the virtual gift of this land was worthless. Yet astonishing to relate, Mr. Lloyd George did not jump at the offer. Instead he argued that the land was valueless—"rocks, not land" as he said at Oxford. So that he stood convicted out of his own mouth of attempting to delude the Swindon and Bedford audiences. If Sutherland was a barren desert, then there could have been no "devastation" or any wrong done to any man. If Sutherland was not a barren desert, then his refusal of the bargain was incomprehensible.

In his discomfiture he tried as many tricks as any eel fairly caught on the hook. He asserted that these precious lands had lost their value because they had been devastated and had gone out of cultivation. He was at once reminded of the awkward fact, which has already been stated in this article that in the whole 3,000,000 acres of Scottish deer forests there had been only 2000 acres of old arable. Even if all this were situated in the Duke of Sutherland's Sutharlandshire estates there must have been 398,000 acres in the area offered which had never been allowed to go out of cultivation, for the simple reason that it had never been cultivated. That way there was no retreat for Mr. Lloyd George. So he fell back on abuse, contending that the Duke was asking £479,000 for 400,000 acres when his trustees had valued his whole Scottish estates of 1,700,000 acres at only £400,000 for death duties. Thus Mr. Lloyd George made use of a confidential and private return for public and political con-

troversy—a gross breach of confidence. But even so, with his habitual incapacity for getting his facts right, he had gone lamentably wrong. He was only 777,000 acres out in his estimate of the Duke's total estate, and, as for the valuation of £400,000, that was purely formal and was so understood by the revenue authorities, while it was a net figure and did not include the mortgages on the estate. These would have to be taken into account in computing the value for a sale.

By the date of his Glasgow speech, however, on February 4, Mr. Lloyd George had determined upon brazening the matter out, and in that speech he left his audience to decide whether the Duke had attempted to swindle the Treasury by selling it "the lean, scraggy end of the whole of the huge joint he has got there," or whether his trustees had committed perjury. Yet there was just a trace of some weakening on his part: "I stated the fact," he said, "that some of these depopulated glens at one time maintained a sturdy population and might yet be made productive. I have been attacked as if I suggested that corn could be grown on the hilltops." The only comment on this fresh mendacity is that Mr. Lloyd George, as the published reports of his earlier speeches show, did not thus limit his charges against the Scottish landlords. He spoke of "millions of acres" not of a few "depopulated glens," of "scores of thousands" of crofters dislodged, not of a few hundreds who were all that the "glens" could have supported. He now added an additional reckless accusation against the Duke's ancestors alleging that between 1811 and 1820 15,000 inhabitants of Sutherland had been ejected from their "snug farms." It was only one absurdity the more. He was promptly asked how he could explain the census returns which showed that in 1811 the population of that county had stood at 23,629 and had risen—notwithstanding the mythical removal of 15,000 souls—to 23,840 in 1821. Up to date he has not attempted to solve this puzzle.

Glasgow was, however, his greatest effort in fiction. He had yet another tale of a Duke of Sutherland who had claimed £10,000 compensation in 1748 when the Government took away from the Highland chiefs their right to hang their subjects, and had only been awarded £1000. Again, every single fact was wrong. There was no Duke of Sutherland in 1748; the title was not

created till 1833. No ancestor of the present Duke then held land in Sutherland. Mr. Lloyd George had muddled up the Duke of Argyll with the Duke of Sutherland, yet that was not the full extent of his blunder. For the Duke of Argyll had been awarded not £1000 but £20,000.

Our extraordinarily ignorant and mendacious Chancellor of the Exchequer can never get his facts right when he is dealing with a Duke. He fell foul at Glasgow of the Duke of Montrose, accusing him of asking £26,000 for 380 acres of land, required by the Corporation of Glasgow for waterworks, which, he said was rated at only 6d. an acre He declared that the Duke had ultimately obtained only £19,000, which was "2000 years' purchase." Again not a point or figure was right. The Duke's agent had not asked £26,000 but £19,300, and the Duke himself was absent in South Africa. The sum awarded on arbitration was £19,090. The rateable value of 6d. an acre was a pure fantasy of Mr. Lloyd George's, and accepting the value placed upon the land by the Corporation valuer who certainly was not guilty of overstatement, the price was not 2000 years but only 112 years' purchase. When this was pointed out Mr. Lloyd George did not climb down but made a fresh and utterly irrevelant attack on the Duke.

Yet another of his "illustrations" in the speech was that of the Cathcart School Board purchase. It followed immediately upon the attack on the Duke of Montrose and was so worded that everybody construed it as a further indictment of the Duke. The *Star*, which was simple enough to trust to the word of its dear leader, indeed had to apologise hurriedly for so treating it. In this instance Mr. Lloyd George professed that a plot of "less than 1½ acres" had been sold to the School Board for £3270 by the extortionate landlord. The truth was that the area was not "less than 1½ acres" but more than 2¼, and the sum received by the landlord was not £3270 but only £2670, allowing for costs. Mr. Lloyd George neither apologised to the Duke of Montrose nor to the owner, Sir John Stirling Maxwell, but, like an ill-tempered dog, snarled under his castigation.

One last instance and this anthology of his mendacities and mistakes shall conclude. At Holloway in November last year, in an attempt to show that the ownership of land is a monopoly,

he gave this "fair sample" from St. Pancras: "The annual value of St. Pancras is something like £2,500,000. Within a generation from now almost the whole of that will pass into the hands of as many landlords as I have got fingers." Mr. Lloyd George has only ten fingers. Now the number of separate freehold estates in St. Pancras is 1500, and the six largest owners are public bodies and railway companies—the latter representing hundreds of thousands of shareholders. The net rateable value of St. Pancras is £1,750,000 of which £350,000 is attributable to these public bodies. Both Mr Lloyd George's "fair samples" are frauds. He added that in St. Pancras the "owners of the soil" did not "contribute one penny" towards making the roads—a most impudent falsehood, since he knew that the cost of making the roads always falls on the landowners.

In his own words, "there has never been such a case since the days of Ananias and Sapphira." But what can we expect of the politician who forces on this country the cruel Bill, disestablishing the Church in Wales and depriving its poverty-stricken clergy of one-third of their pitiful incomes—he a Minister drawing £5000 a year, with investments yielding £400 a year, to say nothing of the proceeds of his Stock Exchange speculations—and is yet hypocrite enough to come forward and tell his fellow Baptists that "to half starve married Ministers is treason to Protestant religion." Not a statement of his should be accepted, except upon affidavit, and even then it should be handled with tongs. *Mentiris impudentissime*—for the first time in history that stinging phrase which should cut a man of honour like a whip-lash, can be addressed with justice to a British Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that British Chancellor of the Exchequer does not care!

A SIMPLE TORY

THE ART OF BIOGRAPHY

The title of my Paper * is a challenge not I hope to the better opinion, but certainly to accepted practice. From time to time, indeed, voices are raised to describe the difficulties which confront a biographer and to enumerate the qualifications required in a successful practitioner of the art. Such lists are so formidable that if they were believed, the wonder would be that any biographies should ever be written. But they are not believed. There is a larger output in biography than in any other classes of books, except those of Theology and Fiction, under which latter head it has sometimes been suggested that Biography—and History also—should be included. You remember what "Mr. Sludge the Medium" said :

> Such a scribe
> You pay and praise for putting life in stones,
> Fire into fog, making the past your world.
> There's plenty of "How did you contrive to grasp
> The thread which led you through this labyrinth ?
> How build such solid fabric out of air ?
> How on so slight foundation found this tale,
> Biography, narrative ?" Or, in other words,
> "How many lies did it require to make
> The portly truth you here present us with ?"

The fault in some modern biography is not, however, that it is fanciful, but that it is artless. It is the fashion in these days to write a man's life immediately after he is dead, when authentic documents are numerous and personal recollections still fresh. The difficult thing is to make the documents tell a coherent story and to fuse the varied recollections into a living impression. The difficulty is sometimes not recognised, and in other cases is deliberately avoided. It is thought that personal

* Read to the New College Essay Society at Oxford, March 7, 1914.

acquaintance with the subject is a sufficient qualification. Or, on the other hand, the task is put as it were into commission; different friends are invited to contribute their recollections, and no attempt is made to weld them into a whole. A picture to which one brush contributed the eye, another the mouth, and so on, would only by a miracle present an intelligible likeness. There is indeed a certain interest in the composite biographies which present impressions of the subject from a succession of different angles. It is the same kind of interest that belongs to "The Ring and the Book"; but Edward Fitzgerald thought that even Browning had failed to work the book into a ring, and that the poem remained "a shapeless thing." Lord Tennyson's Life of his father, admirable in some respects, is from this point of view rather material for a biography than itself a finished work of art.

A very high authority is responsible for opinions which might lead to the conclusion that biography is not a conscious art at all, but that anybody or everybody is competent, with luck, to write a good life of somebody else. The book which by common consent is the greatest biography in the English language was written, said Lord Macaulay, by "one of the smallest men," "of the meanest and feeblest intellect," that ever lived. Many of the greatest men that ever lived have written biography, he added, but a dunce and a fool has beaten them all. Macaulay's critical authority once reigned paramount, and his judgment on the Boswell of Johnson's Life dies hard. The Professor of English Literature in this University has, I am aware, pronounced Boswell to be a man of genius; adding that "the idle paradox which presents him in the likeness of a lucky dunce was never tenable by serious criticism, and has long since been rejected by all who bring thought to bear on the problems of literature." This, I hope you will agree, is the better opinion; but I am not sure that it prevails quite so fully among serious critics as Professor Raleigh's words suggest. Another Professor of English Literature—also a member of this University—has recently published some observations on the same subject; and, while he does more justice than Macaulay to Boswell's skill, he yet seems to me not quite to hit the real point. Boswell's chief virtues as a biographer are, says Sir Sidney Lee, those of "the faithful hound"

and "the parasitical temper;" his book is great because he "did much which self-respecting persons would scorn to do;" and "the salt of his biography is his literal reports of Johnson's conversations, reports in the spirit of the interviewer." I cannot agree here with Professor Lee. For one thing, as an old journalist, I must demur to the suggestion that the spirit of the interviewer is literalness. I am afraid that there are politicians and ambassadors, more perhaps in other countries than in this, who know to their cost that it is nothing of the kind; and where the medium of the interview is rightly and truthfully used, its method is never simple literalness. The ablest interviewers I have known were Mr. Stead and Edmund Garrett. The general accuracy of their interviews was seldom, if ever, impugned; but they never took a note, and did not attempt to reproduce with slavish literalness every word that was said by their subjects. I have always regarded as a masterpiece in this sort of journalism an interview, so called, between Garrett and Cecil Rhodes. I know of no statement within so short a compass—I do not think that there is any statement of whatever compass—which embodies so vividly so much of the manner, character and ideas of Mr. Rhodes as this presentation by Garrett of the substance of several conversations. It does so not because Garrett was a faithful hound or a parasite—he was neither; but because he had quick perception and was a literary artist. And so with Boswell. Call him by what contemptuous names you will, for the opportunities which he sought and used; but do not suppose that any faithful hound with like opportunities could have written Boswell's *Johnson*. The book is no doubt unique in a fortunate conjunction—of Johnson, a great man and a good, willing to talk, with Boswell at hand to draw him out, to remember, and to collect. But the unique conjunction would have failed of its actual result if Boswell had not been possessed of biographical genius. He had an instinct for what was interesting and characteristic; he knew how to arrange, select, plan and present.

The point can be enforced by comparing another famous biography, in which also there was a peculiarly fortunate concurrence. Every one, I imagine, would include Lockhart's *Life of Scott* among the six best biographies in the English language, and some good judges have placed it second to Boswell's *Johnson*.

Scott was almost as good a biographical subject as Johnson, and Lockhart had intimate knowledge of his father-in-law. Nevertheless Lockhart's book is not so good a biography as Boswell's. On the one hand, Lockhart's *Scott* is often spun out with letters and diaries of other people which add very little to our knowledge of Scott himself. On the other hand, those who have delved deep sometimes complain that Lockhart misses many things which he must have known or could easily have found out, and which lovers of Scott would dearly like to know. Ruskin, one of whose many abandoned literary projects was a Life of Sir Walter, goes so far as to say that "Lockhart is always inconceivably silent about the little things one most wants to know." But what is all this except to say that Lockhart was not so fine an artist in biography as Macaulay's dunce?

Biography, then, is an art. What are its conditions and laws? The rule which is most commonly and most strongly laid down by those who discourse on the subject is Brevity; and doubtless many biographies, perhaps most, are too long. But there are some awkward facts which the preachers of biographical brevity have to face. One is that two of the best biographies in the English language are also two of the longest. Sir Sidney Lee, as is natural in an editor, has laid great stress on brevity; but I have noticed that many—I am not sure that I might not say all—of the very longest articles in the *Dictionary of National Biography* are from the pen of the professor of brevity. And nobody, I am sure, who has read those articles has ever wished that they had been shorter. Professor Lee's biographies are models of condensation. If they are longer than others, it is because their subject-matter was of more importance. In a recent review of a somewhat long biography, the author was asked with some asperity why he had not modelled his work on Tacitus and Plutarch. To require of an ordinary practitioner genius such as theirs seems to be rating the art of biography a little high; nor is the collocation of the two names particularly happy, for the method and scope of Tacitus and Plutarch severally are as different as is their style; but the reviewer's remark suggests some observations. Tacitus, the supreme master of biting brevity, was short in his biographies because he was writing not biography but history. Plutarch's *Lives*, though by one standard of comparison short

are by another long. He wrote not so much individual biography, as collective; and if his scale be compared with a collection such as the *National Dictionary*, it will be found that Plutarch's *Lives* are long.

Length or shortness in biography must obviously be relative, not only to the importance of the subject and the quantity of appropriate material, but also to the design of the book as a work of art. In the kindred art of graphic representation there may be sketches and finished portraits, and among the latter whole-lengths, half-lengths and heads. An intelligent critic does not say that the sketch of a head in half a dozen lines by Phil May is bad because it is not wrought with the minuteness of a portrait-piece by Holbein; nor is a play in five acts by Shakespeare declared too long because Browning gave a life's drama in the fifty-six lines of "My Last Duchess." Southey's *Life of Nelson*—that "immortal monument raised by genius to valour"—was not too short because Lockhart's *Life of Scott* was long. The question whether a sketch or a full-length is in any particular case the more appropriate biographical method depends upon another factor. Has the person's life-story been told before, are most of the relevant facts already known, or is there material available which is both new and important? In the former case, the better method is that which the French call a "study" and in which, for grace and lucidity, they are unsurpassed. Brevity is therein the wise counsel. Yet the pursuit of brevity by those who might have told us more about great and interesting people has involved us in much loss. "Many other things I could now say of him," wrote Anthony à Wood in closing his too short account of a famous Oxonian, "relating either to his most generous mind in prosperity, or dejected estate in his worst state of poverty, but for brevity's sake I shall now pass them by." Much that we would gladly know about Richard Lovelace is therefore lost to us. Let us be thankful that no evil genius was at Boswell's elbow to persuade him for brevity's sake to cut down his anecdotes of Dr. Johnson.

The proper criterion to apply to products of the art of biography is concerned not with size but with Relevance. The pages in a biography may be rightly many and rightly few. The book is condemned unless they are relevant; just as in the case of a

picture detail can only be right if it is pertinent. But relevant to what? In considering this question we shall come nearest, I think, to the essential conditions of the art; and the words with which the Father of Biography prefaces one of his most famous *Lives* will carry us far on the way to the heart of the matter. "We shall now proceed," says Plutarch, "to give the lives of Alexander the Great and of Cæsar who overthrew Pompey; and, as the quantity of material is so great, we shall only premise that we hope for indulgence though we do not give the actions in full detail and with a scrupulous exactness, but rather in a short summary; since we are writing not Histories, but Lives. Nor is it always in the most distinguished achievements that men's virtues or vices may be best discerned; but very often an action of small note, a short saying, or a jest shall distinguish a person's real character more than the greatest sieges or the most important battles." How many biographies would have been better done had these words been taken to heart! Yet Plutarch's instructions may be pushed too far. "He is the greatest of biographers," says Mr. Frederic Harrison in a pleasant chapter of *Among My Books*, "because he thoroughly grasped and practised the true principle of biographic work—to make a living portrait of a man's inner nature, not to write the annals of his external acts. The conventional biography records what the person *did*; the true biography reveals what the person *was*." That is a true saying, and every biographer should bind it about his neck when setting himself to his task. Yet it is not quite the whole truth. In the case of a man of action, a Life which left out what he did would be absurd. Who would be satisfied with a Life of Gladstone which said nothing of his Budgets, his Midlothian campaign, his fight for Home Rule? You cannot show what such a man *was* except in relation to what he *did*; but the essential thing is at the same time to bring out the relation between what he did and what he was. Few, I suppose, will dispute Mr. Harrison's judgment that Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* is "the most masterly portrait ever painted with the pen—far more true, more real, and more graven on the memory of ages, than are all the laborious studies of all the annalists ancient and modern;" though Professor Freeman, I think, preferred Arrian to Plutarch. Yet Plutarch tells us a great deal about what

Alexander did. His Life is a masterpiece of biography, not because Plutarch left out actions and events, but because he made them the index of a mind and a character. To keep the man in the foreground, to make him stand out as a person from the background of event, action and circumstance: that is the essential duty of a biographical artist. It is also his greatest difficulty; and that, perhaps, is a reason (though others might be suggested) why, as has often been remarked, the best biographies are more often of men of letters than of men of action.

The biographer, then, must be relevant to individual character. He is to remember Plutarch's words; he is to write not Histories, but Lives. Often he may from the nature of his material make fresh contribution to history; and it is worth noticing in this connection that Plutarch, in another place, explains that his reason for passing lightly over much in the *Life of Nicias* is that he has nothing to add to the inimitable narrative of Thucydides. If, on the other hand, a biographer find new material at hand, he must become a historian; yet even so, if he desires to make his book a work of art, the history must be subordinated to the biography. A book which proclaims itself the *Life and Times of Somebody* is a hybrid little likely to possess artistic method as biography. The true biographer will similarly beware of *Somebody and his Circle*. His work is to be relevant to an individual. Of course a man's family and friends, and his dealings with them, are always some part, and often a large part, of his own life. Such dealings come within Plutarch's category of "things which serve to decipher the man and his nature." Who could gain a true idea of Dr. Johnson apart from his friends? But one of Boswell's many artistic merits is that the Doctor is always at the centre of the circle. A like reason is not available in the case of men who lived aloof; and thus, if Lord Rosebery's book on Chatham were to be regarded as a biography—a description, however, which it expressly disclaims—there are sketches in it which cannot be considered wholly relevant; though, to be sure, their omission would remove some of the most brilliant pieces of that admirable torso. If there be a fault in Sir George Trevelyan's *Early Life of Charles James Fox*, it is a tendency to discursiveness; though, here again, it were ungrateful to wish

anything away from what is one of the most delightful biographical studies in our language.

It is, however, in relation to the family of the subject of a biography that the rules of relevance are most often and most flagrantly disregarded. For my part I generally find the conventional first chapter on Ancestry as tiresome as—dare I say it?—the introduction to a Waverley novel. I am aware that there is a school which claims that biography should adjust itself to the newest scientific lights or theories, and trace the hero's descent in such a way as to serve the need of students of heredity and genetics. Sir Sidney Lee has, however, dealt with this claim so admirably in his *Leslie Stephen Lecture on Biography*, that I shall pass it over lightly. Except in special cases such researches into hereditary influences, even in the first degree, are often a snare to the biographer. Plutarch set the fashion, and after telling us, in the introduction to the *Life of Alexander*, aforesaid, that he is concerned only with what throws light upon a person's real character proceeds forthwith to relate Alexander's descent from Hercules and to give us particulars of his father and mother on the eve of their marriage. I leave them aside in the decent obscurity of a foreign tongue. The greatest expert in genetics would derive no light from them. The dreams and omens of ancient biographers reappear in the pages of the moderns as ancestral incidents or circumstances invested with far-fetched significance. Mr. Chesterton makes some excellent remarks in this connection at the beginning of his *Life of Browning*. There is a theory that the poet was descended from feudal barons; another, that he was of Jewish blood; a third, that there was in him a strain of the negro. We are shown how easily each of these three hypothetical descents can be made from the poet's writings to appear significant; "but," asks Mr. Chesterton, "is there in the world a biographer who could lay his hand upon his heart and say that he would not have seen as much significance in any three other nationalities?" And he proceeds in a passage of excellent chaff to show how significant it might have been if Browning's ancestors had been Frenchmen, his grandfather a Swede, or his great-aunt a Red Indian. Mr. Chesterton here hits on the head what is a very common "sin and snare of biographers." They "tend to see significance in everything; characteristic carelessness if their hero

drops his pipe, and characteristic carefulness if he picks it up again." When such characteristics are traced back to ancestors in the third and fourth degree, the thing becomes as tiresome as ridiculous. Until at least the laws of heredity are better determined, I suggest that biographers would be well advised to draw the line before they reach great-grandfathers. For the biographical relevance of grandfathers there does seem to be a case; the classic instance is that of Governor Pitt whose fiery blood descended, in Lord Rosebery's phrase, "like burning lava" to his grandson, the Earl of Chatham. As for a man's brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles and cousins, many biographies are full of them most superfluously.

Another danger of biographical irrelevance lurks in *A Life and Letters*. "It is too much the habit of modern biographers," says Ruskin, "to confuse epistolary talk with vital facts." The letters which a man writes, as also those which he receives, may indeed be relevant and vital biographical fact. They may or they may not. In the case of the letters written by him, it depends much upon his powers of expression and habits of self-revelation. In the case of letters received by him, it depends entirely upon whether they do or do not throw light on his own actions and character. These rules of the art of biography are more obvious than observed. Many biographies are packed with letters which have no closer relation to the subject of the book than that he was the recipient of them. Here is an extract from a modern biography: "The following interesting letter from Chichester Fortescue deserves to be included in these pages, if only for the remarkable prophecy of a Home Rule party in the House of Commons which it contains." *Qui s'excuse, s'accuse.* In a Life of Chichester Fortescue his prophecy in 1866 might be relevant, but the biographer was writing the Life of an altogether different person, in relation to whom the letter has no relevance whatever. Of course a biographer's temptation in this matter is great. He finds interesting things in the papers before him, and rather than pass them over, he flings relevance aside and brings them in. It is a temptation which requires some strength of artistic conscience to resist; but the resistance may find its reward. The man who writes a biography full of irrelevant good things will have them picked out by others who will fit them into

their proper places. He does but open a quarry. He who writes with strict respect for the conditions of his art may carve a statue.

Sometimes there are accidents in the making of biographies whereby letters which would have been more relevant in one place are given where they are less relevant in another. There is a curious instance in the case of two important biographies which recently appeared almost simultaneously of men who for part of their lives were in close official relations—Lord Clarendon and Lord Lyons. One of the most memorable events in the diplomatic career of Lord Clarendon was his proposal for general disarmament in 1870—a proposal which anticipated certain suggestions of our own day, and which at the time was promptly followed by the outbreak of the Franco-German War. *Absit omen!* In Sir Herbert Maxwell's *Life of Lord Clarendon* the affair receives bare mention in a few lines. In Lord Newton's *Life of Lord Lyons* it is the subject of a most interesting chapter, and many documents relating to it are published. Yet the initiative was Lord Clarendon's. He was, indeed, prompted in the first instance by the French Government; but he made the proposal his own, and pushed it *con amore*. Lord Lyons, on the other hand, was in this matter nothing but a rather unwilling and wholly sceptical intermediary. It cannot be said that the letters are irrelevant to the *Life of Lord Lyons*, but they would have been far more relevant in the *Life of Lord Clarendon*. One is tempted to wish that some biographical clearing-house or exchange could be established whereby the proper material might find its way to the proper place.

Next to relevance, in the canons of the biographer's art, come selection and arrangement. Anything that is irrelevant should be excluded, but not everything that is relevant can be included. Selection must depend primarily of course upon the determined scale; but even in a full-length, two-volume biography, wholesale rejection is necessary. It is, however, quite as easy to err by leaving out as by putting in. The portrait may be rendered incomplete, and even false, by undue reticence, as well as by inconsiderate babbling. Biographical "indiscretion" is a term commonly applied only to the latter error, but the former sometimes merits it no less. There was a striking instance in the

biographical treatment of a modern man of letters. The authorised account of his life took the form of a selection of his private letters. Singularly frank in some directions, the selection was so severely reticent in others that the editor took a subsequent occasion to correct the entirely misleading impression—obscuring some of the hero's "most characteristic traits"—which the original volumes had necessarily created. I think that the editor's second thoughts were well advised; but who can be sure that the correction will catch up the misleading picture? Every one is familiar with such phrases in a biography as "Of his domestic relations this is not the place to speak," or "There are some aspects of his life and character too sacred to be here put down." Such remarks show a misconception of what biography is, and are a confession of failure. To tell "sacred" things aright requires the nicest tact, but to leave them altogether untold is to strip the biography of the things best worth telling. It is to turn the key on the heart of the subject.

Arrangement is a difficulty no less great than selection. By the laws of human life, a biographer has, it is true, a beginning and an end to his work prescribed to him; but between the birth and the death of his subject, how great is the call upon his art for proportion, order, convenience, lucidity and all the other branches of arrangement! The infinite variety among the lives of different men, their differences in number and kind of interests, occupations and actions, require a corresponding variety in the method best adapted to each particular case. Any practitioner of the art must be accounted peculiarly fortunate and successful if he is not told, whatever method he has adopted, that he would have done better to follow another. In the case of a full and varied life, the severely chronological method, consistently applied throughout, is almost certainly the worst. It becomes worse than ever, in a biography which is mainly composed of letters, if these too are given in mere chronological order. The object of the biographer is to produce an ordered impression, not the effect of a kaleidoscope. To give within the compass of a few hundred pages a coherent account of the innumerable facts, thoughts, reasons, circumstances, which make up a human life calls far more insistently than is always recognised for architectonic art.

One condition of the biographer's art remains to be noticed, but it is so obvious that very few words about it will suffice. The biographer must be honest. He must have general sympathy with his subject, for without it he cannot hope to gain the insight which will enable him to understand and to interpret. Lewes's *Life of Goethe*, which Leslie Stephen, than whom there could be no higher authority, accounted one of the greatest of English biographies, fails, if at all, only because Lewes's "general prepossession against German style and dislike of the mystical and allegorical may disqualify him for adequate appreciation of some aspects of Goethe's genius." But a biographer's sympathy should neither be blind nor undiscriminating. I will quote words from two modern masters of the art. "No partiality, no grudge," says Lord Morley, after Cicero. "I had no choice," says Sir George Trevelyan in the second edition of his famous *Life of Macaulay*, "but to ask myself, with regard to each feature of the portrait, not whether it was attractive, but whether it was characteristic." There is danger in each extreme. The great biographies may reveal the hero's faults, but they do so frankly, and the predominant note is sympathy. A touch of ambiguity or a scratch of over-candid friendship may spoil the effect. Mr. Purcell's *Life of Manning* is to my thinking one of the best of modern biographies, but it just missed the very highest rank by leaving an uncomfortable sense of ambiguity in the writer's standpoint. What has set some readers against Froude as the biographer of Carlyle—though for my part I rank the *Life of Carlyle* among the masterpieces—is a suspicion that he bore some grudge. Charles Eliot Norton, who, however, is hardly an impartial witness, found the book "artfully malignant." The sugar-candied mood is as dangerous as the too candid. What spoils Dowden's *Life of Shelley* is a partiality passing the bounds of common sense. Of the excessive partiality of many a biography written by adoring relatives, it is needless to speak.

In discussions about art the dispute is perpetual over the relation, in sphere and importance, between subject and treatment. In painting let us agree that you may make a fine work of art out of a pumpkin or a hide; but in the art of biography there is no purse to be made out of a sow's ear. Half the battle is won when the artist has got hold of a good subject. A bad

biography can, indeed, be written on a good subject; but it is almost as difficult to make a complete failure with a good subject as to make even a passable success with a bad subject. It is not always recognised, however, wherein the goodness of a subject from the point of view of biography consists. Moral goodness is of course not in itself a sufficient recommendation. There are excellent biographies, and autobiographies, of rascals, and there are very dull books about saints. Neither is it sufficient alone that the subjects should be persons of importance in their day. The first qualifications of a good subject are that the life of the man or woman should be really memorable, that there should be a marked personality behind the actions, that the character should be distinctive and interesting. The practice of biography differs widely in its choice of subjects from these requirements of the art. It is held that Cabinet rank, or membership of the Royal Academy, or the episcopal bench and so forth, qualifies a man *ipso facto* to become the subject of a biography in two volumes. Everybody, I expect, could name a political biography—and if a dozen people were asked to do it, a dozen different books would very probably be named—from which the resulting impression was only a wonder how and why the hero attained his high place. Such a result, it may be said, is true to life, for the wonder is sometimes expressed of living Cabinet Ministers or of other persons officially stamped as great, wise and eminent. But this is an inadequate result of a work of art, and is never what the author intended. The failure arises sometimes from the simple fact that the politician, though eminent in place, was in truth a very commonplace person; and in other cases because the hero's life was too entirely political. Politics in themselves are among the most intractable forms of biographical material. The temptation to write history and not lives is, then, peculiarly strong; the difficulty of subordinating the background to the figure is great; and, moreover, the outward actions are often not an index of the man, the political medium is a distorting mirror. "Bismarck, reading a book of superior calibre, once came upon a portrait of an eminent personage whom he had known well. Such a man as is described here, he cried, never existed; and he went on in graphic strokes to paint the sitter as he had actually found him. 'It is not in diplomatic materials, but in their life of every day that

you come to know men.' "* One comes to know more of Bismarck from Busch's diary than from any collection of the Chancellor's public acts. The official lives of contemporary politicians, though rarely forming first-rate biographical material, may nevertheless afford valuable material, or foot-notes, to history, and by that standard they may perhaps fairly claim to be judged.

A second element in the goodness of biographical subject is the existence of material of self-expression clothed in attractive and intelligible language. Such material may exist in the shape of diaries, memoranda, letters, or recorded conversations. It is sometimes laid down as a general rule that a biographer should not interpose between the reader and the subject but should leave the subject to reveal himself. There is a large element of truth in this rule, but it may be stated far too absolutely. The practice of some of the best biographers conforms least to it, and only in the rarest cases will strict adherence to it produce a full, true and sufficient picture. Persons vary infinitely both in their gifts of self-expression and in their candour. Some are morbidly self-abasing; others are careful always to give themselves *le beau rôle*; others leave no key under their own hand with which to unlock their hearts. There are, as somebody has said, three forms of truth about every man; there is what he seemed to himself, to his friends, and to his enemies. The biographical artist has to seek a final impression of "the true truth" by considering and condensing all the factors. But the existence of such material as was indicated just now is an enormous help. The greatest of mankind are sometimes, however, the most lacking in the gift or habit of self-expression, and this is one reason why biographies of great men are often the least satisfying. There is an awful aloofness about such men, and the best art of biography cannot bridge the gulf:

> Thin, thin, the pleasant human noises grow,
>   And faint the city gleams;
> Rare the lone pastoral huts—marvel not thou!
> The solemn peaks but to the stars are known,
> But to the stars, and the cold lunar beams;
> Alone the sun arises, and alone
>   Spring the great streams.

* Lord Morley's *Notes on Politics and History*, p. 62.

Dr. Johnson was a great man, but he was clubbable and communicative, and so Boswell had a perfect subject. The elder Pitt screened himself from his fellows. His letters on public affairs are pompous and involved; his family letters are for the most part stilted. It is difficult to come into close touch with a man who writes to his favourite son that "all the Nine will sue for your Love" and that the College is "not yet evacuated," he supposes, "of its learned garrison." Lord Rosebery wrote some interesting pages on this topic in the preface to his fragment on Chatham, concluding, in consequence of the lack of suitable biographical material, that "the complete life of Chatham is not merely difficult to write, but impossible. It is safe, indeed, to assert that it never has been written and never can be written." He did not know that the word impossible is unknown to the learned garrison of this College. Mr. Basil Williams in his recent *Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham* has filled what had been a conspicuous and even a discreditable lacuna in English literature. He has given us a biography of one of the glories of our race and State, which is well proportioned, admirable in style, and sane in judgment. It would be interesting to know whether Lord Rosebery finds reason for withdrawing his *obiter dictum*. If he does not, it will not be from any fault on the part of the author of the new *Life of Chatham*; it will be from defect, which even he was unable to supply, in the material. The account of the statesman's speeches, triumphs, difficulties, schemes and efforts, could hardly be bettered; of the inner springs of his action, of the life of the man in undress, there is still something to seek. The great Commoner had no taste for self-revelation, and would have brooked no Boswell.

The puissant English Minister of a later age was, from one point of view, an ideal subject for a biographer's art. Mr. Gladstone was not only a great man concerned in great actions, but his character was of many-sided interest and of fascinating complexity. "Robert Browning, writer of plays," might in him have found "a subject to your hand." But from another point of view, the subject was less ideal. Mr. Gladstone was voluminously communicative in letters and in speeches—the speeches reported verbatim, not conjecturally pieced together like Chatham's. He was the greatest speaker of the age, but the speeches were oratory,

not literature, and much of their fascination disappears with the flashing eye, the resonant voice, the eloquent gesture, the eager personality of the man. And then as a writer of letters, diaries and memoranda Mr. Gladstone did not shine by any habitual concision or pungency of phrase. The biographer of Disraeli will here be at the advantage; and not less the biographer of Lord Salisbury, if I may judge by such few private letters and notes as I have seen. Lord Morley's private material for the *Life of Gladstone* was, I imagine, rather voluminous than easily tractable. And this is the reason of a judgment which I once heard passed upon the book by a friend. "Whenever Morley fills the page by direct recital or otherwise, the book is uniformly interesting; when he brings Mr. Gladstone on *in propria persona*, it sometimes tends to drag." I was too good a Gladstonian and too much absorbed in the contents to have noticed this difference when I first read the book, but I perceive what my friend meant. Mr. Gladstone as a writer was not light of hand, and this was one of many difficulties the consideration of which must enhance any craftsman's admiration for Lord Morley's great achievement.

One of Mr. Gladstone's contemporaries has more recently been the subject of a biography which also is markedly successful. John Bright was a great orator, but you cannot make a good biography merely out of speeches, even though, as in this case, they possess literary form. He was a great man, but his scope was somewhat limited. His mind was not very flexible; his interests did not cover a very wide range. Nor, except in his best speeches, was his manner of self-expression particularly attractive. I took up Mr. Trevelyan's Life of him with somewhat anxious curiosity. In Garibaldi's romantic adventures, he had the advantage of a splendid subject, which he treated with contagious gusto and with perfect art. But what would he be able to make of a subject so different, and by comparison so humdrum, as John Bright? I think that most readers have found that the book holds them from the first page to the last. Mr. Trevelyan has overcome the difficulties of the subject by due subordination of external circumstances to personality, and by impressing the force of a noble and simple character upon every chapter of the Life.

Mr. Trevelyan's books suggest another reflection on the materials in the art of biography. Unchastened hero-worship is,

as we have seen, out of place in biography; but generous sympathy is essential, and in biography, as in the novel or the drama, contrasts and foils are often useful. The hero demands a villain; and the subject for a sympathetic biography may be accounted additionally fortunate if the material aptly provides a villain of the piece. When Mr. Gladstone is the hero, the villain is ready-made to the biographer's hand in Mr. Disraeli. As soon as Disraeli's biographer reaches the point at which those two dominant personalities fill the stage with their conflict, the parts will of course be reversed. Did not Mr. Gladstone himself say, in a speech here in Oxford, which I well remember hearing as an undergraduate, that his mission in life had become "to dog the footsteps of Lord Beaconsfield"? In Mr. Trevelyan's *Life of John Bright*, where the hero is the opponent of the Crimean War and the popular tribune on behalf of Reform, the villain is Lord Palmerston, who carried through the war and in domestic affairs pursued from the Liberal side a Conservative policy. But in the books about Garibaldi the same statesman plays, among the subsidiary characters, the part of hero to Austrian and other villains. Thus in the biographer's pages "one man in his time plays many parts." I hasten to add that Mr. Trevelyan is obviously alive to the humour of the situation; and in the Life of Bright pleads the necessity of biographical art for dealing so harshly with the stalwart English gentleman who "snapped his fingers in the face of the priests and despots."

One of the ironies of the art of biography is that the lives which, from some points of view, are best worth writing are those which nobody will read and which, therefore, are seldom written. The Lives for which a loud demand creates a constant supply are of the people who have made open mark in the world; but they are not always those which are inherently most memorable. "Lives in which the public are interested," says Ruskin, roundly, "are scarcely ever worth writing. For the most part compulsorily artificial, often affectedly so—on the whole, fortunate beyond ordinary rule—and, so far as the men are really greater than others, unintelligible to the common reader, the lives of statesmen, soldiers, authors, artists, or any one habitually set in the sight of many, tell us at last little more than what sort of people they dealt with, and of the pens they wrote with; the personal life is

inscrutably broken up—often contemptibly, and the external aspect of it merely a husk, at the best. The lives we need to have written for us are of the people whom the world has not thought of—far less heard of—who are yet doing the most of its work, and of whom we may learn how it can best be done." There is some exaggeration in this, though Ruskin saves himself, it will have been noted, by saying of the lives in which the public are interested that they are, not never, but scarcely ever, worth writing. But that there is truth in his statement will be admitted, I think, by any one who is fond of biography and who recalls how many of his favourite "Lives" are of little known persons. Ruskin's words come from his Preface to *The Story of Ida*, a very charming and touching biography of a Tuscan peasant-girl by an American writer, Miss Francesca Alexander. In an able critical article I saw named, the other day, as the best biography in the English language the *Life of Dr. John Brown* by Dr. Cairns. I read the book in consequence, and though I think that judgment of it capricious, it is certainly a very interesting and well-written biography. Yet the book is, I imagine, little read, and the subject of it is perhaps little remembered except as the father of another Dr. John Brown, the author of *Rab* and *Marjorie*. There have been good critics—Dr. Garnett among them—who accounted Carlyle's *Life of Sterling* not merely a biographical masterpiece, but the author's most completely satisfactory performance. Carlyle may perhaps be given the curious distinction of having written both one of the best short biographies in the language, and one of the worst, by which latter description I have heard a competent authority call his *Life of Schiller*. For the writing of the *Life of John Sterling*, two men of genius and one of high literary ability contended—Mill, Carlyle and Archdeacon Hare. Yet Sterling achieved little, and made small mark in the world. Mr. Chesterton, from a different aspect, touches a point somewhat similar to Ruskin's, and, again, with a note of paradoxical exaggeration. The real gospel of Dickens, he says, is "the inexhaustive opportunity offered by the liberty and the variety of man. Compared with this life, all public life, all fame, all wisdom, is by its nature cramped and cold and small. For on that defined and lighted public stage men are of necessity forced to profess one set of accomplishments,

to rise to one rigid standard. It is the utterly unknown people who can grow in all directions like an exuberant tree. Many of us live publicly with featureless public puppets, images of the small public abstractions. It is when we pass our own private gate, and open our own secret door, that we step into the land of the giants." What Mr. Chesterton says of the sphere of fiction and caricature may be paralleled, I think, in that of biography. I know of readers who make the *Dictionary of National Biography* their supper book or bed-side book. They would tell us, I expect, that its fascination resides not so much in the apt and lucid biographies of the more famous men, but rather in those of many of the lesser known, men whose lives have never formed the subject of biography elsewhere, but who disclose unexpected points of vivid oddity or otherwise of marked character; or of men, again, whose capacities found no favouring tide of circumstance. What is really memorable, even for influence and effect, is not always what has been marked by the world's coarse thumb. "The growing good of the world," said George Eliot, in closing the story of a life of partial failure, "is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life and rest in unvisited tombs."

E. T. Cook

SOME LITTLE KNOWN FACTS ABOUT BUGS

THERE is an old saying: A lion fears no bugs. The word *bug* originally meant a ghost or goblin. In this sense it is frequently used by Shakespeare in his plays; and Spenser ("Faerie Queen," Canto xii) writes of, "Bugs to fearen babes." How the word became transferred to insects appears to be unknown. The old meaning survives in "bugbear" and "bogey," but, otherwise, fell into disuse when the word became current as an insect's name. In this entomological sense it will be used here: but it is essential to define its meaning even more closely, for it is a word that is, more often than not, employed in a loose fashion. Among all classes in the United States of America, and to a lesser degree among the uneducated in this country, every insect, and any small creeping animal that looks like an insect, is a bug. Among entomologists the word is often applied to any insect which belongs to the order Hemiptera. It is an order comprising about 20,000 different species of land and water insects. They live by sucking the juices of plants and animals and are provided with suitable mouths for the purpose. The true bugs form a sub-order called Heteroptera, and in this group there is a family, the *Cimicidæ*. To this family belongs the bed-bug and some twenty other closely allied insects. The *Cimicidæ* form a small group of half-parasitic hemipterous insects widely spread over the surface of the globe. They are of extraordinary interest, but have been little studied by naturalists. The collections in the museums of Europe are generally poor. Yet the reader will observe later on that most of the animals which are attacked by these bugs live in the immediate neighbourhood of man. In the following pages the word bug will

be confined to these twenty known species which form this small family.

It will be best to begin with the genus *Cimex*. The human bed-bug is one of the most widely distributed and generally detested insects in the world. *Cimex lectularius* has only lately been suspected of spreading disease; but evidence is now being collected which may show that relapsing fever, Oriental sore, leprosy and other dreadful maladies may be carried from man to man by bugs. The insect was well known to the Greeks and Romans. Aristotle refers to it as *koris* and Pliny as *cimex*. Linnæus suspected that it was not a native of Europe, and there are reasons for believing that the insect reached the ancients, with many other accompaniments of civilisation, from the East. There is some evidence that bugs did not reach Germany until the twelfth century, and that they were not introduced into England until somewhere about the year 1500. Thomas Moufet (*d.* 1604), who was physician to the second earl of Pembroke and an acute observer of insect life, fixes, with wonderful exactitude, the year when bugs reached London as 1503, and mentions two ladies who, discovering for the first time the bites on their bodies, were terrified by the suspicion that they were plague spots. Other persons, with natural desire to introduce the *odium theologicum*, charged the Protestant or Huguenot refugees from France with having brought them across the Channel. Though bugs show an aptitude for following man on his migrations there are still outlying spots in North Europe and South America which the common bed-bug has not yet reached. They are nocturnal insects.

Like all other hemipterous insects, bugs have highly developed mouth-parts for piercing and sucking. Beneath the head is a proboscis called the rostrum. It is a stoutish grooved beak which, when not in use, can be folded back against the chest, and is composed out of those appendages of the mouth which, in other insects, are known, technically, as the labium and two labial palpi. Within the groove are two pairs of sharp fine stylets which work to and fro and are, technically, the bug's maxillæ and mandibles. All the members of the present family are blood-suckers and, having pierced the skin of their host, blood is drawn up through the groove into the parasite's mouth. The insect's

salivary glands are highly developed; there are three pairs, of which the largest are contained in the abdomen; ducts conduct the saliva to the mouth. It is an odourless but strongly alkaline and poisonous secretion which flows down the stylets into the wound and causes the red blotches and swellings on the victim's skin. It may benefit the blood-sucker by dilating the capillaries and so causing a flow of blood to the spot. The body of a bug, like that of all other insects, is composed of a number of segments jointed together. There is a head, with tolerably large compound and faceted eyes at the side, and a pair of slender four-jointed antennæ in front. The thorax, which bears the six slender legs, comes next, and behind the waist is a large circular but strangely flattened abdomen which is composed of ten segments, one placed behind the other. This flattened and compressed body is not uncommon among other parasitic insects and serves the bug well; for it is enabled to hide in the cracks of walls, floors, furniture and other secure retreats.

Though possessed of rudimentary wings, which look like little pads on the back of the adult, this insect cannot fly; nor do its legs, which are slender and all of the same type, enable it to jump. But it may possibly be attracted by the smell of man, and when other means fail it is said sometimes to climb to the ceiling and drop on his bed. In colour, bugs are a ruddy brown and their bodies are more or less plentifully provided with hairs or bristles arranged in definite system and characteristic of the different species. It has lately been pointed out that these bristles of the bug family are of four quite distinct types which are associated with different parts of the insect's bodies. First, there is a plain simple bristle tapering and pointed. Secondly, there is a bristle which also tapers but is abruptly cut off and toothed at the end. Thirdly, there is a relatively thick and cylindrical bristle with distinct ridges at the side and an obtuse apex shaped like a funnel with teeth round the edge. And lastly, there is the fourth type which is curved like a scimitar, the convex side being toothed and the apex wide and blunt.

Any account of the form and anatomy of a bug would be very imperfect if it did not point out a peculiarity which is especially striking among these insects. In the group to which the bed-

bug belongs along with about a dozen other species, the body of the male insect is strongly unsymmetrical. The eighth abdominal segment (of the male only) is distorted on to one side and the pair of horny plates (sclerites), which form it, are both unequal as regards their right and left halves. This peculiarity, which would require minute knowledge of technical terms to explain in detail, is connected with the organs of reproduction. In the second group, with about half a dozen species, which are all parasitic on bats, the eighth segment of the male is very nearly symmetrical.

The female insect lays her eggs three or four times a year. They are white with a projecting rim round the edge at one end. From ten to fifty may be laid at a time, and they are put in crevices. They hatch in a week or more, and the young bug, though very small and yellowish in colour, is similar in structure to and an almost exact counterpart of its parents. It passes through no perceptible metamorphosis and sucks blood as soon as it can. Whether the larval bug, if it may so be called, can feed on food other than blood appears to be unknown. It moults its skin four or five times in the course of its growth, and after the last moult the little wing-pads become visible. This is the chief change from larval to mature insect. The whole development to maturity takes about three months. All observers are agreed that the larvæ can live for weeks without food. The adults are even more tenacious of life and they bear hunger and cold with equanimity. It is said that they have been found in the bed-hangings of rooms that have been unoccupied for six years. After that long fast it is not surprising to learn that they were as white as paper and terribly thin.

Nomadic tribes are said to be free from the persecutions of bed-bugs. They are insects which love old and solid dwellings, furnished with wooden bedsteads, genuine bits of ancient furniture, curtains, tapestry, wall-hangings, and other curios which make bedrooms dirty or, as the bugs think, comfortable. They migrate freely from house to house, in towns, across roofs and along gutters. When they are numerous, houses have been rendered uninhabitable. Modern houses are sometimes invaded in a mysterious fashion and, when they are the houses of the rich,

charges of having introduced them are frequently levelled against innocent workmen or harmless bats. It is, however, more than probable that they were imported in the cracks of some priceless piece of antique woodwork, a Jacobean bedstead, a Sheraton wardrobe, or Italian cinque-cento chest of drawers.

Most members of the bug family are provided with scent glands which secrete a nauseous smelling liquid. It is a colourless fluid, very acid, and contains a volatile oil which floats on water. A drop in one's eye causes violent irritation and tears. The liquid is stored in two minute bladders which open by pores between the insertion of the second and third pairs of legs. When bugs are pinched with tweezers or frightened a small drop exudes and the smell intensifies. It is worse when the insects are stimulated by the increased vitality of summer. The discharge is voluntary and doubtless a protection against many enemies. Yet the bed-bug and others of the family are preyed on by larger bugs which are closely related and in the nature of cannibals. These hunt them down and suck them dry.

Bugs, although so different in general appearance from lice, are related to them. In structure, habits and affinities they are quite distinct from fleas. They both have thirst for man's blood, but nothing else in common. The flea is a bold, clean, active, dashing cavalier. The bug is a crawling, nocturnal, foul-smelling assassin. The flea has a laterally compressed body, simple eyes, no trace of wings, and passes through complete metamorphosis in the course of its life. In all these respects the bug may be contrasted.

A parasite, so closely resembling our human bed-bug as to be almost indistinguishable, has been found on bats in England. Some entomologists maintain that the same species is parasitic on bats and on mankind ; others would distinguish the bat's parasite under the name of *C. vespertilionis*. For the moment the question must remain unsettled. The human bug has been found infesting the nests and houses of domestic fowls and pigeons. Once it has been taken from a dormouse, but this must be regarded as a chance occurrence.

The species of bug which has been dealt with so far is an insect of world-wide distribution and essentially a follower and parasite of humanity. In the tropics mankind is also exposed

to the bites of another species named *C. hemiptera*. This tropical bug is common in dwellings and also turns its attention to domestic fowls. In India it has been found on one of the swallow tribe. On rare occasions it has been discovered among the parasites of tropical bats.

Pigeons have bugs peculiar to themselves, which are sometimes found in vast numbers in pigeon-lofts. *C. columbarius* is a small insect and appears to be confined to the Western side of the old world. It has, so far, only been found in France, Holland and England. It is exceedingly abundant in some parts of France and so voracious that young pigeons are sometimes attacked and left dead from loss of blood. The pigeon-bug of the Eastern side of the old world (*C. peristeræ*) is another insect. But like the Western form it is closely allied to the bed-bug and chiefly distinguishable by the size of its eyes, the shape of the antennæ and the length of its hairs. It has, so far, only been found at Simla, where it seems to be common in pigeon-houses. It may, later perhaps, be found extending all through India into Central Asia. Eighty specimens were sent home by Mr. Dodsworth in 1911, and they are of a brownish orange colour which, if not due to accident or youth, is very characteristic. Both these parasites have up to the present day only been found in the company of domestic pigeons; and it would be a matter of great interest to ascertain whether the nests of the rock-dove, from which it is believed that all domestic varieties are descended, harbour similar or different forms of these insects. Domestic pigeons often share their lofts with bats and may well have derived their bugs from these fellow lodgers.

Yet there are species of *Cimex* which are essentially parasites of bats. The European bat-bug (*C. pipistrelli*) was discovered and described in 1839 by Jenyns, an English entomologist. It was on the small common bat or Pipistrelle that he found it. Later collectors have also obtained specimens on the Noctule and Serotine bats. It has been recorded from bats in England, Holland, Germany, Switzerland and Russia and appears to be a Western palearctic form. In museum collections it is a rarity, not perhaps because it is actually so scarce but because the parasites of bats are difficult to obtain. The American bat-bug (*C. pilosellus*) is again distinguishable and is generally distributed

through Canada and the United States. As its name implies it is an unusually hairy bug.

Three great rarities remain to be mentioned before the list of known species, which belong to the genus *Cimex*, is completed. *C. fœda* is only known from one broken specimen in the Stockholm Museum. In the museum at Budapesth there is a unique specimen (*C. dissimilis*) which was caught on the wall of a house in Hungary. It presumably came from the bats which lived in the roof and, since it is so unfamiliar, it probably does not attack mankind. The third rarity (*C. improvisus*) about whose mode of life nothing has been ascertained up to the present, is known from two specimens in the collections at Vienna and Budapesth respectively. It is a small insect, perhaps the parasite of some small mammal or bird, for both specimens were swept up from the grass in the nets of beetle-collectors.

Most persons are perhaps aware that the nests of house-martins are infested with bugs, but the minute investigation of their habits has not been easy. Those whose houses are favoured by the presence of swallows and martins are generally reluctant to have the birds molested, and there is an almost universal superstition against destroying their nests. In Europe and in North Africa the parasite of the martin (named *Œciacus hirundinis*) is plentiful ; as many as 200 of these insects have been taken from a single nest. Cases are on record where fully fledged young birds have been found so completely robbed of their blood as to be too weak to move. The same bug has occasionally been found on sparrows which have the well-known objectionable habit of usurping the old nests of house-martins and holding them against the rightful owners. This bug has once, on the Continent, been found in the nest of the Little Owl. As it is well established that many raptorial animals take on to themselves the parasites of their prey, one may suppose that the owl had been feeding her brood on swallows. It has also, occasionally, been taken from the nests of sand-martins, and, as these members of the swallow tribe breed in deep burrows far from houses, it is difficult to conjecture how the bug got there. It may have been transferred to the sand-martins at the season of migration when the swallow tribes flock together. The same insect is abundant in the nests of the

swifts which breed in the tower of Strassburg Cathedral. It has, on a few occasions, been found clinging to birds which were killed on migration. The majority, however, remain behind in the deserted martin's nests where they may be found in late September in all stages of development. Early in April they are still there but thin, hungry, and expectant. Months of cold and famine have been endured with surprising fortitude: but the return of their warm-hearted feathered hosts must be very welcome. The reader may wonder why insect-eating birds should tolerate these pests, which must trouble them horribly. Perhaps the nauseous scent glands act as a protection. This insect is a bird-parasite of the Old World only. Another species (*Œ. vicarius*) is found in the nests of swallows or martins in North America. Under the bark of trees in Chili a peculiar bug (*Bertilia valdiviana*) has been found. Very little is known of its habits though it was described as long ago as 1865.

We pass now to a very peculiar and interesting group or sub-family of bugs which are found on bats in tropical countries. Several of them have only quite recently been discovered. One of the strangest points about certain members of the group is the structure of their legs. As every one knows, the legs of an insect consist of a number of jointed segments. The horny outside which forms an external skeleton contains the muscles which move the legs. In a typical insect the segments which compose the leg (excluding the small tarsal joints in the foot) are four in number. The last of these, nearest the foot, which is named the *tibia*, is usually comparatively long and slender. It may be roughly compared to our shin-bone. Now in some of these tropical bat-bugs there is a pseudo-joint in the tibia, the effect of which is to give more flexibility to the leg without introducing an extra articulation. In these insects we find a type of bug most highly specialised for a parasitic life, and they are as a rule taken from the bodies of the bats. In the genus *Cacodmus* there is no pseudo-joint in any of the tibiæ. In the genus *Aphrania* there is a pseudo-joint in the tibiæ of the hind legs and traces of one beginning in the tibiæ of the middle pair of legs. Lastly, in the genus *Loxaspis* we find the last stage of development with pseudo-joints in all three pairs of legs. These half-articulations are unknown among insects with the exceptions of two groups (*Polyctenidæ* and *Nycteribidæ*),

and both of these are composed of the parasites of bats. The former are hemipterous insects remotely related to bugs. The latter are wingless flies belonging to a totally different order of insects. They cling with spider-like legs to the bat's fur. The pseudo-jointed leg is therefore an instance of an adaptation separately evolved in three separate groups of insects which lead similar lives.

One of these rare bat-bugs (*Cacodmus villosus*) is found in Natal, the Transvaal and Nyassaland. A second (*C. ignotus*), also probably African, closely allied to it but densely covered with rather long hairs, is an enormous insect twelve millimetres long. The only known specimen was found on a bat preserved in a jar of spirits in the Natural History Museum. A third (*C. indicus*) is found on Indian bats. From Basutoland another insect (*Aphrania barys*), about which little is known, has been brought back. In the Sudan and Uganda bats are infested with a dark brown bug (*Loxaspis mirandus*) of which the first examples were taken in 1911, from a house near Mombasa, by Mr. Jackson, Governor of Uganda. From the bat caves of Java comes another bug (*L. seminitens*). Lastly to complete the catalogue of known species there is an American bug (*Hæmatosiphon inodora*) which occupies an isolated place in a sub-family and genus by itself. It has a very long rostrum, enters human dwellings, but for the most part is a parasite of fowls. Its range extends from the Southern United States to Mexico and the Central American republics. Since the domestic fowl is a bird that was introduced into the New World it cannot be the original host, and there is great likelihood that the imported domestic fowls received their parasite from the native bats.

This brings us to the consideration of two problems. First, since all parasites are clearly descended from non-parasitic ancestors, how did bugs develop their parasitic habits? Secondly, what animals were their first hosts? As to the first, one can almost see allied insects in a state of transition. They are normally feeders on vegetable juices but only need the opportunity to become suckers of animal blood. In an allied family there is a field-bug (*Lygocoris campestris*) which is often found under the stacks in the cornfields of the Continent. With the straw it gets carried accidentally into barns and stables. Here, amid changed

surroundings, it bites and sucks the blood of horses and cows. It has penetrated into the dwellings of man. Where straw is used as thatch it has been found in the nests of the swallow family. So we trace all the steps by which opportunity makes parasites. As to the second question the reader cannot have failed to notice the obvious connection that exists between the *Cimicidæ* and bats. Out of the twenty species in the family twelve are essentially bat-parasites. Bats are their true hosts, and of the remaining eight, several more have occasionally been found on bats. In many parts of the world bats are found in neglected attics and under the roofs of human dwellings. Here they are brought into proximity, not only with mankind, but with pigeons in pigeon-lofts and swallows which nest under the eaves. The inference is almost irresistible that all the members of this noteworthy family of insects were originally parasites of bats.

HAROLD RUSSELL

AMERICAN AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, *March* 9, 1914.

THE Marconi disclosures and the cynical indifference to public opinion by the elevation of Sir Rufus Isaacs have not increased British prestige in the eyes of Americans, or made Americans believe that British political methods are much purer than their own, or that there is much difference between Tammany selling contracts for public works and the Liberal Party selling honours to fatten the campaign fund. Mr. Lloyd George and his Radical supporters, the New York *Times* says:

> Never tire of railing at the Peers as an expensive, useless, hindering, and rather corrupting element in British politics. Mr. George particularly derides the aristocracy not only as backward and stupid, but as selfish, unscrupulous, living off the earnings of others, enjoying privileges for which they make no return, and callously inflicting cruel hardship on the innocent and long-suffering masses.

The hypocrisy of the whole affair is nauseating to Americans, who knowing that they are sinners politically have not pretended to be saints, and who are disgusted to find that the Puritan professions of Liberal austere morality were simply used to cloak things that no American politician ever dared to do.

On May 27, 1911, Porfirio Diaz, after having been President of Mexico for more than thirty years, was forced to resign and leave the country, and Francisco Madero was declared his successor. In February last year a revolution broke out in the City of Mexico led by Felix Diaz, a nephew of the old President, and after ten days' stubborn fighting in the streets of the capital Madero was deposed, General Victoriano Huerta was proclaimed military dictator, Madero was arrested and held a prisoner and a few days later assassinated; but whether on the order of Huerta or with his connivance will probably never be known. Since that

day in May nearly three years ago when Porfirio Diaz—the only man who had been able to keep Mexico in order and ensure the safety of the lives of foreigners and the protection of their property —was deposed and banished, Mexico has brewed and drank hell's broth. The country has been torn by anarchy, the Northern states have long ceased to recognise Huerta's authority, men have been murdered and women violated, an enormous amount of property has been destroyed, bandits rob and burn and slay, both sides live on the country, foreigner as well as native is in despair. It is said that more than a hundred Americans have been murdered in the last three years, but it was not until a Scotchman, W. S. Benton, who owned a large ranch in the state of Chihuahua was killed, that American indignation threatened reprisals.

Benton was killed about the eighteenth of February, although the exact date is uncertain. When Francisco Villa, the Commander of the Rebel army of the North, took Juarez, depredations were committed on Benton's ranch, and he went to Villa to remonstrate. His friends sought to dissuade him, for they knew the kind of man Villa was and his hatred for all foreigners; but Benton was a man of courage, and bad as he knew Villa to be he evidently did not believe that he would commit deliberate murder.

From the time that Benton entered Villa's headquarters in Juarez nothing has been seen of him. When he did not return, his wife and friends became alarmed and set on foot enquiries, only to be told by Villa that he did not know what had become of Benton. Then as the demands grew more pressing Villa admitted he had placed Benton in confinement, and a little later he announced that Benton had been tried by court-martial and shot. There is no British Consul in Juarez, but the American Consuls are charged with the protection of foreigners in view of the tacit agreement of the Powers to give the United States a free hand in Mexico. Benton had been given no opportunity to communicate with his wife, his friends, or the Consul, or to seek legal or other advice. A demand made on Villa for Benton's body by the American Consul, acting under instructions from the State Department at the request of the British Ambassador, was refused. A later demand to Villa to permit the exhumation of Benton's body so that the cause of death might be definitely determined was also refused.

The only persons who can positively testify as to the way in which Benton came to his death are Villa and the men under his control, who preserve their own confidence, but there is evidence enough to convince the unprejudiced that Benton was murdered; that there was neither legal nor military justification for his death; and everything points to Villa being the murderer, who shot him, probably fatally, and then the dying man was riddled with bullets from rifles in the hands of Villa's soldiers. When it became no longer possible to conceal the fact of Benton's death, Villa first declared that Benton had gained access to him by a ruse, that he violently assailed him and drew a revolver, evidently intending to kill him, but Villa disarmed him and knocked him down. Benton was tried by court-martial, found guilty and duly executed. To fortify his case Villa later declared that Benton was a well-known Huertista sympathiser and had given encouragement to the Federal cause, and he had murdered Mexican peons.

Benton had lived many years in Mexico ranching and every one is agreed that he was a shrewd, hard-headed, practical man, and not a fool. Now only a fool or a guileless man ignorant of the Mexican character and the unrestrained, passionate brute that Villa is would have drawn a revolver on him. That was an invitation to suicide, for even if Benton had gone there with the deliberate intention to kill Villa, and had succeeded, the odds were a thousand to one he could not hope to escape alive, and a Scotchman of Benton's temperament does not kill his enemy at the price of his own life. But Benton was no tenderfoot. He had been a rancher in Mexico for twenty-five years, he knew Villa for what he is, he knew that all his life he had been a bandit and had killed without mercy, and Benton was well versed in the etiquette of the frontier. That etiquette is that when a man goes armed—"totes a gun" in the vernacular of the West—it is presumptive evidence that "he is looking for trouble" and his adversary may shoot him rather than risk being shot; but a man who is unarmed shows his pacific intentions. When Benton was warned not to go to Villa he said he would not carry a revolver, and the evidence in possession of the British authorities leads them to believe that he went into the presence of Villa without a weapon of any kind. That being the case it is manifest Benton would not have threatened Villa, nor was his life in danger. Villa

has admitted that when Benton threatened him he drew his revolver and pressed it against his victim's stomach; he does not admit that he pulled the trigger, but one may take it for granted that followed. Villa is not the man who knows pity, or to whom the sight of the dying is rare.

The murder of Benton—for it is the general belief that Benton was murdered and not killed as an incident of war—has done more than anything else to convince the American public of the unfitness of the revolutionists to assume charge of the Government of Mexico and of the impossibility of peace being restored to the country unless the United States intervenes and takes control. Urged by the British Government, the Washington Government acted with commendable promptness in trying to ascertain the facts in connection with Benton's death, and instructions were sent to the American consular representatives to make an investigation. Their opportunity to get at the truth was necessarily limited, the best they could do was to interrogate Villa, and their reports show how little faith is to be placed in any statement he makes. A demand on Villa to surrender Benton's body was refused. A request that the body be exhumed so that it might be examined by a British-American medical and legal commission was at first granted and then denied. At the time I write no one knows where the body is, whether it is buried at Juarez, which was the first statement made by Villa, or taken to Chihuahua and there buried, which he later asserted; whether it was buried or burned so as to conceal the manner of death.

Villa having on his own account defied the United States the indignity is made more offensive by the action of General Carranza, nominally his superior and the "First Chief" of the Constitutionalist Army. As Benton was a British subject, Carranza has coolly told the American Consul, the United States can have no interest in his death, and if the British Government is anxious to ascertain how he came to his end it must ask in person through its own official agent and not invoke the good offices of the United States. There has been nothing so insolent since the days of the Barbary corsairs, when the great States of Europe thought it not beneath their dignity to secure their commerce by the payment of bribes, and then, forced to assert their dignity, drove the pirates

... But Carranza feels he need fear nothing and he has no

strongholds that can be bombarded by British fleets. The British Government having announced that it had no intention of sending an army into Mexico to demand reparation, and President Wilson having repeatedly made it known that he would not intervene by force of arms in the affairs of Mexico, Carranza can afford to laugh at representations and defy both Governments.

Carranza ought to show more consideration for the feelings of the United States. The rebels have been pampered and coddled by the Washington Government. To enable them to carry on their war of pillage and plunder the embargo on arms ordered by President Taft has been raised by Mr. Wilson and the rebels are now able to purchase arms and ammunition in this country. They show how much they appreciate this support by murdering Americans and treating with contempt the American Government. They have made it clear that nothing is to be gained from rebel success.

Mr. Wilson hoped that the success of the rebels in the North would overthrow the Huerta régime and make it unnecessary for the United States to intervene. It is not certain that the rebels can drive out Huerta, but supposing they should, to what extent would Mexico be better off? Villa has displayed some vigour in the field, although he has done nothing thus far to prove that he has any real military ability, but apart from any capacity he may possess as a military commander he is impossible as President. e is illiterate, undisciplined, violent. All his life he has been bandit, and he is now doing on a larger scale what in the old ıys he did when he commanded a roving band and plundered ıd murdered for profit and to gratify his love of cruelty. Carranza a higher type, an educated man, but from all that can be learned is weak and timorous; slow in action, and like many weak en a stickler for dignity who tries to create the impression of ength by insisting on trifles. While Villa has been fighting has dawdled and done nothing, although as the "First Chief" the Constitutionalist Army his place was in the field directing itary operations. It is generally believed that he has purposely t away from Villa, fearing that his nominal subordinate ald refuse to obey his commands and that in case of a clash army, such as it is, would more quickly throw in its fortunes th the fighting Villa than the nominal "Commander" who has ne nothing to arouse the enthusiasm of his followers.

Both Carranza and Villa may be patriots, but it is doubtful if either is patriotic enough to yield to the other. As "First Chief" of the Constitutionalist Army and head of the revolutionary movement Carranza is in line for the Presidency when Huerta has abdicated or fled, but if Villa does not oppose him every one will be surprised. Villa, according to agents of the rebels in Washington, is to be content with the appointment of Chief of Rurales—the mounted police corresponding somewhat to the Irish Constabulary and the North-west Mounted Police of Canada —when the day of triumph comes, but Villa is no more likely to be satisfied with a place so unimportant than Carranza would be fool enough to put a man so ambitious and so little to be relied upon where he could exercise such great power. Compared to the Presidency that of Chief of Rurales is a minor post, but it gives him command of a fine body of fighting men who are dangerous to the peace of the President unless he can be absolutely certain of the loyalty of their commander. Carranza and Villa are the most conspicuous figures among the rebels, but they are not the only men who are ambitious or who think they are entitled to claim the highest rewards. In the opinion of men with knowledge of Mexico and its people the elimination of Huerta will bring about conditions as bad if not worse than they are to-day, and instead of the country being free of revolution the rival factions will be engaged in a more sanguinary struggle for possession of the Government. President Wilson has managed to stave off intervention for a year. How long, every one asks, before he will be compelled to act?

War with Mexico, as readers of this Review have before been told, is not popular, but neither is Mr. Wilson's policy. Most people think that he made a mistake in not recognising Huerta, and had he done so it would have been possible for Huerta to crush the revolution, as he would have raised money in Europe and the United States, while the rebels would have received no financial assistance. It is doubtful whether the recognition of Huerta would have made much difference, as Carranza and Villa were determined to revolt, but if it is admitted that Mr. Wilson blundered it is idle to talk about it now. The mischief has been done and nothing can repair it. If the interests of the world require that there shall be peace in Mexico, the only hope is from without and not from within. The United States, either on

its own account or as the world's mandatory, must do the work.

In recommending to Congress the repeal of the section of the Panama Canal Act exempting American coastwise vessels using the canal from the payment of tolls, contrary to the explicit wording of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty that the canal shall be open to the vessels of all nations on "terms of entire equality," President Wilson has shown his courage, statesmanship and shrewd political leadership. The line of least friction, so far as his own party is concerned, was for the President to do nothing and to allow the controversy to wear itself out through the channels of diplomacy. Free tolls was Democratic doctrine as it was part of the platform on which Mr. Wilson was nominated. That particular plank, according to a great many people, was smuggled into the platform by a few men with selfish interests to serve, but the men particularly involved deny this, and say no attempt was made at concealment and it was the fault of the delegates who adopted the platform if they did not read it before they voted. The contention is of little moment, the fact that free tolls was made a part of the platform would be ample warrant for the President to hold himself bound by the party's declaration of principles, especially as many Democrats favour a ship subsidy but do not dare openly to vote for it.

Mr. Wilson brushes all technicalities aside. He no more considers the platform than he does the twisted interpretation that astute lawyers can give to the meaning of the treaty. In a letter to Mr. William L. Marbury, of Baltimore, the President wrote:

> With regard to the question of Canal tolls, my opinion is very clear. The exemption constitutes a very mistaken policy from every point of view.
>
> It is economically unjust; as a matter of fact, it benefits for the present, at any rate, only a monopoly; and it seems to me in clear violation of the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. There is, of course, much honest difference of opinion as to the last point, as there is, no doubt, as to the others; but it is at least debatable, and if the promises we make in such matters are debatable, I, for one, do not care to debate them. I think the country would prefer to let no question arise as to its whole-hearted purpose to redeem its promises in the light of any reasonable construction of them rather than debate a point of honour.

It required courage on the part of the President to take this stand as on August 1912, when he was a candidate for the Presidency he made a speech in the course of which he approved the

plank in the Democratic platform exempting coastwise ships from tolls. Only a man of courage would risk the chance of being accused of inconsistency or wabbling.

Mr. Wilson showed a broad grasp of international affairs in urging Congress to repeal the obnoxious law. A few years ago all the world seemed anxious to court the favour of the United States and nations were competing with each other to win American friendship. Now the position is reversed—the friends of the United States are few, and it finds itself in danger of isolation at a critical time in its history unless it changes its manners and methods. Mr. Wilson is seeking to alter a situation that was only partly of his making. Strained relations with Japan began when Mr. Roosevelt was President, and although the Japanese Government and the Japanese people welcomed the American battleship fleet on its globe-encircling voyage, Japanese statesmen and the Japanese people were too intelligent not to appreciate the full significance of the remark of the Commander-in-Chief on the eve of leaving America, that the fleet was ready "for a fight or a frolic." Mr. Roosevelt left many legacies to Mr. Taft, and Japan was not the least important. Mr. Taft, with equal generosity, passed it on to Mr. Wilson and made it still more burdensome. Mr. Knox as Secretary of State had conceived the brilliant coup of neutralising the Manchurian railways, which made Russia and Japan take alarm and drove them to reach an understanding. As the United States fears Japan more than it does any other Power, sound American policy would have kept the two great Asiatic Powers apart instead of bringing them together, but the mischief was done before it was realised, and it was then too late to undo it. Then in the closing days of his Administration Mr. Taft felt himself compelled to end treaty relations with Russia, which did not tend to remove the irritation felt in Russia against the United States, and he approved the Panama Canal Act with its discrimination in violation of the treaty.

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This was the state of affairs when Mr. Wilson came to the White House a year ago; Japan resentful, complaining that its treaty had been violated and its pride wounded; Russia suspicious and angry at the slight put upon it; England irritated because the canal treaty had been so lightly brushed aside; the other great maritime nations sympathetically supporting England

because of their own interest in "equality of treatment" and their natural objection to treaties being regarded as binding on them but voidable if the United States found them inconvenient. Mr. Wilson's Mexican policy increased the general irritation, as without exception the nations having the largest interests in Mexico were in favour of the recognition of Huerta. Still further to create feeling against the United States was the action of Congress incorporating in the Tariff Bill a discriminatory duty on goods imported in foreign bottoms, which was alleged to be another infraction of treaty rights; power to examine the books of importers and other things to cause friction.

Although Mr. Wilson has from the beginning discouraged all suggestion of American intervention in Mexico in the endeavour to calm popular excitement, he has been compelled to recognise that despite his strong objection to the use of force circumstances might make it impossible for him to escape war, and to go into Mexico with the sympathies of the world against his country might cause embarrassment. With the possible exception of Japan, there was no fear that any of the Powers would raise an issue that it would be inconvenient for the United States to meet at the time when its resources were taxed to put down revolution in Mexico.

American dread for Japan is somewhat incomprehensible to foreigners. That Americans have no great love for the Japanese and that the Japanese cordially reciprocate this feeling may be taken for a fact, but that Japan should be constantly watching for an opportunity to attack the United States seems imaginative rather than real. But whether or not there is anything on which to base it, the fear exists and the belief is prevalent. Disparity in resources, population and navies appears to have been lost sight of, the enormous difficulties of Japan making an offensive war and sending her troops and supplies across the Pacific are not, a layman would think, given proper consideration; but as those are purely military questions what an unprofessional person may think is worthless. Americans have been so often told by their highest military authorities that they have no Army and no adequate system of coast defences that perhaps they are justified in believing that it would be not such a difficult matter for Japan to land troops on the American mainland and hold it against the American army.

That Japan could easily take the Philippines every one agrees, and with slightly more trouble she could capture the Hawaiian Islands. That would give her an advanced base 1200 miles from the west coast of America. Japan's next move, according to the strategists, would be to seize Alaska, where she would find all the food-supplies needed, and raid the coast. What the American navy would be doing while this was going on and Japan was moving her troops first to the Philippines and then to Hawaii, and later to Alaska, the strategists do not tell us, but they evidently think that the Japanese navy, inferior to that of the United States on paper, but having the advantage of actual battle experience under modern conditions, has nothing to fear from the American navy.

The invasion of Mexico is not taken lightly. When the United States went to war against Spain no one feared the result, for the odds were overwhelmingly in favour of the United States. Conditions in Mexico are quite different, and although the population of the United States is about seven times as large as that of Mexico, and the United States has all the money it needs and can buy or manufacture limitless quantities of arms and ammunition while Mexico is hard pressed financially and must get its military supplies from abroad, yet with all this in favour of the United States and against Mexico the contest would not be so one-sided as surface appearances indicate, that is if the American military men are to be relied upon, and it is to be presumed they are not talking without knowledge. If the United States has to raise an army of at least a quarter of a million men and keep it in Mexico for some years with its fleet also engaged in military operations in Mexican waters, it is evident that if Japan should think the opportunity had come to make demands on the United States, either the army would have to be withdrawn from Mexico or another and larger army would have to be created by hammering raw recruits into soldiers, who would be hopelessly outclassed against Japan's veterans led by commanders who know what real fighting means. Considering all the circumstances perhaps it might not be so difficult for Japan to take the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands and entrench herself on the American mainland. If Japan should form an alliance the position of the United States might be almost desperate. That Japan would be ... to find an ally in a war against the United States seems

without the range of practical politics, although there are Americans who believe that is not impossible; nevertheless Mr. Wilson shows his wisdom in endeavouring to end the isolation of his own country and to restore the friendly relations with European Powers that have recently been strained, so as to enjoy their sympathetic support in case of necessity.

It was said of Mr. Wilson when he was a candidate for the Presidency that having no political experience he would probably be a failure if elected President. In asking repeal he has proved himself a very adroit political leader. He might have asked it on the merits of the case and argued in support of his contention, which would have given his opponents an opportunity to rebut his arguments. Mr. Wilson took a much broader position. He appealed on the ground of morality and the larger questions of national interest to be affected by the decision. It is difficult for men to defend an act that involves the national honour. No matter what differences of opinion there may be about the meaning of the treaty, the President told Congress, no one outside of the United States has any doubt as to its meaning. "The large thing to do is the only thing we can afford to do," he said, "a voluntary withdrawal from a position everywhere questioned and misunderstood. We ought to reverse our action without raising the question whether we are right or wrong, and so once more deserve our reputation for generosity and the redemption of every obligation without quibble or hesitation."

That is an appeal almost impossible to resist. Some men accuse Mr. Wilson of being foolishly generous, but the country would rather Congress should be foolishly generous than niggardly dishonest. Finally, to bring to his support those members of Congress who might remain unmoved by moral considerations, Mr. Wilson urged expediency and the public exigency. "I ask this of you," he said in closing his brief but memorable address, "in support of the foreign policy of the Administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure." Every one must place his own interpretation on the President's almost startling utterance. Public men and the country at large think they know what the President intended to convey.

A. MAURICE LOW

PORTUGAL AND THE REPUBLIC

A WRITER in one of the organs of the Portuguese Democrats last December spoke of "that great scene in the Terreiro do Paço on February 1, 1908, in which the soul of the people thrilled and manifested itself through two of its brave sons" (the murderers of Dom Carlos and the Crown Prince). It is notorious that the soul of the people did not thrill, its indifference and apathy after the murder excited universal comment. But the proclamation of the Republic on October 5, 1910, was worse than that crime, for it was a tremendous blunder. To take advantage of the indifference of a people in order to impose a party must always bring untold suffering on a country, if only from the suspicions and uneasiness of rulers who know themselves to be in a minority. Sincere and wisely patriotic politicians would have worked at reform from within the Monarchy. But such gradual effort was distasteful to idealists who wished by legislation suddenly to change the face of the earth and to intriguers who wanted office. The first three years of the Republic have amply shown the evils resulting from its premature proclamation, from proclaiming it, that is, before the Republican parties had broadened out to something more than petty clans—the attempts to thrust on the people reforms for which it was not ready, the isolation of the Republican parties, their quarrels, the withdrawal in despair or disgust of one after another of the more able and disinterested Republicans, the accession of the extremists, the persecution of political opponents and the grand invasion of politics in all questions great and small. The recent political crisis emphasised the dissensions of the Republican parties, and the dearth of Republican statesmen. All the ablest and wisest men refused portfolios.

It is obvious, then, that the Republic should not have been

proclaimed on October 5, 1910, and that those who cried out against abuses should have directed their efforts to purge the régime of those abuses, not to overturn the régime and—retain the abuses. But the question occurs: Does not the same argument hold good now? I shall not be suspected of any excessive love for the Republic when I say that more good will result for Portugal by reforms from within the Republic than by renewed attempts to overthrow it. An often-quoted distich of Pope might well be taken to heart now by the Portuguese and should be graven in letters of gold over the door of the Lisbon Ministries of the Interior and of the Colonies:

> For forms of government let fools contest
> Whate'er is best administered is best.

The Royalists during the last three years have had every opportunity to effect a counter-revolution, and their efforts have ignominiously failed. Any further attempt to restore the Monarchy by force would be unpardonable, especially in view of the amnesty granted by the Republic. The Republic has done the right thing in passing the Amnesty Bill, and it remains for the Royalists and foreign opinion to do the right thing in their turn, by giving the Republic a fair chance to pursue the moderate policy thus initiated. The enemies of the Republic will do well to let it alone for the next two or three years at least. Before the amnesty this was impossible, but it now becomes both possible and necessary. I must frankly confess to the belief that the more rope the Republic is given the sooner is it likely to hang itself with its own hands; and in that case the tired country will turn more readily to the Monarchy which will come back on a stable and assured footing, instead of to a most dangerous and uncertain tenure were it to impose itself by bombs or bayonets. But if through some miracle the Republican dissensions cease and by adopting a moderate policy the Republic is able to stir the people from its indifference, the Republic will acquire the respect and gradually the co-operation of the Royalists. King Manoel would no doubt then be the first to place Portugal's prosperity above that of his family, and acquiesce in the expressed wishes of the people. Certainly opinion in England would accept as readily a broad-minded and tolerant Republic as a

restoration of the Monarchy. The pity is that the Republicans will not be convinced that criticisms of the Republic are not due to enmity towards Portugal or even towards the Republic. No doubt Portugal suffers like Spain from the criticisms of many ignorant foreigners—both countries seem to be only studied in times of unrest and on a basis of accumulated ignorance concerning the conditions of the country and the character of the inhabitants. But whereas the Spaniards often do not read or pay attention to these criticisms the Portuguese are exceedingly sensitive to them. This sensitiveness in the more foolish and uneducated Republicans takes a darker tinge and they treat all criticisms with suspicion and abuse. The outcry in England in favour of an amnesty was, they are persuaded, Jesuit and anti-Portuguese in its origin. Even the *Nação*, the only openly Royalist (Miguelist) newspaper now published in Lisbon, which has upheld the disinterestedness of the British Press in this matter, has recently said in a leading article that Portugal's old ally, Great Britain, wishes to foster anarchy in Portugal in order to seize the Portuguese colonies!

Now that the amnesty is an accomplished fact, a greater friendliness towards the Republic will result, provided of course that the persecutions are not revived. I am told that the amnesty cannot be accepted as satisfactory because a few persons are banished, or rather not permitted to return to their country, and I say deliberately that I have never heard a more astounding proposition. Because, out of over two thousand, eleven persons, who probably would not return if they could, are banished as leaders or instigators of movements against the Republic, this amnesty which decrees that not a single political prisoner shall remain in prison is to be regarded as ungenerous! But, it is said, the terms of the amnesty will not be carried out, or, perhaps, these prisoners will be re-arrested. That is another matter, and remains to be seen. Meanwhile the prisons have been cleared of political prisoners. The outcry in England and elsewhere was directed against the state of the prisons, the treatment of the prisoners, the arrest of innocent persons, the confinement of political prisoners in the *Penitenciaria*, the long imprisonment of persons without trial or even a formal accusation. The amnesty at a blow puts an end to all these charges. It could

scarcely have been more generous. Personally I expected that the leaders, including Dom João d' Almeida (not the banished captain of that name but the prisoner of the *Penitenciaria*) would be deported to a penal settlement in Africa. Senhor Machado Santos himself stipulated (in the discussion of the amnesty question in the Portuguese Parliament on December 15, 1913) that the Government should be empowered to banish a certain number of leaders for a period of three years or more. During the same discussion Dr. Affonso Costa, then Premier, considered that an amnesty would "hamper the progress of public affairs." Nothing would better please Dr. Costa and the Democrats than that a new Royalist conspiracy should prove his words prophetic and that the action of Dr. Arriaga, the kindly and able President of the Republic, in insisting upon an amnesty should fail to justify itself.

But other acts besides the amnesty show a more moderate tendency in the present Government. For instance Dr. Gama Pinto, the well-known physician who was dismissed by the late Government for employing some nuns as nurses, has been restored to his post. Moreover the Censorship has ceased. When the terms of the Amnesty Bill were known, but before the Bill had become law, the *Nação* and *Intransigente* continued, perfectly unmolested by the authorities, to fulminate and rail (against the terms of the Bill).

So far the new Government has acted in a conciliatory sense. It is, however, but a stop-gap Ministry, and it is rather ominous for the future that a great number of the officials appointed by the late Government remain in office throughout the country. If, as this implies, the General Election this summer secures an overwhelming return of the Democrats, the extremists will again come into power, we shall have the *Mundo* as it were officially insulting and offending all sorts and conditions of men, from the President of the Republic downwards, and making unnecessarily thousands of enemies for the Republic, and no doubt we shall have an army of *Carbonario* spies employed by the Government, sowing distrust in town and country. ("Because they are cheaper than the police," Senhor Rodrigues charmingly explained, as though unaware of the danger of employing men who if unpaid in coin would certainly repay themselves in power, and

a hold upon the Government.) If the extremist Ministry and the old spirit of intolerance return the days of the Republic will probably be numbered. Much will therefore depend on the present Government's impartiality in holding the elections. Yet, many ask themselves, what satisfactory result in any case can the elections bring? No Royalist is likely to present himself for election, but among the Republicans if no party were given a preponderance at the polls, a succession of weak coalition Ministries would probably follow.

The situation, it is said, requires a dictator. But Portuguese politics have shown that it is easier for a statesman to make himself dictator than to maintain himself as such and carry out any part of his policy. It is in the character of the Portuguese that by their indifference and easy *laissez-faire* they rather encourage a dictator, yet as soon as he shows himself in his true colours they will combine to upset him. It was such a combination that formed the *Regenerador* party against the absolutism of Costa Cabral, and later, in 1877, the *Progressista* party against Saldanha; and so, to compare big with little, the Evolutionists and Unionists have combined for the overthrow of Dr. Costa. It is extremely improbable that Dr. Costa will ever be successful in a really constructive policy. For one thing he suffers from a weakness for quack or startling immediate remedies. And he brings ready-made clothes, neatly folded, from Paris and attempts to fit them upon the Portuguese people with disastrous results. It has become the custom to abuse Dr. Costa for all the follies and misdeeds of the Republic. This is a little unfair. In reality he was pathetically ground between the upper millstone of his friends and the nether millstone of his opponents. If he could dispense with the journalistic co-operation of such friends as Sr. França Borges and with the support of the more unscrupulous among the *Carbonarios* he might still make a useful Premier for Portugal. But he is either too weak or too loyal to break with the friends on whose shoulders he rose to power.

Certainly in these first three years of the Republic neither the administration of Portugal nor the administration of the colonies has improved. There are three immediate problems of especial importance, the maintenance of discipline, the question of religion and education and the financial situation. As to

the first the Republic has had a most disintegrating influence, the necessary consequence, it may be, of a revolution, however peacefully effected. Many shades of Radicalism, Syndicalism and Anarchism have sprung up, small groups determined to replace what they consider the hypocrisy of a bourgeois Republic by a Government more sincerely—anarchic, presumably. Each of these groups may be convinced that it has the only true remedy for the situation, but meanwhile it does not make the situation easier, and at all events it behoves the authorities to adopt far more stringent measures against bomb-throwers. The Republicans must really eat their words in this matter at least, and admit that the bomb can never be an instrument of liberty. The employment of *Carbonarios* has discontented the police, and their methods have disgusted military men.

The Lisbon police is in process of being reorganised, but the secret society or rather societies known generally as the *Carbonaria* will have to disappear before confidence can be felt in the Republican régime or in the future of Portugal. While in Lisbon the leaders of the Republican parties continue to bicker and personally abuse one another in their respective newspapers, it is scarcely surprising if the indifference in the country increases. The peasants wish for a decrease of taxation, for some material comfort in their lives, but, failing this, they wish to be let alone, to live in peace and security. The religious question concerns them (and the colonies) more nearly than it concerns the capital. And it has been the folly of the Republic to alienate the peasants of the North, who care less for their king than for their religion, by introducing a policy of extreme anti-Clericalism: one of the ready-made suits ordered from Paris. One has only to compare the attitude of the Portuguese clergy towards the Republic with that of the Spanish clergy towards the very mild anti-Clericalism of Canalejas in 1910 to realise that Clerical fanaticism is practically non-existent in Portugal. But the law of separation between Church and State has deprived the priest of all authority over his parishioners. What is to replace the steadying influence of the Church in the villages? To undermine the authority of the Church in country parishes is like pulling nails out of a packing-case: the whole concern is liable to fall to pieces. It is the fine character of the peasants of the north of Portugal that makes

one believe that the bedrock of Portugal's population is sound and inspires confidence in the ultimate destinies of Portugal. Only she must not attempt to dance before she can walk. The politicians sometimes clamour and fume and manufacture surpluses as though a year in the life of a nation were as a year in the life of an individual. Short cuts to the satisfaction of personal or party ambitions there may be, but there can be no short cuts to the welfare of a country sunk so low through generations of public mismanagement and private neglect. It is because the mass of the people are so courageous, patient, sober, good-natured and intelligent that one feels tempted to cry out upon all these personal vanities and ambitions that disturb the face of the nation. Education, too, must come very slowly. The decree of 1911 has made it compulsory; it was already compulsory by the decree of 1878, but the latest returns give the illiterate as four and a half millions out of a total of six million inhabitants. One cannot help suspecting that the action of the Republic—in its decrees, in constituting the expensive Ministry of Public Instruction, in founding chiefly on paper over 900 schools—has been mostly for show. As to the efforts of the extremists to bring up the children in the schools without religion they will probably defeat themselves. History has shown that the Church cannot be so crushed; and if religious instruction has produced the present crop of free-thinkers possibly instruction without religion will achieve results equally paradoxical. Emphatically the best policy for the Republic now is a policy of moderation—to maintain order and encourage wealth and private enterprise, to tolerate opinions and suppress insubordination, and by no means to saturate all questions with the poison of politics or even to legislate overmuch.

A policy of conciliation will, moreover, have a closer bearing upon finance than might be supposed. The efforts of Dr. Affonso Costa to produce a surplus with one hand, while with the other he kept on alienating persons and interests from the Republic, could not be successful, in any permanent sense of benefit to the country, though they might result in some momentary success for the Minister of Finance. The whole financial system of Portugal is so artificial that it is easy—temporarily—to divorce the prosperity of the Exchequer from that of the country. For

instance, in 1913 the Exchequer benefited by 2280 contos more than in 1912 (at about £200 the conto) from the duties on the importation of corn, while the peasants in the North were emigrating for lack of bread. But a forced surplus of this kind is not required or expected. Friends of Portugal would be content to see a very small annual improvement in her finances, and this should be possible with careful administration. If such gradual improvement is not possible under existing conditions there is only one satisfactory method of rendering it possible—the sale of some of the Portuguese colonies in return for an addition of some thousands of contos to the yearly income of Portugal. Fresh taxation is scarcely to be thought of. Portugal in this respect is like the old man who had an old cow:

> And he had no fodder to give her,
> So he took up his fiddle and played this tune:
> Consider, good cow, consider,
> This isn't the time for the grass to grow,
> Consider, good cow, consider.

It is often said that nothing can be done in Portugal without fresh capital (and since nearly all available capital is employed in the service of the public debt this means a new foreign loan), but the first use of a loan would be the construction of a fleet, and this, however flattering to Portugal's pride, would be folly in the present circumstances. On the other hand a tolerant and orderly Republic progressing slowly with the co-operation of all patriotic Portuguese would win the respect of Europe; and such progress is possible if only an increasing number of citizens will realise that the way to prosperity lies not through politics or the formation of another party or another programme but through quiet and possibly obscure labour. What, after all, it may be said, is this vaunted unrest in Portugal? A handful of men addicted to the throwing of bombs, a handful permeated by international ideas, the dissensions of three or four small political parties, the polemics of journalists in Lisbon, city of gossip and intrigue, the distrust created by the existence of secret societies, the discontent of a few officers, the sincere ultra-Radical opinions of some persons, the professional conspiracies of others—all this produces a cumulative impression; but the very number of parties and interests should make it easy to divide them and

rule, and a Government which allowed free play to words and showed by one or two examples that it intended to be severe in repression of subversive deeds would probably not find these conspiracies very terrible. It is a question of an efficient Lisbon police. Outside the towns of Lisbon and Oporto there is the illiterate but intelligent peasant population, ready to give its adherence to the Republic when it sees in the Republic something more than a party clique.

The Republic has given an amnesty. Will it now act in the proper spirit of an amnesty and start afresh on more moderate lines, or plunge again into a Jacobin policy and lose its second great opportunity of obtaining the confidence not only of Europe but of the Portuguese provinces? The next few years will say; but it may be stated at once that on those, either Royalist or Radical, who by Jacobinism or conspiracy hamper the quiet ordering of affairs, a great responsibility will rest. Perhaps it is much to ask—that the Royalists should set the welfare of Portugal above the Crown, that the Republicans should set it above petty interests or the stereotyped cries of anti-this and down-with-that, but certainly all who take an interest in Portugal will watch anxiously to see whether sufficient love of country still survives there to make such sacrifice possible—the Portuguese love of country, of which Camões wrote as lofty and enduring, unswayed by any low prize:

> . . . amor da patria não movida
> De premio vil mas alto e quasi eterno.

AUBREY F. G. BELL

"PAPER" AUDIENCES

Mr. Granville Barker, to whom I take off my cap as being well qualified to give an opinion worth having, said some few weeks ago that there is nothing wrong with the drama, but his summing up of the position as given in the *Evening News* appears to me to be a logical and practical conclusion from one point of view only. What Mr. Barker says as to the opportunity offered at the bookstall of the Kingsway Theatre, where, he says, you may spend £5 in shilling editions of good plays—all English—cannot be denied, but the crux of the matter as I see it lies in the regrettable fact that the population of these islands will not spend £5 or five pence on the drama, be it good or bad, as long as they are afforded the opportunity of seeing the drama for nothing. The whole question, "What's wrong with the drama?" springs from and is most intimately connected with another question, namely, "Is the drama, intellectual or unintellectual, a sound financial proposition?"

If there were but few cases of financial failure in connection with the theatre the question: "What's wrong with the drama?" would probably not arise, because plays of every description would be produced, would attract the audiences for whom they were intended, would run their allotted span and eventually give way to the next production without any question of there being anything wrong at all. When people have to pay for their amusement they appreciate that amusement in proportion to the amount of entertainment which they derive from that particular form of amusement, and, to use an Americanism, it is "up to them" to choose the form best suited to their individual taste. One can imagine that the ultra-modern "nut" who, night after night, parts with his half-guinea for a stall in a theatre where musical comedy reigns supreme, might, if he chanced to pay his money for the opportunity of seeing *Androcles and the Lion*, or *The*

Fugitive, come out of the theatre feeling that he had wasted his time and his money. He might even be guilty of the indiscretion of classifying such plays as "awful rot," but on the other hand the admirers of Mr. Shaw and Mr. Galsworthy, would almost certainly pass a similar though probably a more grammatical criticism should they by some mischance pay their money for the doubtful privilege of listening to a modern musical comedy or—though this is perhaps carrying the idea into the realms of impossibility—a *Revue*. But however that may be I am convinced that if you so arrange matters that the "nut" is on the free-list of the musical comedy theatre, and the party in search of a stimulus to his intellect is permitted to hold that privilege for another class of dramatic fare, the interest of either party will diminish in proportion to the ease with which they are able to obtain "something for nothing."

It is a matter of amazement to me that anybody who can afford to pay for seats in a theatre should ever stoop to the undignified position of a beggar, but it is a fact that people whose incomes justify a reasonable expenditure on amusement look upon the theatre as a free entertainment. These people would not go into anybody's shop and say, "I hear you have some splendid flannel shirts at half a guinea, would you mind giving me a couple for nothing?" because they know perfectly well that the shopkeeper would quite justifiably refuse to give them anything beyond a quick escort to the street, but once let them know that this or that privileged person has seen a play without paying for his or her seat and they will commit almost any importunity to obtain a free seat if they have any desire to see that particular play. What is more, they will not go to that play at all unless they have the opportunity of doing so without payment. Of all the factors which go to make success or failure in the theatre I believe this dead-head system to be the most damaging.

There is another factor which runs it close in connection with library speculations in theatre seats, but for the moment let us examine the "paper" system and endeavour to find out where it is leading us. As far as I can judge the evil begins with the system of Press criticisms. It is an open question whether or no "good notices" or "bad" affect the success of a play. If the notices are superlatively good it frequently happens that the play

tails, and quite a number of plays which have been praised by the critics with faint damns have nevertheless held their own and succeeded in paying their way. But why, oh why should the critic be given a free seat? I understand that the critic receives payment for his column or half-column of praise or vituperation, so why in the name of all that is wonderful and topsy-turvy should he be allowed to see the play without payment? If the newspaper does not care to afford the price of a stall it is open to the critic to book and pay for a seat in one of the less expensive parts of the theatre, and if his paper pays him at an adequate rate for his work, he will still be in pocket by the transaction.

"*But,*" you may urge, "why should the critic be mulcted of the price of the seat rather than the proprietor of the newspaper?" I can only reply that the artist when he paints a picture has either to pay a model to sit to him in his studio, or he has to pay his railway fare and expenses to the scene of his studies of land, sea, or sky or a combination of the three. I do not say that the dramatic critic ought to pay for his seat himself, I only say that somebody ought to pay for the seat occupied by the critic, and that failing the spirit of enterprise on the part of the newspaper proprietors, he could avoid saddling a dead loss upon the manager of the theatre and the author of the play, and still be a certain number of guineas to the good.

"But," you may say, if you are an actor or an actress, "what will happen if neither critic nor proprietor sees the matter from this point of view? We shall have no newspaper criticisms! What are we to do with these expensive albums which we have bought for the purpose of keeping this or that notice saying how wonderful our performance in the part of so-and-so was?" Burn them! They do not cut any ice! Vanity never did and never will cut any ice, and a word in your ear friend—do you always paste the bad notice in the album alongside the good one? "But," says the manager, "in the event of there being no dramatic criticism, how are the public to know whether the play will be suited to their particular taste?" Tell them, my dear Sir, by means of a little more lucid advertising. Purchase just a little more space in the advertisement columns of the papers and do not confine your announcements to three lines "under the clock."

When the modern shopkeeper has a new line of socks for sale

he tells the public so, sometimes in a whole column of the paper. He does not send a parcel of socks to the Editor and ask him to give a free puff. He pays for his advertisement in cash and I judge from the continuity of his policy that he sells the socks. Carry out your advertising in the same fashion and you will stand a chance of doing what he does, namely, sell the article which you are trying to sell instead of having to give it away.

If by doing so you put an end to the system of free seats for critics, you will have made a big hole in the free list for a start, and you can then take a look round and proceed to lop off other branches of the dead-head tree.

In years gone by, before the dead-head system grew to the appalling dimensions which it has now attained, it used to be considered a compliment to afford a close friend of the management the privilege of seeing a play for nothing, but in these days to offer a free seat is to my mind little better than an insult, as you are offering to give away something which you cannot sell, and which you would not give away if you could sell.

"Then"—argues the manager, "I have a big theatre, and though the bookings and seats bought at the door may represent quite a paying house, the number of people will not more than half fill the theatre. The players cannot do justice to the play unless they see a well-filled house, what am I to do if I do not give away seats?" For heaven's sake, my dear Sir, play your drama to the money that is in the house and do not fill the vacant seats with dead-heads. After all it is in the nature of a swindle that you should take money from one man for precisely the same entertainment which you offer to another free of charge, merely because you don't like to see an honest empty seat here and there. As for the players, if they complain, send them back to the provinces to learn their business, they may return after a year or two a little less conscious of the audience and a little more fitted to play the parts allotted to them.

For every seat given away for any entertainment, I am convinced that the sale of three or more seats is sacrificed, and if any one can tell me what satisfaction is to be derived from presenting a free entertainment to people who can quite well afford to pay for their amusement, I will remove my hat to my informant and acknowledge that he knows more about the theatre

than I can ever hope to. Then again, supposing for one moment that any advantage can be derived from the presentation of free seats, which I for one absolutely refuse to believe, surely it would be well to exercise a little discretion in apportioning the little esteemed privilege.

I speak from personal experience here because during the run of a play with which I was intimately connected, which had been most kindly treated by critics and first-night audience, but which did not, in spite of its reception, climb at once to any giddy height of financial success, although at the time I refer to the business was certainly on a paying basis, the management thought fit to try and improve matters by filling the vacant seats with free passes. The method in this case was crude in the extreme, and to my way of thinking did far more harm than good. It consisted of sending every Monday morning a parcel of sixty or seventy passes for various parts of the theatre to a house agent in a suburb some twelve miles out of London, with a request that he would distribute them to suitable people. There being no people in the world suitable to receive free passes, it was very speedily current rumour in that very well-to-do and populous suburb, that it was not necessary to pay for seats for the latest London "Success" because you could always get them for nothing from Jones the house agent. I may be permitted to doubt if five pounds in cash found its way into the coffers of the theatre from that suburb during the run of the play in question.

The opportunity to put a stop to the abuses of the "paper" system has just arisen, as there has recently been formed an association of managers known as "The West-end Theatre Managers' Association Ltd." which I presume to be a representative body since it goes to the trouble and expense of issuing weekly a most useful guide to the London theatres. If that association will turn its attention to the dead-head system now prevailing in the London theatres and take firm measures to "cut it out" root and branch, I believe that then and only then will any check be put upon the growing desire of the public to get something for nothing. It is true enough that nothing succeeds like success, but it is equally true that if you give something for nothing, you get nothing in return.

PHILIP E. HUBBARD

POOR MEN'S LAW

UNLESS the "powers that be" interfere, there will come into force on May 1 a set of new rules materially extending, facilitating, and cheapening the procedure governing the suits of poor persons in the High Court. The usefulness of these rules will, however, largely depend on whether they are widely known and their working understood. In particular it is essential to their success (1) that members of the legal profession should respond adequately to the call made upon their public spirit; (2) that public opinion should be sufficiently roused to secure the establishment, by Treasury grant or otherwise, of the fund necessary to work the scheme; and (3) that the poorer classes, for whose benefit they are devised, should be made aware of their existence and enabled to take advantage of them. I shall therefore make no apology for attempting to draw attention to the subject and to explain shortly the present situation and the scope and importance of the forthcoming changes.

It is generally agreed that the standing reproach of our legal procedure is its expensiveness. But the criticisms so freely showered on it in this connection are too commonly loose and ill-considered. If the national "litigation bill" could be analysed, it would be found that the great bulk of the money is well spent. The cost is high because the standard is high. The law insists on the best evidence, and on the most elaborate safeguards against error. The result is an expensive system, but the extra outlay tends to promote justice far oftener than to hinder it. Still truer is it that an expensive personnel is wise economy. Few will dispute the wisdom of not only paying Judges well but of surrounding them with an atmosphere of reverence and ceremony. Only less important is the "monopoly" of the Bar and of solicitors, which alone gives the authorities sufficiently stringent

control to maintain a high tradition. There is no just ground for reproach until the point is reached where the expense hinders justice.

The common complaint, therefore, of the law's costliness can only be partly justified. For the well-to-do there is no grievance; and the great bulk of expensive litigation is such as only arises out of the affairs of those who can afford to pay for it. The poor man's need of the law is mainly for small disputes, and these are dealt with in the County Courts, where litigation is very much cheaper. And of course, the criticism does not apply to criminal procedure at all. Poverty has never debarred any one from access to the criminal courts.

Thus the expensiveness of legal procedure can only be justly regarded as an evil in a certain residue of civil cases. These fall into two groups. First come those actions which are outside the jurisdiction of the County Court and in which parties are involved to whom the High Court scale of costs is prohibitive. The number of these cases is limited, but when they occur there is a practical denial of justice to the poor, which is quite indefensible and a deep blot on the national escutcheon. And they include some of the most important classes of personal actions, such as libel, slander, seduction, breach of promise, and divorce; besides all claims (except for workman's compensation) where the sum involved is over £100. All such actions must be brought in the High Court; and there are very few cases indeed that can be fought there for less than £50. Even an undefended divorce is cheap at £25. Of course, a successful litigant is entitled to recover about 70 per cent. of his costs—if he can; but that is no answer to the charge, for it ought to be possible for a man to sue before he is certain he will win.

Secondly, there are the cases of litigants too poor even to fight a County Court action. The costs of these are on a sliding scale. Small claims can be fought for a few shillings, but many actions involve an expenditure of comparatively large sums. To take an average case within my own experience, a claim by a widow under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which failed through a technical defect in the evidence of her husband's death, cost the applicant about £12, which she could ill afford out of 11s. a week, with four young children to support: fortunately the employer behaved generously.

There is, then, a residue of cases where an intolerable hardship is inflicted by an expensive system of law. It would not be possible to cheapen the system as a whole without lowering its standards, which (as above hinted) would be disastrously false economy. The only remedy, therefore, is to give cheap access to the Courts to those to whom the normal charges are prohibitive.

There are those who resist this conclusion on the ground that it should be the policy of the law to discourage the poor from litigation. No doubt there is a good deal to be said for such a policy from the professional point of view, and possibly even more from that of the poor. But in practice the system of one law for the rich and none for the poor produces too many hard cases to be tolerable.

The law has, in fact, recognised this by providing a special cheap procedure for poor men. In so doing it has conceded the principle that those who cannot afford to incur the normal charges should be enabled to sue for a smaller charge which they can afford, or free of charge if necessary. And once this principle is conceded, it is clear that no system can be regarded as satisfactory unless the special poor man's procedure is really available to every person whose poverty in effect debars him from access to the courts as an ordinary litigant. Under the present system, however, there is a wide gulf. There is a very large class of persons who are too poor to pay £50 for a hearing and too rich to be allowed to have it for less.

Until 1883 the right to sue *in formâ pauperis* was regulated by an Act of Henry VII, which confined it to those who were not worth £5 exclusive of wearing apparel. By the present Rules,* which superseded the Act of Henry VII in 1883, the standard has been raised to £25, but the difficulty and expense of the procedure is calculated to discourage all but the most persevering. Indeed it has been unkindly remarked that a man who is really a pauper cannot possibly afford to be declared one.

The first step which a would-be plaintiff must take in order to realise the humble ambition of suing *in formâ pauperis* is to lay a statement of his case before a counsel.

This, however, is not quite so simple as it sounds. It means that the applicant must begin by looking for a solicitor to draw

* Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 16, Rules 22–31.

it up. It is easy enough for the well-to-do to drive down to their solicitor's, but it is a formidable undertaking for a working man to walk up to one. He has to conduct his search after working hours or lose a day's pay. He does not know where to look or whom to trust: he is very helpless. It is not every solicitor that is inclined to take up a case which is obviously likely to be unprofitable. It does not need much imagination to realise what a real deterrent this casting about is to a workman, who is usually one of the shyest of beings. And at the end of it he runs the risk of falling into the hands of certain rather unsatisfactory organisations which, under cover of giving him cheap assistance, are apt to run up unnecessary bills of costs and leave him substantially poorer than they found him.

But supposing he has the luck or the perseverance to find a well-disposed solicitor, his ordeal is by no means over. He makes his statement, which is taken down. He gives the names and addresses of his witnesses, who are interviewed and their evidence copied out and signed. The whole case is then put into proper form and sent to a counsel for his opinion.

If counsel's opinion is favourable, it is sent with the case to the Judge. It must be accompanied by an affidavit that the applicant is not worth £25 exclusive of wearing apparel. That is to say, a man who has a "home" comprising £10 worth of furniture and has saved £15 in the course of his life is accounted too rich to be allowed to sue *in formâ pauperis* and is faced with the cheerful alternative of either finding £50 or abandoning his case. And even if a man has actually not got a farthing of available money, the law sometimes, with fine irony, pronounces him too rich to be called pauper. Thus a police-constable in receipt of a pension of 28s. a week, though it was proved to be insufficient to feed and clothe his family, and unassignable at that, was held to be worth £25; and so too was a married lady who enjoyed an allowance at the rate of £1 a week. In the Divorce Court the rule has been so far modified that in practice applicants are allowed to sue *in formâ pauperis* if they can prove that their weekly wages are not more than 25s.; but even this latitude leaves an enormous class which is practically debarred from access to the Court. Supposing, however, that the Judge is satisfied by the affidavit that the applicant is genuinely indigent

within the meaning of the rule, and that the written case is a full and true statement of the facts, he may admit him to sue as a pauper and assign him a solicitor and counsel, usually those who have already advised him, if they consent to be assigned. From this point onward he has, as a rule, nothing to pay except his solicitor's out-of-pocket expenses and those of his witnesses, which, incidentally, may be no joke by themselves. But for the expenses of getting himself declared unable to incur any expense he is, by a Gilbertian touch, liable, and he may expect a little bill from his solicitor with some dozen or fifteen items such as taking instructions, attending witnesses, correspondence, drawing up case, copying evidence, attending counsel, counsel's fee, reporting counsel's opinion, drawing affidavit, marking exhibits, attending before Commissioner, fee for oath and exhibit, attending counsel for his consent to be assigned, lodging affidavit, &c. These services soon mount up to £4 or £5—a specimen kindly drawn up for me by a solicitor comes to £4 10s. 2d.—which is hardly an encouraging start for the wage-earner whose total capital in the world is *ex hypothesi* under £25. It should be said that there are many solicitors who would waive these charges or most of them; but these are what they are entitled to charge, and a poor man cannot count on finding a solicitor willing to waive his rights; and there are some who would run up a considerably larger bill. Of course, these are the costs of a plaintiff's application: a defendant would not be put to so great an expense, because all he has to do is to prove himself not worth £25. But if he fails to do that his position is far harder than a plaintiff's, since he finds litigation thrust upon him which he is utterly unable to sustain. Such are the obstacles which at present hinder the poor man's access to the High Court. The same is true, though in a much lower degree, of the County Courts, which have adopted the High Court rules on this subject.

Before proceeding, however, to describe the impending changes, it will be worth while to mention the chief attempt which has been made hitherto to mitigate the hardship of the present system. This has been the establishment of voluntary associations known as Poor Man's Lawyers. These have been started by various independent agencies. Often they are attached to missions or settlements: recently the Cavendish Club has been

active in promoting them. They generally consist of young barristers or solicitors, who are willing to make their early experiments *in corpore vili*. Barristers are, of course, not permitted to appear for a client free of charge nor unless they are instructed by a solicitor; but they may give free advice. Accordingly a court is holden on a given night each week in some favoured spot in Whitechapel or Lambeth or wherever it may be. The Court is usually a dingy back-room, and the cause list a succession of uncompensated workmen, unremunerated servants, unhusbanded mothers, wives with hair prematurely grey or eyes unnaturally black, tenants seeking to keep a roof over their heads or the ceiling from falling on their heads, broken bones, broken vows, broken contracts, an epitome of all the ills that flesh is heir to. To them the Court—which generally sits in pairs—tenders such advice as its knowledge of the law suggests, for them writes letters, interviews various rather indifferent specimens of humanity, negotiates settlements, or conducts the affair to a pass whence there is no escape but litigation.

In a word, whatever the flippant may say, there is no doubt that the Poor Man's Lawyer agencies are doing a really useful work, not only to themselves but to their clients, who are often highly appreciative and seldom critical. But they are less effective than they might be, and that for several reasons. In the first place they are thinly scattered over London, and not very widely known. Moreover they are, or were till recently, quite unrelated to each other: there was no common standard or method. An improvement has, however, been effected in this direction by the formation last year of the Poor Man's Lawyer Association of London, which has been approved by the Law Society. The Association has framed rules which aim mainly at securing (1) that only qualified barristers and solicitors shall give advice, (2) that no fees shall be charged under any circumstances, and (3) that no advising barrister or solicitor shall act in a case where he has advised. The last rule is a necessary one, because otherwise the besetting danger of these agencies would be the temptation to advise litigation for the sake of the fee or the advertisement that it brings.

It will be a great gain if all the voluntary agencies in London affiliate themselves to the central Association, and still more

if the latter becomes widely known. There must be plenty of willing men with an evening a week to spare, and there is no reason why a Poor Man's Lawyer department should not be established in every poor district in London.

But though the spread of free advice will go a long way to mitigate the hardship of the present poor man's law, it cannot touch the heart of the grievance. It cannot give the poor man access to the Court, though it may enable him to do without it. When litigation is the only solution the Poor Man's Lawyer has to retire from the case. He may be able to pass the applicant on to a friendly solicitor, but he has to leave the case to be built up practically *ab initio*. And if the poor man happens, as he generally does, to fall into that unlucky gulf of the passing rich at 25s. a week, his adviser is helpless and can only recommend him to bear the ills he has. To add that he can get redress by paying £50 for it is liable only to make him feel that the gentleman's sense of humour is as odd as his law.

Such are the uses and the limitations of the voluntary agencies which have hitherto tried to get round the poor man's hindrances to justice. Clearly there remains the need of a reform that will remove the root evil by making the special procedure for poor persons available to all who cannot afford the normal procedure. And such a reform will be of greatly increased value if it could be so carried out as to recognise the work of the voluntary agencies and enable them to bring their clients, when necessary, as it were to the threshold of the Court, instead of having to drop their cases the moment an action is contemplated. But it is time to examine the reforms actually impending and to see how far they go towards bridging the gulf.

The improvements which the new Rules are designed to effect are threefold. First, they extend the procedure. Under them a man may be admitted to sue as a "poor person" (the expression is substituted for "pauper") if he is worth less than £50 exclusive of wearing apparel and tools of trade: and under special circumstances the Judge may direct the admission of persons worth over £50, up to £100. This alteration will, of course, enormously extend the numbers eligible to sue as poor persons. It is, however, regrettable that the standard is still fixed by a lump sum, because such a method has little relation to the actualities of a

working-man's wealth. The average weekly wage-earner has no realisable capital except his home. In a sense his body is his capital, but it is not convertible into a lump sum. Nature only allows it him, like a married woman's settlement, without power of anticipation. His earning capacity cannot therefore be fairly capitalised in reckoning his available wealth. The Courts, however, have not adopted this view. The Divorce Court has chosen to rule that a man who earns 25s. a week is "worth £25," apparently irrespective of his necessary expenditure. The other Courts have laid down no clear principle in regard to wage-earners, though in the case of pensioners they seem to assume that the full annual value of the pension must be regarded as the lump sum under the rule. But such a composition is artificial and misleading. For purposes of litigation, a man is only worth what he has left to spend after providing for the necessaries of life. It is mere mockery to tell a labourer who is supporting a wife and six children on 30s. a week that he is "worth £25." He can no more realise £25 than he can fly. And it is useless to deal with working-class incomes apart from family circumstances. It is manifestly unjust to admit the poverty of a bachelor living at home on 24s. in the country, and to deny the poverty of a father of six who earns 26s. in a town. The only way of approximating to fairness is to draw up a scale, on the model of those used by the Charity Organisation Society or to be found in any of the books which deal with the cost of living. That is to say, for the purpose of discovering what a man is "worth" in the eye of the law, his gross income should be ascertained, and from that should be deducted his rent and so much for every adult and child for whose support he is responsible, and the balance alone reckoned as available for litigation.

There would be no real difficulty about this. Every "prescribed officer" (of whom more presently) could keep a scale. As it is, the applicant has to state his income, and this statement has to be verified. It would only be necessary for him to add the numbers of the family dependent on him and the rent.

But perhaps it is too much to expect such a development as yet. The procedure for poor persons is at present only a tentative attempt to meet the extremest cases of hardship. The day must come when it is comprehensively dealt with. Meanwhile the

present reforms are a most useful step in the right direction. By raising the limit to £50, and to £100 in exceptional cases, they far more than double the numbers to whom the procedure will be available, for, fortunately, a wage between 25s. and 50s. is far commoner (in London, at any rate) than a wage of less than 25s.; but a good deal will depend on how the Courts interpret the rule. In any case, the exception of tools of trade is a welcome reform, as these are as necessary to a man as his clothes.

So much for the extension of the procedure by the new rules. Secondly, they facilitate it. An applicant will no longer have to find a solicitor and persuade him to take up the case. All he will have to do will be to send in an application and two "references" to the "prescribed officer," who in London will be a Master of the High Court and elsewhere the district registrar. The prescribed officer is to keep two lists, the first, A, comprising solicitors and counsel who are willing to be assigned applications to investigate and report upon, and the second, B, comprising solicitors and counsel willing to conduct cases which have been reported on by list A. This division is necessary to prevent a solicitor or counsel reporting favourably on a case in order to have the κῦδος of conducting it.

When the prescribed officer receives the application he will assign it to a solicitor or counsel on list A. The latter will send for the applicant and satisfy himself that he is worth less than £50 (or less than £100 in special cases), and that he has a *primâ facie* case. For this purpose he can hear other witnesses and may require facts to be proved by affidavit, but not at the applicant's expense.

When the lawyer is satisfied that the applicant ought to be admitted to sue as a poor person, he will write a report to that effect and send it to the Judge. The Judge may then admit the applicant and assign him a solicitor and counsel from list B to conduct his case. The Judge has unfettered discretion both as to admitting and assigning, except that he must not assign from list B the same solicitor or counsel as the one on list A who has reported on the case. The solicitor and counsel assigned then proceed to see the case through. The great advantage of this procedure over the old is that the only act required of the applicant on his own initiative is the first application, and that

is made in a prescribed form to a prescribed officer. This will be an immense advantage to the poor. Instead of wandering dubiously round trying to find a solicitor to take up his case, he will be able to apply direct to a responsible officer. The boon will be scarcely less great to the voluntary Poor Man's Lawyers. At present these agencies either have to leave their clients to fend for themselves when it comes to litigation, or else pass them on to one or two obliging firms they know privately: which amounts to asking a favour each time. No young lawyer likes to be perpetually unloading unremunerative clients on to all the solicitors he knows.

From the point of view of pure procedure this change in the method of application is the most important of all the new rules. And it might be of even greater advantage if it could be simplified —in those cases, at least, in which recognised voluntary agencies are consulted. As the new rules stand, what will happen in those cases is this. A man will come to some Poor Man's Lawyer Committee for advice. They will investigate the case, write letters, negotiate for a settlement, and advise him as to his position. After a time it becomes clear that an action will be necessary, and that the man will require to sue as a poor person. All they can then do is to write out an application for the man to sign and send it in to the prescribed officer. This application will be assigned to a solicitor or counsel on the A list, who will have to investigate the case all over again.

It would therefore be a great economy of trouble if the practice were adopted that a recognised Poor Man's Lawyer agency (*i.e.* any of those affiliated to the London Association) should be allowed to send in the application together with a report signed by one of its legal members (who must have his name on the A list) to the prescribed officer, who would then treat the case as though the application had been previously received and assigned to that member to investigate and report upon. Such a practice would open the door to no abuse and would not only save a double investigation, but would enable the voluntary agencies to bring their clients, as already mentioned, to the threshold of the Court.

Finally, the new rules will effectively cheapen the poor man's procedure. Under the present arrangement, as we have seen, the applicant has to pay all the expenses incurred before his

actual admission to sue as a pauper, and these may well amount to a sum which seriously deters him from attempting so to sue. By the new rules he is exempt from all fees and charges from the moment of his application. The only payments which he is even allowed to make are to his solicitor for out-of-pocket expenses, including those of witnesses; and these are not chargeable unless he is willing to pay them.

The question of expenses, however, brings us to the *crux* of the whole scheme. If the poor person is not to pay, who is? The new rules point to the only possible solution. After cutting down costs by prohibiting counsel to receive any remuneration whatever, by only allowing solicitors their actual out-of-pocket expenses, and by eliminating court fees, taxation fees, and party costs, there remains an irreducible minimum, the actual expenses of the solicitor and of witnesses. These may be very small, but where there are several affidavits or other documents to be prepared, or several witnesses, especially if they come from a distance, they may be considerable.

The new rules provide that the solicitor may receive these out-of-pocket expenses "either from the poor person or out of any fund which may from time to time be created by the Treasury or approved by the Lord Chancellor." And it is quite clear that almost the whole practical value of the new rules will depend on the existence and adequacy of some such fund. For no solicitors can reasonably be expected to put themselves on to either the A or the B list unless their out-of-pocket expenses are guaranteed; and in most cases it will be useless to look to the poor person for them.

It is reported that the Bar Council have received a private gift to form the nucleus of such a fund; but whether this be true or not, it is earnestly to be hoped that the authorities will either secure a Treasury grant or take active measures to create a fund for this purpose: otherwise the new rules are likely to break down from the very first. No very large sum will be required; for the costs to be met from it will only average a few pounds for each suit.

The other critical feature of the new procedure will, of course, be the A and B lists. Its success or failure must largely depend on whether a sufficient number of solicitors and barristers will

place their names on either or both. It will require a good deal of public spirit to get an adequate panel. It is a public-spirited man who is willing to investigate and conduct a case for nothing at any moment. But one may feel confident that if only the new rules become sufficiently widely known, the men will be forthcoming and will send in their names by May 1 to the Prescribed Officer (Poor Persons), at the Royal Courts of Justice.

There is, however, a danger that some, especially barristers, will make a compromise between duty and inclination, and send in their names for the B list but not for the A list. It is greatly to be hoped that this temptation will be resisted. Naturally a young counsel is glad of any chance of appearing in Court, whereas there is little attraction in investigating a case in which he cannot hope to appear. But unless there are enough men on list A the scheme cannot be worked, and it is therefore of primary importance that both counsel and solicitors will have the public spirit to put their names down for both lists.

Naturally even under the new rules poor persons will mainly have the services of young and inexperienced counsel who have the necessary time to spare: but a most salutary reform will have been accomplished if they are given, in greater numbers and on easier conditions than before, the enjoyment of the elementary civic right of access to the highest Courts.

There is a good deal of difference of opinion as to how great the effect of these changes will be. It can hardly be doubted that the most numerous class of applicants who will take advantage of them at first will be those who seek divorce. Not that there is a great demand for divorce among the poor; there is not. But once a person wants a divorce they generally continue to want it till they get it. Consequently there must be an accumulation of people who have wanted a divorce. And whatever view may be taken of divorce—for some speak of it as a privilege and others as a poison—it is hardly possible to defend limiting it to the rich. It would be as just to allow the unrestricted sale of prussic acid to all who could pay £25 a bottle for it. As regards other classes of action, some people fear that the new procedure will lead to a rush of vexatious litigation, trifling libels, and the like. But this danger will be averted if the panels of solicitors and counsel do their duty, as they will, and only recommend

substantial cases. Others, again, think that little use will be made of it. If that is so, there will be the consolation of knowing that no great grievance exists. It is far more likely, however, that the new rules will cause a substantial increase, especially of the larger County Court cases and grave cases of libel and seduction; but it is hard and unwise to prophesy in such matters.

Finally, it must be admitted that the new rules do not by any means completely bridge the gulf. There will remain many poor folk worth over £50 but too poor to sue. A really sound solution cannot be reached until a more sensible criterion of wealth is adopted; but in the meantime we shall have cause to be thankful if the changes go a fair way towards diminishing the main reproach that lies upon our legal procedure.

ROBERT PALMER

GREATER BRITAIN AND INDIA

CANADIAN AFFAIRS

I

ONCE more the Canadian party scrummage is formed over the great underlying issue of railway policy—a kick-ball which will not be punted out of the arena of play until all three transcontinental thoroughfares are finished and in working order. It is not easy to over-estimate the political influence of Canada's three great railway corporations, the oldest of which, however, is so self-reliant and prosperous that it can well afford to ignore the warfare of party politicians—except, of course, when its vital interests are threatened. In Canada you may be a Conservative or a Liberal or you may sit on the fence; alternatively you may be C.P.R. or G.T.R. or C.N.R., or rather you might have been, for that is no longer the proper order of the three three-letter shibboleths according to the present emergencies of Dominion politics. It is the C.P.R. man, I should say, who sits at ease on a well-upholstered fence in these latter days, for he is much more concerned with questions of Imperial importance (being one of the greatest of all practical Imperialists) than with Canadian domestic issues. He is content to look westward or eastward along his all-red and all-ready route, which crosses two oceans and a continent, and silently congratulate himself that the victory of the Conservative Party in 1911 put an end for the time being to the American Reciprocity plan, which would have forced Canada's trade into new north-to-south channels and would have been a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole economic development of Canada since confederation was carried. More was done to avert this calamity by the saying of Sir William Van Horne (an

ex-President of the Canadian Pacific corporation) that the success of the Reciprocity plans would provide Canada with "a bed to lie on and die in" than by any two speeches on the right side of the Imperialism *v.* Continentalism issue. After all, this C.P.R. man, who holds aloof from the Ottawa party game as far as possible, is one of the policemen of Imperialism. He must needs think in terms of oceans and continents, and see clearly—more clearly perhaps than any politician walking and talking within his sphere of influence—that Canada's growth and that of the Empire in its entirety are but results of the operation of one and the same Imperial factor.

Let it be said here that the Reciprocity craze (which generally disguises itself as a pious aspiration after Free Trade in general and free wheat in particular) is not yet dead. It is damned, no doubt, but it still survives in the prairie provinces (especially Saskatchewan with its polyglot population) as well as in the council-chamber of Liberalism according to St. Laurier. The Saskatchewan Grain-Growers' Association, which represents the majority of the farmers in its province beyond a possibility of doubt, is still agitating for the removal of the Canadian duties on wheat and flour imported from the United States, a measure which would automatically remove the duties levied on Canadian wheat and flour entering that country. The farmers sincerely believe that if such a step were taken Canada's high-grade grain could be sold at a premium in Chicago and Minneapolis. But they do not see any more than they did in 1911 that the effect would be disastrous on the railway and lake-navigation companies and the great and growing milling industry, thanks to which the figures of traffic and concentration are distributed from west to east so that the Eastern provinces get some benefit from the vast expense of opening up Canada's half of the North American prairie-region to settlement and building up the canal system, which has made the St. Lawrence route as valuable to Canada as the Mediterranean was to the Roman Empire. The wheat-grower of the West is apt to forget that a nation cannot live by wheat alone; the all-Canadian idea is a little beyond one who sometimes thinks that "wheat-mining" is the alpha and omega of mankind's industry. The Reciprocity craze, which has its root in sectional selfishness,

will continue—like the Home Rule fallacy in the politics of the Mother Country—to exhibit an ebb and flow of potency in the warfare of political ideals. About the only way to kill it out would be a great increase in the British preference, such as is also vehemently desired by the Western farmers. Meanwhile the Imperialists of the East and of the Far West (British Columbia) can hold the balance aright. And the Borden Administration, it is manifest, see that the Reciprocitarians are still a fighting force and know that, in Marvell's words:

> The same arts that did gain
> A power, must it maintain.

It is the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the business of constructing the National Transcontinental Railway (which is to be leased to the Grand Trunk Pacific under conditions defined by statute and involving a definite standard of building) which has once more brought the question of railway policy into the political limelight. The Commissioners were Mr. Gutelius, a former divisional superintendent of the Canadian Pacific, and Mr. Lynch-Staunton, a well-known barrister. There is no reason whatever to doubt the disinterestedness of those charged with enquiring into the finances of this tremendous undertaking—a project which was beyond the powers of a government of politicians without a special knowledge of the business of constructing a railway through the wilderness and financing its construction. The report speaks of waste and extravagance on a colossal scale, the contractors who sub-let their easy contracts being able to earn huge profits. The Liberal leaders will gain nothing by attacking the good faith of the very able Commissioners or by suggesting that the policy of the present Government in regard to other railway undertakings is inspired by corrupt motives. The Canadian people, who are business men first and politicians afterwards, have long since decided that the financing of the National Transcontinental was careless and extravagant to a degree. It is a sad pity that the Government sections of the Transcontinental thoroughfare could not have been carried out as carefully and economically as those built by the Grand Trunk Pacific Company. The money lost is gone and cannot be recovered by any legal process; perhaps the less said about it the better

for Canada's business reputation. But, in my opinion, it will be a mistake if the original scheme of a Transcontinental of low gradients and easy curves and permanent solidity is to any extent abandoned. The Grand Trunk Pacific is Canada's *riposte* to the Panama Canal and ought to be built as originally designed in every respect. If it is not, how can the Grand Trunk Pacific be compelled to abide by the statutory conditions of leasing and operating it?

2

The Grand Trunk Pacific, however, is approaching completion, and when the rapidly diminishing gaps in the new steel thoroughfare between the Atlantic and the Pacific are filled up Canadians are likely to forget the huge bill that has been paid up. It will not be one of the emergency roads, which are designed in the first instance to bring in settlement, and cannot be brought up to the modern standard except by improvements extending over a long term of years. It will be a first-rate line in every respect, the easiest of all the trade-routes across the continent, and will be operated almost from the first at a minimum cost. What a sad thing it is that the creator of this colossal project could not live to see its completion! Canada and the Empire have had no better friend than the late Charles Hays, who was America's present to Canada in return for Canada's gift of Mr. J. J. Hill.

If anybody wishes to know what the new Transcontinental means to the Far West let him read Mr. J. B. Bickersteth's account* of his adventures as missionary in the vast territory lying between Edmonton and the Yellowhead Pass (by far the easiest loop-hole in the rampart of the Rockies), and extending northward to the Athabasca River, which is one of the "back blocks" it has opened up. Mr. Bickersteth was captain three years ago of the Oxford University "soccer" team, and he seems to have been as popular in a portion of the West that is still wild and woolly to a degree as he was at Oxford. Lord Grey describes his chapters as "the letters of a man in whom accuracy of observation, sympathy, sense of proportion, poise, courage, humour, self-forgetfulness and whole-hearted devotion to the service of God

* *The Land of Open Doors.* By J. B. Bickersteth. Foreword by Earl Grey. Wells Gardner, Darton and Co. 7s. 6d. net.

and man are alike conspicuous." He well deserves the ex-Governor-General's compliment, and I can heartily commend his book to those who wish to know what the Imperial Church is doing on the advancing front of Western civilisation, and at the same time learn the truth about the life and labour of the Canadian North-West. Among the men of the railway construction camps who are in some respects a race apart (like the placer-miners or the cow-boys of Mr. Owen Wister's older West), Mr. Bickersteth found many tough and intractable characters. The worst of them, however, liked him at sight and treated his office with a measure of respect that was none the less real because uncouthly expressed. Mr. Bickersteth scoffs at the idea that the Englishman as such is despised in western Canada. It is only the slack or bumptious English immigrant who is regarded with aversion; as he is indeed in his own country. The west he shows us is neither a Tom Tiddler's ground nor a Canaan overflowing with milk and honey: it is a land where a competence is only to be earned by hard and unremitting toil; but every man has a chance of earning it.

E. B. O.

INDIA

THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON INDIAN FINANCE

During all the long controversy, the questions in Parliament, the full-dress debates, and the flood of comments in the daily Press about the financial methods of the India Office, the subject was never alluded to in these Notes save once. That was fourteen months ago, and the allusion consisted of less than a dozen lines. Now that the Royal Commission on Indian Finance and Currency has presented its report, the matter may be discussed here without any risk of the charge that it has been prejudged. I do not propose to abuse or to accuse anybody. I only intend quite quietly to recite a few facts.

What has been at the root of all this trouble about the India Office? The Secretary of State has a number of advisers, known collectively as the Council of India. In recent years successive Secretaries of State have taken little heed of their Council; but

there were exceptions to their disregard. The Secretary of State has control of very large sums belonging to India. To advise him in his financial transactions, he had upon his Council certain magnates of the City of London. These gentlemen from the City were never slighted or thrust aside, as was for a time the rule in the case of the eminent administrators from India who formed the bulk of the Council. The City members, in fact, gradually became all-powerful in the India Office. They were listened to with bated breath. They were allowed to do what they liked, and did it. Even Secretaries of State, fresh from their books or from their little colonies, deferred to their judgment and dutifully obeyed their behests. They were magnates in the City, these gentlemen, but they strode through Whitehall like demi-gods. Yet though the India Office knew very little about finance, and therefore sought help from without, there was one permanent official within its walls who had a marvellous familiarity with the subject. This was Mr. Lionel Abrahams, C.B., now a full-blown Assistant Under-Secretary of State, and Clerk of the Council of India. Mr. Abrahams is one of those extraordinarily clever men who occasionally blossom in our Civil Service. He reminds one of that other official of whom, when he was at the India Office, the late Lord Wolverhampton used to say: "Look at that man, now. He could get ten thousand a year in the City any day. And how much do you think we pay him? Why, a paltry twelve hundred a year. When that man says so-and-so, how do you suppose I can go against him?" Mr. Abrahams is a man of similar type. He has astonishing capacity, indomitable industry, and he is perfectly honest and sincere. He knows so much more about all these subjects than anybody else, and he exercises so much unseen influence, that no one can stand against him. If he had elected to serve in India, and not in London, his fate would have been pre-ordained. They are always a little frightened of such men in India, and have quaint methods of dealing with them. Because he has a positive genius for finance, Mr. Abrahams would assuredly have been set to work making railway embankments, or shepherding refractory Maharajahs, or chasing dacoits in Burma, or some other task for which he is probably totally unfitted. I am not at all sure that the system is a wrong one. It saves a great deal of quite superfluous trouble. For

instance, at present Mr. Abrahams has conceived that a State Bank on a huge scale would be the best panacea for India's financial ills. He has produced a portentous memorandum and offered reams of evidence, in support of his belief. India has never asked for a State Bank. Most of the witnesses before the Commission were dead against the scheme. But Mr. Abrahams favours it, he has several allies, he has the ear of the India Office, and it is not at all improbable that he and those who think as he does will have their way. These things help to account for the fervour with which the Government of India, on their own ground, persist in cherishing the view that railway embankments and refractory Maharajahs have their peculiar uses.

The talents of the City gentlemen and Mr. Abrahams were doubtless exercised innocuously enough, until a few years ago India began to accumulate huge funds in London. Mr. Asquith has said that in the policy then adopted the Government only followed the precedent set by their predecessors. The statement does not bear examination, for the simple reason that their predecessors never had these immense sums at their disposal. Certain changes in the financial policy of India have of late placed enormous floating balances and other tremendous sums under the control of the Secretary of State. There was a time when Lord Morley, good innocent man, positively boasted of the gigantic financial patronage he was thus able to exercise. At a meeting of the Bankers' Association he said with pride that the maturing and lending of his cash balances amounted to £60,000,000 a year, and that the India Office was responsible in the year 1910–11 for a turnover of £160,000,000. This unprecedented financial patronage, for which the City can show no parallel, was not exercised in reality by the Secretary of State at all, nor did the ex-administrators from India who sit on his Council have any effective share in it. It was really exercised by the gentlemen from the City, with the incomparable Mr. Abrahams somewhere in the background. Let us not criticise them for undertaking these necessary duties. The work naturally and inevitably fell to them, and they had to do it; but what India said, and what onlookers said, was that a terrific power in the money market was being placed in the hands of two or three bankers and a

still comparatively young permanent official. It was not good, it was not wholesome that so much power should be quite casually entrusted to three or four men who were really responsible to no one. Whether they did the work well did not matter. The system was in any case wrong. India went a good deal further, however. There were voices in India which began to protest that the work was not well done, that City interests were favoured rather than Indian interests, that the whole procedure needed investigation, and that there were features about it which required to be brought to light. How far these strictures were justified we shall see later.

What brought the whole question to a head was a side issue. The purchases of silver by Messrs. Samuel Montagu and Co. for the India Office, which formed the subject of so much controversy in Parliament and out of it, and cost Sir Stuart Samuel his seat, had very little to do with the broad criticisms directed against the India Office. They were a separate transaction, the Royal Commission did not investigate them, and they are only alluded to here because they illustrate the methods practised by the gentlemen who controlled the India Office financial transactions. Put in a sentence, the Bank of England had the business of buying silver for the India Office, and Messrs. Samuel Montagu and Co. secretly got it away from the Bank. So short is the public memory nowadays that certain Government organs have been permitted to assert quite recently without contradiction that Messrs. Montagu and Co. made the purchases at the invitation of the India Office. Such is not the case. Messrs. Montagu asked for the business in an unofficial letter to Sir Felix Schuster, the Chairman of the Finance Committee of the India Council, and they got it. Whether they prevented the success of an alleged "corner" in silver, and whether they made or lost money themselves, are questions of minor moment. They did not make the proposal from patriotic motives, but as a matter of business. The whole transaction was nevertheless a perfectly honest one. It raises points of discretion and good taste, and not of ntegrity. The salient facts in this connection are that the deal was kept secret from Sir Stuart Samuel, the head of the firm, because he happened to be a Member of Parliament; that it was kept secret from Mr. Edwin Montagu, then Under-Secretary

of State for India, with the right to sit on the Finance Committee, because of his "close relationship" to the firm; that it was initiated in an unofficial letter to Sir Felix Schuster, who is Governor of the Union of London and Smiths Bank, which happens to number Messrs. Montagu and Co. among its clients; and that it was kept secret from the Bank of England, although the Bank believed that under a verbal arrangement with Lord Inchcape, subsequently confirmed in writing, the silver purchases for the India Office were to be exclusively undertaken by them. It is interesting to observe that the note of the terms, upon which the Bank of England relied, was "written on India Office paper in Mr. Abrahams' own handwriting." That is perhaps all that need be said about the silver purchases. It was the verbal arrangements, the unofficial letters, the secrecy from this person and from that, the hole-and-corner character of the whole transaction, the apparent tricking of the Bank of England, the undue intimacy of the affair, that the public condemned, and rightly condemned. There was nothing morally wrong about it, but it was highly injudicious and inexpedient.

Out of the silver purchases controversy grew the movement which ended in the Royal Commission. "Our trusty and well-beloved" subjects forming the Commission had to enquire into many things, but one question commended to their attention was the problem of what those estimable City gentlemen, Lord Inchcape, Sir Felix Schuster, and the rest, with the inevitable Mr. Abrahams in the rear, had been doing with the Secretary of State's balances. Had they administered them wisely and well, or had they not? It had already become known that portions of these balances had been placed on deposit in banks with which members of the Finance Committee were connected, and the suggestion had been made that these deposits were at uncommonly low rates of interest. For instance, the Union of London and Smiths Bank, of which Sir Felix Schuster is the Governor, had on deposit without security in 1911 over £3,000,000 of Indian money. The National Provincial Bank of England, of which Lord Inchcape is a director, had repeatedly held large sums in a similar way; in 1912, when he had ceased to be a member of the India Council, it held on deposit £1,300,000 of Indian money. Again, it was known that Messrs. Samuel Montagu and Co.

had borrowed from the Secretary of State, and repaid, an annual sum averaging £2,000,000 ever since 1908. The contention was that in practice the firm had received "what amounts to permanent loans at rates ordinarily payable for short-term loans"; and the same contention is applied to various other favoured firms. There was again nothing morally wrong in any of these transactions. The Secretary of State had long been accustomed to make short-term loans from his surplus balances to approved firms in the City; only until recent years he had never had a great deal to lend. When his balances at length swelled enormously, he could not find enough borrowers in the City. A good many City firms do not care to borrow big sums for very short periods, and not all of them seem to have been given facilities for almost continuous borrowing. Lord Inchcape, who was then Chairman of the Finance Committee, thereupon made the ingenious suggestion that the large balances unutilised for loans might be placed on temporary deposit in joint stock banks. The suggestion was possibly a good one, though many people in India do not think so; but what was perhaps unfortunate was that two of the first four banks selected for this purpose were Lord Inchcape's own and Sir Felix Schuster's. Observe the great delicacy and consideration of these City gentlemen in their attitude towards each other. Being Chairman of the Finance Committee, Lord Inchcape was blushingly compelled himself to suggest his own bank as a suitable receptacle for India's surplus cash; but when it came to Sir Felix Schuster's bank he explains: "I would like to say that these deposits were made with my sanction, without any reference to Sir Felix Schuster. Sir Felix Schuster and I never discussed the apportionment of these deposits, nor did we discuss the matter of rates." A very nice and proper feeling; but one rather wonders whether the demi-gods ever winked at each other. It is clear, nevertheless, that when Lord Inchcape was instructing the India Office broker to make these huge deposits in joint-stock banks, he had his embarrassing moments. Other banks might have wanted these deposits, and might have offered better terms. But when torn between his conflicting emotions as a banker, and as a custodian of India's money, he never flinched, as is shown by his answers to the following questions:

10,707. Are you satisfied as a business man that you did in fact get the best rates—I will not say in every single instance?—I always did the very best I could for the Secretary of State. I put myself in the place of the Secretary of State, and I dealt in reference to his money precisely as if I were dealing with my own. I got the very best rate I possibly could. With regard to the deposits in the National Provincial Bank, I squeezed the very last penny out of them.

10,708. That was your own bank?—Yes, my own bank. It was the business of the manager of the bank to get the money from me on the best terms he could, and it was my business to get the best that I could from the manager of the bank. He knew that perfectly well.

Very nice and proper again; a positively idyllic scene between the Relentless Committee-man and the Importunate Manager. Sir Felix Schuster was equally austere when in turn he became Chairman of the Finance Committee, as is shown by the following answer:

11,001. Suppose that the Accountant-General and the broker proposed to make an additional deposit with your own bank; what would be your position then?—Of course I considered myself in that matter as representing the Secretary of State and not my own bank. It was my duty to get the best possible rate for the Secretary of State. I, representing the Secretary of State, asked our manager, or got the broker to ask our manager, What is the best rate you can allow for this deposit? I got that answer from him, without interfering myself in my position as a director of a bank. Having had that rate given by our manager I told the broker, Our bank will allow, say, 3½ per cent.; now that is the best rate from them; you try and get a higher rate at other banks if you can. He did, and I got the information from him that he had been to A, B, and C banks, who would only allow so much; if that rate was worse than our rate, our rate would be accepted, but if it was better our deposit would be paid off. On several occasions certainly we declined it because it did not suit us to take it.

Now, no one need doubt that these gentlemen gave these answers in perfect good faith. It may further be conceded that these answers no doubt represented precisely what passed, that nothing untoward occurred, and that the money was placed on deposit in their own banks at just as good a rate of interest as might have been obtained anywhere else. That is not the question. The question is whether it is wise and expedient for gentlemen holding confidential paid positions as advisers to the Secretary of State, to be directing and controlling financial transactions between the India Office and the institutions with which they happen to be connected in another capacity? May not their proceedings be open to misconception? And there are other

questions which arise. Why do these wealthy financial magnates consent to serve year after year, for pay which must be a matter of entire indifference to them, upon India Office Committees? Is it from pure patriotism, or from a kindly desire to steer the innocent Lord Morley and the inexperienced Lord Crewe through the mazes of the money market? Is it because one way to baronetcies and coronets lies through the portals of Whitehall? Is it because they seek the immense financial patronage which is eagerly placed at their disposal? Has India any justification for saying that they have let her balances pile up for the benefit of the London money market? And does the India Office really require so much advice from these self-sacrificing gentlemen? Let us see what the Royal Commission has to say in answer to some of these questions.

The Commission's report throughout bears evidence to the moderate and judicial influence exercised by Mr. Austen Chamberlain. It is mild and restrained, at times almost non-committal, certainly never accusatory. The Commission found that the great growth of the balances in London was due mainly, "though not entirely," to accidental causes and to the prosperity of India. It considered that the India Office perhaps sold Council Drafts unnecessarily at very low rates on occasions when the London balance was in no need of replenishment, but advised no new restrictions in this respect. It so far recognised the justice of India's complaints as to urge that loans should be regularly made to the Presidency Banks in India from the surplus balances in the hands of the Government of India. On the other hand, it held that the Secretary of State had made good use of his balances, and that the system of granting loans to approved borrowers in the City was "on the whole well managed," though it suggested certain improvements, and particularly the enlargement of the list of approved borrowers. The following is the somewhat colourless comment of the Commission on the question of deposits in banks:

It is stated that the broker finds himself unable as a rule to place more than from £10,000,000 to £11,000,000 with borrowers on the list under the rules to which he is required to conform. From June 1909 to December 1912 the total India Office balance was considerably higher than £11,000,000. The broker was accordingly directed to place the remainder on deposit with certain specified London banks. The deposit

was usually for a period of two months, but some belonging to the Gold Standard Reserve were occasionally deposited in this way for three months.

In view of the fact that two successive chairmen of the Finance Committee and another member of that Committee were also members of the directorates of banks with which such deposits were made at a time when they held their appointments at the India Office, and that unfavourable comment has been publicly made on this association, we have examined very carefully into the circumstances attending the making of these deposits. [redacted] connection between members of the Finance Committee and certain of the banks led to any kind of favouritism being shown to these banks. The deposits were never made at anything less than the best rate of interest obtainable at the time they were made. There was no hesitation in removing a deposit from one bank to another if advantage could be secured by so doing. There is, therefore, no ground for criticism of the way in which this duty was discharged. But we think it advisable to call the attention of the Secretary of State to *the importance of avoiding as far as possible all occasion for criticism of this nature*, though it may be founded on prejudice and ignorance of the facts.

The conclusions of the Commission may be accepted readily enough, so far as they go; but in the opinion of a good many people competent to judge, they leave much unsaid which ought to have been said. The touching pictures of these financial dignitaries wrestling with their own managers from a pure and fervent desire to do their best for the Secretary of State—that helpless and childlike being!—may be perfectly accurate. The spectacle of that pathetic martyr to public duty, Lord Inchcape, "squeezing the very last penny" out of his own bank sooner than India should suffer loss, may be entirely believable. These simple and affecting narratives will not be questioned here. But is it right and expedient that the Secretary of State, through his ignorance of finance and the money market, should put these self-sacrificing gentlemen in a position which might easily have become invidious if they had not been so very careful? Is it wise that the Government should place so much control of the London money market in the hands of private individuals, however helpful their advice may sometimes be? Is all the criticism that has been heard unfounded? Is there, on the facts disclosed, absolutely no foundation for the frequent statement that the finances of India in London had got into the hands of a little clique, which managed the entire business in a hole-and-corner way, not always to its own disadvantage, which cared very little about India and a great deal about the London money

market? I shall not answer these questions. Readers may judge for themselves. Two points only remain to be noted in this connection. The first is that the Commission thinks that "undue prominence" has been given to "City experience" on the Finance Committee of the Council of India, and recommends that in future only one City member should be appointed. The second is a point which the Commission ought to have recommended, but did not. It is that no City member of the Finance Committee should retain his seat if the India Office enters into any financial transactions with any institution with which he may happen to be intimately associated. Only thus will misconceptions be in future avoided.

The issues of a larger and more general kind dealt with by the Commission must be reserved for discussion on another occasion. Meanwhile one feels moved to revert again to the compelling figure of Mr. Abrahams, the Admirable Crichton who loomed so large throughout the whole enquiry. Mr. Abrahams has a fascination which never flags. He is so ready, so delightfully omniscient, so serenely confident, so sure of his aims. Take just one little touch. He is talking of the best way of seeking City advice, and parenthetically observes: "So long as we have a broker of our own, *that is until he is swept away by a State Bank*." You note the quietly masterful assumption. No one, save Mr. Abrahams, has decided on a State Bank; even the modest Royal Commissioners would make no recommendation about it, one way or the other. But Mr. Abrahams seems to want a State Bank, and in his vision the thing is settled. If it is, it would probably be found in practice to have perpetuated at the London end the very defects of control which are now so much assailed. Thoughts of this kind do not disturb our incomparable Assistant Under-Secretary. He committed himself to the remarkable statement that there was no one in the India Office with Indian experience of finance, but there was "an enormous amount of written experience," and "the number of people who are extremely familiar with the written experience is *quite satisfactory*." If the India Office prefers to control India, and to decide great issues, on third-hand knowledge of "written experience" instead of consultation with actual experience, a good many things which have hitherto puzzled many people become

plain. It is a quaint, complacent place, the India Office. Everybody is so entirely pleased with everybody else, and they all toil until their eyes grow dim over "the enormous amount of written experience which the Office contains." They work so hard at controlling India. Consider the pathos of Mr. Abrahams' account of the woes of the Financial Secretary, an office he has recently vacated: "The burden is heavier than one man should bear. He may have to deal with large questions when jaded and pressed with conflicting duties; he cannot attempt to keep up as he should like his general financial and economic knowledge; he is likely to break down at intervals from overwork." Deplorable! And yet there are ignorant people who continue to think of the India Office as a placid duck-pond which wants stirring up now and then with a long pole.

ASIATICUS

CORRESPONDENCE

THE DEAD HAND OF FEDERALISM: A CANADIAN REJOINDER

To the Editor of the NATIONAL REVIEW

SIR,—I have no intention, even if I possessed the ability necessary for such a task, of attempting to refute Mr. Ian Colvin's indictment of American and Australian Federalism as both weak and, at the same time, anti-democratic. I prefer, with your kind permission, to present my rejoinder, if it can be so considered, in the form of impressions gathered, both from a ten years' residence at Ottawa and from such reading of Canadian and American history, documentary or printed, as I have had opportunity to make.

Concerning Australian Federalism I will say nothing, since I know nothing. Concerning the "vices" of American Federalism I will only remark that a system devised in the eighteenth century and stereotyped by an inflexible written constitution hardly seems, as I view it, to offer any points for practical comparison with such an "Imperial Federalism" as that of which "Federal Home Rulers" hope to build the foundations by giving to Ireland the status of Canada, and to the Irish provinces the autonomy of Ontario and Quebec.

Canadian Federalism offers, in a word, the only analogy, real or assumed, whereby we may judge any such scheme as above referred to. In the first place, Federalism was deliberately adopted in Canada by such statesmen as Sir John Macdonald and Sir George Etienne Cartier, after twenty-seven years of legislative union (1840–1867), as the only possible alternative to disruption and the annexation of Quebec, at all events, to the United States. But Canadian Federalism, with its racial and religious problems, and the predominant position of the minority in the central Parliament (65 votes out of a total of 134), offers, in the second place, a still more immediate and much closer parallel to "Federal Home Rule" for Ireland. The facts here briefly indicated literally need no comment; the application appears—to Federal Home Rulers— plain, unmistakable, and urgent.

May I venture to add, in this connection, first, that the "fiscal discrimination" as between unit and unit (province and province), seemingly feared as the result of Irish autonomy, does not exist in the case of Canada, and need not exist as between Ireland and England were the "Canadian parallel" applied by statesmen in a statesmanlike fashion.

Secondly, that the fashion of speaking of Irish Home Rule as involving an (apparently) "lower status of British citizenship" in the case of Ulster Protestants is one which will be strongly and justly resented by the "British citizens" of our overseas Dominions. Is the "status" of a Canadian subject "lower," in this respect, than that of a native-born Briton? And if not, why assume (or pretend) that Irish "citizenship" would necessarily be "inferior" to English or Scottish under Irish autonomy? The inference, in either case, seems to me as dangerous as it is radically false.

Trusting that you may see good to insert this letter,

I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS W. GREY, D.Litt.

The Manor Lodge, Alexandra Road, Watford,

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EPISODES OF THE MONTH

The Royal Visit to France

It is an immense relief to be able to turn for a moment from the sinister machinations of the bloodthirsty bounders who momentarily hold this unfortunate country by the throat —our Huertas, Villas and Carranzas—to such a delightful episode as the visit of the King and Queen to Paris, which from every point of view was a conspicuous and unclouded success. It is always somewhat difficult to ascertain the exact truth about any Royal function which ex hypothesi must be represented by an inviolable convention—with which no sensible person would quarrel as it is of the utmost advantage to the country to possess one institution above criticism—as a notable triumph. But there was nothing conventional about the success of their Majesties' visit to Paris, which made a deep and abiding impression on *La ville lumière*, and through Paris on the Nation at large, just as the wonderful reception they received everywhere from our brilliant neighbours across the Channel made a corresponding impression on the people of the United Kingdom. It was an event which will count in the time to come, for it left things different to what it found them. Another link has been forged in a priceless chain. The friendship between the two countries which had already been put to rude tests with disastrous results to the common aggressor, will be more enduring and powerful than ever

as a European factor, thanks to the personal contribution made by the King and Queen during those strenuous and joyous days in Paris which every one, from President Poincaré and Madame Poincaré down to the humblest seamstress, combined to make an ineffaceable impression on their illustrious guests. King George was welcomed in many capacities, firstly as the son of his father, whom the French rightly regard as the great architect of the Entente, to whose courageous personal initiative and action it was due. "Le Roi Edouard" is a name to conjure with on the Continent, and the true greatness of the late King can only be appreciated by those who have had the opportunity of hearing his praises sung by foreign statesmen who came in contact with him. King George was also welcomed as a typical British gentleman who of late years has become particularly sympathetic to Frenchmen, and also as the representative of a friendly and all but allied Power. President Poincaré's felicitous speeches, to which the King so admirably responded, breathe the true spirit of the great defensive pact which has played so momentous a part in preserving the peace of Europe, and we rejoice to observe that in the official statement issued at the close of the Royal visit—the political importance of which was not lessened by the presence of the British Foreign Minister in the Royal suite—it was stated that:

> In the course of the conversations which have been carried on between Sir Edward Grey and M. Doumergue on the occasion of the visit of their Majesties the King and Queen to Paris, the various questions interesting the two countries have been considered and the identity of the views of the two Ministers on all points has been established, regard being paid to the results of the policy pursued by the two Governments in association with the Imperial Russian Government. Sir Edward Grey and M. Doumergue are in complete agreement as to the necessity of the three Powers continuing their constant efforts with a view to the maintenance of the balance of power and of peace.

Triple Entente

THAT is the gist of the policy governing the Entente between ourselves and France, which is completed by the relations subsisting on the one hand between the members of the Dual Alliance, our own happy and beneficent relationship with Russia, and the common co-operation of the three Powers where common interests are involved. It is perhaps the only non-destructive work for which the present British Government is destined to be remembered. It was noted that

throughout the Royal visit to Paris, the importance and success of which even the Potsdam Party knew it would be futile to minimise, Ministerial newspapers were frequently pecking at the Entente and laboriously depreciating its significance, while they became positively hysterical at the mention of the Triple Entente, which is like a red rag to a bull. So far as we have observed, every single Radical newspaper is a bitter enemy of the Triple Entente, which is a necessary counterpoise to the Triple Alliance, yet some of the same organs which decry Ententes and Alliances and would have us relapse to the days of Perfide Albion when we hadn't a friend who counted in Europe, are prepared at need to defend our miserably inadequate naval preparations on the express ground that the real naval position necessitates our counting French and Russian battleships as though they were for all practical purposes British battleships and would be with us in the event of a conflict with Germany and her allies. As usual they would have it both ways. We are to have all the advantages of the Triple Entente without any corresponding obligations. To any one who cares to look the facts in the *face* it is obvious that in the parlous plight to which we have been reduced by the Coalition, which is tantamount to the eclipse of England in Europe, our main security against German attack is the Triple Entente and the wholesome belief in Berlin that in the event of unprovoked aggression upon these islands the guns would go off in France and Russia. Long may that belief prevail, though it is dangerous and humiliating for us to trade on it. France and Russia are both making prodigious patriotic sacrifices in the interests of peace. They are entitled to ask and to go on asking, however politely, that we shall at any rate abstain from civil war, shall put our house in order and make adequate contribution to the common pot. In this connection we would vehemently protest against the conduct of Radical Jews, who, while pretending that the possibility of Pogroms in Russia offers an insurmountable obstacle to Anglo-Russian friendship, enthusiastically support Pogroms of Protestants in Ireland.

United States and Mexico

Many of us have long thought that sooner or later conflict must arise between the Great Republic and her anarchic neighbour, but for some mysterious reason the Americans regarded such a suggestion as unsympathetic, if not malicious. At last the inevitable crisis has come, and, as usually happens in such cases, over some comparatively trifling matter, viz., as to the manner in which the Stars and Stripes should be saluted by the Huerta Government as a reparation for the unwarrantable arrest of American sailors. President Wilson found himself constrained to order the American fleet to seize Vera Cruz, while the Senate was debating the wording of a declaratory resolution; and although the amiable and attractive optimist at the White House persists in regarding himself as at peace with the Mexican nation, while waging war upon President Huerta, whose "elimination" has long been a cardinal object of Washington policy, the rest of the world, apparently including the Mexicans, insists that Mexico and the United States are practically at war. Experts are making the usual alternative forecasts (1) that the Americans are engaged in a military picnic, which will be over before Whitsuntide; (2) that they are in for a long and costly "Boer War," involving many casualties and little glory. In any case, it is their business and not ours; and although we have never belonged to the Anglo-American Gushing Brigade, there is no occasion for British newspapers to make themselves disagreeable about the action of the United States, for which British history supplies many precedents. The wonder is not that the Americans are at war with their impossible neighbours, but that they have kept the peace so long; and yet this is the manner in which the *Nation*, the organ of Carnegieism, Cocoa, and Cant, thus permits itself to speak of President Wilson, one of the most high-minded of living statesmen: "A statesman who sacrifices lives because some ceremonial detail is lacking in the ritual of an apology, is behaving with a levity unworthy of a civilised ruler. This deliberate and needless raising of the point of honour is a lapse into barbaric morals, which would be more natural in some Prussian colonel in an Alsatian garrison than in the humanitarian President of a civilised Republic." It were charitable to assume that the strain of supporting the Pogrom has temporarily robbed

A Preliminary Question

After our experiences of his Majesty's Ministers in the Marconi scandal, the public are naturally on the *qui vive* as to the extent to which any particular episode might be exploited by politicians who so happily combine the process of furthering their Party ends with that of feathering their private nests. Now that the Unlimited Right of Ministers to Speculate has become part of the accepted creed of the Coalition and confessed or detected speculators, no matter how low they may stoop in concealing their operations, are white-washed by the House of Commons, canonised by the National Liberal Club, glorified and honoured by the Prime Minister, we naturally consider each successive crisis from the practical point of view, and seek to ascertain how far lucky politicians "in the know" and their favoured friends may find themselves in a position to secure some of that "unearned increment" which makes a Duke into a criminal and a Radical Chancellor of the Exchequer a popular hero. Our readers may be interested in extracts from the City articles of the *Morning Post* covering the period of the abortive Pogrom, the inception of which, as Lord Percy points out in his powerful indictment, possibly dates from one of Mr. Lloyd George's giddy breakfasts in Downing Street, where the enemies of the British Army and the enemies of the Ulster Loyalists hit on the brilliant idea of launching the one against the other with tolerable equanimity as to the result. If the Army failed many birds would be killed with one stone, as its "uselessness" would be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Radical Party, and the sum spent upon it could in familiar platform jargon be devoted to "social reform." The Nationalists would be enchanted at the downfall of an old enemy, whose victories have caused them such pain, while its reverses have afforded corresponding glee. On the other hand, in the event of a successful coup against Ulster, and surprise is a great factor in war—especially in civil war when no attack is expected—the Loyalists would be smashed and the Molly Maguires would be installed in triumph. It was, indeed, a Machiavellian scheme from the Coalition standpoint, which placed its authors in the happy position of "Heads I win and tails I don't lose." We do not pretend to know what brilliant brain conceived the abortive Pogrom, though all the

and to take a more hopeful view of the efforts of those less extreme who are working for a way out. . . . Consols were unchanged. Home Railway Stocks rose; Bears again. It was an idle day .

CLOSING PRICES OF CONSOLS : 74¾ to 74⅞.

Tuesday, March 24. FIRMER MARKETS

On the Stock Exchange yesterday, in spite of the political commotions, the tone of business in general was firm and prices rose. It might have been thought that all the alarming rumours would have caused a slump, but apparently the effect of them upon the mind of the City was to convince it that so acute and early a culmination of the crisis must lead to a settlement, because of the very gravity of the dangers threatened. A lightning flash that clears the air before you know where you are is better than a long drizzle. So Bears, in fear of a settlement, closed their "short" accounts, and prices rose. Consols rose gallantly $\frac{7}{16}$ to 75$\frac{5}{16}$. Home Railway securities were firm. . . .

CLOSING PRICES OF CONSOLS : 75$\frac{8}{16}$ to 75$\frac{5}{16}$, plus $\frac{7}{16}$.

Condition of Successful Speculation

SUCCESSFUL speculation demands movements in the market, and whether the movement be upward or downward matters little so long as the speculator is on the right side of the movement, and is able from inside information to form intelligent anticipations as to the probable course of prices. The reader will note the sharp rises and falls in Consols, which were accompanied by similar movements in other gilt-edged securities which would enable large sums to be made in a very short time without any money passing or any material risk. Whether Ministers or their relatives or their City friends exploited the Pogrom for the purpose of making money we cannot say at the present time, because we do not know, but there seems to have been exceptional activity in normally stagnant markets, and there is nothing in the record or character of his Majesty's present advisers to prevent us from believing that they would reject opportunities of profitable speculation. It is certain that if they were detected, either by the judicial enquiry, which they dread, or by accident, of which they may be at the mercy, they would be white-washed by the House of Commons, banqueted at the National Liberal Club, while Mr. Asquith would go out of his way to applaud their candour and integrity, while at a pinch, Sir Edward Grey, *vir pietate gravis* of the Party, would come forward to throw an ægis of respectability over any

colleague in distress. This matter should not be allowed to rest where it is. The impeachment of all Ministers mixed up in the Pogrom plot is a matter of urgent vital necessity, which should become a prominent plank in the Unionist platform. It is no less important to ascertain whether the men who plotted this dastardly coup added speculation to their other crimes, and though difficult it should not be impossible to probe the truth in the light supplied by the Marconi scandal. As the reader will observe from the quotations on a previous page, there was a sharp fall in Consols on the first three days of the week ending March 21, the price dropping between March 14 and March 18 from $75\frac{7}{16}$—$75\frac{9}{16}$ to $74\frac{3}{4}$—$74\frac{7}{8}$. This can scarcely be explained away by any operations of the National Debt Commissioners, because the whole gilt-edged market was equally affected. Then, as we read in the *Morning Post* of Friday March 20, came a sharp rise, with the explanation "the only substantial reason for the rise was that Bulls came on the scene to buy call options."

Gambling in a Gamble

THE next day came another fall of $\frac{5}{16}$, after which the Pogrom culminated, collapsed, and our crypto Cromwells scuttled to cover. What would be interesting to know is whether during these periods of violent oscillations, financiers in touch with Ministers and likely to have inside information were Bulls or Bears on any large scale. The Prime Minister, who appears so sensitive concerning the "honour" of Ministers, would be well advised—not that we imagine for a moment he will take the advice—to hold an enquiry such as he refused to hold as regards the Marconi speculations of his colleagues, in order that he may be in a position to state on oath that Ministers confessedly guilty of many unspeakable abominations were at any rate guiltless of the crowning abomination of turning their Pogrom to pecuniary account. It is equally necessary to know as to whether, even if they did not operate themselves, they "tipped the wink" to friends in the City who might be expected to repay them in kind at the first favourable opportunity. If our readers challenge us as to whether we accuse members of the Asquith Ministry of making money in the recent crisis,

we say frankly that we should not be surprised to find that those who would so lightly gamble with the lives of their political opponents were capable of gambling in that gamble on the Stock Exchange, though after recent lessons they would probably take infinite precautions in covering up their tracks.

A Congenial Topic

We come now to a more congenial topic: Mr. Churchill, whom no one would accuse of Stock Exchange speculations, which, as we know from his sworn testimony before the Marconi Select Committee, he holds in horror. His activities have lain in other spheres. He has devoted his entire existence to achieving what he conceives to be "success" alias notoriety. At last he has done something which, if not exactly deserving immortality, should at any rate secure for its author a temporary niche in the chronicles of our time. Never has so much machinery been employed with so little result as that concentrated on the booming of the Windbag of Dundee. He began intriguing with the Press when barely out of his teens. This is scarcely surprising in a desperate young man in a desperate hurry to "arrive," though it is surprising that any portion of the Press should have lent itself to the manœuvres of our "arriviste." Still more surprising is the combined failure of Mr. Churchill and his journalistic henchmen to palm him off on the public as a great man. Lord Northcliffe is one of the most striking personalities of our generation; in his own way he is a genius. How his acumen could ever have allowed him to imagine that anything could be made of an egomaniac remains one of the minor mysteries of politics. The Harmsworth Press has been consistent in few things except in advertising this unconscionable adventurer, from whom its unfortunate readers are never given a holiday at any period of the year, whether he dives or lies or flies. But the net result of the stupendous and protracted efforts of "five times the largest circulation in the world," has been to demonstrate the vast difference between Harmsworth Press opinion and public opinion. Colossal circulations and unlimited advertisements may coincide with infinitesimal influence on the nation by whom the great Harmsworth hero is equally distrusted and despised. However, as already admitted, he has at last done something

which the world would not willingly forget. As a rule the dreary and verbose typoscripts which Mr. Churchill discharges as "speeches" in the House of Commons, or from the platform, wither as they fall on the faithful organs which religiously reproduce them. They count for little or nothing, and as a general rule remain unread, except by emotional editors working up the Churchill boom, whose latest manifestations, our readers may remember, was a "new National Party" which Mr. Churchill was to lead, though who was to follow was never precisely defined by the misguided enthusiasts of Carmelite House, engaged, as usual in "backing the wrong horse."

Projecting the Pogrom

Nevertheless, Mr. Churchill made a speech six weeks ago still worth recalling. As a study in psychology it is interesting as confirming the view that the speaker would never be really dangerous because he will always "give away the show." He gave it away with both hands at Bradford on March 14, and although we are duly grateful for that warning to all whom it might concern, we would as soon see a homicidal lunatic at the head of the Admiralty as the present mountebank, who in order to provide limelight for himself would set Ulster in a blaze to-day or the world in a blaze to-morrow. In order to emphasise his own importance as a mouthpiece of the Government and to launch the Pogrom with due éclat, Mr. Churchill took with him to Bradford the Chief Whip, Mr. Percy Illingworth, whom one might have imagined would have been fully occupied in administering the funds of the Radical Party. After the usual travesty of the political situation Mr. Churchill declared: "God forbid that I should ever stand in the path of conciliation." Then he expatiated, doubtless with an eye to the restive Irish vote of Dundee, on "the wisdom and the eloquence with which Mr. Redmond (cheers) has conducted this great historical controversy," and anticipated the happy day "when of their own free will the Ulster counties that have exercised the option will seek to be incorporated in the ancient Parliament of their Motherland, when that brilliant and courageous speaker Mr. Devlin will lead the Democracy of Belfast to take their true position in the Council of United and Progressive Ireland." After this flap-

doodle Mr. Churchill came to real business. Ulster was to be challenged to fight, and indeed as we have learnt since, to be compelled to fight. If Ulstermen rejected "the offer" of the Government, which, be it remembered, involved automatic inclusion in six years, "it can only be because they prefer shooting to voting (cheers), because they would rather use the bullet than the ballot (cheers)." Then came the trite observation "We live in a strange world." We certainly do, and the world is a good deal stranger to-day than when the *grand agent provocateur* unfolded his project at Bradford:

> Many extraordinary things have happened, but what are we to say of persons professing to be serious who are ready to raise an impious hand against the laws of their country, who are ready, so they tell us, to shed the blood of their fellow men, all because they won't take the trouble to walk into the polling-booth and mark a voting paper? Is it not strange that they should be so eager to begin the horrid work, which at the very best must be a tragic adventure, that they cannot even wait for the result of the General Election, which cannot now be long delayed, and which, according to what they say of their prospects, may quite easily remove all need for revolution.

Pinchbeck Napoleon

AT the moment of this sinister utterance our pinchbeck Napoleon had already matured his plan for doing the very thing of which he was accusing Ulster, and of organising a Pogrom for which, if for once we may believe the Prime Minister, his Majesty's Government had no responsibility and was ex hypothesi unknown to the King, though Colonel Seely has been at pains to inform the public that nothing was done without the full cognisance not merely of what is generally known as the Pogrom Committee of the Cabinet, but also of the Cabinet itself. Mr. Asquith's colleagues were "so eager to begin the horrid work which at the very best must be a tragic adventure," simply and solely because they dared not await "the results of the General Election, which cannot now be long delayed." We are nowadays so accustomed to brazen effrontery in impostors occupying positions which used to be described as "responsible," that such exhibitions pass unnoticed, though they are noteworthy in the light of subsequent events. Mr. Churchill told his audience:

> In European affairs it has for some years past been considered wicked and immoral to use the argument of an inevitable war. No European statesman would be acquitted

in the comity of nations who brought a war on in a hurry because he believed that sooner or later it was bound to come. The conscience of the modern world revolts, the wisdom of the modern world revolts, against such a doctrine. We have learned, however paradoxical it may seem, that inevitable wars can be postponed, but in Ulster a six years interval of peace is apparently an added insult. They tell us that they will have nothing of it, that nothing will satisfy them, but to begin killing and shooting us immediately. They might, at any rate, allow their intended victims to pass the six years interval with their wives and families.

After this nauseous cant came the passage which Lord Percy emphasises, as revealing the true inwardness of the Pogrom plot. "*Ah! Gentlemen, after this offer has been made any unconstitutional action by Ulster can only, in a phrase which Mr. Gladstone once used on another occasion, 'wear the aspect of unprovoked aggression,' and I am sure that the first British soldier or coastguard, bluejacket or Royal Irish Constabulary man, who is attacked and killed by an Orangeman, will raise an explosion in this country of a kind they little appreciate or understand, and will shake the very foundations, the basis, and structure of society.*"

The Agent Provocateur

THAT was in plain words the plan of the Pogrom. A conflict was to be precipitated in Ulster, in which the Volunteers were to be made to appear as aggressors, and necessary steps would be taken to secure that object. The police were to begin the attack, and probably Nationalist policemen had been surreptitiously drafted into Belfast for that purpose. The Army was to be brought in "to restore law and order;" the hope being entertained that in the process British soldiers or blue-jackets might be killed, and public opinion in Great Britain alienated. Happily limelight politicians cannot keep their own counsel. Mr. Churchill cackled over his Pogrom like a hen over a new-laid egg. His hearers must have been astonished to learn from the lips of a prominent member of a peace-at-any-price Government that "Bloodshed no doubt is lamentable. I have seen some of it, more, perhaps, than any of those who talk about it with such levity, but there are worse things than bloodshed even on an extended scale." The reader can now judge for himself as to whether the epithet "bloodthirsty bounders," which we have applied to this Government, is justified or not.

The *agent provocateur* always defends himself on the ground that bloodshed at his own time is better for the community than bloodshed at somebody else's time, and therefore he goads his victims to aggression. Mr. Churchill's Pronunciámento, which has been to some extent lost sight of amid other equally astounding Ministerial utterances and acts, supplies the key to this outrage. He was apparently the self-appointed Generalissimo and Admiralissimo of the intended operations. He incidentally supplies the measure of Mr. Asquith's fitness for his present position. The Prime Minister from the outset professed innocence of everything beyond insignificant precautionary measures for the guarding of stores against unnamed, because unknown, persons. He denied movements of ships and troops, now admitted. Mr. Churchill, on the other hand, at Bradford six weeks ago, indicated the magnitude of the operations. After palliating bloodshed "even on an extended scale," he declared: "An eclipse of the central Government of the British Empire would be worse. The abandonment by our public men of the righteous aims to which they are pledged in honour would be worse. The cowardly abdication of responsibility by the Executive would be worse. The trampling down of law and order, which under the conditions of a civilised State assures life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—all this would be worse than bloodshed." Then he swaggered about his achievements during the Railway Strike three years ago. "We had to act. The railwaymen were our good friends. We laboured and we shall labour to secure fair conditions for them in their employment, but many who were not strikers joined in. There was widespread disorder and interruption of traffic. It became my duty, from which, however reluctantly, I did not shrink, to send 50,000 soldiers on to the railways of England. Order was kept, and then, thank God, Mr. Lloyd George made peace. Why do I refer to this now?" Obviously because if it was justifiable to bring out 50,000 soldiers against "our good friends," much stronger measures would be justifiable against "our enemies"—the Ulster Loyalists.

"My Message"

After vituperating the Unionist Party Mr. Churchill thus attitudinised: "The administrators of ancient kingdoms and warlike races and noble provinces and principalities, dwell in prosperous progress and security in the long sunshine of British peace. Who will dare to break up that British peace? Let us see who will dare with lethal weapons and of deliberate purpose to break up that peace." After this came another outburst of egomania. "I recognise that I cannot be in all respects a complete exponent of Liberal thought and opinion. I hope I have a firm grip of democratic principles. I know I earnestly desire the social betterment of the masses of the people, but still, there are many others in this hall, on this platform, in the Government, or among our colleagues in the House of Commons, who have a far better right than I have and are much more capable of interpreting the instinctive promptings and the inner thoughts of Liberals and Liberalism." (No, no.) However, if he cannot compete as a social reformer he holds the field as a plotter of Pogroms. Possibly anxiety to challenge Mr. Lloyd George's unassailable popularity with the "wild men" of the Radical Party is partly accountable for the latest lunacy. "*It is, however, possible that at this particular moment I may be able to be of some use. There are times and occasions when I have a message to give which is of vital consequence. Here I am this afternoon, and here is the message which I bring you.*" The message may be thus epitomised. If Ulster chose to submit to the domination of the Devlins so be it, but if on the other hand

> the civil and parliamentary systems under which we have dwelt and our fathers before us for so many years are to be brought to the crude challenge of force, if the Government and the Parliament of this great country and greater Empire are to be exposed to menace and brutality; if all the loose, wanton, and reckless chatter which we have been forced to listen to all these many months is in the end to disclose a sinister and revolutionary purpose, then I can only say to you: "*Let us go forward together and put these grave matters to the proof.*"

The single object of such a speech at such a moment was to exasperate Ulster, and the provocation was all the greater coming from the son of the man who declared at the time of the birth of the Unionist Party "Ulster will fight and Ulster will be Right." Ulstermen whose instinct of self-preservation is highly developed

were quick to appreciate the sinister significance of this Bradford "message," but many people elsewhere who were "fed up" with Mr. Churchill's pseudo-sensational speeches were disposed to discount it as the usual effort to draw the limelight.

Pogrom Premier

WHAT are called "Moderate Liberals," *i.e.* men who privately express moderate opinions but publicly support any and every infamy perpetrated by their Party, declared it was monstrous to hold the Prime Minister, who was conscientiously straining every nerve for peace, responsible for the pugnacity of a crack-brained colleague. For some mysterious reason impossible to fathom it has been the fashion in some circles to treat the Prime Minister as a superior person, a theory of which the evidence is far to seek, but for once this defence was destroyed by the unequivocal answer of Mr. Asquith to the plain question of Mr. Evelyn Cecil on the first day the House of Commons met after the "My Message to Ulster." "May I ask whether the Prime Minister endorses the tone and the substance of the speech delivered by the First Lord of the Admiralty last Saturday?"

MR. ASQUITH: "Yes, I do." (Loud and prolonged cheers from the Coalition.) Our report is taken from the *Morning Post.* According to the *Times* "Mr. Asquith nodded, and without rising was understood to say 'I do'." While the daily Official report runs as follows:

MR. EVELYN CECIL: "Does the right hon. gentleman endorse the tone and substance of the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty at Bradford on Saturday?"

The PRIME MINISTER indicated his assent.

It is impossible for Mr. Asquith or any member of the Government, including the Jesuitical Lord Haldane and the pure and immaculate Sir Edward Grey, to disclaim responsibility for the Pogrom explicitly expounded at Bradford with the knowledge and approval of the head of the Government. Mr. Churchill defended bloodshed "on an extended scale," and challenged the Ulstermen to "put these grave matters to the proof" as the authorised mouthpiece of the Cabinet. Everything that has happened since goes to establish the responsibility of the Cabinet in general and the Prime Minister in particular, and any

efforts on his part to minimise his own knowledge can only be described as so many falsehoods—not that his Party think the worse of him for telling falsehoods, because falsehoods have also become, like Speculation, the accepted creed of the Coalition. The more lies a Minister tells the more highly he is thought of by his Party; and a Radical like Sir Ronald Munro Fergusson, who refuses to bow the knee to the prevailing deity, is "banished" to a distant Dominion where truth and honour are still held in some respect. "It is an ill wind that blows nobody any good," and after some of the deplorable appointments from which Australia has suffered at the hands of the present Government, it is a decided gain to the whole Empire that Sir Ronald Munro Fergusson should be, so to speak, "squeezed "out of home politics. For once Great Britain's loss is Australia's gain—an observation which can hardly be made concerning the dumping of some of the political misfits into great positions in the King's Dominions.

The Asquith Legend

Our readers will be totally unable to unravel the stupefying developments of the past month unless, in the first place, they harden their hearts against the possibility of being surprised by any *infamy* perpetrated by the Asquith Government, while in the second place they must realise the true character of the Prime Minister. Mr. Asquith talks educated English. When you have said that you have said everything. That is all that can be alleged in his favour. He is unquestionably the most contemptible character who has ever held the highest position in this country, and his personality is primarily responsible for our present perilous plight. Don't Care ended badly, and Don't Care will end badly, but meanwhile he may wreck the country, as he was within an ace of doing in the week ending March 21. Not the least asset of the Coalition is the assiduously propagated legend readily swallowed by Unionist Mugs and mugwumps—fostered by the *Times*, which apparently stands *in loco parentis* to the Premier, while its gracious consort, the *Daily Mail*, occupies a similar position towards the First Lord of the Admiralty—that the Asquiths and Haldanes represent respectability in a disreputable Coalition, and are to that extent better than the Churchills and Lloyd Georges

from whose machinations they are continually endeavouring, if not very successfully, to save the State. We are invited to believe that there are depths plumbed by the Windbag and the Artful Dodger to which the Heavy Fathers of the Cabinet would never sink, and ex hypothesi it is the duty of patriotic Englishmen to help the quondam Liberal Imperialists in their heroic stand against Rats and pro-Boers. But, if possible, the respectables are a greater public danger than the scallywags, because, whereas the latter can never pass muster as something different to what they are, the slimy hypocrisies of the former to some extent impose on us in spite of such unspeakable episodes as the faking of a speech in Hansard, of which Lord Haldane has been convicted, and the steady unbroken stream of falsehoods, which flow from the Fountain Head of the great Ministry of Mendacity. We have never minimised our opinion of Mr. Lloyd George, one of the "Little Brothers of the Rich," known far and wide as the modern Ananias. His own vocabulary would be incapable of coping with his conduct. He is a foul-mouthed demagogue, an unblushing blackguard, who sticks at nothing, but he is very far from being the worst member of the Asquith Cabinet—in fact he is comparatively harmless, because we can all so easily see him for what he really is. He is, so to speak, "known to the police."

Simple Simon's Revelation

OTHER Ministers who daily thank God that they are not as Mr. Lloyd George are infinitely more dangerous, *e.g.* the Premier, who bears the palm over the Pogrom to which, as we have seen, he gave explicit sanction by his emphatic endorsement of the Bradford pronouncement, on which too much stress cannot be laid, as it prevents the Pogrom from being dismissed as the uanuthorised venture of some Sucking Napoleon. It was the settled policy of the Cabinet. In face of his attitude on March 16, when his attention was specifically directed to the advocacy of "extensive bloodshed" as a solution of the Irish question, it is grotesque to suggest that Mr. Asquith could have remained in blissful ignorance of the Plot, with which his name will be imperishably associated, because were he an honest *fool* who had been kept in the dark by unscrupulous colleagues, he and they must have parted company the moment he ascertained what they were at. Every day the case against the Premier becomes blacker. When he emphatically

approved the bloodthirsty speech at Bradford he must have already sanctioned the appointment of the Pogrom Committee of the Cabinet, the existence of which was disclosed by Simple Simon, the Attorney-General, in a speech at Blackburn on March 27. Simple Simon was proud of having been a member of this Committee, and having caught the disease which more or less afflicts every member of the Ministry he told his audience:

> I have not only been present at every Cabinet meeting which has discussed the matter from the first, *but I was selected by the Prime Minister to be one of those who were members of the smaller Committee of the Cabinet which discussed at the War Office these very arrangements about which such a monstrous insinuation is now made.* Therefore I am in a position to tell you the truth, and I assert upon my honour that from first to last, whether our discussions were in a Cabinet or whether our discussions were with our military advisers, there was never mentioned, there was never a suggestion of—there was never a thought of—this unprovoked butchery of a Protestant population which now serves for the Tory version of a perfectly reasonable and necessary precaution.

Every reader of this revelation of the existence of a War Committee of the Cabinet automatically asked himself, "Is it conceivable that a special Cabinet Committee would have been appointed to superintend the guarding of Government stores in Ulster?" The public are unaffected by the word of honour of any member of the Ministry of mental reservations, and we only accept Sir John Simon's statement so far as it disclosed the portentous fact of the existence of the Pogrom Committee of the Cabinet, which consisted of the following members beside the Attorney-General—who was presumably to decide as to the issue of the warrants for the leaders of the Ulster movement, which is believed to have been part of the provocation which Mesrs, Churchill and Co. hoped would lead to the blood-letting on which their hopes were centred—Lord Crewe, who fortunately for himself fell ill before the culmination of the plot, in which he cannot escape complicity; Mr. Birrell, Colonel Seely, and Mr. Winston Churchill.

The Artless Sealy

We are ignorant as to the code regulating Cabinets, though until the artless prattle of Simple Simon we had erroneously supposed that Cabinets met under the seal of secrecy, which it would be a gross impropriety to violate. But we are changing all that with a good many other things. The Prime Minister is made responsible by the

Attorney-General for the existence of this War Committee, and our well-informed contemporary, the *Morning Post*, accuses Mr. Asquith of having attended its last and most important meeting on March 19. Colonel Seely's authority may not be of much account, but anything he says may be regarded as evidence against himself and any of his colleagues, now his former colleagues, because among the amazing by-products of the Pogrom was the resignation of Colonel Seely after prolonged and despairing efforts on the part of the limpet to remain on its rock. No one has ever accused Colonel Seely of being a clever man, but he makes up in conceit what he lacks in intelligence, and in the course of endeavouring to explain himself to his constituents he has made several assertions not less astounding than those of other Ministers. He cannot conceal his amazement at being out in the cold, and wonders how the country can get on without him, all the more as he did absolutely nothing which was not approved not only by the Pogrom Committee but by the Cabinet itself. Indeed, he can only account for his present plight by the fact that everybody went mad except himself. It is, we believe, a recognised form of hallucination to regard oneself the only sane man in the lunatic asylum. Contrast Colonel Seely's narrative with that of Simple Simon or with any statement by the Prime Minister who grabbed the War Office the moment Colonel Seely was ejected. "I had the full approval of all my colleagues in the action that I took, and when history comes to be written I think they will be a little puzzled at my ultimate resignation, because every order I gave was punctually and implicitly obeyed, and every step I decided on I carried out to the full." (Colonel Seely at Langley Mill, Derbyshire, April 18, see *Morning Post*, April 20.) Again (vide same speech):

The assumption was that the Cabinet deliberately planned to provoke Ulster into some lawless act, and that they would take advantage of it and shoot them down. He found it difficult to cope with statements such as those. He said solemnly that his whole object had been and was to secure a peaceful settlement of the Irish question. He knew that bloodshed might well ruin the chances of peace in Ireland, and it was in order to secure a peaceful settlement that he had laboured. That he should have taken steps such as were attributed to him was so unthinkable to him that he could not find words sufficiently strong in which to deny so gross a charge. What were those plans, and who knew of them? No instructions were given to the General Officer commanding the Forces in Ireland which were not known to the whole Cabinet Com-

mittee who considered the question, namely, Lord Crewe, Sir John Simon, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Birrell, and also to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Adjutant General, *and the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty* [our italics]. Were all those men engaged in a plot by a day or two of butchery to shatter the movement in Ulster? (Cries of "Not likely.") When he said the other day that the Conservative Press had gone mad did he put it too high? Surely nothing less than a sudden attack of madness must have overtaken men who believed that the men he had mentioned in addition to himself were engaged in one of the most wicked plots, if it were true, which had ever stained history.

Premier Bears the Palm

WHERE everything is so vile it would be difficult to award the prize, though as we have already insisted on a full review of the facts, which are being added to from day to day, the Premier bears the palm. Even our eight-pound-a-week parliamentarians would have been shocked had they known that at the very moment he came down to the House with his tongue in his cheek to talk peace and conciliation, so as to throw the Ulstermen off their guard and make them easier victims of the Pogrom, the Cabinet were elaborating military and naval arrangements for a St. Bartholomew or Sedan, though a Bunker's Hill was well on the cards. As in the Marconi scandal, to which in many respects the Pogrom scandal bears a painful resemblance, the dates are always suggestive, and must continually be borne in mind by those who would master this gruesome story. On Monday, March 9, two days before the Nationalist breakfast in Downing Street, Mr. Asquith had produced his "proposals" to settle the Ulster question in the interests of peace by granting a "stay of execution" for six years, at the end of which our fellow Loyalists would be automatically included in the Home Rule area and pass under the sway of the Molly Maguires. This was the maximum the masters of the Cabinet would tolerate, and our "toe the line" Premier commended it to the House of Commons in his most unctuous manner. "The best traditions of our fathers, no less than the undisclosed and fateful issues of the present are speaking to us to-day in imperious accents, and asking us to pursue if we can the way of amity and peace." The Pogrom was about to pursue its way, though whether the date and details were already fixed has not yet been ascertained, though it will doubtless be disclosed in due course. On March 16, as we have seen, came the public blessing of the "bloody"

speech at Bradford, while the Premier continued to prate of peace and goodwill towards Ulster, urging a "basis of settlement," and "ultimate agreement." Happily he did not impose upon Sir Edward Carson, who denounced the whole manœuvre as a "hypocritical sham." There was a suspicious reticence on this March 16 when Mr. Asquith was pressed to throw his "proposals" into practical shape, his attitude being so unsatisfactory and mysterious that Mr. Bonar Law demanded a day to debate it. We now have the key to the mystery. Mr. Asquith absented himself from the House for a day or two after March 16, though whether to nurse a convenient chill or to supervise the Pogrom we do not know, but he was back again for the debate on Mr. Bonar Law's Vote of Censure which the Government itself arranged to take on March 19—the very day the Pogrom Committee of the Cabinet held its final meeting, at which Mr. Asquith is alleged to have been present.

Mr. Bonar Law's Offer

THE history of this week is equally interesting and important. The reader will see how much turns on Mr. Asquith's connection with the Pogrom Committee, some meeting of which he undoubtedly attended. The debate of March 19, which would be useful in throwing Ulster off her guard, was arranged by his *locum tenens*, Mr. Lloyd George, across the floor of the House of Commons on the afternoon of March 17, during a conversation to which Mr. Ronald McNeill contributed this pertinent observation: "Will the right hon. gentleman (Mr. George) say when the Government intend to take the bloodshed referred to by the First Lord?" This must have made the Pogromites "sit up" as showing that Ulster was awake. That same day our pinchbeck Napoleon introduced the Naval Estimates designed to transfer the ultimate command of the sea to Germany, while maintaining the immediate command as against Ulster. For once Mr. Churchill could say with truth: "There has not been the slightest abatement of naval and military preparations." The Government were arming to the teeth, and the hour had been fixed when those islands would be drenched in blood at the bidding of the Molly Maguires, on whose votes the salaries of the Pogrom Party depend. Mr. Asquith was again absent on March 18, though

whether inactive we cannot say. The Pogrom Committee of the Cabinet met that day, its penultimate meeting before the final touches were put on March 19, the very day of the tragicomedy of the debate in the House of Commons on Mr. Bonar Law's motion for which the Premier reappeared in his familiar rôle of arch-hypocrite. We referred to this discussion last month, and though writing after the Pogrom fiasco, we had no conception of the diabolical cunning of Ministers in selecting a time when it was vital for them to lull Unionists into a false sense of security, by pretending to be working for a peaceful settlement under cover of which war preparations were being made on an immense scale. The Unionist leader, it will be remembered, went inordinate lengths in trying to help the Government out of the pit of their own digging. The public were amazed at the blank *non possumus* of the Premier. The country was not "in the know"—it did not realise that the God of Battles was about to be appealed to by professional Pacifists. Mr. Bonar Law naturally could not compete with a predetermined and fully organised Pogrom, to be carried out under the immediate supervision of a Committee of the Cabinet, and backed by the whole machinery of the Executive Government. None the less, in fact all the more, the Unionists leader's offers are worth recalling. He proposed in the first place that a revised version of the Home Rule Bill embodying Mr. Asquith's "proposals" should be submitted to the country by a Referendum, adding that "if the country decided in favour of them, then I have the authority of Lord Lansdowne to say now, that so far as his influence in the House of Lords goes, that body will offer no obstacle to follow out completely, without alteration and without delay, the decision of the will of the people of this country." In the whole history of Parliamentary institutions there never was such a munificent offer by any Opposition to any Government. The Unionist leader significantly added, doubtless drawing a bow at a venture, that if such an offer was refused, "it can only be because, in the words of the First Lord of the Admiralty, he (Mr. Asquith) prefers that the question should be settled by bullets rather than by votes."

"The Village Idiot"

Mr. Bonar Law even went beyond this offer because, under cross-examination by Mr. Asquith, he conceded that if the Referendum were favourable it would carry with it, in the opinion of official Unionism, the right to coerce Ulster, also that for the purposes of this Referendum there should be no plural voting. We can now appreciate the alarm of our Pogrom Premier at a proposal which no rational man would dream of refusing, so he turned from Mr. Bonar Law to try and pick a quarrel with Sir Edward Carson, who is, however, up to all the tricks of the trade, and the last man to be hocussed by forensic quibbling. So when he was asked, "Would Ulster accept the decision?" *i.e.* on the terms proposed by Mr. Bonar Law, the Ulster leader replied, "Does the Prime Minister give me a firm offer? If so I will answer it." Upon which the Premier collapsed. The event of the evening was Sir Edward Carson's announcement, which struck a chill in the hearts of the Pogrom plotters, who realised that his absence from Ulster was essential to the success of the policy of provocation, "I had intended to intervene at a later stage of this debate, but in consequence of many things that have happened, and not least of all in consequence of what I might call a trifling with this subject by the Prime Minister and the provocation, which he has endorsed, by the First Lord of the Admiralty on Saturday, I feel that I ought not to be here but in Belfast." Every word of Mr. Asquith's speech on March 19 should be studied with meticulous care, because, when he spoke, arrangements had been completed for the *coup d'etat* in Ulster, involving the proclamation of martial law in Belfast, the despatch of an expeditionary force of at least 25,000 troops supported by a powerful battle fleet to blockade and bombard the Ulster capital, from which soldiers were to be hastily withdrawn lest they should suffer the fate of Ulster women and children. We reject the latest legend of Mr. Asquith as the village idiot completely in the dark as to the arrangements of his own Pogrom Committee. He was responsible for its existence, he had approved the Bradford speech, he knew the men on the Committee, including Mr. Churchill, who was lusting for blood; nor should it be forgotten that he had intimate touch with the War Office through his own brother-in-law, Mr. H. J. Tennant, while another

satellite, Mr. Harold Baker, is in the same department, who no more than the Premier can escape responsibility on the plea of village idiotcy. No denials by Mr. Asquith nor indeed by any other Minister are worth the breath with which they are spoken, as only Ministerial statements on oath subject to cross-examination count. If Ministers wish to clear themselves of complicity in their own Pogrom, they must appoint that judicial enquiry of which they are terrified. The Opposition must press for their impeachment. With civil war in his heart Mr. Asquith had peace on his lips in the House of Commons, when he hazarded the following peroration: "In the same spirit in which the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Bonar Law) commenced, and I think concluded, his speech, I do most solemnly venture to appeal to the House of Commons to think twice and thrice, nay, many times more than that, before they dismiss what seems to us, in good faith after much deliberation, and, as I have admitted, with great reluctance, to be the only way upon the pursuit of which the real hope of a lasting settlement may be realised."

Behind the Scenes

Let us now take a glimpse behind the scenes during the period when the Government were preparing to assassinate Ulster while fooling Parliament by peaceful professions. We need not go into elaborate detail, as the whole story is set forth with admirable precision by Lord Percy, who points out that the War Office opened fire on the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland (Sir Arthur Paget) on the very day of the proclamation of the Pogrom at Bradford by our neurotic Napoleon. This despatch, which, unlike other documents in the amazing White Paper of which new and enlarged editions appear month by month, appears to have been written in the ordinary way in the name of the Army Council. It cannot fail to have astonished its recipient, who was informed that the Government had reports of anticipated attempts "in various parts of Ireland by evil-disposed persons to obtain possession of arms, ammunition, and other Government stores. It is considered advisable that you should at once take special precautions for safeguarding depots and other places where arms or stores are kept as you may think advisable. It appears from the information received that Armagh, Omagh, Carrick-

fergus and Inniskillen are insufficiently guarded, being specially liable to attack." Other passages suggest that the Commander-in-Chief was expected to read between the lines, and to play the Pogrom game without prompting. Needless to say there was no risk whatsoever of any raid, the Government had no information to that effect. The injunction to the Commander-in-Chief "that no steps should be omitted to ensure the safety of Government arms and stores in the south as well as in the north of Ireland," appears to have been lost. There are still gaps in our information, as the process of extracting the truth is as difficult as in connection with Marconi matters, and it may be that before these pages are in the reader's hands the plot will thicken, though it certainly cannot grow less. Colonel Seely, at an early stage, took the Pogrom out of the hands of the Army Council, doubtless acting under orders of the maniac at the Admiralty, and on March 16 he instructed Sir Arthur Paget to "wire —— me not later than 8 A.M. to-morrow (17th) what steps you have taken to carry out instructions in paragraph 2 of War Office confidential letter, dated March 14, 1914; also, if the general instructions in paragraph 3 of the same letter have now been issued."

HAS this document been bowdlerised before being published, as there was no obvious urgency. Then came Colonel Seely's surprising summons: "I shall be glad if you can come over, bringing with you full plans in detail, and meet me at War Office at 10.45 A.M. on Wednesday March 18." Think of it, Sir Arthur Paget was to wire by 8 o'clock one morning, and himself to appear at the War Office at 10.45 on the following morning, bringing "full plans" of the trumpery "precautionary measures" necessary for the safeguarding of Government stores, about which he had evidently entertained no anxiety! Possibly the General is not very quick at the uptake, and had no conception as to what was expected of him. He replied:

A Summons to London

March 16, 1914.

Your telegram. Have issued general instructions and taken all available steps. Will send details to-morrow by post.

Still puzzled, Sir Arthur Paget telegraphed again, March 17:

In further reference to your telegram under the present circumstances, I am not [illegible] referred to in paragraph 2 of

War Office letter. A sufficient number, however, are in readiness to move at short notice. Am despatching letter in explanation to-day.

This letter, also of March 17, is now at last vouchsafed to the public, which had been previously given to understand that no further documents could be produced. The bewildered General explains as regards the four places alleged to be in danger by the War Office, that Inniskillen was guarded by a company from Londonderry, Carrickfergus by a small detachment from Holywood which would now be increased, while steps were being taken to remove reserve arms and ammunition from Armagh and Omagh to Dublin and Inniskillen respectively, in about eight days. General Paget added: "From the point of view of safety only," it would be preferable to provide guards at once for Armagh and Omagh from the Infantry battalions at Mullingar "and to evacuate the recruits at these places"; "But in the present state of the country, I am of opinion that any such move of troops would create intense excitement in Ulster, and possibly precipitate a crisis." It never dawned upon the writer that this was the very thing the Pogrom Party, now in the ascendant in the Government, were bent on, and he ingenuously informed Colonel Seely: "For these reasons I do not consider myself justified in moving troops at the present time, although I am keeping a sufficient number in readiness to move at short notice, in case the situation should develop into a more dangerous state." Then followed another passage, vindicating his own good faith, while absolutely damning the Government. It incidentally explodes the fiction of the Coalition Press, that Sir Arthur Paget was the prompter of the Pogrom policy. "I would, however, point out that there is no intelligence Service in this command, and that all the reliable political information is received by me at second hand, so that I am placed at a considerable disadvantage in attempting to judge the urgency of the situation, and to foresee possible dangers in time to act."

Plan of Campaign

THAT was the frame of mind in which the Commander-in-Chief left Ireland on April 17, as innocent of any Pogrom plot as the present reader or the present writer. Nor do we make any imputations upon Sir Arthur Paget at any subsequent stage; Ministers doubtless fed him up with the falsehoods which form their stock in trade,

though we much regret that a distinguished soldier should at any time have consented to take upon himself any blame which so clearly belonged to the politicians, by attaching his name to the somewhat farcical document of April 2, containing an obviously incomplete account of historic interviews with General Gough and others. As the reader is aware, on March 18 and 19, the Pogrom Committee of the Cabinet met at the War Office, and it was from the War Office on the first of these days that Sir Arthur Paget telegraphed to Major General Friend in Ireland in somewhat striking terms, considering that only the safeguarding of stores was in question, and that Sir John Simon, himself a member of the Pogrom Committee, bore public testimony to the unprovocative attitude of the Ulster Volunteers, and that no one has been able to identify "the evil disposed persons" who bulked so largely in Ministerial imagination:

> Bedfords to move to places which have been decided. Battalion of 14th Brigade to go to Newry and Dundalk. Battalion, Victoria Barracks, Belfast, to go to Holywood with all ammunition and bolts of rifles if unable to move rifles themselves. These movements to be simultaneous if possible and to be complete by dawn, Saturday 21, with all secrecy.

This gives us Pogrom day. That there were to be combined operations by sea and land, ex hypothesi to safeguard stores already protected, is shown by this telegram from,

SIR A. PAGET (IN LONDON) TO MAJOR GENERAL FRIEND.

March 19, 1914.

> Staff Officer to be at Kingstown Pier to-morrow midday to confer with Senior Naval Officer. Company, Bedfordshire Regiment, for Carrickfergus to be at Kingstown to-morrow evening. Acknowledge.

General Friend rose to the situation, though he was

> rather doubtful whether the Northern Railway will allow troop trains to travel northwards. In this event there must ensue a delay in the movements, and we must make alternative arrangements for transport. The headquarters of the depot and the brigade as well as the battalion are being moved from Belfast.

In other words, Belfast was to be denuded of troops, as part of the plan to provoke a conflict between the police and the Ulster Volunteers—also to withdraw the British Army beyond the range of operations of the British Navy. Every detail was being carefully worked out doubtless by the Cabinet Committee then in session at the War Office.

SIR A. PAGET (IN LONDON) TO MAJOR-GENERAL FRIEND.

March 19, 1914.

Your telegram received. Depot, Victoria Barracks, is not to move, but it is at discretion of Officer Commanding district to send recruits to their battalions if internal dissension is feared. A guard of not more than 50 men, under selected officers, must remain to hold the barracks.

SIR A. PAGET (IN LONDON) TO MAJOR-GENERAL FRIEND.

March 19, 1914.

If there is difficulty about sending battalion by train to Dundalk, it must be at Kingstown by 4 P.M. to proceed by sea. Horses will not be carried.

Hysterics

SIR ARTHUR PAGET hastily recrossed the Channel, and on March 20, Colonel Seely wrote informing him of the arrangements for the proclamation of martial law in Belfast, which would doubtless exasperate the Ulstermen to the requisite boiling-point. Sir N. Macready—the Military Governor of Belfast elect—was unwell and could not cross before Sunday. "It will be essential for you to arrange that some officer represents him for the moment, as Birrell has issued instructions to Commissioner of Police, Belfast, to take instructions from officer appointed General-Officer-Commanding there." So "Obiter Dicta" was "in it." The Pogromites were now in an hysterical condition. Colonel Seely continued,

Wire name of officer appointed temporarily as soon as possible. You should apply to Great Northern Railway for facilities for transport of troops and let me know their reply to-day. This may give rise to important legal questions. The Commanding Officers of two cruisers now at Kingstown will report to you. Inform Admiralty as soon as possible if battalion intended for Dundalk goes by rail or by sea. Destroyer *Firedrake* last night left Portland forKingstown to be at your disposal. You may think it right to take special measures for the comfort of your troops owing to the rough weather. *Any necessary additional expenditure is authorised by this telegram.* [Our italics.] Report generally on the situation by wire this afternoon.

Colonel Seely would scarcely have credited the crisis to the "madness" of the Conservative Press had he foreseen the possibility of the publication of this telegram to the General at the front, or indeed of another confidential document of the same date entitled "War Office to Sir A. Paget," announcing

it has been decided to appoint an officer as General Officer Commanding the Belfast District. You will make this appointment by notification in Irish Command Orders at such time as you may consider proper. . . . The Irish Government has arranged to appoint this officer a divisional magistrate in order to invest him with the necessary power for control of the Royal Irish Constabulary within the limits of his Command.

The Army Council are informed that the Irish Government have already given general instructions to the Commissioner of Police in Belfast to act under the orders of the senior military officer at Belfast. As you are aware, Major-General Sir Nevil Macready has been selected for appointment as General Officer Commanding the Belfast District, but owing to illness cannot take up duties before Monday, the 23rd inst.

Sir Arthur Paget telegraphed to Colonel Seely the same day:

As a temporary measure, am prepared to send General Friend to Belfast to-day.

Again

Transport of troops agreed to by railway and battalion has gone by train. I have so informed Admiralty. A company has been sent by sea to Carrickfergus. All arrangements for general situation have been made and commencement of all movements started successfully.

The Pogrom was indeed in full swing, but was brought to an abrupt full-stop. thanks to the noble conduct of British officers, who rightly declined to do the dirty work of *agents provocateurs*, never hitherto imposed on the British Army. Lord Percy fully discusses this aspect of the case. For the moment we are concerned with Ministerial performances. Side by side with these war telegrams we will once more place the speech of our Pogrom Premier, delivered in the House of Commons on March 19, which justifies everything we have ever said or thought of him and a great deal more:

I do venture most solemnly to appeal to the House of Commons to think twice and thrice, nay, many times more than that, before they dismiss what seems to us, in good faith, after much deliberation, and as I have admitted with great reluctance, to be the only way upon the pursuit of which the real hope of a lasting settlement may be realised.

The Prime Minister's contention was, be it remembered, that the acceptance of his proposal of a six years time limit at the very least involved six years peace. At the very moment his own Cabinet were completing arrangements, of which we accuse him of being a party, for the stealthy assassination of Ulster.

A Lunatic at Large

On a par with the communications from the War Office, of which we have presumably only a few samples, are the orders of the Admiralty, of which again only the more presentable are given to the public. There are no means of telling whether these were personal messages sent by the pinchbeck Napoleon "on his own," or

whether they went out in the regular way with the authority of the Board of Admiralty. They contain touches worthy of the best *opéra bouffe*. On March 19, the Vice-Admiral commanding the Third Battle Squadron which was off the coast of Spain, was ordered to send the *Britannia* to Gibraltar

and proceed at once with remainder of squadron at ordinary speed to Lamlash. After clearing Ushant you are yourself to proceed in your flagship to Plymouth, handing over command of squadron temporarily to the Rear-Admiral. From Plymouth you are to come to London and report yourself at the Admiralty, subsequently rejoining the squadron overland at Lamlash, whither your flagship is to proceed in the interval.

The same day the Senior Naval Officer at Bantry Bay (*H.M.S. New Zealand*) was informed:

Following orders are to be given at once to Commanding Officer of *Attentive*: You are to proceed to Kingstown with *Pathfinder* in company at sufficient speed to arrive by noon 20th instant. A staff officer will be sent from Dublin to communicate with you on arrival. You are to embark one company Bedfordshire Regiment, one half in each ship, and proceed to Belfast Lough so as to arrive off Carrickfergus at daybreak on Saturday, 21st instant. The troops are to be landed at once. You should then take *Attentive* to Bangor, County Down, land yourself in plain clothes, and proceed to Holywood Barracks and interview General Sir Nevil Macready as to co-operation with military in certain eventualities. You should comply with the requests made as far as practicable without landing men. Captain of *Pathfinder* is to personally arrange with senior military officer in Carrickfergus Castle for guarding the ammunition and other Government stores there. This place is to be defended against attack by every means, and if co-operation of Navy is necessary, by guns and searchlights from the ship. So long as the two ships are anchored on the opposite sides of the Lough, the positions of *Attentive* and *Pathfinder* may be exchanged at your discretion. Men may be granted day leave at your discretion. Report when *Attentive* and *Pathfinder* leave for Kingstown.

Perhaps the landing of the Commanding Officer in mufti is the gem of the collection. Why a British naval officer should be ordered to discard his uniform when engaged on duty is a mystery that passes understanding. Simultaneously a telegram was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, *H.M.S. Iron Duke*, Portsmouth, ordering

a destroyer of Fourth Flotilla to arrive at Kingstown to-morrow evening. She is required for the purpose of embarking the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Dublin, if necessary, and her Commanding Officer is, on arrival, to report himself to the General at the Royal Hospital Dublin, and place himself at his orders. *Commanding Officer is to wear plain clothes on shore* [our italics]. Report which vessel you select for this service.

Presumably the appearance of a British uniform in Nationalist Ireland even when engaged on Nationalist business might conceivably provoke insult. Another telegram was addressed to the Commanding Officer, *H.M.S. Gibraltar*:

Proceed without delay to Kingstown with *Royal Arthur* in company, and be prepared to embark to-morrow approximately 275 Infantry in each ship for conveyance to Dundalk, where they are to be disembarked early on the following morning. Time you expect to arrive Kingstown should be reported.

THAT the Pogrom was booming may be gathered from the following telegrams, which give the lie to many Ministerial statements:

The Boom

ADMIRALTY TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, HOME FLEETS, H.M.S. "IRON DUKE."

March 20, 1914.

The Vice-Admiral, Third Battle Squadron, has been ordered to proceed with his squadron to Lamlash. Two divisions of the Fourth Flotilla are to join the squadron at Lamlash on Monday, 23rd March, and follow temporarily orders of Vice-Admiral.

VICE-ADMIRAL, THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON, TO ADMIRALTY.

March 20, 1914.

I hope to be at Admiralty on Monday morning in accordance with orders contained in Admiralty telegram of yesterday.

ADMIRALTY TO THE VICE-ADMIRAL, THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON.

March 20, 1914.

Monday is early enough for your visit to Admiralty as reported in your telegram of to-day.

H.M.S. "GIBRALTAR," KINGSTOWN, TO ADMIRALTY.

March 20, 1914.

I am informed troops will proceed to Dundalk by land. May I sail for Milford Haven and Queenstown? *Attentive* and *Pathfinder* are here and are leaving to-day for Carrickfergus.

VICE-ADMIRAL, THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON, TO ADMIRALTY.

March 20, 1914.

If *King Edward VII* while at Devonport were to embark four or eight field-guns for squadron, they would be useful for exercising the men *during the bad weather which may be expected* [our italics]. Similar embarkation of guns was approved by the Admiralty telegram of 11 October, 1912. If approved, the guns should be ready at Devonport on arrival of the ship.

NOTE.—Copies of telegrams exchanged between the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Third Battle Squadron and the Admiralty in October 1912, and referred to in Vice-Admiral's telegram above:

VICE-ADMIRAL, THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON, TO ADMIRALTY.

October 9, 1912.

Submit that while at the home ports ships of Third Squadron proceeding to Mediterranean may draw field guns and necessary ammunition. If approved, submit that

ADMIRALTY TO VICE-ADMIRAL, THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON.

October 11, 1912.

Approved for ships of Third Squadron proceeding to Mediterranean to draw field guns and ammunition. Instructions given. Guns and carriages to be returned when ships return.

ADMIRALTY TO H.M.S. "GIBRALTAR," KINGSTOWN.

March 20, 1914.

Approve your proceeding Milford Haven and Queenstown in company with *Royal Arthur*. Following is to be transmitted to Commanding Officer of *Attentive* in modification of orders he has already received:

"Owing to illness Sir Nevil Macready will not leave for Ireland until 22nd inst, and pending his arrival you should, after anchoring in Belfast Lough, keep in touch with Major-General Friend instead."

ADMIRALTY TO THE VICE-ADMIRAL COMMANDING THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON.

March 21, 1914.

The application contained in your telegram of yesterday to embark four field guns for squadron is approved. Necessary directions have been sent to the Admiral Superintendent, Devonport.

The Slump

AFTER the boom the slump. The splendid stand of the officers of the Curragh against the unlawful, and according to every member of the Ministry unauthorised, Pogrom brought these great combined manœuvres to a standstill, and our latest Napoleon had no option but to cancel his orders for the attack on Ulster, though at what precise hour on March 21 the débâcle began we do not know. However, this telegram from "the Admiralty" to Vice-Admiral Commanding Third Battle Squadron on that date gives, approximately, the time of the *volte-face*:

Arrangements previous to orders of 19 instant are to hold good, and squadron is to take part in tactical exercises under Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets. *King Edward VII* is, however, to call at Devonport as arranged to exchange (12-inch) gun, you, yourself, coming to Admiralty with *Zealandia* papers and rejoining ship at Plymouth. *King Edward VII* should then meet squadron in Channel for commencement of tactical exercises. Arrangements for embarking field guns cancelled.

At least two other telegrams were necessary:

ADMIRALTY TO H.M.S. "SHARK."

March 21, 1914.

The eight destroyers under your orders are to return at once to Southampton.

ADMIRALTY TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, HOME FLEETS, H.M.S. "IRON DUKE," PORTSMOUTH.

March 21, 1914.

The eight destroyers proceeding to Lamlash have been ordered back to Southamp-

ton. The following orders have been sent to Vice-Admiral, Third Battle Squadron: (Repeats instructions contained in despatch of 21 March from Admiralty to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Third Battle Squadron).

The Prime Minister electrified the House of Commons on April 22 by stating: "I became aware that these orders (summoning the Third Battle Squadron to Lamlash, &c.) had been given on the morning of the 21st. On my suggestion they were countermanded." Quite so. They were countermanded owing to what had happened at the Curragh; and Mr. Asquith's tardy attempt to claim credit for putting a stopper on his colleagues only reacts upon himself, because every one is asking how it came about that if the Prime Minister was aware on March 21 of these formidable naval manœuvres he permitted himself to inform the public through the medium of the *Times* on March 23, after the fiasco, that "the so-called naval movements simply consisted in the use of two small cruisers to convey a detachment of troops to Carrickfergus." This can only serve to enhance Mr. Asquith's reputation as a master of *suppressio veri et suggestio falsi*. No one affects to expect anything from Mr. Churchill, so no astonishment was caused by his previous statement that the telegraphic orders of March 19 and 20 were issued by the Admiralty "on the direction of the Executive Government," and in accordance with a previous decision of the Cabinet. No one is impressed by the Premier's efforts to reconcile the irreconcilable. The Treasury Bench is a factory of falsehood always working overtime. Fortunately, Mr. Bonar Law has proved his capacity to deal with his opponents from Mr. Asquith downwards, and the debate impending at the time of going to Press will doubtless throw fresh and worse light on the conduct of Ministers.

Lord Haldane's Laurels

WE need not weary our readers by labouring a story which is as familiar to them as to us. The Hush-up Press has for once been in abeyance. We would suggest one rule which will be found an infallible political guide: "Always believe the worst of the Asquith Government, and never give any Minister the benefit of any doubt." This is a strong statement, but is it too strong?

Take a typical episode symptomatic of the utter demoralisation of the Cabinet. On March 23, Lord Haldane, the Lord Chancellor, made the following declaration in the House of Lords, which was universally interpreted as signifying that all Pogroms were "off." "No orders were issued, no orders will be issued, and no orders are likely to be issued, for the coercion of Ulster." This is, perhaps, the only unequivocal statement Lord Haldane has made throughout his political career. In the privacy of his chamber, and without any intimation to the House of Lords over which he presides, the Lord Chancellor inserted the word "immediate" before the word "coercion," thus conveying a totally different meaning to that contained in his speech. To deliberately mislead either House of Parliament and the country is nowadays regarded as the greatest of Ministerial gifts, and the surest passport to Party esteem and promotion. Mr. Asquith is a past-master in this noble art, but he must now surrender the laurel to his colleague on the Woolsack, who conceived the ingenious idea of privately interpolating a word into his speech, completely altering its character. Doubtless it was hoped that some unsuspecting opponent might some time be tempted to quote the declaration against the coercion of Ulster, and would be ignominiously tripped up by reference to Hansard. We have heard people describe the Haldane episode as the "limit," but we differ from those who take this view, being convinced that we are miles away from the records his Majesty's Ministers will attain before they become merged in the populace. That the presence of such personages in high offices is a subject of profound anxiety to all patriotic Englishmen, because *inter alia* they are bringing us into contempt throughout the British Empire, and making us the laughing-stock of the civilised world, goes without saying, but the prospect is not one of unrelieved gloom. There are two particularly bright spots. In the first place the officers of the British Army, with little or nothing to fall back on but their pay, suddenly confronted with a dangerous crisis, rose to the occasion, and by their spirited self-sacrificing attitude in refusing to participate in what is now indignantly described by the Government as an imaginary attack upon Ulster, literally saved the country from civil war. The issue of Army *v.* People has recoiled upon those who launched it. Were our

officers governed by class hatreds as working men are told, what could have suited them better than to go and shoot down the Trade Unionists in Belfast? Rather than do this General Gough and his comrades took the option of dismissal, which was offered them by the Government with a guilty conscience. Another bright spot is the splendid steadfastness and extraordinary efficiency of Ulster, which has just succeeded at the moment of going to press in bringing off a daring coup by landing a great consignment of arms and ammunition—a further safeguard against civil war.

Another Pogrom?

We cannot leave this revolting episode, which must be made to stink in the nostrils of the entire community, without making two observations, one of which is new, while both are true. The country has narrowly escaped a great catastrophe at the hands of our Mexican politicians, whose god is Boodle, and the usual optimist who invariably "chips in" at the most inopportune moment is disposed to regard the collapse of the Pogrom—which he would previously have pronounced a grotesque invention, had we or others suggested that Ministers were capable of it—as a guarantee against further Pogroms. Do not believe him. The collapse of one Mexican revolution is no guarantee against another, though possibly the cowardice of the Cabinet may be some slight security against further enterprise. Ministers, however, are in a vile temper—everything about them is vile—they are professional wreckers who have already destroyed almost everything which made this country—we had almost inadvertently said their country, forgetting the amount of alien blood coursing through the veins of these anarchists—and in sheer vindictiveness they might launch another Pogrom if they had another chance. Ulster must consequently remain *toujours en vedette*, calm, peaceful, strong, vigilant. Every form of provocation will be attempted and must be sedulously resisted. All the luck was for once on the right side. Providence frowned upon the Pogrom and placed precisely the right men in the right places—a leaky mountebank here, a complete jackass there just as they were wanted, with a few quiet unobtrusive heroes dotted about where they could best save the situation. Bu

the Pogrom Party, baffled for the time being, may try again and again, adopting different methods, selecting different agents. Wounded vanity is among the most powerful human incentives, and the Cabinet contains a vast mass of wounded vanity, and will contain a great deal more before we are through with the Plot. It may be that Mr. Asquith's assumption of the War Office—which was lauded sky-high by the usual "Juggins" of the Unionist Press as a conspicuous act of patriotism—is a mere blind. He was doubtless exasperated by Colonel Seely's fiasco to which, as has been shown, he could not have been a stranger. He may be hoping yet to immortalise himself by wiping the eye of competitive Napoleons.

Unionist Illusions

THE only thing we know for certain about the Prime Minister is that he is a double-dyed hypocrite whose word no man can rely on. He stands convicted of trying by honeyed words to put Ulster off the scent of the Pogrom, which his colleagues were busily organising under his very nose with his knowledge and approval. In any case he is damned and he knows it, but this does not make him a less dangerous man, and though at the time of going to press he is squealing like an enraged guinea-pig against any imputations on his personal honour, he is not to be trusted out of sight. By day and by night Ulster must keep vigil, and the Ulster Intelligence Department must take note of the movement of every single ship, of every man, of every gun. This is all so obvious as to be hardly worth saying, were it not for the number of simpletons who continue to treat Messrs. Asquith and Co. seriously because they occupy important positions in the State. There is one other thing which is less obvious though equally true, which requires saying however unpalatable to the politicians of any Party. The game of politics is more bewildering than fascinating to outsiders, and many onlookers are amazed, not to say staggered, by the series of magnanimous offers of the official Opposition to the Government—of which the price would be paid by other people—and that people who of all the inhabitants of the United Kingdom are most entitled to our admiration, consideration and regard. We refer, of course, to the only Nation in Arms in these Islands—Ulster. It is time for plain

speaking on this question, which has been postponed as long as possible, but it would be perilous to continue encouraging delusions because as we should all now be able to see delusions promote Pogroms. So far as we understand the position as set forth in the speeches of the responsible Unionist leaders—especially the pellucid declarations of Mr. Bonar Law—to whom in passing we would pay our humble tribute of admiration for the straightforwardness, sincerity and courage with which he has confronted a trying situation, and for his splendid trouncing of the scoundrels on the Treasury Bench—the Unionist Party is supposed to be committed to support Ulster in her resistance to this preposterous Home Rule Bill, should any attempt be made to enforce it without a General Election or some kind of Referendum, to be held on terms most favourable to the Pogrom Party. But if, on the other hand, the Government, realising the impossibility of prosecuting their present policy, of robbing the people of their veto on civil war, should submit their proposals amended or unamended in any shape or form to the electorate, and a majority of *one* should be swept up from the Celtic fringe by the combined efforts of Ananias and Co., who would exploit every form of corruption such as lavish promises of public works to doubtful constituencies, then the Unionist Party is committed to stand aside, take no further part in the Irish controversy, while it is even alleged that we should give our moral support to the coercion of Ulster.

Majority Cant

WE say frankly that to our mind such an attitude is unthinkable, because such conduct would be unspeakable. Majorities may be powerful, but they are not all-powerful, and no practical man can afford to make a religion of a mere majority, however composed. There are majorities and majorities—an overwhelming majority would be able to do many things which a small majority could not even contemplate. Unionists should not be a party to misleading the country into imagining, for example, that in the event of a Referendum (an unattractive word which we understand means a "poll of the people") minus the plural vote—expected by Radicals to involve the *disfranchisement of several hundred* thousand Unionists who are qualified parliamentary voters—

resulting in a majority for Home Rule of say ten votes out of seven millions, that Home Rule, as a practical proposition, would be any nearer realisation than it is to-day. We grant that an overwhelming majority, say of two-thirds of the people, such as would be required together with many other safeguards before the Constitution of any other great country could be broken up and that country dismembered, would merit serious consideration, though we deny that in the pass to which things have been allowed to drift by the crass ineptitude of Ministers, that even then the subjugation of Belfast to Dublin would be either a practical or a possible policy which Unionists would be compelled to regard as inevitable. The Irish crisis is now beyond the control of majorities. At the first blush this sounds heresy, but we are already suffering from a prolonged surfeit of Letspretendia, and it is time to get down to what the Americans call the bed-rock. Now what is the bed-rock of the Irish question, not as it is set forth in Parliament, but as it really is? Those who pass their lives at Westminster, and devote their energies to what they are pleased to call "Government by discussion," naturally regard speaking not merely as the supreme art but as the supreme thing. In their minds words instinctively replace realities. But even professional orators recognise at a pinch that there is something more potent than their own verbiage, to wit, armed and disciplined strength at the decisive point, and while Messrs. Asquith and Co. were bemusing the House of Commons, breathing a spirit of sweet reasonableness and appealing to the great parliamentary tradition of the past as the only safe guide for the future, they were stealthily organising "bloodshed on an extended scale."

"Consent of Governed"

We have therefore left the region of speaking for the region of action. Speakers have condemned themselves to take a back seat, leaving the issue to be decided by other forces—by those which in the last resort decide the fate of every nation. The bullet has ostentatiously replaced the ballot, and the ballot can no longer replace the bullet. The Government must be tried and condemned, not on what they have said but on what they did and sought to do. The facts must be plainly placed before the electors

so that all who run may read, and the people must be frankly told that the conversion of the Party of Progress into a party of Pogroms has deprived the electorate of the right to decide the destiny of Ireland, which now lies in the hands of the people of Ulster. The dice cannot be loaded against them in the manner proposed by the Government, and innocently acquiesced in the Opposition until the other day. There has been a complete transformation, which so far few politicians have grasped, but which the people must understand. We are among those who from the outset discarded accepted shibboleths, because the organisation of Ulster appeared to us to be the most formidable and commanding fact. We have steadily maintained that the United Kingdom, whether by a large or a small majority would have no more right, and we may now add, power, to vote Ulster against her will out of the common citizenship into the hateful and hideous regime of the Molly Maguires and the Ancient Order of Hibernians than we should be entitled to vote Scotland against her will into the German Empire. Those who talk of the "consent of the Governed," which is understood to be the basis of the Home Rule policy, must mean something. If it is right to give Ulster an option to-day it is equally right to give her an option to-morrow. But we are now a stage further since the bullet has been appealed to by the Pogrom Party as the arbiter, and it would be grotesque to invite Ulster on the failure of the bullet which she did not fear to take her chances with the ballot, as though things remained where they were. The coercion of Ulster has been attempted with the single result of driving a few more nails into the coffin of our Government of Huertas and Villas. The Unionist Party remains a great and powerful Party, but even Unionists cannot decently ask Ulster to resume the *status quo ante* and take her chance at a General Election against Ananias and Sapphira, or at a Referendum conducted by Ministers capable of stuffing the ballot boxes at need.

The Truth

WE earnestly hope that Mr. Bonar Law will withdraw all offers made prior to the Pogrom, and reconsider a situation which is governed by the *fact* emphasised by Lord Percy in not the least valuable passage of his invaluable article. We have indeed reached the nemesis

of anti-militarism. The Government are aware of the fact, and the people must appreciate its full consequences. Until the other day the Ulster movement was dismissed as empty bluff by Ministers in general and the Prime Minister in particular, who has never attempted to conceal his contempt for Carsonism. That men should be willing to lay down their lives in any cause was a subject of ribald merriment in the circles frequented by Mr. Asquith. A time-serving lawyer is the worst possible judge of a grave situation, because he measures other men by his own sordid standard. Then came the sudden *volte-face*—the panic and the Pogrom. Ulster might be successfully stabbed in the back; she could hardly be defeated in fair fight with the exiguous forces available. That is, and remains, the situation, and no Unionist has any right to beguile the electors into imagining that a mere parliamentary majority would be able to subjugate Ulster, for the simple and sufficient reason that enough Ulstermen are prepared to die sooner than submit to the tyranny of their hereditary enemies. That is the position in a nutshell. Lord Percy, who knows what he is talking about, and never allows a cool and expert military judgment to be deflected by political prepossessions or prejudices, asks what the Government would do in the event of a mobilisation of the Ulster army of a hundred thousand men, reminding us that the armed forces of the Crown have, thanks to the wisdom and foresight of Lord Haldane, been reduced to about 120,000 Regular troops, which means that after deducting raw recruits, the Indian drafts, and the garrisons necessary to preserve order in Southern Ireland, as well as in the cities of Great Britain, where there is a large and divided Irish population, "the force available for the suppression of Ulster would probably not number more than 25,000 men." In other words, the Ulster movement is now so strong that it would be necessary to mobilise our entire Army in order to cope with it, and the fighting would take the bloodiest of all forms, namely, street fighting. The fact that in four days in Paris, in 1848, 20,000 lives were lost with two or three times more as many wounded, gives us some idea of what might be expected not only in Belfast but in several cities of the United Kingdom. Even if the Army had its heart in the work it would be a well-nigh impossible task, all the more as we should be compelled to

keep a large force on our east coast—England's danger being Germany's opportunity.

A Nation in Arms

Mr. Asquith is by way of being a great parliamentarian, and he emulates the language of great parliamentarians, but it is self-evident that there is only one suitable place for himself and any colleagues who prosecute the policy of dismemberment to the bitter end, for the sake of establishing a Tammany Hall Government in Ireland —namely, Bedlam. Nor can the Unionist Party escape its share of responsibility, for the time has come to tell the people the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The coercion of Ulster is not only a moral but a physical impossibility, which would only be attempted by a nation of lunatics, whether the majority of lunatics were large or small. We have to retrace our steps to the beginning, whence the Unionist Party started nearly thirty years ago, and proclaim in season and out of season that there is only one permanent or possible solution of the Irish question, namely, the maintenance of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland, which is alike vital to our welfare and our safety, and offers the only possible hope of peace. We trust that Unionists will have the necessary candour and courage to deal faithfully with this question, and that there may be no further suggestions that majorities can effect the impossible, or that any assistance is derivable from the jargon about Referendums. We are up against a "Nation in Arms" who has been allowed by her blind and fatuous enemies to become so powerful that she dominates the political situation. We can only regain that domestic tranquillity which is essential to civilised communities by seeing things as they are and acting accordingly.

THE "POGROM" PLOT

THE CASE FOR THE IMPEACHMENT OF MINISTERS

THE new political situation created by the events which took place towards the end of March has not yet been grasped in all its bearings. The country is at this moment in the hands of a Ministry certain of whom have attempted without the knowledge either of the King or of Parliament to bring about one of the most cold-blooded *coups d'état* recorded in history, involving wholesale bloodshed and the deliberate provocation of the Ulster population in order to provide an excuse for their ruthless repression.

The attention of the country has been directed to the statement published in the Press on April 18 and signed by Sir E. Carson and Lord Londonderry, explaining the true designs of the conspirators; but in order to understand fully the case for the impeachment of Ministers, it is necessary to set forth first the reasons which led up to the plot and its details so far as they have yet been established.

We must bear in mind what was the situation confronting the Government before the opening of the Session. They had become convinced on their own admission that Ulster was no longer bluffing, they knew that Mr. Redmond would not tolerate any concessions sufficient to satisfy the Covenanters, and they perceived a certain restiveness among the extremists of their own Party at the apparent weakening of the Government. If their proposal of exclusion for six years was rejected, as they knew it must be, the defiance of Ulster should be met by at least some show of firmness, some display of force. The Nationalists would demand it in return for their acquiescence in the proposed exclusion, it was equally necessary in order to reassure their own supporters, above all it was necessary in order to save the

face of the Government in view of the unwavering attitude of the Ulstermen. Now there were three very potent forces driving some of them towards the fatal step. It had long been evident that circumstances might arise either before or after the passing of the Bill which would necessitate the suppression of Ulster. It was a contingency they had up till now tried to avoid, but which they must take into account. If Ulster mobilised her army of 100,000 men what steps should the Government take? Were the armed forces of the Crown sufficient to repel such a rising? There are in this country about 120,000 regular troops, but after deducting recruits, men untrained in musketry, drafts for India and the Colonies and the necessary garrisons for maintaining law and order in the south of Ireland, as well as in Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, and other cities where there is a large Irish population, the force available for the suppression of Ulster would probably not number more than 25,000 men. In order to effect their purpose, therefore, it would be necessary to mobilise the Army, and even then it is more than doubtful whether they would be sufficient. Supposing that the fighting in Ulster took the form of a desperate resistance in the towns, only to be overcome step by step by the capture of street after street, and house after house. This is the most costly and horrible form of fighting, but the Ulstermen had taken steps to send away all the women and children, and a fanatical people might well consider themselves justified in thinking that under such circumstances they would be more than a match for Regulars who would be unable to use their guns. In Paris, in 1848, four days' street fighting cost the lives of 20,000 men, and probably two or three times this number were wounded. And yet the circumstances then were not so favourable for the defenders as they would be now, for the short range of the musket in those days was insufficient to prevent the attackers bringing up artillery to demolish the barricades; also the troops were inflamed with the most deadly fury against the Revolutionists on account of their atrocities. But there were other considerations to be borne in mind by the Government. Would not the strain thus placed on the discipline and willingness of the Army prove too great for such a horrible campaign? And what would be the effect on the public in this country? What would be the effect on the national credit and prestige? And what would be

the attitude of foreign nations—of Germany, waiting her time to strike, and of France, who would find her ally had abandoned her for the sake of a needless fratricidal strife? We should never lose sight of the fact that it is very doubtful indeed whether the suppression of Ulster is possible, even supposing the entire willingness of the Army, under existing conditions.

It was surely the Nemesis of the fatal policy of reduction of armaments. The Government which had abandoned every naval standard, and reduced the Army by 40,000 men, now found themselves powerless to deal with a possible civil disturbance on the part of a force they had for years been covering with scorn and derision.

In addition to this Ministers had to bear in mind that popular apathy might be transformed into a storm of indignation if they were to take the first aggressive step. And yet to suppress such a movement it would be necessary to act quickly, to break up the mobilisation arrangements and forestall all hostile designs. The dilemma was and still is great. It is not easy to suppress a great community by force of arms with at least half the nation hostile to such a course and the other half indifferent.

The third consideration was the humiliating position of the Government, placed as they were between the devil and the deep sea, between Mr. Redmond and Sir Edward Carson. It was extremely galling to feel that they were powerless in the hands of the Nationalist leader and of Mr. Devlin, that they were hampered at every turn, and that all sham conciliatory speeches and meaningless phrases such as "Home Rule within Home Rule" and vague talk of a "Federal Solution" were greeted with defiance and derision by the one side, and were rendered wholly worthless by the persistent veto of the other. The situation was intolerable and they must escape from it. Every day increased the efficiency of the Covenanters, rendered their resistance more formidable, and enlisted popular sympathy on their behalf.

It may seem to some incredible that British Cabinet Ministers in the twentieth century could deliberately concoct a plot on the lines of a Russian "Pogrom." They experience exactly the same difficulty in realising it that we all do in looking back on history and understanding how a man with the record and precepts of a Robespierre could send thousands to the scaffold, or how

others outwardly animated by the highest motives have been guilty of the most heinous crimes. The cause lies partly in the false position into which men get themselves, partly in the character of the men themselves. From the moment the compact was made with the Irish Nationalist leader the last shred of Liberal principles was thrown to the winds. The party of peace, retrenchment and reform, the party of disarmament and anti-militarism, became committed to a course which if persisted in must lead to bloodshed in Ireland. The very men who raised a howl of indignation when Lord Roberts solemnly warned his countrymen that Germany strikes when her hour has come, one of whose spokesmen rebuked him sententiously for using such language, the very men who grew most eloquent over the wickedness of war and treated every warning as a criminal incitement to aggression, were being forced in the supposed interests of democracy to adopt an attitude towards Ulster which had it been adopted by a Turkish Government towards Armenians, or a Russian Government towards Finns or Poles, would have caused the Liberal Party to hold indignation meetings all over the country. The Labour Party, some of whom deny that the working man has anything to lose by a foreign invasion, that National Defence is no concern of his, that troops drafted into a strike area to protect life and property are infringing popular liberties, had at last found some use for soldiers. The future of democracy depended on the use of the Army they had flouted and insulted, not to defend this country from a foreign foe but to shoot down their fellow Trade Unionists in the factories and shipyards of Belfast. Now men thus forced through an initial false step into an untenable position where they become convicted hypocrites, lose all power of seeing facts in their true light, as is proved by the story of all revolutionary movements, and it explains the attitude of the rank and file of the Party in the present crisis as well as that of the leaders. They have been led on by one false step after another until they have come to drift about with no guiding principle whatever. As for those who actually engineered the plot, the members of the Committee of the Cabinet—appointed, according to Sir J. Simon, "to take perfectly reasonable and necessary precautions"—they were the following: Lord Crewe, Sir J. Simon, Mr. Churchill, Colonel Seely, and Mr. Birrell. Whether all these were really privy to the

whole plan is uncertain. Lord Crewe was taken ill on the 19th, and was not present at all the meetings nor at the last meeting on the 19th, and it is quite probable that Mr. Churchill and Colonel Seely arranged the final movements of ships and of troops between them, without informing their colleagues. At any rate they were directly responsible for the orders issued. There is no reason to be surprised that these two gentlemen were found capable of this course. It has been seen that some show of force was probably contemplated by the whole Cabinet in the interests of the political situation in order to satisfy their supporters. It was with this object that the Committee of the Cabinet was appointed. Under the pretext of precautionary measures Mr. Churchill saw an opportunity of bringing off a coup which would release the Party from its intolerable position, rouse popular feeling in England against the Ulstermen, gain for the Government a reputation for firmness, and attract the Labour Party by the suppression of what was represented to be an aristocratic revolution. The Ulstermen would outrage popular sentiment by attacking British troops, and Mr. Churchill, the hero of the hour, the strong man of the Government, would crush them by a prompt display of force and the most subtle strategical combinations.

The charges made in the course of this article are so grave and so well supported that the reader will understand the necessity of very plain speaking as to the character of the chief conspirators. Mr. Churchill is an adventurer whose character is a combination of inordinate vanity, unbounded personal ambition, recklessness, a passion for intrigue, and a strange craving for sensation. The effect of a strikingly successful career and a long course of demagogy on a mind actuated by no principle whatever, has resulted in a kind of mental obsession not uncommon in unbalanced minds. Such men, convinced that they are called to play the part of Napoleon, become ego-maniacs and lose all sense of proportion, of right and wrong, and entertain no scruples. He has tried on more than one occasion to direct the movements of the Fleet alone and unaided; one such attempt resulted in the complete fiasco of the Naval Manœuvres in 1912, and his language in speaking of "my ships" bespeaks a degree of vanity hardly removed from insanity. His extraordinary behaviour at the time of the Sydney Street affair exemplifies the almost uncanny fascination that any scene of

horror and bloodshed exercises upon him. There is reason to believe that the possibilities of the Irish situation simply carried him off his feet; it was the fulfilment of his dreams, the chance of a lifetime. As for Colonel Seely, he was probably little more than a cypher, and a certain impenetrable self-sufficiency and shallowness perhaps blinded him as to the real nature of the transactions. If the others knew the real design, which is extremely doubtful, they may have been deluded by some such specious pretext as that Ulster would be overawed by a sudden stroke and would abandon her resistance, or else may have argued that as bloodshed was inevitable in the long run, they were taking the best course in overwhelming her at once.

The story of the plot can best be understood by following the course of events from day to day. It begins on March 11 immediately after the sham offer made to Ulster had been refused. On that day negotiations were proceeding between the Irish leaders and the Government. Attention was aroused by a breakfast party given to them by Mr. Lloyd George, and it was rumoured in the Press that this foreshadowed some action against Ulster. On the same day there was a Cabinet meeting presided over by Mr. Asquith, and it was decided to send the Third Battle Squadron to Lamlash in order that it might be handy in case of trouble.

On the 13th the members of the War Committee of the Cabinet met at the Irish Office. This meeting was preceded by a conference between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Birrell on the one side and Mr. Redmond, Mr. Devlin, Mr. O'Connor, and Mr. Dillon on the other, showing that the War Committee were acting through Mr. Birrell in conjunction with the Nationalist leaders.

On the 14th Mr. Churchill, whose most fatal defect is that he cannot refrain from blurting out a secret and thus giving timely warning of his intentions, made an inflammatory speech at Bradford with this incendiary peroration: "Let us go forward together and put these grave matters to the proof." It is of the highest importance as affording the key to the whole conspiracy. He said that "There are worse things than bloodshed even on an extended scale," and that "any unconstitutional action by Ulster can only, in a phrase which Mr. Gladstone once used on another occasion, 'wear the aspect of unprovoked aggression,' and I am sure that the first British soldier or coastguard, bluejacket or Royal

rish Constabulary man who is attacked and killed by an Orangeman, will raise an explosion in this country of a kind they little appreciate or understand, and will shake to its very foundations the structure of society." On the very day these words were uttered, the train was fired, the first move in the plot was made. A letter was sent by the War Office to Sir A. Paget, Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, informing him that reports had been received by the Government "that attempts may be made in various parts of Ireland by evil-disposed persons to obtain possession of arms, ammunition, and other Government stores," and that he was to take special precautions to safeguard depots and stores. "It appears from the information received that Armagh, Omagh, Carrickfergus, and Enniskillen are insufficiently guarded, being specially liable to attack." There is a large depot at Carrickfergus. At Omagh, Armagh, and Enniskillen there is the necessary equipment for the reservists of the three regiments whose depot is at those places, *i.e.* about 1000 rifles or so at each, boots, clothing, &c. This letter was dated March 14, but does not seem to have been received till the 16th, when presumably General Paget communicated with the officers at the four points mentioned.

On March 17 General Paget wrote to tell the War Office what he was doing. He said that in accordance with the instructions given him on March 14 he was taking special precautions to ensure the safety of Government arms and stores. He pointed out that Enniskillen was already guarded by a company from the infantry battalion at Londonderry, that the detachment at Carrickfergus would now be increased, that at Armagh and Omagh steps were being taken to remove reserve arms and ammunition to Dublin and Enniskillen respectively, and the commanding officers were taking special precautions to ensure the safety of the depots. He stated that "It would be preferable from the point of view of safety only to provide guards for Armagh and Omagh from the battalion at Mullingar and evacuate the recruits from those places, but that he considered that any such move of troops would be inadvisable and might precipitate a crisis." He added that as he "had no intelligence service and no reliable political information, he was at a great disadvantage in judging the urgency of the situation." He also sent a telegram

saying that under present circumstances he was not moving troops north, and referred to his letter in explanation.

In pursuance of these precautions, which he evidently considered amply sufficient, the guards at Enniskillen and elsewhere were doubled, and the ammunition was packed for removal.

On this day Mr. Redmond made a speech in which, after the manner of a dictator with an army at his sole disposal, he asserted that "if force was interposed, force would be met by force." It may be only a coincidence, but it is none the less remarkable, that these are the exact words used in Clode's *Manual of Military Law* in reference to insurrection. It is possible that Mr. Redmond had been studying Clode. It is also possible that Sir J. Simon, who was no doubt made a member of the War Committee in order to advise the conspirators on the legal aspect of their designs, was also legal adviser to the Nationalist leader.

On March 18 the orders given by Sir A. Paget were still being carried out. A detachment of forty-three men of the Norfolks was sent across Belfast Lough from Holywood on the east side to Carrickfergus on the west. Ammunition was apparently also being sent away from there on this day. It must be carefully noted that Sir A. Paget had already carried out all the precautions that he on the spot considered necessary, but he had hardly reported them to the War Office when he was summoned to London. Then an extraordinary change comes over the scene. A meeting takes place at the War Office attended by Colonel Seely, Mr. Churchill, Sir J. Simon, Lord Crewe, Mr. Birrell, Sir J. French, and Sir J. S. Ewart. For no apparent reason all his precautions are countermanded and an entirely new plan is formulated. We are told that he lunched with Colonel Seely on this day, but we do not know whether there were any others present.

On Thursday the 19th there is a further interview at the War Office. It is not quite clear who was present on this occasion, but we know that Colonel Seely, Sir J. French, and Sir J. S. Ewart were there. We are told that one subject of discussion related to the attitude of officers, and that it was arranged to give officers who were domiciled in Ulster the chance of "disappearing" from their regiments while operations were in progress.

On this day the new scheme was definitely settled, and the following orders were issued:

The Third Battle Squadron to proceed at ordinary steam to amlash. This would bring it there by the morning of the 23rd, r earlier if a wireless message to hasten it were sent in the meanime. The Admiral, Sir Lewis Bayley, was ordered to come to Devonport, see the First Lord of the Admiralty in London, and hen rejoin his squadron at Lamlash overland.

To the Curragh, ordering every man there to be served out rith ten rounds of ball cartridge, to parade the Engineers and rmy Service Corps, examine their rifles and double all guards.

To the Divisional and Brigade Commanders at the Curragh and lsewhere to meet the Commander-in-Chief the next morning.

To Mullingar, ordering a detachment of 200 Bedfords to Inniskillen and 100 to Armagh the next morning.

To General Friend, officer-in-charge of administration on Sir A. Paget's staff, ordering the withdrawal of the Dorsets from he Victoria Barracks, Belfast, to Holywood outside the city, eaving a guard of not more than 50 men to hold the barracks.

To General Friend, ordering the Cornwalls from the Curragh o move via Dublin to Newry and Dundalk. A later telegram ras sent at 10 P.M. to the effect that if trains were not available hey were to be sent by sea from Kingstown.

The 100 Cheshires at Enniskillen were ordered to rejoin their attalion at Londonderry, being replaced by the Bedfords. A etachment of 300 Bedfords was ordered from Londonderry * o Omagh. A detachment of 150 Yorkshire Light Infantry o go to Kingstown ready to be shipped round to Carrickfergus. 'he cruisers *Attentive* and *Pathfinder* were ordered to Kingstown rom Berehaven in order to transport the Yorkshires, and two ruisers of the Training Squadron were ordered to Kingstown o be ready to transport the Cornwalls to Newry and Dundalk f required.

Before leaving, Sir A. Paget was provided with the officers f his War Staff, who were officially appointed next day. He also sked that the naval officer attached to the War Office should e attached to his staff to advise on questions of embarkation nd disembarkation.

* According to the *Times* this detachment of Bedfords was at Londonderry; but is may be a mistake. The headquarters of the battalion is Mullingar, and it may ave been from there that they were moved. The point is of no importance.

On Friday the 20th these movements were carried out. As soon as the Bedfords arrive at Armagh they start entrenching and provisioning themselves as for a siege, a maxim is mounted on the roof of the barracks, and a sandbag battery is constructed. Arrangements are also made for the billeting of cavalry horses in the town.

The Cheshires, by removing their detachment from Enniskillen, are now concentrated at Londonderry.

The Dorsets leave Belfast and join the Norfolks at Holywood and the Cornwalls reach Dundalk and Newry in the afternoon. The 150 men of the Yorkshire Light Infantry leave the Curragh and go on board the *Attentive* and *Pathfinder*. Orders are sent to the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla to leave Southampton early on the following morning so as to arrive at Lamlash on Monday the 23rd. On Saturday the 21st the movements are completed by the arrival of the Yorkshires at Carrickfergus and the return of the 45 men of the Norfolks, originally sent there by Sir A. Paget, to Holywood. All units in the Irish command are warned to be in immediate readiness to move north. The Destroyer Flotilla starts at 7.30 A.M. from Southampton. Owing to events which will shortly be related all these preparations are suddenly countermanded. The ships are ordered to return in the afternoon or evening of the 21st. On this afternoon Mr. Lloyd George made a speech at Huddersfield in which he loaded Ulster with abuse, and said "the Government would confront the defiance of popular liberties with a most resolute unwavering determination whatever the hazard may be." It is now time to examine these preparations in detail.

They begin with the War Office letter of March 14 in which the Government state their fears for the safety of the depots from evil-disposed persons. The same expression is used by Mr. Churchill, Sir J. Simon, and Colonel Seely. They particularly stated in the House that they recognised "that any such attempt would be discountenanced by the responsible leaders of the Ulster movement," and Mr. Asquith said they had not anticipated "organised or concerted operations on the part of the Ulster Volunteers." In spite of this, although they only feared a few casual depredators, they deliberately cancelled all Sir A. Paget's measures. From whence did the reports emanate on which the

acted? Mr. Churchill tells us "they had received police reports, military opinion and military advice as to the insecurity of these depots." As to police reports, if they exist why do they not tell us what they were? And if they had received military reports they must have come from the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, but Sir A. Paget says in his letter of the 17th that he had "no intelligence service and no means of judging the urgency of the situation." The story about the military reports is therefore plainly nonsense, they did not exist. Mr. Churchill tells us that when the new moves were planned Sir A. Paget took a very serious view of them, which was not shared by Ministers. Thus the Government, without any request from the military authorities, who apparently never dreamt of danger, ordered the safeguarding of depots. They did not even leave it there, they actually mentioned which depots were in danger, so precise was their information, although they omitted to tell the Commander-in-Chief what this information was or who the evilly-disposed persons were. On hearing the sensible and unprovocative character of the measures he proposes to take, they become dissatisfied and summon him in haste to London. Thereupon, having cancelled his orders, they not only initiate themselves measures utterly inconsistent with the mere strengthening of garrisons, against his advice, for he takes a most alarmist view of them, but they make preparations to support these measures with a large force of infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers with bridging trains, howitzers* and Army Medical Corps with field ambulances. They send large quantities of hospital stores to Londonderry, and they make preparations—on the admission of Mr. Churchill—to send a large force from England to give further support if required, and a naval officer is specially appointed to deal with their disembarkation arrangements. In all a force of 25,000 men is held in readiness, and a fleet consisting of one battle squadron and a destroyer flotilla is ordered to the scene of operations.

Now there are three reasons why these preparations must have been undertaken for only one purpose, the provocation and subjugation of Ulster.

* The use of howitzers was denied in the House both by Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna. The *Morning Post* of April 23, however, gives unimpeachable evidence that orders to hold themselves in readiness were given to howitzer batteries.

First of all there was no reason whatever for undertaking them. Ulster was perfectly quiet, and the Government themselves only feared some evil-disposed but apparently imaginary persons. Secondly, the moves ordered by them on the 19th are incompatible with the intention of guarding stores; they are the opening moves necessitated by the strategy of an offensive campaign. Thirdly, Sir A. Paget, in the interviews which will shortly be dealt with, disclosed the whole criminal design and dissipated the last shreds of doubt.

With regard to the first, it is perfectly plain that if there was any need to reinforce the depots—and Colonel Seely tells us he had for some time had fears for their safety—it would have been quite easy to do so quietly weeks before the crisis, by small detachments which would have escaped all notice. Instead of this they were effected simultaneously as a concerted operation, in a frantic hurry and with a kind of ostentatious secrecy, suggesting further movements on a large scale, and they were delayed until a moment when feeling was running most high in Ulster, until a crisis had been deliberately evoked by making an offer which must be refused, after the most ardent hopes had been raised; a moment chosen by two Cabinet Ministers and the Nationalist leader to make insulting and threatening speeches. A curious sidelight is thrown on the supposed "reports" on which the Government acted, by the following extract from the *Manchester Guardian* of March 20. After saying that some people seemed to fear a raid on some of the stores of arms, its special correspondent in Londonderry adds: "To one who has seen a good deal of the Volunteers during the last fortnight this fear is quite an illusion. The Volunteers, or at least those who control them, may possibly give trouble in the last resort, but they are not in the least likely to seek it." This evidence on the part of an organ in touch with the Government is significant, and goes a long way towards disposing of the alleged "reports," and, indeed, it must be plain to any one who gives the matter a moment's thought, that the only kind of outbreak there was the least reason to fear was a conflict between Catholics and Protestants, and this Ministers deliberately invited by evacuating Belfast, where the garrison by its position between the Nationalist quarter and the rest of the city was in a position to

have quelled any such disturbance at once. The following striking commentary on the extreme danger of the troops in Ulster is given by the *Daily News*, another Liberal paper: "While the Dorsets were passing Craigavon (where Sir E. Carson was staying) the guards of the Ulster Volunteer Force were turned out and stood at the salute at the entrance gate. The soldiers were obviously interested, and many of them returned the compliment. Messages from Enniskillen, Newry, Omagh, and Armagh state that the unexpected arrival of the troops was made the occasion of enthusiastic demonstrations." There would be something irresistibly comic, if it were not for the underlying horror of the thing, in the hurried defence of these isolated posts with sandbags and maxims, while the preparations are watched by cheering crowds waving Union Jacks and singing the National Anthem.

Now let us examine the so-called "precautionary measures." It has already been noted that at Armagh preparations are made for a determined resistance and for the arrival of other troops. At Enniskillen, two companies of Bedfords are substituted for a company of Cheshires, who rejoin their battalion at Londonderry. No less than 300 Bedfords are sent to Omagh, although the depot is no more important than the others, but most strange of all a whole battalion is sent to Dundalk and Newry. The Prime Minister's subsequent explanation was most interesting. "Dundalk, where the guns are," was his expression. Now there were 18 guns at Dundalk and no less than 540 men with them. Not only so, but Dundalk is not even in Ulster; it is in the middle of a purely Nationalist population. As to Newry, it was "an outpost of Dundalk," according to Mr. Asquith. It is no less than twelve miles away, rather far for an outpost, and since there was no reason for reinforcing Dundalk, why garrison its outpost? There was nothing there at all beyond an old disused barracks. What was the reason for the transport of the detachment by sea to Carrickfergus, or for the desperate hurry displayed in the telegram sent late at night to General Friend to send Cornwalls by sea to Dundalk if no trains were available? What was the reason for the extreme haste displayed in the other orders published in the last White Paper and the necessity for their being completed by dawn on the 21st"? Why were the Dorsets moved

out of Belfast to Holywood, with instructions to take away the bolts of the rifles if they had not time to remove them, leaving only 50 men behind? There is one explanation and one only. A glance at the map is necessary to understand the true significance of these steps. There are three main routes into Ulster. The westerly route runs across Lough Erne via Enniskillen and Omagh. Omagh is the most important strategic point on this route, for it is here that the roads and railways leading to Belfast on both sides of Lough Neagh join, as well as the road running north-west and south-east to Armagh and Newry. The main advance was evidently to be made by the other routes so that the garrison must be self-supporting. Hence it was allocated 300 men. Armagh is on the centre route represented by the towns Cavan, Monaghan, Armagh, and Portadown. It is an important junction of roads and railways. Dundalk and Newry are on the easterly route. The former is an important seaport, and the latter had to be held in force owing to the bridge over the river Newry; it is also the meeting-point of the roads to Armagh as well as to Belfast via Banbridge and Lisburn. Newry and Dundalk are on the direct route from Dublin to Belfast. Newry is really the gateway of the province. These are all points which a force intending to invade Ulster would naturally secure as an advanced base, and would seize them without a moment's delay in order to secure the uninterrupted advance of the main body. Hence the urgency of seizing Newry, in order to give the troops time to settle down in the disused barracks, and take measures for the defence of the place in view of immediate operations. The transport by sea to Carrickfergus and the use of the two cruisers was to control the entrance and exit from Belfast Lough, and to enable troops to be concentrated readily on either side of Belfast across the Lough. The withdrawal of the Cheshire detachment to Londonderry was the proper course if active operations were expected, as the units would naturally concentrate as far as possible; the withdrawal of the Dorsets to Holywood was done with a view to concentrating a large force outside the city, and also with the hope that trouble would break out with the Nationalists. The leaving behind of 50 men to guard the barracks is capable of only one explanation. One would hesitate to accept it did not Mr. Churchill's

words make it practically certain. The battalion was moved, according to him, because it was isolated "in the narrow streets of the city." Five hundred or six hundred men were powerless to defend their barracks against a few evilly disposed persons because the streets were narrow! They were really moved, as his words imply, because there was going to be desperate fighting in Belfast and those 500 men might have been overwhelmed. What, then, would be the fate of 50? Exactly what was expected and wanted. Once fighting had begun and passions had been roused those 50 men would have been wiped out, and their fate would rouse intense indignation in England against the Covenanters.

Had these plans been made for a regular campaign they could not have been better devised. It will be seen that the occupation of the line Omagh, Armagh, and Newry would be an excellent base for the decisive operations. The force would have excellent lateral communications from one flank to another by road and railway, and would have behind them a Nationalist population in Southern Armagh and Tyrone.

With regard to the movements of the Fleet, it can only be said that the manner in which the orders were transmitted, and all the attendant circumstances, were highly suspicious. The Third Battle Squadron was off the coast of Spain and there were two others nearer at the time. Nobody has hazarded any explanation as to why this squadron was chosen. Two Destroyer Divisions were put under Admiral Bayley's orders without the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet ever being consulted beforehand. Admiral Bayley had applied for extra field-guns, which were sent on board. Mr. Churchill's explanation of this is that they were asked for "in order to exercise the men on shore in case of dirty weather." Every battleship carries two field-guns, so this explanation is absurd. The application is quite unprecedented, but is easily explained. The Admiral has a grim sense of humour, and had good reason to expect dirty weather. He was quite right. Field-guns are most useful in dirty weather on shore, though perfectly useless in case of dirty weather on sea, as one cannot even land them.

These orders were sent apparently without the knowledge of the Board of Admiralty, in spite of Mr. Churchill's denial.

Mr. Asquith, in a statement published in the *Times* on Monday the 23rd, stated that the only naval movements "consisted in the use of two small cruisers." On the 24th and on the 25th, in answer to questions in the House, he stated that he knew nothing of eight destroyers. This was not true as he has since admitted that he heard of them on the 21st and at once countermanded the movements. As he did not hear of them till the 21st the Board of Admiralty must have issued the orders, if they did issue them, irrespective of the Executive Government. Yet Mr. Churchill says: "These orders were issued in the regular way by the Board of Admiralty on the direction of the Executive Government." This is obviously untrue in view of Mr. Asquith's statement. It seems most probable that Mr. Churchill and the First Sea Lord issued the orders without the knowledge of the Board. And the following curious but true story would seem to bear this out. The orders were sent for some unknown reason not by wireless but overland. By some strange mischance the telegram was directed to the officer commanding the *Britannia*, which was lying inside the flagship. The *Britannia* signalled that a cypher telegram to which they had no key had been received, intended for the Admiral. A high sea was running, and several attempts to reach the flagship in a boat failed, and thus the Fleet was delayed for several hours. This incident is of importance as showing that the ordinary machinery at the Board of Admiralty was not working.

Mr. Churchill's desperate efforts to explain away the movements of the Fleet are interesting. "This movement was not in any way connected with the special precautionary moves that have been described in the House." Then, presumably, it was by chance the orders happened to be sent just before the moves took place, and that the Fleet was ordered back when "they had been made without opposition." The movements of the Destroyer Flotilla and the Admiral's demand for field-guns were no doubt equally accidental. If they were not required after the completion of the moves, why did the destroyers leave Southampton after the moves had been carried out? They were all finished by that time except one small detachment which had not yet arrived at Carrickfergus. And why were both squadron and flotilla timed to arrive at Lamlash on Monday

when it was known that the moves would be practically finished on Friday night? And why was the Admiral only timed to arrive on Monday for his instructions, long after the moves were completed, when the danger would be over and when, in that case, he would not be required? Mr. Churchill, when he issued these orders, had good reason to believe the danger would not be over.

The part played by Mr. Asquith is most strange. He not only made a false statement in the *Times*, which he repeated in the House, but allowed Mr. Churchill to represent him as being fully acquainted with these naval movements. "My right hon. friend (the Prime Minister), *who knew exactly what had been happening* . . . suggested to me that it would be a good thing to delay the movements of the Battle Squadron." This was said on March 25, while earlier on the same evening the Prime Minister had said the only naval movements consisted in the use of two small cruisers and that he knew nothing of the destroyers! How far was Mr. Asquith kept in ignorance? Did he really know nothing or did he prudently ask no questions so that he could deny all knowledge in case of failure? Those who examine all the facts, starting out in the belief of his innocence, will, it is safe to say, receive some very rude shocks, and doubts will not be allayed by his emphatic endorsement of Mr. Churchill's speech at Bradford, and his agreement with the "tone and substance" of that wretched outburst.

The Radical Press has attempted to justify the "precautionary moves" as being the result of Sir Edward Carson's uncompromising speech in the House on the evening of March 19. Unfortunately for this argument, all the moves had been ordered by the time that speech was made. It is not the least remarkble sign of the efficiency of Ulster's secret service organisation at the projected moves were known to Sir Edward Carson d to the Ulster leaders, and it was on this account he returned hastily to Belfast after delivering that solemn warning based the knowledge of the facts, "Gamble in all else you please, do not gamble in human lives." On that same day the es Dublin correspondent wrote that "the situation had ome definitely worse in the last few days. The Ulstermen believe that the Government is playing with them, and

that deliberate efforts are being made to discredit Ulster in the eyes of the British electors. Mr. Churchill's speech at Bradford and Mr. Redmond's shout of triumph in London last night are regarded in the north as details in a settled policy of exasperation." Radical organs had also got their cue. It must be borne in mind that the outbreak in Ulster was evidently planned to take place on Saturday morning. The *Westminster Gazette* had its article all ready for that afternoon, and made itself look somewhat ridiculous by printing it in spite of the news of the resignation of officers which had upset the plan. "The Government," it said, "is bound to have on the spot such a force as will secure the country against riot, and prevent any group of men from taking the law into their own hands, and precipitating a conflict which might lead to determined fighting. When that is done we shall be able to resume the policy of the Irish Question as politics, and not as threats and counter-threats in a process of civil tumult." On this same afternoon Mr. George made his speech about "the unwavering determination of the Government." He also, perhaps, had got it ready written out or was kept in the dark by his colleagues, who had already made up their minds that the game was up and were countermanding their orders. If so, it was a scurvy trick on their part. The rôle of national clown appears to have an irresistible attraction for Mr. George, but there has certainly been no moment of his somewhat chequered career at which he has cut quite so comic a figure as he did that afternoon at Huddersfield. We do not know whether he had any part in the plot, and he has certainly lain low since the crisis. It is possible that the prospect of the wholesale butchery of Baptists in the streets of Belfast did not appeal to him, but he did his work as well as the Press in creating the necessary atmosphere in which Ulster was to appear the aggressor, the Covenanters were to be goaded into violence, the soldiers and police were to be killed, and a long-suffering Government was at last to take belated action.

We now come to the interviews between Sir A. Paget and his officers. Ministers have tried to evade the issue by saying that his words have been incorrectly quoted, but the fact remains that all accounts of those who heard him are unanimous on all essential points. He said that active operations were to be begun on Saturday, and went on to offer the choice of go

or resigning and being dismissed the service. It will be noted that the latest White Paper says nothing of the all-important interview at 2 P.M. on Friday the 21st, when detailed instructions were given to the generals who did not adopt the alternative of resigning. That those in authority had no delusions as to what was in hand is proved by Sir C. Fergusson's address, in which he stated, "The idea of provoking Ulster is hellish. Steps have been taken in Ulster so that any aggression must come from Ulsterites and they will have to shed first blood." There is grim comedy in Mr. Churchill's testimony to Sir A. Paget's humanity. "He repeatedly informed us that he would not allow his troops to fire on the Orangemen until they had themselves suffered effective loss." The General's humanity is not in question, but what will posterity say of the humanity of those cold-blooded conspirators hatching a plot worthy of sixteenth-century France, to make British soldiers play the part of "agents provocateurs," and get themselves killed in order to provide an excuse for overwhelming the Loyalists of Ireland with horse, foot, and guns? What will it say to the humanity of the arch-conspirator who, to gratify his diseased imagination, was playing the part of David with his victim the British soldier in the rôle of Uriah? There was a "misunderstanding" according to the Government, and all that Sir A. Paget intended to put before his officers were the terms of an Army Memorandum issued on December 16 to General Officers in which it was pointed out that if officers were unwilling to assist the Civil power under all circumstances and resigned on this account, they would be dismissed the Service, but it was admitted that in case of "unreasonable or outrageous" orders they would be justified in refusing to obey, and officers were distinctly informed that no such orders would be issued. Now let us see exactly what Sir A. Paget did. He had received, presumably, the most minute instructions in two interviews, but we are told what is almost incredible—that he had nothing in writing. Colonel Seely says orders were given verbally, as they ought always to be. It is always inartistic to overdo a thing—they never, under any circumstances, ought to be verbal if it can possibly be helped. And a General, in not getting written instructions, was guilty of an offence which no subaltern would have committed. There is no officer who does not believe that Sir A. Paget has got these

orders in writing carefully locked away at this moment, and it explains the Government's inability to make him a scapegoat He came back fresh from those interviews and put that question to the officers. Now there are only two alternatives for the Government. Either he was not authorised to say what he did or he was authorised to say it. Let us remember that if he was not authorised to say it he is obviously unfit to have any sort of responsibility, he is unfit to be in charge of a corporal's guard. Here is a General Officer who, at a critical moment, when feeling is running high, informs his subordinates that the Government is contemplating what they admit themselves would be an outrageous and illegal order which the troops were justified in refusing to obey. They have admitted it by saying that General Gough thought such an order was being given him and he was justified in his refusal. The General has, by doing this, struck a blow at the very foundation of discipline and caused a Ministerial crisis, resulting in the resignation of the Secretary for War, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Adjutant-General, a feeling of intense indignation has been created throughout the Army, and vast numbers of people in this country are under the firm impression that the Government contemplated a "Pogrom." And yet they not only retain the General in his command, but they do not even reprimand him, they do not even blame him except in the mildest manner, and even then accompanied with compensating flattery. The situation has become simply impossible. If the Government are right then Sir A. Paget's retention in his responsible command is out of the question. No officer or man can repose any further faith in him. But if the Government are wrong, then everything is explained. In that case it would be exceedingly unwise to open Sir A. Paget's mouth, for the whole Pogrom plot would be revealed. It is worthy of note as exemplifying the worthlessness of the Government's explanations that when General Gough, having put the terms before his officers, asked for an explanation of the terms "duty as ordered" and "active operations," as well as whether it was intended to initiate operations against Ulster, the General was unable to reassure him.

It would seem, at first sight, almost incredible that Colonel Seely could have been so foolish as to authorise Sir A. Paget to give his officers this choice. The reason is, however, plain

The position of officers when troops are called out in aid of the Civil power is a most anomalous one; situations invariably arise when an officer has to exercise his own judgment as to whether he will obey orders or not. This is fully recognised by military law. If he fires on a crowd without sufficient reason, the fact that he received orders from his superior officer to do so or was authorised to do so by a magistrate does not exonerate him from blame. He can be tried by court-martial for refusing to obey, and he can equally be tried for manslaughter in a Civil court if he does obey. For the terrible work they were called on to do in Ulster it would be necessary to have, if not willing agents, at any rate men who were not free agents. They must be given to understand that that freedom of action tacitly admitted by the Military Code would not be allowed them by a Liberal Government. It was for "active operations" they were required, it was to be as much war as if they were fighting Dervishes or Afridis. To give direct orders to the troops to support the Civil power would not serve the Government's purpose; they wanted hired assassins and not soldiers. Officers must be placed in such a position that there was no loophole for escape. The real nature of the men who had planned all this cannot be understood until we realise the true inwardness of their dealing with these officers at the Curragh. We can well imagine what would have happened had the troops gone. Hell would have been let loose in Ulster. In all probability once the guns had begun to go off there would have been such work as would have stirred the country into a state of shuddering horror. One of two things would then happen. If the affair was cleverly worked the Ulstermen might put themselves in the wrong by taking the first step, and by offering violence to police and soldiers, in which case the people would lay the blame on them; this was what Ministers hoped for. If popular indignation took another form, the Army would be to blame. Ministers would still be safe, all the odium would be cast on the officers, and all the forces of democracy would be concentrated against an Army controlled by aristocrats who shed the blood of working men like water.

If one pictures to oneself the actual situation at the moment Sir A. Paget was holding these interviews with the officers, the artificial character of the whole affair is revealed. While he was

talking of a "blaze in Ulster," of active operations, and whi he was, in Mr. Churchill's phrase, "considering the possibilit of armed opposition to the small bodies of troops that we moving to reinforce the depots," the troops carrying out the moves were being hailed by crowds indulging in "enthusiast demonstrations" at the sight of a red tunic or a khaki jacket.

On receipt of the news of the resignations, Colonel Seely first feeling was evidently that of baffled rage. The Comman ing Officers were to come to London immediately. A success was at once appointed to General Gough, and the other officer who had just been given a free choice of resigning or going t Ulster, were now, in defiance of logic, told that their resignation would be refused. That was at midnight, and a man is apt t feel over-confident after a good dinner. A more sober temp came with the morning. On Saturday Mr. Churchill, at an rate, realised that the game was up and countermanded th Fleet.

One of the worst features of the dealings with the office was the warning that those who claimed leave of absence falsel on a plea of being domiciled in Ulster would be court-martialled Ministers were apparently judging officers by their own standard of which the country was now to have striking evidence.

There is no need to deal here at length with the negotiation carried on between the Government and General Gough o Sunday the 22nd and the subsequent repudiation of the guarantee given him. They have no direct bearing on the plot, excep as showing the character of the men who planned it. Suffic it to say that the Government of the greatest Empire the worl has ever seen spent the week-end on their knees before a cavalr brigadier fawning on him to take back his resignation. H was naturally surprised. He had been given a free choice o going to Ulster or being dismissed, and had chosen the latte alternative. If they did not like his decision why had he bee offered the choice? There was no suggestion of any disobedienc of orders; Ministers said so afterwards in the clearest terms He was not conscious of having done anything wrong; Minister and politics and Party warfare were nothing to him; he ha taken his choice, had accepted the sacrifice and was retiring into private life, when a lot of panic-stricken gentleme suddenly intervened and implored him to reconsider his deci

sion. He had never asked to be bargained with, but of course if they wanted to do so the situation was altered. He was accustomed to deal with men, and this was an affair which concerned not only his own honour but that of those under him. He could not afford to take risks. Nothing could be accepted that was not written and signed, and when that was done he subjected it to the closest scrutiny, asking for the meaning of every phrase. At last he got a clearly expressed written guarantee that his brigade would not be used for the coercion of Ulster, signed by the Secretary for War, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Adjutant-General. With this in his pocket he lost not a moment in crossing to Ireland and informing those under him of the Government's promise. Delay he knew would be fatal, for of course as soon as he was gone the Government would repudiate their promise. Sure enough they did so. How much truth there is in the story of the rest of the Cabinet being unaware of the two paragraphs written by Colonel Seely with the help of Lord Morley we need not stay to enquire. The accounts given by different Ministers were somewhat conflicting, and in any case both Lord Morley and Colonel Seely have stated emphatically that both thought and still think that they expressed the opinion of the Cabinet and both have refused to recede from this position. How, therefore, Lord Morley can still remain a member of the Government is a mystery of which he has been unable to give any satisfactory explanation. As to Colonel Seely, he went through the farce of resigning and of having his resignation refused. His solemn promise to General Gough had been repudiated by his leader, mere decency demanded that he should resign and that he should insist on his resignation being accepted. He, however, apparently took the curious view that Mr. Asquith was the keeper of his honour, and could absolve him from the disgrace of a broken pledge. If the Prime Minister had wished to punish him he could have taken no surer way to do so. Colonel Seely, having sacrificed his reputation for the sweets of office, found that the sacrifice was in vain, that Sir John French and Sir Spencer Ewart held a different view of their obligations from that held by him. For two days desperate efforts were made to induce them to take back their resignations, and Lord Haldane was commissioned most characteristically to draw up a form of words which would satisfy both

them and the officers they had unwittingly deceived. The belief of the professional politician that little things like honour, justice, and the word of one gentlemen to another can be explained away by adroit phrasing, and that black is really white if you can only confuse the issue sufficiently to make it appear so, is positively pathetic. There is something intensely humorous in the laborious efforts of the Lord Chancellor to effect the impossible under the delusion that words can transform a dishonourable action into an honourable one. His failure must have galled him severely, for he himself had experienced no difficulty in inserting without saying a word to any one the word "immediate" into the official report of a speech in which he had distinctly declared that the Government had no intention of undertaking the coercion of Ulster. This little mean deception has done more to ruin the Government in the eyes of honest men than almost any other episode of the crisis. As for the late Secretary for War, in his efforts to retrieve his position, he has since made it infinitely worse. In a speech on April 11, at Draycott, he said that Sir J. French and Sir J. S. Ewart had resigned "for some curious and inverted reason," and that the only difference in the situation was "that he was £5000 a year poorer." Why he should go out of his way to proclaim to all the world that he cannot understand the motives of officers and gentlemen is a complete mystery. His reference to his salary is, to say the least, not a happy one, while his belief that the loss of the money is the only difference in his situation is one which few will be found to endorse. But perhaps it would be kinder not to undeceive him on this point. "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise." There is, however, one consolation in all the humiliation which this chapter of history has brought on the nation, for every man who cares for his country is thanking God to-day that the standards of his Majesty's Ministers are not the standards of the British Army. And more than this: when the events of these last few weeks come to be viewed in all their bearings, it will be seen that it is the story of the Indian Mutiny, of Rorke's Drift, and of Wagon Hill all over again and that that proverbial scapegoat, the poor despised regimental officer, has once more saved the country from disaster.

Some idea of the real nature of this conspiracy can be gathered

considering the magnitude and shamelessness of the whole terprise. It was the largest combined naval and military pedition that this country has undertaken since the Crimea, it was aimed not at any foreign enemy but at a loyal, -abiding community, whose only claim was to remain in the ted Kingdom, and whose preparations for resistance Ministers scorned and mocked at as bluff and bluster.

It must be borne in mind that Mr. Asquith has admitted the instructions given to Sir A. Paget were not even comicated to the Army Council and were therefore given out their authority. There is also every indication that orders to the Fleet were given without the authority of the ard of Admiralty. The Cabinet as a whole were also apparently norant of them. In other words, a gang of conspirators without he knowledge of the King, of the Executive Government, of Parliament, or of the military and naval authorities attempted o conduct combined naval and military operations on a gigantic scale in order to drive a million people of our own flesh and blood out of the United Kingdom. Let it also be remembered that the steps taken were such as this country would not tolerate or a moment if undertaken against a foreign foe. Let us suppose, merely for the sake of argument, that the Government had a popular mandate for their policy and a moral right to coerce Ulster. There were only two conceivable courses even in this ase for them to adopt. One was to have stopped Ulster ming from the very first, and suppressed all attempts to organise sistance to Home Rule as soon as they were begun. Not only d they not do this but they deliberately encouraged and ffened the attitude of Ulster by ignoring every claim made their behalf in Parliament and openly deriding all their preations. No self-respecting body of men, much less a fanatical d determined community, would have endured such treatt.

The other course was to have waited until Home Rule had n passed, until the Provisional Government had been set up d had openly defied the law. At any rate, once having allowed m to arm, no action was justifiable until they had committed me act of violence and defiance of authority.

Even then any nominally democratic Government would

have issued a plain statement or ultimatum setting forth its reasons for using force and demanding submission within a certain time. This is necessary, or at any rate demanded by public opinion, in case of hostilities against a foreign enemy. Before the outbreak of the South African War the Radical Party loudly condemned the Government for making any preparations at all as likely to produce a conflict, and when any concessions were made, abused Mr. Chamberlain for allowing them to be extorted from him instead of granting them with willingness and with an evident desire to avoid war. Lord Salisbury complained that this country could never be ready for war because public opinion was too sensitive to allow the necessary strategical steps to be taken before the war broke out. This Government has stretched even the doctrines of Bismarck and Bernhardi to their furthest limit. The German doctrine of war allows of such deception, of such deliberate provocation, and also of the initial moves of troops before war has broken out, but to suggest that they would ever employ such methods against this country is regarded as intensely wicked by every Liberal. To suggest that we ourselves could ever employ them against Germany is simply unthinkable. Not only this, but there is evidence to suggest that the rules of war were not even going to be observed in Ulster. For what purpose were howitzers going to be taken? And how would the ships' guns and the field-guns carried by the ships be used? The statement published in the Press and signed by Sir E. Carson and Lord Londonderry is undoubtedly true. It is confirmed by everything that has occurred and from every possible source. The fighting was to take place in Belfast by the seizure of the old Town Hall and the arrest of the leaders. In the streets of Belfast the guns would have been useless. They were to bombard the town from outside—a town filled with women and children, an "open" town which the laws of civilised warfare do not permit troops to bombard. Such was the intention of a Liberal Government acting in the name of democracy in the twentieth century. But the last and deepest infamy to which Ministers descended was the use of the King's name to persuade the officers at the Curragh to take part in the "Pogrom." Fortunately they did not believe for one instant that his Majesty had any inkling of this design, but there is good

evidence for the statement that his name was mentioned. They could descend to no lower depth than this treason. Having deceived the King, having left him in the dark, they pretended to be acting in his name and tried to fasten the odium upon him.

There has never in the whole history of this country been a clearer case for the impeachment of Ministers.

It is not a question of Party politics, nor of the merits or demerits of Home Rule, nor even of the rights or wrongs of the Ulstermen. A man may be a Home Ruler, he may hold that the Ulstermen are not justified in arming, his opinion on political questions may be directly opposed in every particular to the faith of Unionists, but this is not a matter where Party considerations can weigh for an instant. Englishmen, whatever *their views on these matters, have not reached that stage of* decadence where they can contemplate with indifference the successive steps in the deliberate organisation of a St. Bartholomew. All the nations of the world are watching us to-day, some with anxiety, others with satisfaction and ill-disguised contempt. There has been some very plain speaking from our Dominions oversea, and the views of foreign nations are, to say the least, disturbing. Any further continuance in office of the men who planned the "Pogrom" must sink us lower and lower in the eyes of the world. Men capable of such a plot are capable of another equally vile and perhaps more cunning. There is reason to believe that even now attempts are being made to set Catholics and Protestants by the ears in order to provide an excuse for overwhelming Ulster with horse, foot, and guns. Our honour and our prestige are at stake; if we allow this crime to go unpunished, we shall become an object of scorn and derision to all the world. There is no time to lose. If we continue on our present course we may see, before many months are over, the disruption of the Army and the outbreak of Revolution and Civil War. Civil War, if it comes, cannot be confined to Ireland; and at the sound of the first gun fired in that struggle the British Empire will crumble in dust and ashes, and we shall learn in that hour of shame the full bitterness of that sentence, "Your house is left unto you desolate."

PERCY

YUAN SHIH-K'AI, DICTATOR

HOWSOEVER opinions may differ as to the morality of Yuan Shih-k'ai's policy, or of its prospects of ultimate success, it is impossible to withhold admiration for the indomitable courage and profound statecraft of the man. Indeed, the more one studies the record of his achievements since his return to office in October 1911, the more marvellous does it appear. There is something fascinating in the spectacle of this Oriental superman, unswervingly pursuing his fixed aims amidst the ruins of a disordered state, slowly and surely gathering again into his supple hands the reins of power, calculating the forces against him with the skill of a Macchiavelli, setting one against another by stratagems of deep finesse, playing on every string of popular prejudice and personal ambition with a master hand, and finally striking, at critical moments, with the ruthlessness of a Bismarck. When one remembers the conditions under which he assumed the provisional Presidency of the Republic, and the forces with which he has had to contend, practically single-handed, for the past two years, his success in pursuing his policy of centralisation and evolving the beginnings of order out of chaos, seems little short of miraculous. We may deplore many of his methods, but it is impossible to deny the consummate skill with which he handles his materials. Whatever the future may have in store, Yuan Shih-k'ai has assuredly earned for himself an enduring place amongst the great names in Chinese history.

Eighteen months ago, when the Kuo-Min tang still held the balance of power, Yuan's policy was one of watchful waiting. He knew full well that the activities of Young China, the hybrid radicalism of Sun Yat-sen and his fellow fanatics, must speedily wear themselves out in futility against the irresistible deadweight of national conservatism. He could afford to give them rope, to

let them discuss their paper constitutions and democratic ideals at Peking, while his secret agents were busy in the provinces organising at strategical points the forces with which, when the time came, he would be able to put an end to any armed assaults that might be organised by the political factions. At that date, it was impossible, by the light of Yuan's record under the Manchu dynasty, to predict his line of action or to gauge the measure of his strength of purpose in a protracted crisis. It had already been made manifest, for all who had eyes to see and ears to hear, that the Republic was an accidental and transient phenomenon, which must be replaced in the near future either by the absolute Monarchy of the Man of Destiny, or by a limited Monarchy tempered by cautious experiments in Constitutionalism; * but even those who appreciated Yuan's statesmanship could not assert with any degree of confidence that he would display the qualities necessary to attain even partial command of a situation so complicated and so dangerous. It remained to be proved that he possessed the combination of diplomatic suppleness and ruthless despotism which is required for the making of a ruler in China. The velvet glove had been in evidence on more than one historic occasion—notably in September 1898—but the iron hand had never been revealed in absolute authority.

Looking back to-day upon the chief events of Yuan's administration of the Presidency of the Republic, it is interesting to observe how each one marks a distinct and pre-arranged advance in a resolutely consistent policy, that policy which Yuan had frankly proclaimed from the outset as the country's only possible way of salvation. Western observers, even when familiar with the principles and practice of Chinese officialism, find some difficulty in accounting for the boldness with which, at the first crisis of the revolution, Yuan resisted the abolition of the Monarchy and held his ground, almost alone, against the forces of Young China triumphant. They find it harder still to explain how it came to pass that, having thus declared himself, a man of Yuan's proved capacity in tactics of expediency should have been elected to the Presidency by the vote of Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary colleagues, and that they should apparently have believed in his conversion to democratic principles of government.

* Vide *Recent Events and Present Policies in China*, p. 149.

Looking back over the history of the past two years, we can trace in each of Yuan Shih-k'ai's nicely timed dramatic *coups*, the working out to its logical conclusion of his unswerving belief in despotic government: but as each step points more and more clearly to the inevitable restoration of autocracy, it becomes correspondingly difficult to account for the childlike confidence in him displayed by the leaders of the Kuo-Min tang. It is impossible to believe that the members of the Nanking Assembly were individually and collectively beguiled by Yuan's belated profession of faith in the Republic: their naïveté in this matter can only be explained on the cynical assumption that the delegates were more concerned for the furthering of their private fortunes than for the application of Republican principles, and that they looked to Yuan to play the game of party politics, as they conceived it, and with due regard to the part they had borne in putting him at the head of affairs.

The issue has proved that they misjudged their man and the solidity of the classical orthodoxy which he had proclaimed in defending the Monarchy. Yuan, as President, has shown himself a past-master of all the arts of mandarin intrigue, expert in opportunism, prudent in counsel, of many devices; a very Ulysses for stratagem, unwavering in the execution of his plans. He has adhered boldly to the corrupt traditions of venal expediency, which have characterised the government of China for centuries, to the nepotism and tortuous methods of Oriental statecraft: but in all, and above all, he has fought steadily for the maintenance of the unbroken continuity of time-honoured traditions, for the preservation of the philosophy and morality of the Confucian system, and for the maintenance of the ancient social structure of civilisation, founded upon that system, whose apex is the Dragon Throne. He has acted from the outset upon the conviction which he frankly set forth to the *Times* correspondent at Peking on November 20, 1911, that "the institution of a Republic could only mean the instability of a rampant democracy, of dissension and partition," and that its results would be chaos "amidst which all interests would suffer and for several decades there would be no peace in the Empire." He believed, with good cause, that the politicians of Young China were vain dreamers and that by no possibility could their dreams be brought into any

direct relation with the actualities of the life, the deep-rooted reverences and beliefs, of the Chinese people. And upon this belief he acted consistently, even while yielding lip-service to the Republican form of government and taking an empty oath of allegiance to the principle of representative institutions.

It is not my purpose to recapitulate here the incidents—many of them tragically sordid—of Yuan's successful campaign against the "rampant democracy" of Young China, or to trace in their order the stages by which he has slowly but surely restored the ancient edifice of autocracy, revered by the orthodox literati and accepted by the Chinese people as the foundation of the immemorial order of things. Two incidents, however, which clearly indicated the President's policy and the methods by which it was to be fulfilled, deserve to be remembered. The first was the summary execution, by his orders, of two Republican generals, accused of treasonable conspiracy at Wuchang, in August 1912—an act of autocratic martial law administered *à l'Orientale*, without hesitation or formalities. The second was the assassination at Shanghai, in April 1913, of Sung Chiao-jen, the Kuo-Min tang's candidate for the Premiership, under circumstances which pointed clearly to the complicity, if not the direct instigation, of the President. The Republican generals at Wuchang were dangerous because they were capable of organising a military revolt; Sung Chiao-jen was dangerous because, at the moment when the National Assembly was about to meet for the first time, he was the uncompromising advocate of Parliamentary, as opposed to Presidential, authority. In both instances, the dangers were swiftly and ruthlessly removed, by measures of despotic barbarity as cold-blooded as those of Tzu Hsi at the height of her power; and in both instances Yuan's knowledge of his countrymen was justified by the fact that the nation accepted the situation without indignation, almost with indifference. According to the *Times* correspondent, indeed, the general opinion in China in the autumn of 1912, instinctively recognising the need for some effective authority, blamed Yuan for being "far too anxious not to transgress constitutional limits." He has since rectified his shortcomings in that respect. If at any time since his inauguration as President, he has displayed a conciliatory attitude towards Young China, subsequent events

have proved that he was merely drawing back in order to jump the more effectively.

At the outset, Yuan's position was rendered dangerously insecure for lack of the sinews of war; until he had negotiated a large foreign loan, his authority lacked not only the prestige which recognition by the Powers conferred, but it lacked the means of purchasing the "loyalty" of military commanders like Chang Hsün, and providing his agents at the provincial capitals with the only argument which is invariably convincing in China. Once placed in possession of funds, however, and assured of the sympathy and support of the Governments which direct the operations of the "Five Powers" group of financiers, Yuan could face with equanimity the Cantonese party's last desperate bid for place and power. "The war to punish Yuan" was a melancholy fiasco, and incidentally a valuable object-lesson in Chinese politics, because from beginning to end it was a matter of dollars and cents. The army and navy were frankly at the service of the highest bidder and the only cash bidder was Yuan.

It was only after the President's easy victory over the rabble forces of Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing that his policy of centralisation revealed the hand of the Strong Man, and his intention of restoring the principles and practice of autocratic government. He had bided his time—he had endured with philosophic calm the invasion of the high places of the metropolitan government by hordes of turbulent "western-learning" students; he had given them rope, and they had hanged themselves. After the collapse of the last possible attempt at organised insurrection, the proscription of the Kuo-Min tang was inevitable. He removed it, as Cromwell removed the Rump Parliament, and no dog barked in all the land. At his subsequent formal "election" to the Presidency on October 6, 1913, he took occasion to emphasise the fact that, for the future, he proposed to rule without interference, in accordance with ancient tradition. "Restrictions have been placed on my authority," he observed, "which have hampered me in my work of promoting the country's best interests," to which was added the significant reminder that "he had always preferred conservative to radical courses." He proceeded, therefore, to adopt them, removing, one by one, the flimsy props of the Cantonese jerry-built Republicanism with the

deliberate precision of a chess-player; and all the while, as he destroyed the substance of representative government, he continued solemnly to pay his respects to the memory of its shadow.

There was nothing surprising in the fact that Yuan Shih-k'ai, having defeated the armed forces of his political opponents, should have put an end to the farce of Parliamentary Government at Peking by decreeing the dissolution of the Kuo-Min tang. There was nothing surprising, from the Chinese point of view, in his action: nor was there anything contrary to Chinese traditions of statecraft in the "face-saving" expedients and explanations by which he justified every subsequent move in a perfectly planned policy. The only really remarkable feature of the situation lay in the failure of many European observers to foresee its inevitable conclusion, and in their apparently sincere belief that constitutional methods of government were still within the range of practical politics at Peking. The dissolution of the Kuo-Min tang resulted naturally in the abolition of the National Assembly and thereafter, equally logically, in the suppression of the local self-government Assemblies throughout the country. Parliament was replaced by a Political Council and an "Administrative Conference for the revision of the Constitution," accompanied by assurances—framed on the latest British model—that the President's intention was to evolve a new system of Parliamentary government in due course. The Administrative Conference, a body of seventy-one members, was composed almost exclusively of men selected by the President and by his agents, the Tutuhs in the provinces, literati and officials of the old regime. Yuan Shih-k'ai's first Presidential address to this body left no room for further doubts as to his policy. "The Republic," he declared, "had been in existence for two years, and during this period, principles and laws have been dragged in the dust, while morality, self-control, and righteousness have been swept into oblivion"—in other words, his own wise forecast had been completely fulfilled. Thereafter, adopting the traditional phraseology of Imperial decrees, he proceeded to express his opinion of "the minority of turbulent demagogues," who had brought such evils upon the State, the "specious rogues" who talked glibly of liberty, equality, and patriotism, "intent all the while on possessing themselves of others' wealth, with which they flee overseas, seeking shelter

under the ægis of the foreigner." Finally, after expressing his belief in gradual reforms and his intention to adopt a policy of practical reconstruction, he declared that, in his experience of the art of Government, men and money were more useful than revolutionary theories. It was, to all intents and purposes, a declaration after the manner of the old song:

> We don't want to fight, but by Jingo, if we do,
> We've got the ships, we've got the men and we've got the money too.

As regards money, he was (and is) by no means well supplied; but the men were ready to his hand and those whom he selected, as Tutuhs, to direct and express "public opinion" in the provinces, have served him faithfully and well. With the scrupulous regard for appearances, the careful whitening of sepulchres, which is the first principle of government in China, every step that Yuan has taken, since last October, towards the practical reconstruction of the old orthodox autocracy and centralisation of power, has been ostensibly in response to the unanimous petition of the Tutuhs. On their representations (thoughtfully drafted, to prevent possible mistakes, in the President's Secretariat) the Provincial Assemblies have been abolished. With their approval, and that of the Political Council, the Worship of Heaven has been revived, with ceremonies similar to those observed by the Manchu dynasty. At their instance, the Provisional Constitution has been suspended, till a more convenient season, and replaced by the Presidential system of government. The Cabinet has become little more than a perfunctory body of well-paid secretaries, and the Premier's only duties are to appear at diplomatic functions and to countersign, *pro forma*, the Presidential mandates. The Conference for the redrafting of the Constitution, which met on March 18, afforded an indication of its quality by proposing to amend certain articles of the Code so as to confer on the President full power to declare war and make treaties without Parliamentary sanction.* Here, again, we have an example of collective "face-saving"—for all concerned are well

* On April 2 a Reuter's telegram from Peking announced that the amendments to the Constitution proposed by Yuan Shih-k'ai had been unanimously adopted by the Conference. Even more significant is the statement that the Constitution will embody a reaffirmation of the terms of the abdication of the Manchus.

ware that, in the absence of a successful revolution, there is no kelihood of any Parliament being convened for many a day to ome. Have not the provincial Assemblies been dissolved for perversely ursurping financial authority and obstructing the usiness of administration "? *Per contra*, it is to be observed hat Yuan Shih-k'ai has given proof of the beginning of a policy f reconstruction, by instituting examinations to test the fitness f District Magistrates and other local authorities—a highly ecessary reform, which might lead to practical results if honestly arried out by competent examiners.

So long as Yuan Shih-k'ai's policy was confined to political nd financial measures, clearly directed towards the re-establishment of the old order of metropolitan administration, public opinion accepted it placidly enough as a normal reaction against innovations that ran counter to the instincts and customs of the people. The Press, still largely controlled by Young China at the Treaty Ports, denounced it as unconstitutional, but the masses, knowing nothing of constitutions, were evidently unconcerned in the disputes of the scribes and politicians. They were only anxious that the bloodshed and brigandage, which they had come to associate with Republican ideas, should cease; wheresoever public opinion was articulate, it was evidently disposed to hope that Yuan, the Strong Man, would succeed in restoring law and order. It was only when the President, acting upon the "advice" of the Administrative Council, decided henceforward to perform the Winter Solstice sacrifice at the Temple of Heaven, that he became, in the sight of the people, something far more important than an administrator and a politician. By this momentous decision, Yuan Shih-k'ai has carried his original profession of political faith to its logical conclusion—a conclusion which concerns the sons of Han in their daily lives, because it means the restoration of the social structure, the re-assertion of things which the iconoclasts of Young China threatened utterly to destroy. By this decision, as a *Times* correspondent in Peking justly observes, "the President has practically proclaimed himself an autocratic ruler, who is responsible not to the nation but to the Almighty alone." Yet even in so doing, Yuan is careful to have it suggested by his faithful Councillors that the Worship of Heaven was originally "Republican in spirit."

Interpreted by the light of Chinese history, the President's emergence in the rôle of High Priest at the Temple of Heaven, wearing the sacerdotal diadem, would seem to foreshadow the imminent restoration of the Dragon Throne to its time-honoured place as the pivot of the Confucian system. Apart from the remarkable revival of Confucianism throughout the provinces (and notably at Canton, the headquarters of Radical Republicanism) there are many features in the situation at Peking which point to the same conclusion. In the first place, it is important to remember that, even while Yuan Shih-k'ai, making a virtue of necessity, acquiesced in the Republic, he, and the elder statesmen of the metropolitan administration, made no secret of the fact that they were at heart opposed to the change. Neither by his actions nor by his utterances has Yuan ever definitely abandoned the monarchical principles which led him to fight for the maintenance of the Throne as the necessary centre and rallying-point of any national policy of reorganisation. On the contrary, viewed in the light of recent events, the record of the Presidency affords at many points evidence of a policy deliberately framed to facilitate the restoration of the monarchical system of government, whensoever the reaction (which he clearly foresaw) should take place. It is a significant fact that, upon the outbreak of the revolution, he urged that the reigning family should be retained as an emblem of monarchy, but deprived of all power to renew the misgovernment of the past. It must also be remembered that the decrees in which the Manchu dynasty voluntarily relinquished the Throne, deliberately avoided using the Chinese term which conveys the idea of final abdication. The machinery of monarchy was carefully left, and still remains, intact. In close proximity to the Presidential quarters, the boy Emperor continues to enjoy the traditional prerogatives and dignities of the Son of Heaven, to hold his daily Court and to maintain the elaborate etiquette of the Forbidden City. It was assuredly one and the same dexterous hand which penned the abdication edicts of two years ago, and which, in October last, guided the Vermilion Pencil in framing the deeply significant address from the "Tsching Emperor" to President Yuan Shih-k'ai, read by Prince P'u Lun at the inauguration ceremony—a document which openly asserts the Imperial family's continued interest in "the administrative

owers of the country entrusted to the Republican Government." ast, but not least, amongst the significant features of the present ituation at Peking, is the personnel of the President's carefully elected Cabinet, collectively representing that classical orthooxy in whose eyes the Throne must ever remain an integral art of the Celestial system of government. These, like uan Shih-k'ai's representatives on the Administrative Council nd at the provincial capitals, are men who habitually speak of e President as "Guardian of the Heir Apparent," and who, like m, are "no lovers of changes which run counter to immemorial stom."

The road to re-establishment of the monarchy is evidently lear. From Yuan Shih-k'ai's present dictatorship to complete restoration of the old order can only be a matter of time and opportunity. All recent events tend to justify the belief that the change will be gradually and peacefully accomplished, by steps conforming tactfully to national sentiment and precedent and by adherence to the policy which Yuan publicly proclaimed in 1911; that is to say, by retention of the existing Manchu dynasty with greatly restricted authority. This is the policy which as we know, commended itself to the astute intelligence of Li Hung-chang, during the crisis of 1900, when the collapse of the Manchu rule was freely discussed, and to the dispassionate judgment of competent observers like Prince Ito and Sir Robert Hart, both of whom recognised the necessity for retaining the monarchical form of government, and the difficulty of finding any individual or family in China with prestige sufficient to command the loyalty of the political factions. It may be that, from the stepping-stone of an absolute dictatorship, supported by public opinion, Yuan Shih-k'ai may eventually be persuaded to follow the example of the founder of the Ming dynasty and establish in his own person a new Imperial line, but all the weight of classical tradition and his own proclaimed convictions would appear to point rather to the probability of a Regency, accompanied by the restoration of the Emperor Hsüan T'ung, under conditions greatly limiting the prerogatives and privileges of the Imperial Clans and Bannermen. Opinion on this point must necessarily be speculative, but there can be but little doubt that the restoration of the Worship of Heaven marks one of the final

stages of China's unpremeditated and ineffectual excursion into Republicanism.

From the political point of view, the restoration of the Manchu line must undoubtedly present difficulties and dangers, but against them should be set certain compensating advantages. Young China's national and republican aspirations are still a force to be reckoned with, but they are far less considerable, so far as the masses are concerned, than they were before the Cantonese had given proof that the expulsion of the Manchus appealed to them chiefly as a means of advancing their own self-seeking political ambitions. Racial antagonism exists, no doubt, but not as the fierce appeal of a battle-cry. Of itself, it could never have served to hold the revolutionaries together with the cohesion which was actually inspired by their common prejudices and aspirations. The dangers of civil strife arising from collective opposition to Manchu rule are less immediate than the dangers of chaos and confusion which result from Young China's violent indiscipline and from its predisposition to treasons, stratagems and crimes of assassination. Whatever form of government the rulers of the country may endeavour to establish, this danger must remain, for the simple reason that life is cheap in China and that assassins can be hired by any fanatic or dissatisfied placeman for a few dollars. It is a danger economic and social, rather than political, in its root cause, a danger which can only be stamped out by ruthless reprisals of the kind that Yuan Shih-k'ai has repeatedly adopted. Setting this aside, however, and accepting the conclusion that the Dictator's policy is monarchical in intention, there is justification for the belief that he will prefer Manchu restoration and a Regency in his own hands to the hazardous experiment of founding a new Chinese dynasty. The men whom he has gathered about him are nearly all Imperialists, closely identified with the old regime—men born and bred in the classical tradition which made Li Hung-chang, Liu K'un-yi, Tseng Kuo-fan, and other Chinese statesmen, faithful servants of the Manchu Throne. It is impossible to ignore the significant fact that the anti-Manchu monarchists of K'ang Yu-wei's faction have been quietly relegated to the background, that Liang Ch'i-chao is no longer of the President's counsels. Then, too, there is the question of the Dependencies—Mongolia and Tibet—whose

allegiance to the Manchus was refused to the Republic. Finally, there is the ever-restless Mahommedan element, led by the irreconciliable Sheng Yün, ex-Viceroy of Kansuh, which has hitherto declined to accept the revolution; and there is the formidable free-lance, General Chang Hsün, who has always been a supporter of the monarchy. Yuan Shih-k'ai knows his countrymen well. He knows that the masses of the "stupid people" remain politically unconscious, asking nothing of their rulers except to be allowed to live and labour in peace. He is fairly certain, therefore, to take the line of least resistance, to conciliate, as far as possible, the most dangerous elements of disorder, while endeavouring to re-establish those conditions of Government to which the nation is accustomed. The "White Wolf's" outbreak of brigandage is only one of many proofs of the necessity for centralisation and honest men at Pekin; herein China's history is repeating itself on familiar lines. It is still doubtful, at this juncture, whether the moral and material forces at Yuan's disposal will suffice to restore the old equilibrium, but it may safely be predicted that he will continue to marshal and direct them in accordance with the classical traditions of Chinese statecraft, by adherence to the Confucian system and eventually by re-establishment of the Throne.

J. O. P. Bland

THE COMFORTABLE CLASSES AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

The Territorial Forces Amendment Bill gave rise to a long and interesting debate when it was introduced for Second Reading in the House of Lords on March 12, 1914.

This Bill gives effect to the idea that certain comfortable and privileged people should lead the way in the matter of military training. Much argument can be spent on the question of who can rightly be called comfortable and privileged. A dispute on this point affords an alluring shelter to those who dislike the principle of the measure. But those who favour the idea that example is better than precept, and believe that even comparative comfort entails the performance of duty, will not be put off by the apparent difficulty of deciding who shall first be called upon for military service. Any one can pick holes in any given classification for any purpose. But grades of fortune exist, and always have existed; they have had to be adopted for such important things as Insurance and Income Tax; while most other laws that look as if they apply impartially to every one are in reality unequal in their incidence, owing to the different sorts and conditions of men and women to whom they apply.

It is not pretended that the classes named in this Bill exhaust all those persons who are meet to be trained as soldiers. Nor do the authors of the Bill contend that the schedules or details are to be accepted as final. They have merely selected certain sorts of young men who have either inherited or acquired a comfortable place in society, and required them to justify this place by the performance of military duty.

Briefly it is proposed that every public school boy in about a hundred and fifteen public schools shall receive compulsory cadet training, followed by an ample recruit-training between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one; that

all graduates at twenty-five universities shall receive the same recruit-training before taking a degree; and that no one shall enter any of the higher professions such as the Bar, the Civil Service, Medicine, Surgery, Dentistry, Banking, or the Stock Exchange, or enjoy an income of £400 a year from any source unless and until they have been trained in the same way. In all cases the recruit-training is to be followed by an annual training till the age of thirty; and by liability to be called out in times of national danger till the age of forty-five. Those who cannot serve will have to pay. Those who will not serve will be put in prison or lose their votes, or perhaps both. Provision is made for dealing fairly and gently with all sorts of hard cases. It will at once be seen that to put all this into an Act of Parliament *unchains a torrent of criticism which can be best dealt with* by examining the searching and able speeches of the Peers who took part in the Debate.

Lord Newton began by moving: "That in the opinion of this House no system of Home Defence which is not based upon the democratic principle of Universal Service can be fully effective and reliable." No one knows more about the military needs of this country from the European point of view than Lord Newton. Not long ago he wrote a book on the life and times of Lord Lyons, which good judges declare to be one of the very best of its kind. He is also a keen critic of the War Office. It was therefore a little disappointing that he would not support the attempt contained in this Bill to promote the military strength of the country. But that disappointment may be softened by the thought that he was expressing in his amendment the official view of the National Service League. We will deal with that view later on. Lord Newton said that the Bill was in some respects an improvement upon the various schemes that are brought forward from time to time by Secretaries of State belonging to either Party; but that it appeared to him to be one of those well-meant schemes that are bound inevitably to fail. He then made fun of the force that the Bill is designed to raise. He compared it to the order of baronets of whom Sir Vavasour Firebrace was the eloquent champion in the fine comedy scene in the drawing-room of Marney Abbey, sketched by the master hand of Disraeli, in the early pages of *Sibyl*. No one knows better than Lord Newton how to wield the weapon of

satire. But his citation of Disraeli, and particularly of Sir Vavasour Firebrace, was not quite fortunate for his purpose. The whole teaching of *Sibyl* is that the aristocracy are the natural and only leaders of the people. Disraeli's speeches and writings are stuffed with the doctrine of "Noblesse oblige." Sir Vavasour Firebrace is held up to ridicule for insisting that the restoration of the long withheld rights of the baronets was the question of the day. The fixing of his hopes on the mere possession of a title is satirised in order to illustrate the truth that a title is nothing but a sound unless the holder does his duty to his country. Lord Newton next argued in favour of the wholesale application of military training with no regard for persons, and praised the sentiment of Mr. Kipling's well-known line, "Duke's son, cook's son, son of a belted earl." The only chance of the success of the advocates of National Service was to "persuade all classes in this country that there is some similarity of interest."

The Lord Chancellor welcomed the principle of the Bill with *ominous* cordiality. "It is a fine principle" . . . "that those who are prosperous and fortunate should show the way to those who are less prosperous and less fortunate. That is a fine principle, and the difficulties as usual come with the working of it. Four hundred pounds a year! That includes the case of a clergyman with ten children." The noble Viscount was reminded by an interrupter that the Bill only referred to those under 21, and that for a clergyman to have a family of ten children before coming of age was not a likely thing to happen. It should here be noted that if a young man liable to serve expects any hardship by being forced to attend an annual training during the earlier years of married life, this Bill allows him to knock off all his liability in the first year by doing a recruit service for twelve months instead of for six. He will then be called upon for no more annual training, but only for an annual musketry course up to the age of thirty. A year's training before the age of twenty-one, and the firing of a *few* shots on the range every year for the next ten years, do not place a very severe strain upon any one. If, on the other hand, the shorter period of recruit training be chosen, the annual training for the next *four* years is to be fifteen days, and for the next five years eight days: and in either case the chance of being called out for any national emergency up to the age of forty-five remains just

the same. What less can a man do to fit himself to be a soldier of the King when his country wants him? With the exception of the recruit-training, which all right-minded young men will regard as a privilege and a pleasure, the yearly training is even a little less than that which Lord Haldane himself has laid down for the Territorials. Yet he said in the House of Lords that this Bill imposes a "very severe system, and can only be justified if it is necessary."

The answer to this is that every branch of the Army and of the Reserve Forces is many thousands below the smallest number that the King's Ministers have judged to be enough for the safety of the Empire and of the British Isles. If it is not necessary to take almost any step to alter this alarming state of affairs then nothing is necessary, and we may sleep comfortably in our beds until our throats are cut. It may be presumed that the Government share this view. Perhaps they are obliged to share it or else lose the votes of the Little Englanders in the House of Commons, who the other day gave us one more proof of their feelings towards the Army. Be this as it may, the Lord Chancellor dismissed our military weakness as being of no account. He accepted as quite true the statement that under the Voluntary system the units are never full. "They never are," he added. "As regards the Regulars we need not trouble ourselves; the shortage is nothing to what it has been even in recent years, and I have no doubt the shortage will soon be made good. As regards the Territorial Force there is an apparent deficit; it is a deficit of some 60,000, I think." This was to be made up by the National Reserve. Most people thought that the National Reserve was at least intended to fill up gaps in the Territorial Force that occur as a result of active service, and not to take the place on mobilisation of officers and men who never existed at all. But we will let that pass. The Lord Chancellor's trump card was an investigation into invasion and Home Defence that is going on under the presidency of the Prime Minister. And better still, he promised us a speech from the Prime Minister, in which he will make certain general principles clear. The Lord Chancellor did not even hint at any concrete proposal for repairing the admitted weakness of our defences. But if a speech from the Prime Minister cannot cure a complaint, the sufferer must indeed be past praying for.

Anyhow, Lord Haldane concluded by telling the House of Lords that he did not think "that any system of Compulsory Service is either wanted or possible for this country." His second objection was that the Bill before the House was unworkable and unnecessary.

Lord Joicey was not so complacent. He was "rather staggered" by hearing from "gentlemen occupying the highest military positions . . . that the Voluntary system has broken down so far as our Territorial system is concerned." He had "been compelled to change his views with regard to the matter during recent years." These "recent years" have been spent by Lord Joicey if not literally in the House of Lords, at any rate in the enjoyment of a peerage. He gave voice to his changed views with that fine independence which is such a valuable attribute of the hereditary House. He delivered a very damaging attack upon the failure of the Government to provide for national safety, and proclaimed himself "anxious to see a system of compulsion." But he did not like the Bill. He thought that compulsion should be applied to every class, but in particular to those who are "practically loafers, who do not do any work if they can avoid it." By this Bill "you miss that class altogether." Lord Joicey evidently thinks that loafing is a monopoly of the poor. He does not know the "nuts."

Lord Stanhope, who has given much careful study to every aspect of National Defence, made a powerful and very instructive speech in favour of the Bill. He also declared in favour of Lord Newton's Amendment advocating Universal Service, but explained that as the Lord Chancellor had said that this Amendment was equivalent to the rejection of the Bill he should vote against it. He calculated with a moderation beyond any reasonable dispute that the Bill would presently yield a force of men between twenty and thirty years of age amounting to 100,000: and an additional force of 180,000 men between the ages of thirty and forty-five, at a cost of not much over a million pounds a year. He then argued that the Bill would be a help and not a hindrance to any scheme for Compulsory Service—"one ounce of example is worth a great deal of theory and talk on public platforms." Let the middle and upper classes set the example, and give a guarantee of their own good faith, and the rest will follow. The class difference set up by the Bill would not last very long.

If, as I feel certain, military training is proved to be a benefit, the first people [illegible] will desire to have the advantage of that military training will be the classes who

are left out. They can have it under this Bill. They have the right to volunteer, and they have, of course, the right at any time through their representatives to demand that this principle of compulsion shall be extended to all classes whatever their income and whatever their standing. It has been said that they will feel that it is only right that the richer classes should have to do military service because they have to defend their own property. Well, the working man will realise that the provision of this force does a great deal more than that. I think the noble lord, Lord Newton, stated that the working classes would be against this Bill because it puts all the power into the hands of the upper classes. If that is true, the working classes must be very much more foolish than I believe them to be if they allow that to last for more than a very few months. They would at once demand that they should also have that power; and they could regain the power they had by mere force of numbers, by being ready to join the force, and by their numbers they would necessarily swamp those who come from the upper classes.

Lord Stanhope concluded by a telling appeal in favour of the principle of "Noblesse oblige." "I am one of those," he said, "who believe that wealth, position, or power entails responsibilities and obligations. . . . That is the principle of which we all approve, and little as I care for the law, I shall have an even lower respect for it if this principle cannot be put in the form of a Bill, and carried through both Houses of Parliament."

Lord Lovat wished the Bill to be read a second time from the point of view of the question of officers. If the Bill would provide officers, we should be meeting one of the greatest difficulties of the day. He reminded the House that there is a difficulty in filling Sandhurst with cadets. The Officers Training Corps, at any rate, "would be tremendously helped by the Bill." "The Bill could not be thrown aside simply because it may contain some clauses to which objection can be taken." He pointed out that the training recommended in the Bill coincided with the ideas already set out by the present Director of Military Training, and the present Military Secretary. He further approved of the principle "that we should be prepared to do ourselves, and get our sons to do, what we ask the people to do." The proposal of the Bill was an "absolutely necessary forerunner of any general form of conscription." After insisting on the weakness of our National Defence, and noting the suspicious silence of Colonel Seely on the vital matter of what kind of a force we should have in this country after the Expeditionary Force had sailed, he urged that the Bill should be read a second time, and thrown out on the Third Reading if found to be unworkable in Committee.

Lord Erroll could not support the Bill. He frankly said

that it was "a step in the right direction and the embodiment of a very high ideal." His objection was that it did not go far enough, although "a little compulsion would be an excellent thing for the Comfortable Classes." Unlike Lord Joicey, he admitted the possibility of there being comfortable wasters, but thought no waster should be allowed to escape. Officers should be chosen from those who had proved themselves most capable and efficient in the ranks. Lord Erroll then went on to expose the admitted deficiencies in all ranks, and proved that the present system is a failure. He contended with great force that we cannot get either the numbers or the training without compulsion. Numbers and training are the only things that matter. He no doubt meant to add to numbers and training the other essential of physical soundness. He devoted a sentence or two to the bitter truth that there are no votes in Compulsory Training, and announced that he would vote for the amendment as the Bill did not go far enough.

Lord Cromer said that it was "abundantly clear that the military defences of this country are in a highly unsatisfactory condition," and remarked that the Lord Chancellor had not produced any conclusive or convincing arguments to justify his belief that no compulsion of any kind was either necessary or desirable. Lord Cromer had no confidence that the Party leaders would face the question of compulsion. If Lord Lansdowne were to declare in favour of either the Bill or the Amendment, he "would be violently attacked on every platform in the country by the adherents of noble lords opposite." The rival proposals before the House were "interesting questions for academic discussion." Nothing could be done, in his opinion, without agreement between "responsible statesmen" on both sides. For the present he thought the Unionist Peers should only be asked to support either Lord Newton or the author of the Bill by the Party leaders; he therefore proposed to follow whatever advice was given by Lord Midleton, as representing the Front Bench.

Lord Ribblesdale did not propose to follow Lord Cromer into the somewhat domestic lecture which as a Unionist he had read to Lord Willoughby and Lord Newton. "In a comfortable country like England, a Bill which sets out to make uncomfortable a good many comfortable people, and, as I understand, to

penalise them unless they are willing to be made uncomfortable, certainly possesses almost sinister advantages of originality." He did not attach much importance to the fact that the Lord Chancellor had declared the Bill to be unworkable. In proof of the proverb that "Where there is a will there is a way," he cited the Government of Ireland Bill. We were told only last summer that it was a perfect instrument of government. Now that the instrument will not work smoothly, it can apparently be altered to any extent. He urged as an objection that the Bill did not provide a military climate. But in spite of that he intended to vote for the Second Reading, in order that the Bill might at least be discussed in Committee.

Lord Sydenham could not support either the Bill or the Amendment, although he agreed that our present military system is far from satisfactory in many respects. "Much has to be done to bring it into the state in which it ought to be for the security of the country." But he had "never been able to see eye to eye with the National Service League." Lord Sydenham almost seemed to favour the Blue Water School, and declined to admit that "the principle of voluntary recruitment is quite played out." He thought it would be wiser to continue in our present policy, arrived at in 1905, than to embark on the military revolution which would be created by establishing Universal Service. He agreed with Lord Cromer that this policy has not yet been carried out, and never can be carried out except by cordial co-operation between the two great parties in the State. It is tempting to remind Lord Sydenham that nine years have slipped away since 1905, during which time England has become relatively weaker than ever before. Nor does the moment of cordial co-operation between parties seem to draw any nearer. You do not hear much of National Defence on Unionist platforms, while no meeting of the Radical caucus is held without a hysterical condemnation of all the weapons of war. Lord Sydenham objected that the Bill would draw "a sumptuary line across our social system" which "would certainly give rise to hardships and injustice." He welcomed Clause 7, which establishes recognised Cadet Corps in all scheduled schools and colleges. He saw no valid objection to compulsory Cadet training of all classes of school age, and emphasised the need of the training of character. "It seems to me that the measure

of success of the Boy Scouts movement is the measure of the failure of our national system of education to give the training which is calculated to produce the best type of citizen, and I believe that under a compulsory National Cadet system organised on the lines of the Boy Scouts, this great work might be extended to all our boys." These are valuable words indeed. Coming from one who, as a soldier and as a statesman, has served his country with so much distinction, they are well worth recording. His lordship concluded by saying that a Bill to establish universal Cadet Corps would receive very little antagonism from any quarter. He believed that the National Service League would regard it "as a first step in the direction they wished to move, and it would tend to strengthen the moral fibre of our citizens."

Lord Hardinge spoke in support of the Bill. He agreed with Lord Lovat that the Bill might make good the shortage of officers. He announced himself to be an ardent follower of Lord Roberts. But he candidly confessed "that no one can shut his eyes to this fact, that at the present moment the people of this country will not undertake universal service." The cause had been so much misrepresented that an intelligent working man has been known to say, "I have no country except the dirt that's in my window box." He should support the Bill because it was a forerunner of Universal Service. But as the nation has not accepted it, then the rich must come forward and set the example.

Lord Ampthill did not like the Bill at all. He regarded it as "wrong in principle," and "unpractical in detail"; and thought it would be "mischievous in its effects on our social system." But he would support the Second Reading, because all the aspects of National Defence should be discussed and have daylight let into them whenever possible. But if the Bill ever got out of Committee, then he would vote against the Third Reading. He hoped that Lord Newton would withdraw his Amendment and simplify the issue. He contended that the principle of "Noblesse oblige" had a moral and not a legal foundation. If there is to be example it should be spontaneous. The duty of National Defence has always been the privilege and honour of the governing class. The masses now form the governing class; they must therefore take over this duty and privilege. He dreaded the "invidious class distinctions" which he believed the Bill would create. He would listen to no appeals

to expediency. The argument that half a loaf was better than no bread left him quite cold. He agreed that no Party was just now likely to advocate Universal Service; but then he thought that the Party system as we know it would not continue indefinitely. He foreshadowed a day when Party leaders would meet together and recommend to the nation an efficient system.

Lord Roberts regretted that he was unable to support the Bill. The method of it was not practical. It would accentuate distinctions between classes. The Bill cut at the root of two great principles: first, that it was the duty of every man to defend his country; second, that without distinction of class, promotion should be dependent on merit alone. It would exempt many men from a duty in which it would be a great advantage for them to share. He could wish that Lord Newton would withdraw his amendment so that the Bill could go for Second Reading, though he himself should not support it. Further discussion would elicit information about the Army, and perhaps bring home to the people the necessity of having the state of the Army considered by a carefully formed Committee of both Parties.

The Bishop of Bangor intended to vote for the Bill. He had formed the opinion that the "country at the present moment is in a thoroughly defenceless position; that whereas our fathers depended for the defence of the country on God and their own good swords, we are dependent on the forbearance of some Powers and on a fragile, delicate alliance with other Powers." The Lord Chancellor need not waste any pity upon the clergy. Mr. Quiverful would look upon the annual training "as a relief from domestic worries." The principle of the Bill, not the details, was what we had to consider. How could the House of Lords better meet the charges against them than by confirming this principle?

Lord Lucas attacked the principle of the Bill. His speech was so amazing that some of it must be given in his own words:

> I think it would be generally agreed that the primary object for which any man desires to accumulate wealth is to be able to obtain certain privileges which the possession of that wealth gives him. Those privileges consist in being relieved of certain obligations which press rather heavily upon a poor man—first, that he should have to work to support himself; second, that he should have to work to support his family; and third, that he should have to work in some form or another to support the State. It is because a man has the desire to relieve himself of these obligations that he sets to work to accumulate wealth, and the possession of wealth has always carried with it the enjoyment to a greater or less degree of all those privileges. I would suggest to

your lordships that if you are going to make wealth a thing the possession of which, instead of conferring those privileges, is to take them away, you will have to change altogether its nature and attributes. In trying by this Bill to make the rich serve the poor, the noble lord is endeavouring to do something that has never yet been achieved by any country . . . and which even the Founder of Christianity preached and preached in vain.

Lord Lucas then criticised some details of the Bill, and with regard to the general question of National Defence sheltered himself behind the promised statement of the Prime Minister.

Lord Midleton pointed out that every speaker, except Lord Lucas and Lord Haldane, had agreed that something must be done to remedy our military weakness. He corrected Lord Lucas's view by citing the obligation of military service which rested on the knights under the Feudal system. All the same he was "bound to say that many of us on this Bench doubt whether it would be wise to lay down a precedent by which would be put on one class a responsibility which in these days must certainly rest on all." Nor could the Front Bench support Lord Newton's Amendment, for that would commit them "to a sort of side-wind opinion in favour of Universal Service."

Lord Stradbroke supported the Bill. Lord Stradbroke took the chair at a meeting in the Guildhall at Cambridge when the idea was unfolded to the University. He wished that the Voluntary system could find us all the men we wanted. "Now, unfortunately, it seems that the spirit is spreading that every one is to be paid for what he does, and there are throughout the country a number of men who are quite well enough off to spare both the time and the money to make themselves efficient Territorials who at the present time take no active part in the defence of the country."

Lord Ridley agreed with the principle of the Bill. "It could only be a beginning of conferring what I would call the benefits of Universal Service upon the whole of the public." Lord Ridley called to remembrance a provision in the Territorial Force Act whereby any regiment could be labelled an Imperial Service Regiment if 90 per cent. of all ranks volunteered for active service abroad; and said that, as far as he knew, his own regiment was the only one that had not disappointed expectations. He was amazed that Lord Lucas, a Radical, should object to the formation of a new precedent, and thought it ought not to go

forth that the House of Lords had declined to give a lead in the matter of Compulsory Service.

Lord Methuen made a powerful speech in favour of Compulsory Cadet Training. He related how the system had been set up in South Africa. It is very tempting to transcribe the whole of Lord Methuen's patriotic utterance. It will not soon be forgotten by those who heard it, and should be read by every one who loves his country. Lord Methuen was glad the Bill had been brought forward, but he was opposed to any system which did not include every class.

Lord Curzon expressed profound sympathy and respect with Lord Methuen, and hoped that the proposal for Compulsory Cadet Training would not end in talk. He admitted the force of example, but the Bill asked him to violate the first principle of the National Service League. Moreover, the "democracy," having assumed the rights of government, should also assume the responsibilities. He endorsed the views of Lord Roberts with regard to class distinctions. He did not attach much value to the promised pronouncement of the Prime Minister. It would be the view of the Government, and not the view of the nation. Lord Curzon earnestly entreated the Radicals not to ignore repeated appeals to deal with national security as a national affair.

The Duke of Bedford supported the Second Reading. He is not a member of the National Service League, but he thought the classes who are well off should set an example in the matter of military service. The Duke subjected our military arrangements to a raking fire of criticism. Many thousands of our boy soldiers were too young for active military service; their fathers and grandfathers in the National Reserve, that once bore the suggestive title of the Veteran Reserve, were too old. We must have an Army for service overseas. The Navy could not occupy India. The Government had no remedy. The Bill did propose a remedy, and he should vote for it.

Lord Lansdowne said the ideal of the Bill was a very chivalrous and attractive ideal. But he saw difficulties. The arbitrary line between schools was hard to draw. The principle of the Bill was at fault. He feared it would set up a military caste. But the Lord Chancellor's task in demolishing the Bill was much easier than that of defending his own military position.

Lord Lansdowne showed no mercy in his exposure of the failure of our present system. He rallied Lord Haldane on his complacency. He did not think public opinion justified either Party in pressing Compulsory Service on Parliament. But he thought public opinion was ripe for Compulsory Training in our schools and continuation schools.

> I believe that if we could train every lad in the country in the rudiments of drill, in the use of the rifle, in habits of discipline, we should do not only a great service to the Army but a great service to the cause of education. We spend, I think it was said last night, £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 upon the education of the children of this country. It is compulsory education, and scarcely a year passes that we do not extend its scope. We now include in it such matters as the compulsory inspection of the eyes of the children, their teeth, their personal cleanliness, and so forth; and why we should not take a step further and make it our business to inculcate in them while they are still young the great fact that they are to be citizens of this country and that they may some day have to shoulder a rifle in its defence, I cannot for the life of me see.

Coming from Lord Lansdowne, this announcement is most significant. He said that the Board of Education and the War Office should make common cause; and that we should teach the young people of this country that citizenship means not only the enjoyment of rights, but the performance of duty.

Lord Morley entered a "caveat" against Compulsory Cadet Training. It might be all very well in South Africa, but South Africa was different. He deprecated any attempt to discover the opinions of the Chief of the General Staff. The Minister was the responsible person. As to national security, had not the Prime Minister already told the National Service League deputation a fortnight ago that the dangers of invasion are not greater than they have been at any previous time in our history. What more do you want? Turning to the Bill, he had never seen a Bill so knocked to pieces. He was dismayed at the thought of there being any loafers at Oxford and Cambridge, and at the public schools.

Lord Newton then withdrew his Amendment. He scoffed at the Bill, but said he would vote against it with a certain amount of reluctance. Fifty-three Peers then voted against the Bill, and thirty-four voted for it. The supporters of the Bill have no cause to be disappointed with this division. In estimating its significance, the Radicals may be written off as a bad debt. Fully a score of Radical Peers were included in the majority. Although, as usual, these Peers were almost inarticulate in debate, most of them probably agreed with Lord Lucas in thinking that

the only use of money is to buy comfort and avoid responsibility. Many Unionist Peers who voted against the Bill would be influenced by Lord Lansdowne. Indeed, Lord Cromer said that he should follow the Opposition Front Bench. It should be noted, however, that this Bench was not quite solid, as Lord Selborne voted for the Bill. Lord Halsbury was not in the House at the time of the division.

No apology is needed for this rather lengthy analysis of the speeches. The debate was most valuable, and it is pretty sure that the *National Review* will not object to publishing a record of such important opinions on the subject of National Defence. What is the significance of this debate? It points out once again the military weakness of the British Isles. It is of no avail to labour this point. The figures speak for themselves. Everybody knows it, and everybody admits it except those who either are responsible for it themselves or else love to have it so.

The remedy is the thing. The Radical remedy is a speech from the Prime Minister. We can almost hear him making it. Does anybody really suppose that with a General Election well within sight the Prime Minister is going to advertise the fact that after eight years of office the Radical Ministry have completely failed to fill the ranks of the Army and of the Reserve Forces? The forthcoming statement of the Prime Minister will be nothing more or less than a document with which Radical speakers will be able to refute inconvenient questions about National Defence.

And what of the National Service League? It has not yet made enough headway to prevail on any political party to take it up. Lord Ampthill will have no compromise, but is out for the full policy of Universal Service. "England expects every man to do his duty," he quoted, with the emphasis on the word every. On the morning this signal was hoisted, it was the leadership of Lord Nelson that made it effective. England has been expecting every man to do his military duty for long enough. Surely the country will respond to the touch of leadership that is given by this Bill. We offer to the nation every public school boy, every University graduate, and every one else with comfort and privilege who is about to enjoy his full manhood. All these will come forward and give in their own persons a guarantee of their own good faith. It is hard to believe that this offer can be refused permanently. Those who refuse it must offer an alternative. It is

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clear that Universal Service cannot come either in this Parliament or the next, unless it is imposed upon us by some other nation. The millennium of conference between Parties seems to be even more remote. The eternal struggle between the temperamental Tory and the temperamental Radical will not be so easily composed. Nor is legislation popular, because it is imposed by what politicians call "both great Parties in the State." The Insurance Act wa passed with the consent of both Parties and of both Houses o Parliament, and wins "hands down" as the most unpopula measure within living memory. No, one Party or the other mus harden its heart, and not try to diminish its own responsibilit by asking the other Party to walk into its parlour. Our foreig policy is said to be no longer a Party affair. The British publi is kept very much in the dark about our foreign policy. Not lon ago, at the Jewellers' Dinner at Birmingham, Mr. Austen Chambe lain made a strong demand for the public to be taken more int the confidence of the Foreign Minister. Quite right. The natic would give the ships and the men and the money, if it were to what they were for. But here comes the question of Party. N Radical Minister dares to disclose to the country any of o essential obligations to the Triple Entente, and in this way expo the inability of our military resources to meet them ; such a di closure would at once create a demand for an Army which we ha not got, and which the supporters of the present Ministry in t House of Commons would not hear of for an instant. The Radi Foreign Minister looks to the Unionist Party to save him from l friends, and to vote for just that amount of armaments whi on paper, can be made to satisfy a not too inquisitive public.

The Unionist Party may one day succeed to the direction our foreign policy. It will be their responsibility to find t material to back it up. It will be of no avail to appeal to Radicals. On a former occasion they warned off Lord Hald from the support of even a mild system of Cadet Training. If cannot have Universal Service, and if the proposals of this do not by that time find increased favour, let us by all me begin by training the youth. If this is linked up with a substan increase in the Regular Army, we may restore the prestige and martial spirit of England.

WILLOUGHBY DE BROKE

AARON HILL

WHAT can possibly have been the phrenological "bumps" of the man who christened his helpless offspring Minerva, Urania, Astræa and Julius Cæsar! It is a nice speculation; and one which might have interested Charles Lamb. But the biographical field offers to the sportsman bigger game than AARON HILL; and the enquiry has been neglected. From time to time, indeed, he has been heard of; but hardly sympathetically. To Sir Leslie Stephen—not often impatient—he is a "bore of the first water;" and another distinguished critic, the late D. C. Tovey, defines him (surely somewhat euphuistically) as "a practical joke concocted between the Muses and Momus, to bring the judgments of mortals into contempt,"* though he nevertheless admits that Hill was "once a power in the world of letters," while even the earlier critic concedes to him both courtesy and amiability. And now, at last, he has found his fitting biographer. From Miss Dorothy Brewster's † careful and laborious pages, he emerges as a far more interesting personality than would have been supposed. If he was not conspicuously eminent as the "poet, dramatist and projector" of her sub-title —if he was scarcely the "supreme genius" of his friend Thomson's grateful "deference and veneration," he was, at least, a kindly and impulsive enthusiast; more ambitious, it may be, than able; more assimilative than inventive; but of endless ingenuity and indefatigable energy. He is an exemplification of Taine's dictum that, in literature as in war, "the common

* Thomson's *Works*, 1897, i, xxiii.

† *Aaron Hill, Poet, Dramatist, and Projector.* By Dorothy Brewster, Ph.D. New York, Columbia University Press, 1913. This book has been approved by the Department of English and Comparative Literature in Columbia University "as a contribution to knowledge worthy of publication."

soldiers occasionally exhibit, more clearly than the generals, the capabilities and tendencies of their time and country." From this point of view alone, Aaron Hill deserves the fuller consideration he has recently received.

He was born on February 10, 1685, at a house on the site of Beaufort Buildings in the Strand. His father, George Hill of Malmesbury Abbey, Wiltshire, was an attorney, originally of a good estate, which he gradually dissipated, leaving, at his death, the education of his children to his widow and her mother The boy's first schooling was at Barnstaple, under Mr. Rayner where he had as his schoolfellow, John Gay, the fabulist. From Barnstaple he passed to Westminster, then under Busby's successor, Dr. Knipe. One of his contemporaries, Barton Booth became the actor and impersonator of Addison's Cato; another was the future Lord Carteret. The only tradition surviving from these days is that Hill increased his slender pocket money by doing the tasks of his classmates, an occupation which his biographer suggests was probably more profitable commercially than some of his later enterprises. At fourteen he left Westminster; and discovering that he possessed an influential relative in the person of Lord Paget (the fifth baron), King William's Ambassador to Turkey, persuaded his grandmother to let him visit his lordship In March 1700, he accordingly set out, by way of Portugal and Italy, for Constantinople—a remarkable expedition for a lad of fifteen, however precocious. He was apparently well-grown and good-looking, points which, no doubt, told in his favour for, contrary to all precedent, Lord Paget received him with much cordiality, and equipped him with a tutor or Governor with whom he sent him to travel in the East. The journal of his voyage to the Turkish capital is lost; but many particulars of what constitutes his Oriental Grand Tour are scattered through the description of the *Ottoman Empire* which he issued eight years later. From these it appears that he explored Greece and the Islands of the Ægean; went by caravan into the Holy Land visited Mecca and Jerusalem, and was all but assassinated by Mohammedan fanatic. Other excursions were made to Sestos and Abydos; to the reputed site of Troy and Hector's tomb. At Samos he watched the sponge-divers, and although "more than most men averse to diving," endeavoured to emulate them;

Patmos he foregathered with an Italian hermit, much less gloomy than his cell; and narrowly escaped being entombed in the catacombs near Memphis, which were then made use of by the predatory Arabs as death-traps for the unsuspecting traveller. After these experiences—probably more or less romanced in the telling—he returned home in Lord Paget's suite, reaching England, after a circuitous and leisurely journey through the Continent, on April 12, 1703, the passage from Holland having been "enlivened by a sea-fight with the French."

By this time he was eighteen, and of the next few years no very definite record exists. But it is clear that his status in the Paget household was disturbed by "the malice of a certain female," not more explicitly described; and that his next occupation was that of tutor to a young gentleman of the Wentworth family, with whom he travelled abroad for three or four years, returning about 1706–7, having greatly improved his pupil, and, on his own part, having gained impressions considerably more mature than those he had previously collected. His next connection was with that eccentric and ubiquitous personage, Charles, Earl of Peterborough and Monmouth (Swift's "Mordanto"), to some "the ramblingest lying rogue on earth;" to others, a Paladin of romance. After the capture of Barcelona, Peterborough was recalled by Queen Anne; and his conduct in Spain became the subject of an inconclusive Parliamentary enquiry. His exploits and his Quixotic personality were just of the kind to attract Hill, who, in 1707, addressed to him, under the title of *Camillus*, a laudatory poem in heroics, his first effort in this way, but possessing little value save its enthusiasm. Here and there one lights upon a compact couplet, for example, that describing Spain as

> Made poor, by *plenty*, dull *content* she knew;
> Her strength *declining*, as her riches *grew*;

which might—without its intrusive italics—have come from Goldsmith's *Traveller;* while the not-inappropriate lines on Peterborough himself:

> He needs no *council*, and he seeks no *praise*:
> When *other* generals *tedious* projects *form*,
> He *thinks*, and *acts*, and *wins* applause, by *storm*,

must have pleased his erratic hero. At all events, Peterboroug made the young man his secretary, a post which Hill retaine until 1710. The interval, when not absorbed by his dutie was devoted to letters. He became a frequenter of the coffe houses; and companioned with Tate (the Laureate), and his ol schoolfellow Gay, who, at one time, is supposed to have bee *his* secretary. He wrote occasional and amatory verses celebrated, in *The Invasion*, the Pretender's unsuccessful attem on Scotland in 1708; helped Tate to translate parts of Ovid *Metamorphoses*, and contributed to that curious forerunner Steele's *Tatler*, the *British Apollo*, a species of Augustan *Enqui Within*, which had not only considerable success, but ma successors. His most ambitious effort, however, was his *F and Just Account of the Present State of the Ottoman Empi* 1709, already referred to, a stately folio based on his Orien travels, having seven plates (each frugally dedicated to a nol patron), and preceded by a goodly subscription list, includi more than four hundred names. The style is described as p tentious and immature; the matter often reminiscent of Ryc and others, though the passages which bear on his perso experiences have freshness and novelty. Hill himself eventu grew ashamed of this performance, professing to regard i rather late in the day—as a boyish effort for which it was unj to render him accountable; but it reached a second edition 1710. This was the year of the author's marriage to Miss Mo an Essex lady of fortune, an event which also marks the inter tion, though not the termination, of his connection with I Peterborough, who wished to carry his secretary with hin the West Indies. This proposition was, however, so stro opposed by Mrs. Hill that her husband was emboldenec decline it.

His wife's means repaired the lack of any paternal inherita and for some time left him at liberty to indulge his tastes, lite and otherwise, from the comfortable foothold of financial secu In a projecting age (one remembers Defoe's *Essay on Proj* he was first and foremost a projector, always, to use an pression of Mrs. Thrale, "racking his invention raw" over new expedient for benefiting humanity. But as, unha most of his projects came to nothing, we may, with some viol

of chronology, imitate his biographer in disposing once for all, though with greater brevity, of his efforts in this direction. His first scheme, that, in fact, with which he is most usually associated, was for extracting oil from beech-nuts. For this, shareholders were obtained, money was raised, and elaborate machinery devised; but the enterprise collapsed, owing to the unexpected, though not unprecedented, failure, for a sequence of years, of the requisite supply of mast. On the beech-oil fiasco came a society (apparently consisting of himself) for publishing accounts of new inventions, in which he is identified with the manufacture of china (from pipeclay or other broken china ground small); with a new fuel (always a subject of contemporary solicitude!) to be composed of coal-dust and Thames mud; and incidentally with the repairing of that encroachment of the Thames near Barking known as Dagenham Breach, a feat which was successfully performed by Captain John Perry.* Vine-growing in England was another of his dreams. Then he is Treasurer for the Golden Islands in Carolina where gentlemen from England and America were invited to settle under attractive inducements and special immunities,—a scheme which, like the rest, failed, but was effected later to some extent by Oglethorpe's colonisation of Georgia. Next he is agent for the York Buildings Company; and occupied in the importation of timber and other commodities from Scotland, with collateral activities in the manufacture of potash. But here again the results failed to realise the expectations formed. By this time Hill's losses and disappointments had considerably damped his ardour for company-promoting and projects generally; and, at last, he came to the conclusion that he would "have done with all designs he could not execute himself." He was still "chock-full of science" (as Captain Cuttle would say); but his enthusiasm was scarcely as inflammable as of yore. In quitting this aspect of his career, it is but fair to add that he was far removed from the ordinary speculator, and genuinely desirous of benefiting his fellow men. He took infinite pains to qualify himself for the researches he engaged upon;

* With the periodical inspections of the embankment works at Dagenham Breach originated the Ministerial Whitebait dinners, which down to 1870 flourished first at the Breach House at Dagenham, and afterwards at Greenwich (*Notes and Queries*, September 1, 1855).

and if his inventions exhausted his energies, and drained h purse, he regretted, not so much his own waste of time and mone as the loss to the public of those inestimable advantages he h endeavoured to secure for them.

In carrying forward the story of Hill's projects, it has be necessary to anticipate. But though his "projects" illustra his character, they are by no means the most attractive pa of it, and to "have done" with them (as he did) leaves one free take up his connection with theatrical affairs and with his litera contemporaries, especially Pope and Richardson. As rega the stage, his first beginnings are obscure. But as his earli tragedy of *Elfrid; or, the Fair Inconstant*, is said to have b written at the desire of Barton Booth, the actor, who, as alrea related, had been his schoolmate at Westminster, it is perh only reasonable to associate Booth with his first dramatic ginnings. At all events, from the troubled rivalries of Dr Lane and the Haymarket, then the only London theatres, issues suddenly in November 1709, as Manager and Directo Drury Lane, at that date under the jurisdiction of one of patentees, William Collier, M.P. How Hill obtained this portant position, and why, are not stated; but he held it fr the above date to June 1710. During this period—as migh predicted—he produced three pieces of his own, the afore tragedy of *Elfrid* (to which, in its revised form, we shall a refer); a comedy, *Trick Upon Trick; or, 'Squire Brainl* and a farce, *The Walking Statue*, the most successful of the th although Genest gives it the dubious commendation of b "more amusing to watch than it is to read"—praise w suggests the cinematograph rather than the footlights. regards *'Squire Brainless*, notwithstanding Hill's assertion comedy is "the easiest way of pleasing," it was acted but t times, and never printed, facts which seem to indicate facility apart, its author's bent was rather to the buskin the sock. Fortunately he did not confine his managerial e to his own performances; but successfully revived severa plays, and produced some new ones. Of these latter was C Shadwell's *Fair Quaker of Deal; or, The Humours of the* which, with its Flips and Mixens, follows Congreve and a pates Smollett in its graphic presentment of the seaman c

period. Even during the Sacheverell trial of 1710, Shadwell's comedy drew crowds to Drury Lane. Then came the inevitable dissensions in the company, culminating in a riot, the result being that Hill transferred his energies to the Haymarket and to Opera, an arrangement facilitated by the fortune which at this date he acquired by his marriage.

Opera, in England at this date (1710), was in a languishing way. But Hill's first experiences were of happy augury. After many solicitations, Handel was paying his first visit to this country, and Hill at once approached him. A subject was selected from Tasso's *Gerusalemme Liberata*; an Italian libretto was prepared by Girolamo Rossi, which Hill translated; and for this Handel composed the opera of *Rinaldo*, which, with much splendour of "Scenes and Machines," was produced at the Haymarket, and received with great enthusiasm. It ran from February to June. The *British Apollo* floridly commended the "vast, extended mind" of the youthful manager, and the ingenuity of those "living birds, spitting dragons, and real waterfalls" in the decorations, concerning which Mr. Joseph Addison, in the new paper the *Spectator*, perhaps remembering ruefully the failure of a certain *Rosamond* of his own, was pleased to be ironic. He objected, also, to "Seignior* *Hendel's*" being described as the "*Orpheus* of our Age," in which he proved himself an incompetent prophet. *Rinaldo*, however, was not a maintained success. Handel went back to Hanover; Hill was displaced; and for the next few years was absorbed by his beech-oil project. Not till February 1716 did he return to the stage with *The Fatal Vision; or, the Fall of Siam*, which was produced at Lincoln's Inn Fields, and played seven times. Both plot and fable are fictitious. But despite its dedication to the two critics, Dennis and Gildon, and despite the mingling of French regularity with "fulness of design," its author seems to have had no further resource than to return once more to his projects. When he came back to the boards, five years later, it was to oblige a needy Scotch friend, Joseph Mitchell, Walpole's poet, in whose name his work appeared. *The Fatal Extravagance* (Hill seems fond of the epithet) was based on the *Yorkshire Tragedy*, the best of the six spurious plays attributed to Shakespeare. It was acted—according to Mallet—

* He corrected this in the next number to "Minheer."

"with a great deal of applause;" and must have lightened th liabilities of its necessitous foster-father.

The success of *The Fatal Extravagance* seems once more to hav swept Hill back into matters theatric. But it is impossible t enter the maze of his managerial experiences. His next person essay in the direction of "fulness of design" and the maintenanc of the unities, was an ill-judged and pretentious re-casting c Shakespeare's *Henry V.** That the *Biographica Dramati* should call this "a very good play," is incomprehensible; bı it is undoubtedly an excellent example of eighteenth-centuı adaptation. The unities are conciliated by laying the sceı wholly in France; Fluellen, Pistol, Gower and so forth, disappea and the "gross rusticity" of Henry's courtship of Katharine France is combed out and curled to suit the Georgian standa of elegance. Worse than all, a new character is added in t person of an entirely superfluous Harriet, niece of Lord Scroo In these things Hill did no more than his contemporaries— Otway before and Cumberland after him; and in obedier to Gallic models. He and his school had not the faint idea that they were not improving Voltaire's "amia barbarian;" and he was seriously wounded when a cert "Menander" in *Pasquin* (for there were some good Sha speareans even in 1723) raised the remonstrance of comn sense. The majority of Hill's audience considered that he "Shakespeare by transmigration." Yet not even Booth's and Nance Oldfield's charms could prolong the vogue of *Henr* beyond six nights.

It was perhaps only in the nature of things that Hill ch to attribute this failure of *Henry V* to causes other than inherent defects. That it did not succeed, he held, was ov to the disastrous popularity of dumb show—of the sens Pantomime and Harlequinade which John Rich had made reigning fashion.† At all events, he was silenced for the

* "*One can foretell with some accuracy*," writes Miss Brewster, "what eight century adapters will cut out of a Shakespearean play, but only a genius akin to own can conceive what they will put in." As an instance of inane excision, she "Tarry, sweet soul, for mine; then fly abreast," from Exeter's account of the of York and Suffolk (Act iv, sc. 6).

† Hogarth satirised Rich's "*dumb Faustus*" in *Masquerades and Operas*, 17

few years. Then, in 1731, the favour shown to Mallet's *Eurydice* and Thomson's *Sophonisba* led him to remodel his tragedy of *Elfrid* under the new name of *Athelwold*. But the further complication of the plot and the additional characters were as powerless as the advocacy of Pope and Peterborough. It ran but three nights. Hill consequently determined to "leave the loathed Stage" in the capacity of playwright; and to devote himself to the more congenial task of criticising its shortcomings. To this end he established the periodical known as the *Prompter*, 1734–6. It treated of many subjects, social and literary; but its main haunt and region was the footlights. It has been compactly praised as being the "best contemporary criticism of an interesting situation," to wit, the condition of the Georgian theatre before the advent of Garrick. Many of Hill's theories are now mossed into truisms; but he was then far better informed than his contemporaries. Plays and players are alike dissected—the latter so pointedly as to provoke occasional reprisals. Cibber, in tragedy, is likened to "an unjointed caterpillar," at which that impenitent veteran only laughed; but the "solemn and deliberate" Quin did not relish being nicknamed "Mr. All-weight," and came to undignified blows with his censor. Personalities, however, were the exception; and Hill's more general arraignment of the incompetence and intrigues of the managers; of the immoral character of the plays; of those "wild triumphs of Folly," Pantomimes and Entertainments; of the stilted mouthing of the male actors and the lachrymose whine of the women; of the disorderly behaviour of the audience and the tyranny of the footman's gallery—all these things are of the most pertinent and instructive kind. "Similar opinions are scattered through the plays, periodicals, letters, and pamphlets of the day, but the *Prompter's* value is that it focuses them all." * It deserves to be better known.

Hill's only other dramatic efforts that matter are his translations from Voltaire. These were three in number, *Zara*, 1736; *Alzira*, 1736; and *Merope*, 1749. *Zara* was produced at Drury Lane in January 1736, and ran fourteen nights. This, for Hill, amounted to a triumph. His translation, it is admitted, was skilful and its success was secured by the acting of the leading lady,

* *Aaron Hill*, p. 123.

the beautiful Mrs. Cibber, who had been Hill's pupil.* In the "Dedication" to the second French edition Voltaire politely referred to his English translator as "M. Hill, homme de lettres qui paraît connaitre le théâtre mieux qu'aucun auteur anglais.' Voltaire's *Zaire*, it is to be observed, is not without obligation to Shakespeare. But what concerns us here is that Hill's adapta tion of it is his best effort. A few months later he produce another version of Voltaire, *Alzira*. It ran nine nights. Afte this a difference arose between Voltaire and his English admirer Voltaire had written a *Mort de César* (based on Shakespeare' "ouvrage monstrueux"), and to counteract it Hill wrote th *Roman Revenge*, which was never acted during his liftime. H last translation or variation from Voltaire was *Merope*, whic Garrick produced at Drury Lane in 1749, taking himself the pa of Dorilas. Hill's preface to *Merope* shows his altered attitu to Voltaire, who had prefixed to the French original a depreci tion of English tragedy. "Il semble (he said) que la même cau qui prive les Anglais du génie de la peinture, et de la musique, le ôte aussi celui de la tragédie." Hill retorted: "He [Voltaire] mu pardon me, if I am sensible that our unpolished London stage . has entertained a nobler taste of dignified simplicity than deprive dramatic poetry of all that animates its passions in pursuit of a cold, starved, tame abstinence, which, from affectation to shun figure, sinks to flatness; an elaborate esc from energy into a grovelling, wearisome, bald, barren, unalarm chillness of expression, that emasculates the mind instead moving it." Hill is in earnest and sees his points; but Voltai unqualified directness is unhappily more damaging than his versary's clatter of epithets.

Merope was Hill's last acted effort, and it is pleasant to t from his fruitless projects and dramatic failures to the m congenial story of his many friendships. And here we m retrace our steps to the periodical with which some of these connected. In March 1724, mainly as a charitable enterp

* *Zaire* is one of the best of Voltaire's tragedies; but its author also pro himself to be highly indebted to the "large black eyes" and Oriental elega Mlle. Jeanne Gaussin.

† Voltaire disapproved of love episodes in the most elevated tragedy. I *Mort de César* there were no women at all.

he had established the *Plain Dealer*, a paper on the model of the *Spectator*. He had a colourless collaborator named Bond; but the better part of the undertaking was his own. The ostensible object was, as usual, "to advance learning, virtue and politeness." In its character-sketches it closely followed its great predecessor, and it dealt with many similar topics, as good breeding, true and false art, decency, patriotism, duelling and *phrases à double entente*, into which last it, nevertheless, occasionally lapsed. On various subjects it spoke out. It disapproved capital punishment as strenuously as Dickens; with Lady Mary advocated inoculation; but dealt lightly with "Woman's Rights." Here, however, we may leave Hill's biographer to speak:

> No. 69 is a paper on Woman's Rights. . . . Even Patty Amble herself was probably amused at her own oratory: "How are we represented, when none of our sex are permitted to sit and vote for us? Is this free government? Is this to be subject to no laws but those we have first given consent to? Either let us as a distinct body have a right to govern ourselves; or admit an equal number of us to sit where laws are made for us. And I believe I may venture to undertake . . . that we will be modest enough in that case, to content ourselves with a bare negative upon all bills that concern us." It is interesting to see a joke become in a couple of centuries a great political problem; no bare negative will satisfy the Patty Ambles of to-day.*

One of the pleasantest features of the *Plain Dealer* is Hill's frank and indeed effusive recognition of contemporary talent. For instance, he admired and praised Young's *Satires*; and it has been suggested by Young's French biographer, Mons. Thomas—on no very strong evidence, it is true—that the future author of the *Night Thoughts* actually contributed to Hill's paper. Another writer frequently mentioned is Pope's "Appius," John Dennis, to whom with Gildon, Hill had dedicated *The Fatal Vision*. Hill had evidently the greatest admiration for the untunable "Sir Longinus" as a critic, although he was perfectly alive to his defects. Writing to Pope in his defence he says: "Neither of us would choose him for a friend; but none of the frailties of his temper, any more than the heavy formalities of his style, can prevent your acknowledging there is often weight in his arguments, and matter that deserves encouragement to be met with in his writings." † Whether Dennis and Young were allies or not, it is clear that Hill

* *Aaron Hill*, p. 160.

† Hill to Pope, Feb. 10, 1731.

appreciated the better verse and criticism of his day. He showed his further appreciation of poetry by his recognition of Mallet's *William and Margaret*, which he reprinted, professedly from a torn leaf of a halfpenny ballad "Garland" picked up on Primrose Hill; and he espoused the cause of that spoiled child of misfortune, Richard Savage, to whose *Miscellaneous Poems and Translations by Several Hands*, 1726, he was the chief contributor. To those who helped him, Savage must have been a trial which it needed all his personal charm to overcome. Among other members of the Hill coterie was Thomson, in the appearance of whose *Winter* Hil actively interested himself, to be repaid by the then friendless anc unknown author with an extravagant gratitude which Johnsor regarded as "servile adulation." Then there were ladies, Pope' "Eliza," Mrs. Haywood (of the *Secret Histories*); the beautifu "Clio," or "Mira" (Miss Martha Fowke); and "Miranda" (Mrs Hill)—all equally admiring and admired. Hill gushed, an they gushed responsive. But Hill (or "Hillarius" as h was affectionally called) was the leader of the band, whicl no doubt, periodically performed, greatly to its own gratifica tion, at his pleasant house in Petty France, overlooking S James's Park—the old St. James's Park of Duck Island and th Canal.

Hill's most prolonged relations, however, were with Richardsc and Pope. And in the case of Pope, the word "relations seems more appropriate than friendship, for friendship it w not, at all events at the outset. In 1718 Hill wrote a poem e titled *The Northern Star*, on that "*new Cæsar* on the Russi throne," Peter the Great. By the author's desire, Berna Lintot, the publisher, submitted it informally to Pope, w praised it to some extent, but on political grounds deprecat its publication. Thereupon Hill, mortified exceedingly, print the piece with an angry "Preface to Mr. Pope," of which Pc apparently took no notice. Two years later, Hill sent Pop poem on *The Creation*, being a paraphrase of the first chap of *Genesis;* and Pope, replying in general terms, also apologi for his alleged action in the matter of *The Northern Star*. H completely disarmed, made profuse recantation in a second F face, in which he said: "I look up to you with extraordin comfort, as to a new constellation breaking out upon our wo

with equal heat and brightness, and cross-spangling, as it were, the whole heaven of wit with your Milky Way of genius."

After this, things seem to have gone on swimmingly until, in March 1728, Hill, to his annoyance, found himself indicated by his initials in the second book and sixth chapter of the *Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus*, as belonging to the group of Flying Fishes—"writers who now and then rise upon their fins, and fly out of the profund; but their wings are soon dry, and they drop down to the bottom." Hill at once retaliated in the *Daily Journal* by splenetic verses on Pope and Swift. Matters were not mended by the appearance in the *Dunciad*, a month later, of the following:

> H . . . tried the next, but hardly snatched from sight,
> Instant buoys up, and rises into light;
> He bears no token of the sabler streams,
> And mounts far off among the swans of Thames.

The reference was to the discreditable diving-match of Book II, and, in the next edition (1729), stars replaced the "H. . ." and the following note was appended to the passage:

> This is an instance of the tenderness of our author. The person here intended wrote an angry preface against him, founded on a mistake, which he afterwards honourably acknowledged in another printed preface. Since when he fell under a second mistake, and abused both him and his friend. He is a writer of genius and spirit, though in his youth he was guilty of some pieces bordering upon bombast. Our poet gives him a panegyric instead of a satire, being edified beyond measure by the only instance he ever met with in his life of one who was much a poet confessing himself in an error; and has suppressed his name as thinking him capable of a second repentance.

The above was proposed as an *amende;* but Hill could not regard it as entirely *honorable*. What he disliked—and very naturally disliked—was being included in the diving-match at all. His "second repentance" took the form of a pseudonymous *Progress of Wit: a Caveat*. "For the Use of an Eminent Writer." It was, in the main, complimentary to Pope, who figured as its "tuneful Alexis," but it contained the following couplets representing him as one who:

> Desiring, and deserving, others' praise,
> Poorly accepts a fame he ne'er repays;
> Unborn to cherish, sneakingly approves,
> And wants the soul to spread the worth he loves.

Having thus liberated his mind in rhyme, Hill wrote to Pope enclosing among other things a poem by his daughter, Urania aged eleven; and intimating incidentally that he had been pained by the note in the *Dunciad*. Pope replied in his usual equivocal way. The note was really a panegyric, though he was not the writer of it. And then he, on his part, professed to be hurt by the charge in the *Caveat* (which he of course associated with Hill), that he neglected to cherish or befriend men of merit. Hill rejoined by a long letter in which he undoubtedly scored, as, being more straightforward and sincere than his correspondent, he was bound to do. Pope's answer to this was unsatisfactory; but he accompanied it by a peace-offering in the form of a copy o the *Odyssey* for "Miss Urania." In a further letter Hill sen Pope a poem to criticise, and Pope complied. He evidentl feared Hill; and henceforth substituted the mask of friendshi for open hostility. Hill's copious communications must hav been a terrible infliction; but it was an infliction to be endure And endure it Pope did—with mute intervals—for some eigl years, his last printed letter being dated 1738. It involved hi in more than one discreditable side issue: and, what was wors condemned him to the criticism and re-criticism of *Athelwo* and *Cæsar*, into which ordeal Bolingbroke was also inveigled l their energetic author. It is pitiable to think of Bolingbroke ai Pope giving their nights and days to the *Roman Revenge*. A during most of the time Hill dangled over Pope's head a nev completed *Essay on Propriety and Impropriety, in Desi Thought, and Expression, illustrated by Examples in both Ki from the Writings of Mr. Pope*, a performance in which P was acute enough to guess that the improprieties might be more trying than the proprieties. The pact, it is clear, always hollow. Each distrusted the other; and there passages in Hill's letters to Richardson after Pope's death wl show unmistakably that Hill's enthusiasm for Pope as a writer many reservations, and a substratum of lingering resentment.

The Pope correspondence ceased in 1739, probably bec —as Mr. Courthope conjectures—Pope was "tired out with length of his penance." The catastrophe was perhaps pre tated by Pope's receipt from Hill of a nine-page analysis, n any work by Hill himself, but of Thomson's *Agamemnon*, on w

Pope's criticism was invited. Pope promised compliance; but—though he continued to send polite messages to Hill by third parties—"the rest is silence." Meanwhile, a year or two earlier, Hill had found a more "corresponding" friend in Richardson, soon to be the author of *Pamela*. The two men suited each other. Both were letter-writers; both were valetudinarians; both delighted to discuss the relative virtues of tar-water and oak-tincture. Better still, there was no rivalry between them. Hill was not a fictionist; and Richardson, save in those hymns of *Pamela* (where he altered the Pamēla of Sidney and Pope to Pamĕla) no verseman. Hill, when he admired, was certainly not lukewarm; and Richardson—as his old friend Johnson said—"would not be content to sail down the stream of reputation without longing to taste the froth from every stroke of the oar." The acquaintance must have begun about 1736, but it was not until 1738 that it became confirmed, that being the year in which, after some mutabilities of fortune, Hill took up his abode at Plaistow in Essex. His wife had died as far back as 1731, her death eliciting a more than usually cordial letter from Pope; but he was accompanied into his retreat by Urania, Minerva, and Astræa. Of Julius Cæsar, little is recorded, but it seems clear that he was not a son of whom his father could be proud.

Plaistow, though then a pleasant rural village, did not prove desirable as a residence. The house was large and old, with a shady, well-grown garden; but Hill's chief object for the future, besides literature, was the revival of his former dream of grape-growing in England. He planted "near a hundred thousand French vines"; but the experiment did not succeed. We hear of a bottle of wine sent to Richardson; but what Richardson said of it we do not hear. Clearly, it can scarcely have reached the standard of "common Sabine;" and Hill might have added, more literally than Horace:

> Mea nec Falernae
> Temperant vites neque Formiani
> Pocula colles—

for he was surprised at his work by an ague, a visitation which soon ceased to be surprising. Plaistow was discovered to have a "moist, malignant Air," and, in such conditions, the planning

of new groves and grottos, to say nothing of vineyards, must have gradually palled.

On December 8, 1740, Richardson sent his friend the first two volumes of *Pamela*, for the kind acceptance of Minerva and Astræa. Urania, by this time, had become the wife of a Mr Johnson. Whether they guessed the authorships or not, both father and daughters were enraptured. "Who could have dreamed," Hill wrote afterwards, in a letter incorporated with the introduction to the second edition, "who could have dreamed he should find, under the modest disguise of a novel, all the sou of religion, good breeding, discretion, good-nature, wit, fancy fine thought and morality? . . . It has witchcraft in every pag of it; but it is the witchcraft of passion and meaning." In later letter to Mallet he said prophetically: "I am much mis taken in the promise of his [Richardson's] genius, or *Pamela* . . is but the dawning of the day he is to give us." As to the youn ladies, they were transported. In July 1741, the flattered litt printer invited them to Salisbury Court; and in October of th same year, they are still persistently preaching the merits *Pamela* and *Pamela's* author.

Hill extended his admiration to the second part of *Pame* a view in which he has few followers; and he even wished have the "sweet charmer's life" stretched to a fifth and six volume. During the progress of the forthcoming *Clarissa*, he repeatedly consulted; and he made many practical suggestio some of which his too-sensitive friend found extremely emb rassing. Finally, he allowed himself to be entrapped into hopeless task (afterwards performed by E. S. Dallas) of abridg the "large, still Book." He worked at eight or nine letters w such good will that Richardson computed he would reduce whole by two-thirds—a reduction to which the unhappy auth however conscious of his own redundancy, could by no me reconcile himself. For a time a coolness ensued, for wh Hill was certainly not to blame; and cordiality was only resto when the first volumes of the printed novel threw the whole fa into raptures. Henceforth Hill wisely confined himself to pr which was prolonged to the close. "I have three girls around r he wrote in November—"Each a Separate Volume in her h and all their Eyes like a wet flower in April!"

The enthusiasm of Minerva and Astræa for *Clarissa* so intoxicated Richardson that he was unwise enough to solicit their sentiments on the then-recently issued *Tom Jones* (1749), which "Piece," he pretended, he had found "neither Leisure nor Inclination" to read. They complied with commendable alacrity, and in perfect good faith. They discovered in that "coarse-titled" book (as Richardson called it) "a double Merit, both of Head, and *Heart*." They praised its construction. They held that the events of the fable "rewarded Sincerity, punished and exposed Hypocrisy, showed Pity and Benevolence in amiable lights, and Avarice and Brutality in very despicable ones." * In short, they blessed when they should have cursed. This was too much for their "honoured friend at Fulham," to whom laudation of his rival was gall and wormwood; and the nettled asperity of his rejoinder drew fresh tears from the fine eyes of the too-frank young ladies, who were scandalised at having exposed themselves to the suspicion of approving "a Work of *Evil Tendency*." Nevertheless they stood to their guns so far as to trust that, on better consideration, Mr. Richardson might come to detect "a Thread of Moral Meaning" in the peccant volumes. Richardson watered off into a vague engagement to "bestow a Reading" on them, should opportunity offer. And this is the last we hear of Minerva and Astræa—those "Girls of an untittering Disposition." Aaron Hill himself died in the following year, February 8, 1750, "at the instant of the Earthquake," and the day before a benefit performance of *Merope*, which, probably through Mallet, had been commanded by Frederick, Prince of Wales. He had been ailing for some time. But "malice domestic" and "foreign levy," in the shape of troublesome relatives and tedious Chancery suits, had detained him too long in the "terrible marsh-pit"—as Richardson called it—of Plaistow; and doubtless shortened his life. He was buried, like his wife, in the cloisters of Westminster Abbey.

Of his projects and his plays enough has been said. Of his poetry there is little to add, and it would be useless to enumerate

* Miss Brewster prints the entire epistle, though not, she admits, as the discoverer of it. It was first made use of with other Hill letters, in the present writer's *Fielding* ("*Men of Letters*" Series), 1883. It is one of the most arresting items in the voluminous (but alas! not luminous!) Richardson correspondence at South Kensington.

mere titles. He adventured in many kinds: epic, satiric, pindaric, lyric. But neither *Gideon* nor *The Fanciad*, neither *The Northern Star* nor *The Art of Acting*, has earned for their writer distinction enough to give him a place in Mr. Courthope's *History of English Poetry* or the comprehensive selections of Mr. Humphry Ward. In dictionaries of quotations he figures as the author of a well-known quatrain:

> *Tenderhearted* stroke a *nettle*
> And it *stings* you, for your *pains*;
> *Grasp* it, like a *man of mettle*,
> And it *soft as silk* remains—

(which also illustrates his fancy for italics). Hill was a gentlema by birth and bearing, and this is more than can be said for som of his contemporaries of the pen. He deserves to be remembere as the introducer of Handel to the English operatic stage; as a earnest advocate of reform when the English theatre was mo than ordinarily misruled and misguided; and as an effecti soldier of English literature at the critical moment when tl dominion of letters was passing from the Patron to the Publi He also merits mention as the adapter of the tragedies of Voltair who, being a past-master in lucidity, should have taught him th the adjective is the enemy of the noun. Even Richardson fou his dear friend's periods "too munificently adorned."

AUSTIN DOBSON

STATE REGISTRATION AND RURAL NURSING

On March 3 Dr. Chapple introduced a Bill "to regulate the qualifications of trained nurses and to provide for their registration." In so doing he went out of his way to make a gratuitous and unfair attack upon the London Hospital, for which he was twice checked by the Speaker. Such an exhibition of animus against an institution to which thousands of persons in all classes owe a debt of gratitude is hardly calculated to inspire confidence in his impartiality or judgment; but, leaving the defence of that well-known hospital in the hands of those most competent to speak, it is here desired to draw attention to the reasons assigned for the introduction of the measure, and to the effect it might have on nursing in the agricultural and rural districts in England.

The reasons for advocating registration as put forward by Dr. Chapple and others are mainly three: namely, that women disguise themselves as nurses for nefarious purposes, thereby bringing disgrace upon uniforms of which those entitled to wear them are justly proud; that there is a shortage of nurses; and that many women are employed as nurses who have had less than the three years training exacted by the majority of great hospitals.

The first is an admitted evil, the second an admitted misfortune, but it has not been shown how registration would remedy either the evil or the misfortune. The third is an admitted fact, but, in the eyes of many persons interested in nursing the poor, neither an evil nor a misfortune. It would be an evil and a misfortune if such nursing were restricted by legislation.

As regards the abuse of uniforms. How could this be prevented by registration? Would the unwary victims who are

so easily entrapped by sirens suddenly develop such prudence as to insist on proof of registration before accompanying the woman who addresses them? If the uniform is to be protected it would be necessary to register not so much the nurse as the dress, or rather dresses, for all institutions could hardly be persuaded to adopt the same—then are nurses in training not to wear them till the expiration of the sacred three years? and, above all, will it surpass the wit of woman to devise a misleading garb sufficiently like that of a nurse or Sister of Charity without infringing the sealed pattern? By all means let the police arrest women, whether dressed as nurses or not, who decoy girls under false pretences, and let them be punished with the utmost rigour of the law, but it is impossible to see how registration would help the matter, nor does the Bill so much as refer to the uniform.

For shortage of nurses the remedy proposed is a singularly strange one. We have lately heard of a shortage of officers in the Army and Navy, and in order to obtain more recruits side-doors have been opened to give a chance to likely youths who have not been able to come up to the heretofore accepted standards of examination. For the shortage of nurses an exactly opposite policy is suggested. Instead of facilitating entrance into the profession this is to be further restricted, the apparent object being to exclude not only those who have failed to reach a certain standard of proficiency, but all who have not spent a given time in attaining such a standard.

It is asserted that the shortage occurs because women hesitate to enter a profession of which the status is not sufficiently high, but not a shadow of proof is adduced for this assertion. Miss Lückes, the experienced matron of the London Hospital, with far more probability attributes the deficiency first to "the elementary failure of hospitals and nurse-training schools to provide suitable accommodation for a proper supply of probationers"; and, secondly, to the "ever-increasing need of more nurses in directions which did not formerly exist"; for instance, in the Colonies, as health missioners and infant life protectors, and in many similar positions. Moreover, it is within the knowledge of those of us who can look back over two or three generations that trained nurses are employed in private families to an

extent formerly quite unknown. In my young days when we fell victims to childish ailments or fractured arms and legs, we were nursed back to health by mothers, old-fashioned children's nurses, and kindly servants, but no one thought of invoking any outside aid except that of the doctor. Now the modern child and the modern surgeon in conjunction have evolved a series of modern maladies in addition to the accidents of those dark days, and the trained nurse periodically appears as a matter of course in every self-respecting household. She is a valuable inmate, but this constant demand for her services intensifies the "shortage" elsewhere.

The certain failure of the provisions of the present Bill to prevent fraud and to increase the supply is however unimportant in comparison with the injury which it threatens to the cause of nursing the poor throughout the country by its third underlying and indeed avowed aim, namely, to prevent the recognition of nurses with less than three years training.

Here are the words of the Bill. After explaining the constitution of the council which is to conduct registration, and providing for the registration of existing nurses under certain conditions during the first three years, it continues:

"At the expiration of the said term of three years any person who claims to be registered under this Act shall be entitled to be so registered, provided that such person has had not less than three years training under a definite curriculum prescribed by the council in the wards of a hospital or hospitals approved of by the council or" in certain other institutions under the Local Government Board, Admiralty, or Army Council.

The various objections to the principle of State registration have been ably dealt with by experts from Miss Nightingale downwards, and have been exhaustively set forth by Lord Knutsford in pamphlet form and in letters and speeches. Here it is only desired to call attention to the inevitable results in rural districts of such legislation as is now proposed.

It is true that Dr. Chapple stated in his speech that the Bill "did not interfere with nursing as carried on at present," but it is hard to reconcile such a statement with his further remarks that "the necessary curriculum should extend over three years," and that his Bill would make the present system of the London

Hospital impossible. Moreover, a commonplace of advocates of State registration is that harm is done to the poor by sending among them inadequately trained nurses.

It is therefore worth considering the actual operations of the nursing societies now carrying on their work in the United Kingdom.

These are numerous and various but outside hospitals and nursing homes the best known agencies are the Cottage Benefit Nursing Association, commonly known as the Holt-Ockley System and Queen Victoria's Jubilee Institute for Nurses. In addition to these there are large numbers of district and village nurses employed by county federations and local associations.

The best idea of the Holt-Ockley System can be gleaned from an account written by Mrs. Edgar Dugdale in the *Daily Mail* of January 25, 1912. After referring to the dearth of efficient nurses for the poor thirty years previously she says: "First in the field were the district nurses going from house to house through the slums where the need for them was greatest. . . Overcrowding is always one of the greatest of their difficulties. But when the idea arose of bringing the nurses within reach of the country poor it became clear at once that here the trouble would often be not overcrowding but over-solitude. The nurse needed here is a woman of the cottage class, who will live in the cottage while required, who is accustomed to its ways, who can not only nurse the patient, but will attend to the house-work and cooking if it is the mother of the family who is laid up."

This system was started with one association working in fifteen parishes round Ockley in 1883. At the time Mrs. Dugdale wrote it had 147 branches and had trained 2000 nurses. These nurses receive a course of instruction for four or six months in dressing wounds, bandaging, poulticing, &c.; in the use of the clinical thermometer and other apparatus needed in illness, in moving and lifting the sick and preventing bedsores, in invalid cookery and general hygiene, and in the proper care of maternity cases. Midwifery requires a separate and additional course, and midwives must be registered according to the requirements of the Central Midwives' Board.

It is specifically laid down by the Cottage Benefit (Holt-Ockley) Nursing Association that the instruction shall not extend

not be properly treated in a labourer's cottage. It is often overlooked, but should not be forgotten, that the patients for whom these nurses are intended are almost invariably removed to a hospital in cases of serious illness or accident. In the cottage the woman who will help all round is more generally welcome than the very highly trained nurse. The latter is badly needed in the hospital, the former in the home.

A typical association run on Holt-Ockley lines is the Heythrop Nursing Association in Oxfordshire now nearing the close of its twenty-second year. It nurses eleven villages with a normal staff of eight nurses. From March 1913 to March 1914 these women nursed 105 cases, living in the cottages, doing cottage work and sharing cottage fare. Of these cases sixty-two were confinements, and among the others were comprised pneumonia, diphtheria, typhoid, and congestion of the lungs. The local doctor bears testimony to the excellence of the nurses, and to the great improvement in the cottages where they have resided, windows open, meals tidily set out, children in better order.

The Stratton Audley Association in the same county employs district nurses who visit, but do not reside in, the cottages, but a resident nurse can be provided on application. Here also the doctors certify that they have always been perfectly satisfied with the nurses—in fact they say that they could not get on without them.

An important feature in associations of this description, whether employing Holt-Ockley or district nurses, is the "committee lady." Nurses are not left unaided and without supervision, but in each village covered by the association there is a committee lady whose duties are, to collect the very small subscriptions or fees paid by the patients, to give notice to the secretary when a nurse is required, to visit the cottage where she is employed during her residence there in order to ascertain that the nurse is doing her duty and is properly treated, and also in some cases to give any extra assistance which may be required. Therefore, the work of such associations brings not only nursing but outside interest to the bedside of the sufferer.

The large and officially recognised Queen Victoria Jubilee Institute for Nurses has done splendid work among the poor for nearly a quarter of a century. Incorporated by Royal Charter in September 1889, and endowed by Queen Victoria with £70,000

the Jubilee offerings of the women of Great Britain and Ireland, its objects, as stated in the Charter are "the training, support and maintenance of women to act as nurses for the sick poor, and the establishment (if thought proper) of a home or homes for such nurses, and generally the promotion and provision of improved means for nursing the sick poor."

Supplementary funds have been contributed and sums specially raised in Ireland and Scotland have been assigned to work in those countries. The English Council has now at its disposal an income of £10,000 a year, the greater part of which is devoted to the training and inspection of Queen's nurses. The qualifications of a Queen's nurse include not less than three years hospital training, six months experience in a district nursing home, and if the nurse is to be employed in midwifery, she must satisfy the requirements of the Central Midwives' Board and be certified under the Midwives Act of 1902.

Since the institute requires three years hospital training, it is accepted by the promoters of the Nurses' Registration Bill, and among the twenty-one persons who are to form the first council it is proposed to include a nurse appointed by the Queen Victoria Jubilee Institute.

It should, however, be noted that the official pamphlet issued by the Institute states that "as district work extended from urban to rural places, it was found that in many country districts there was neither work nor funds to justify the engagement of a Queen's nurse, and yet there existed a great want of care for ordinary ailments and chronic cases."

The institute is therefore ready to affiliate county nursing associations employing both Queen's nurses and village nurses under the general superintendence of a Queen's nurse. Village nurses employed by affiliated associations must be certified midwives and have had (*a*) if possible, twelve months, but in no case less than nine months district and midwifery training; or (*b*) approved hospital training, to be followed by not less than three months approved district training. Thus it will be seen that, though based on the three years training system, the Queen Victoria Jubilee Institute frankly acknowledges that different conditions require a different provision of nursing.

As regards *County* Associations or Federations, these have been ... parts of England and Wales, whether affiliated

to the Queen Victoria Jubilee Institute or working on independent lines. Among the latter the Oxfordshire Nursing Federation may be taken as a fair specimen, not as claiming any superiority over others, but as embracing a county essentially rural, and as akin in its methods and regulations to federations in other similar counties.

The original idea was to invite the various nursing associations already existing in Oxfordshire to federate for mutual aid, to help in starting others in neglected areas, and to act as a medium between the associations and the County Council, whose technical education committee is willing to make grants towards training expenses when assured that the money will be properly utilised. From the outset the federation disclaimed any intention of interfering with the system preferred in any given district, and it is ready to affiliate associations working on the Holt-Ockley, District nurse, Jubilee nurse, or other approved system. In the case of district nurses the federation at present endeavours to provide six months general training, six months midwifery, and three months special district training, about equivalent to the Queen Victoria Jubilee Institute standard for a village nurse. Thirty-three associations have so far been affiliated, and about twelve more are working independently in the county.

The great majority of the affiliated associations in Oxfordshire employ district nurses, but a few have either the Holt-Ockley or both Holt-Ockley and visiting nurses. The federation honorary secretary does not know of any Queen's nurses employed in the county at present. One large parish which used to have a Queen's nurse has lately made a change. The truth is that these agricultural villages and small townships cannot afford such highly trained nurses, and they are not easy to obtain. At a conference of Associations affiliated to the Jubilee Institute lately held in London the general superintendent is reported to have said: "Nurses were ambitious people, and when she had nurses coming to her and complaining, 'I have had two burning cases, two babies and one bad leg, and I want something better' she felt much sympathy with them." Exactly—and this partly explains the increasing difficulty which she further pointed out of inducing nurses to undertake district work at all. The obvious moral would appear to be to grade, not to standardise, nursing and nurses, to employ highly trained nurses in hospitals and in

localities where "interesting" and difficult cases are likely to present themselves, and to endeavour, which also is no easy matter, to provide "burns, babies, and bad legs" with a sufficient supply of the humbler but still efficient class of nurse, and to utilise to the full the supervision and assistance of philanthropic people throughout the country who will devote time and money to the cause.

It should be added that in Oxfordshire midwives working under the federation are inspected by the county superintendent appointed by the County Council, and, acting as health visitor, she also superintends those of the association nurses who undertake the health inspection of schools. This is at present the case in nearly half the elementary schools in Oxfordshire, and the results are so satisfactory that, at the request of the Elementary Education Committee, a scheme for covering the whole area of the county is in preparation. Some similar arrangement probably obtains in most agricultural counties.

Space forbids more than this very fragmentary account of rural nursing—it entirely omits the work done by district nurses connected with cottage hospitals and similar agencies—but enough has been said to indicate the vast network of associations and societies to-day spread over the United Kingdom and having for their object the care of the sick poor in their own homes. Now the proposal for State registration has excited apprehension in the minds of many persons whose views, even if their alarm should be premature, deserve consideration. Miss Whitmore Jones, for instance, an organising secretary of the Cottage Benefit Nursing Association, who has spent much of her life in the cause of cottage nursing, writes: "A system of State registration on a three-year training basis would kill our nursing associations and would be a disaster for country people."

The Bill now before Parliament appears to go either too far or not far enough.

The real evil connected with the nursing profession is not the employment of nurses with comparatively short training so long as the extent of their training is known, and they are only put to do the work for which they are qualified. The evil for which a remedy is sorely needed is the multiplication of so-called Nursing Homes, some of which are merely houses of ill-fame in disguise, [illegible] and are altogether inefficient

both in nursing and in household arrangements. The provisions of the present Bill would not touch the former, and would affect the latter very slightly if at all. The utmost which could result would be that the head of one of these inferior homes would gain an additional chance of misleading the public if she could advertise herself as a registered nurse. She might have just scraped through her three years training and subsequent examination, while otherwise quite unqualified to conduct such an establishment, and under the guise of probationers she could staff it with any failures whom she could "run on the cheap." If a measure could be framed by which any nursing homes carried on for private profit had to be registered and possibly made liable to inspection, this might be of practical benefit to the community. It is not suggested that such homes should be compelled to employ any particular class of nurse, but the proprietors might be obliged to declare how many patients they were prepared to receive, and how many nurses, with what sort of certificates, they employed to attend upon them. This would at least give medical men and the friends of invalids some means of gauging the advantages offered.

As at present advised all that the Bill is prepared to do with a large amount of machinery is to place a number of names of qualified women upon the register and to leave every one else out in the cold. If this is really the intention, and if it is, as asserted, not proposed to interfere with any present nursing, the whole proceeding seems rather superfluous; but if the underlying design is, as is generally suspected, ultimately to render it illegal to employ any but registered nurses, then the friends of the country poor would plead earnestly for full consideration of the position before any decisive step is taken.

If Parliament in its wisdom decides that nurses must be registered we would in any case deprecate a hard-and-fast rule by which only women with three years training should be so distinguished. Surely, some kind of register or directory could be devised which would include the names of all respectable nurses holding certificates with the place and length of training and the class of certificate held. This would give honour where honour is due, would enable those desiring to engage nurses to judge of the qualifications of applicants, and yet would not drive the humbler, but still capable, toiler from her corner of this vast field.

M. E. JERSEY

SPIDERS

SPIDERS are far more numerous than the average person would suppose; in Great Britain alone we have about 550 species, yet of these only two are really familiar objects to every one—the House spider (*Tegenaria domestica*) who is responsible for the thick sheet-like webs that fill up the neglected corners of our house, and the Garden spider (*Epeira diadematata*) whose wheel-like snare, dew-laden in the early morning, is one of the most beautiful objects of the garden and hedgerow. Most invertebrate animals are classed as insects by the ordinary person, though science shudders at such crude treatment; however, it is excusable to mistake spiders for insects, as though this is scarcely a compliment to spiders since they have a higher and more complex organisation, yet they do belong to the same sub-kingdom and may be regarded in the light of cousins. The order to which spiders belong is known as *Araneæ*, and some of the differences between araneads and insects are easy enough to remember. One very simple difference is the fact that no true insect possesses more than three pairs of legs; now a spider has four pairs, and this in inself is sufficient to prove it outside the pale of insect life. Then the body of most insects is divided into three distinct parts, *i.e.* the head, thorax, and abdomen, but in the araneads the body has only two divisions, the head and thorax being fused into one piece called the cephalo-thorax. The eyes of a spider are simple, and may be two, four, six or eight in number; in British species the number of eyes is always six or eight, usually the latter. We do not know much about the senses of spiders, but with regard to their eyesight certain broad statements may be safely made. In the hunting and jumping spiders who make no web, but either run their prey to earth in open chase or else stalk it cautiously before springing, the sense of sight is well developed: their eyes are often large

and brilliant, and sometimes placed on little turrets or tubercles raised above the level of the cephalothorax, which gives them a wider range of vision. Sight is not highly developed in those sedentary individuals who rely on their snares for the capture of prey, and their eyes frequently show a dull glazed appearance and are small in size; but though their vision is not keen, their sense of touch is extremely fine.

As regards their intelligence I cannot speak with much authority from personal experience. I have succeeded in taming a few individuals, but only by the expenditure of much patience and perseverance. A spider has no idea of the value of time, and the person who would secure their confidence must possess an almost unlimited stock of patience, otherwise it is simply waste of time to attempt the task. It is true that hunger may compel them to become tame (*i.e.* to accept insects that are offered them) if they are shut up without any natural supply of food, but when one leaves them free and only supplements their ordinary diet it takes a long time before they lose their suspiciousness. I remember on one occasion sitting motionless for nearly three hours, holding a fly within tempting reach of a house spider. It was almost touching her, but she was too wary a creature to seize a fly whose wings were held in a pair of pincers without much cautious thought first. Eventually the frantic kicks of the fly proved too much for her, and she gripped it fiercely in a death embrace. I finally got her so tame that she would run out from her nest and take the flies directly I dropped them into her web, or even accept them from the pincers. Nor would she trouble to retreat to her nest when having sucked a fly dry I removed its shrivelled body from the snare: so little was she frightened. As the autumn advanced and flies became scarce I thought I would try to feed her on raw meat and thus save myself time and trouble. I took a piece of meat about the size of a fly's body, and attached to it the legs, wings and head of a fly that I had previously killed and cut up for this purpose. I was rather pleased with the effect of my sham insect and dropped it on to the web with all the confidence of ignorance; I felt so sure of the success awaiting my experiment. The spider accustomed to true flies being offered her ran out of her retreat at once, but stopped short at a distance of about an inch from the sham fly,

wavered for one instant, and then returned to her nest. For three successive days I continued to drop into her snare at frequent intervals these pieces of dressed up meat, but she was never again deceived into leaving her nest to investigate them at closer quarters: whether she detected the fraud by sight or by smell I had no means of telling. I experimented in the same way with two other spiders of the same species, but they proved equally difficult to deceive, and unfortunately I continued the experiments for so long (hoping that in time they might make up their minds to taste this new kind of prey) that they completely lost their trust in me, and would not afterwards take the real flies I gave them. As it had cost me much time and trouble to win their confidence I was rather vexed with myself for over-taxing it, more especially as I never regained it again. I found the orb-weavers impossible to tame; as often as not they refused to touch the flies I threw into their webs, and I could never induce them to take one from the pincers.

The life of the Garden spider may be taken as typical of that of the whole orb-weaving family. In the autumn the female spider lays from 500 to 800 eggs, which do not hatch out till the following spring. No sooner do the young ones escape from the egg cocoon than they cluster together in an intricate jumble of legs and bodies, spinning round their common mass a covering of fine silk. Here they remain for about a week until an awakening desire to see life causes them to unroll and disperse in all directions but their legs will not take them far enough from their birthplace, so each spider commences operations for an aerial flight. Facing the wind and standing on the tips of its eight legs, the little spider raises its abdomen and emits a thread or two of finest gossamer. So delicate are these threads that the faintest current of air is sufficient to draw them out, and the spider, when it feels the required degree of tension, leaves go with its feet, and is carried up into the air. Spiders travel thus for considerable distances, and at some height from the ground; they are not, however, altogether at the mercy of the wind, at any rate on calm days, for if they want to drop to earth again they pull in the floating threads with their feet, and as the lines shorten they gradually sink down. This "ballooning" habit is not by any means confined to the orb-weavers, but is a general

practice among young spiders of all species and ensures their wide distribution.

The baby spider makes a perfect web from the beginning; it is a matter of instinct and requires no practice. Intricate as the process is the spider can make it in the dark, and there is every reason to suppose that sight has nothing to do with its construction, the sense of touch taking its place. I remember when I first began to interest myself in spiders I was very anxious to watch one of them spinning its web, but I had no idea at what time they generally started to work. I knew they were nearly all finished by the time I was out in the morning, so I rather naively concluded that they made them during the night. I therefore destroyed the web of one old spider who lived in a corner of my window, and determined to sit up all night, so as to catch her at her weaving. About every half-hour I peeped behind the blind, carefully shading the light of the candle in order not to disturb her should she be engaged upon her task. The night seemed interminable, and the old spider huddled up in her corner gave no sign of life till about 6 A.M., when, disturbed perhaps by my constant visits, she ran away out of the window.

In mediæval times both the webs and the bodies of spiders were supposed to cure certain diseases, and some of these superstitions are still current. I well remember as a child being told to look in a grandfather clock to see if there were any cobwebs there, since one was needed as a cure for ear-ache; I scraped out the required cobweb, which was placed in the sufferer's ear, but I do not recollect that it had any beneficial result! Still, superstitions die hard.

A spider's appetite is not easily appeased, but when we remember that she has to lay some hundreds of eggs, to enclose them in a cocoon involving yards of silk, and constantly to rebuild her snare, all of which material is made from the digested foodstuffs; and also to maintain her own vitality, it is not so surprising that her appetite should be insatiable. Spiders build a silken nest close to their snare, connecting the two by a stout cable along which they can run. When at rest they stay in this retreat, keeping one claw on the cable, which immediately tells them of any capture, the vibrations of the web being transmitted along the cable; moreover, their sense of touch is so fine that they can tell

the whereabouts of the insect from the vibrations alone. When a fly impinges on the web the spider dashes down from her nest and seizes the luckless victim, who is quickly paralysed by her poisonous bite. If it is a large insect, such as a wasp or bee, she approaches it cautiously, keeping at a safe distance while she throws sprays of silk over the hapless creature, who, becoming completely entangled in the mesh, is powerless to use its sting or protect itself in any way. When the capture is made good the spider avoids the tail end with its fatal weapon, but sucks the creature dry from its head extremity. Sometimes she does not feel competent to deal with these insects, and then if they blunder into her web, sooner than have the snare torn by their struggles, she herself bites the threads which hold them and so liberates her prisoners.

Among the orb-weavers the males are not often seen; though their actual number is probably only slightly less than that of the females—at all events during the mating season. When young the spiders of both sexes make perfect webs, but the males on reaching maturity seem to lose the art, only spinning a small snare composed of a few rambling lines of no very fixed design. They become nomadic in their habits, and their life is one of short duration.

Roughly speaking spiders may be divided into two groups—the sedentary spiders who spin a snare for the capture of their prey, and the roving spiders who employ other methods for obtaining food. To this last class belong the jumping and wolf spiders, both of whom present features of considerable interest. The jumping spiders are an important family, numbering several thousand species, but they do not show to advantage in temperate climates: their home is in tropical countries, where they attain a metallic glory of colouring which can vie with the brilliance of the humming birds. The eyesight of these spiders is very keen, and it is a curious fact that certain species can alter the colour of their eyes by a movement of the internal mechanism. Our best known English species, the Zebra spider (*Salticus scenicus*), is only a quarter of an inch long, and the black, grey, and white hairs with which it is clothed are arranged in oblique stripes, hence its popular name. Of its eight eyes, the anterior four are of great size and brilliance; they are worth studying under the microscope,

when their deep sea-green colour is revealed and the fringe of coloured hairs which surround them. The jumping spiders make no snare, but stalk their prey, and then spring upon it after the manner of a tiger. I remember one night at dinner watching with interest a Zebra spider which had fallen on the table from a vase of flowers, stalk a small insect who had descended from a similar eminence, and was wandering aimlessly about the snowy wastes of the tablecloth. These spiders can run with ease on a smooth perpendicular surface which a Garden spider would find it impossible to scale. An examination of their feet will disclose a difference of structure which accounts for the fact. The orb-weaver's foot is armed with three claws which are toothed and form an admirable means for guiding and manipulating a thread of silk, or clinging to any rough surface; as a rope walker she cannot be surpassed, but Nature has provided her with no arrangement by which she can run on a smooth surface. Now the foot of the jumping spider besides two claws possesses a curious pad of hairs known as the scopula: these hairs are hollow, club-shaped and provided with an adhesive material by means of which the spider finds itself as much at home on a polished perpendicular surface as when it is on the ground. It is among the jumping spiders that the remarkable "love dances" of the males take place. In our little Zebra spider the male executes a primitive kind of dance before the female, but in certain tropical species the dance is far more intricate and interesting. The males pirouette and twist and pose before the female, striking elegant attitudes and endeavouring to win her favour by showing off their brilliant colours. The wolf spiders are another important family, and they vary considerably in their habits. Some are quite nomadic, roving all day and camping at night under a stone or any other shelter which chances to be handy; others dig a rough tunnel in the ground to which they return with their booty after each hunting forage, but they do not seem to live for any length of time in the same place. All the largest members of the group, however, dig permanent burrows, spending some time and trouble on the excavation which is lined with silk and often surmounted by an earthen wall or turret. They never range far from their home, but spend most of their time in the mouth of the burrow waiting for insects to stray within a reasonable distance when they leap

upon them. The wolf spiders carry their egg cocoons about with them, attached by threads to the spinnerets. They show the greatest tenacity in clinging to the cocoon in the face of all obstacles, picking it up again and again when it has been taken from them. They do not, however, discriminate between their own egg bag and that of another spider, and they will even accept a ball of pith in place of a real cocoon. The wolf spider's affection for her progeny is not lavished only on the eggs; when the young are hatched out they are quite unable to fend for themselves, but clamber on to their mother's back, where they live for several months. The Tarantula carries her young about like this for seven months, during which time they eat nothing. If they are taken away the old spider shows signs of anxiety, but she is quite content to be supplied with the progeny of another spider.

I once kept a specimen of one of our larger English hunting spiders for about two months. She was a fierce spider, leaping with lightning precision on the flies I turned into her glass-sided box, and carrying them about in her mouth till she found a suitable corner to devour them in. Once or twice I tried to take them away with a pair of pincers, but she always resented any interference and clung to them tenaciously provided I did not frighten her by too rough movements. She got quite used to me as time went on; I often took her out of the box, and she would run about my hands without any sign of fear as I carried her down to the lawn where I let her loose for exercise. Not only did she learn to take flies from a pair of pincers, but on more than one occasion she seized them from between my fingers. After I had had her for about two months she lost one of her legs; only the first joint remained. The loss of a limb is not a very serious matter to a spider as it can reproduce the part when moulting, though the new limb is smaller to start with than the original. However, I was not content to leave the matter to Nature, but being, I suppose, in a meddlesome frame of mind, I bathed the stump with an antiseptic: the next morning she was dead. Alas! the end of nearly all my pets has been tragical.

MARION BLACK-HAWKINS

AMERICAN AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, *April* 10, 1914.

WHEN President Wilson went before Congress on the fifth of last month, to urge the repeal of the clause in the Panama Canal Act granting to American vessels engaged in the coastwise trade using the canal, exemption from tolls, it is not probable he foresaw the bitter resistance that recommendation would meet, or the serious political and personal consequences it may have. If he did, if he had instinctive perception to know that he was putting his leadership and authority to the test and risking party harmony and his political future, then Mr. Wilson did a thing so fine and so courageous that there is nothing to equal it in our time, for he was willing to sacrifice everything for the sake of right. While conceding to Mr. Wilson great courage and high ideals, I do not wish to give him more credit than is his due, and I am inclined to think he did not anticipate repeal would arouse so much passion. He must have known, of course, that it would meet resistance and be used against him by his political opponents and his enemies in the Democratic Party, and it would afford an opportunity to the anti-English element in the United States to revive old feeling and keep alive dislike, but he no doubt believed that the Opposition would be less formidable than it has proved, and that his policy would prevail without serious damage being done.

Mr. Wilson asked repeal on two grounds. He held discrimination in favour of American vessels to be a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, and the honour of the United States was involved. He said to Congress:

> I have come to you upon an errand which can be very briefly performed, but I beg that you will not measure its importance by the number of sentences in which I state it. No communication I have addressed to the Congress carried with it graver or more far-reaching implications to the interest of the country. . . .

The large thing to do is the only thing we can afford to do, a voluntary withdrawal from a position everywhere questioned and misunderstood. We ought to reverse our action without raising the question whether we were right or wrong, and so once more deserve our reputation for generosity and the redemption of every obligation without quibble or hesitation.

There was another reason why the obnoxious clause should be repealed. Mr. Wilson told Congress that the discrimination embarrassed the President in the conduct of foreign relations, and he used this significant language in urging repeal: "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the Administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure."

These two reasons most people believed would have sufficient weight with Congress for it to approve the President's recommendation.

Mr. Wilson's enemies in his own party and his political opponents, Republicans and Progressives, at once seized upon repeal as the weapon they had been searching for to use against the President. Unlike a prime minister, a president seldom, if ever, comes to office able to count upon the loyal and devoted support of his party. The Prime Minister is the leader, not as the result of a struggle, but because the rank and file of the party recognise that of all men he is best fitted for that position, and while his elevation may be a blow to the ambitions of one or two men who hoped for the highest honour, they do not betray him. The Englishman plays the game of politics different from the American. An Englishman would not intrigue against the Prime Minister, and, besides, he would have nothing to gain by helping to drag down the Ministry of which he was part.

In America it is different. The President wins after a long and bitter contest in his own party. Americans like to have foreigners believe that these internecine wars leave no scars. Before the nomination, they say, Democrats fight Democrats as vigorously as they do the common enemy, but after the nomination the fury of the campaign is forgotten, the vanquished is the first to congratulate the victor and to pledge his fealty, and no man thinks of anything except victory for his party.

This is expecting too much of human nature. There is a curious streak in the American that causes him honestly to believe that the magic of democracy or something else makes the American different from other beings. For six months, very often for a year or more, two men and their partisans have been devoting all their efforts to securing the Presidential nomination. During that time they have frequently said harsh and unpleasant things about each other; their adherents and supporters have been less restrained; their respective newspapers magnify the worth or ability of one candidate by discrediting the other. After months of screaming and vilification and passion there comes the convention, and there is seldom a convention in which the defeated does not believe he was cheated out of the nomination, although he is compelled to accept the decision. As a politician his only future is with his party, believing that the nomination was stolen from him he must pretend to smile and congratulate his opponent, but in his heart he is bitter, and would like to see him humiliated at the polls.

This bitterness was more than usually intensified at the last Democratic Convention in Baltimore. There were several candidates, but the real contest was between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Champ Clark, the Speaker of the House: and for the first time in sixteen years the nomination was worth having, as Mr. Roosevelt's bolt from the Chicago Convention made it practically certain that the Democrats would be successful. Mr. Clark went to Baltimore with a majority of the delegates behind him, but the rules of the Democratic convention require that the nomination must be made not by a majority but by two-thirds; although it has almost, without exception, happened that a candidate who had a clear majority when the convention met was able to command the remaining votes sufficient to make him the nominee.

It is probable—not certain, but highly probable—that Mr. Clark would have been nominated had it not been for the influence exercised by Mr. Bryan, who opposed the Speaker for the reason, publicly stated, that he was supported by Tammany, and to Mr. Bryan Tammany was anathema. Mr. Wilson was nominated. Mr. Clark felt that he had been the victim of treachery, especially as he firmly counted upon Mr. Bryan's help, and it led to a break between the two men. Mr. Clark, as well as his partisans, took

part in the campaign and helped in the election of Mr. Wilson, but I leave it to the man of the world to say whether they did it gladly or because they had no alternative.

A president begins his official career with a large crop of enemies, a more than plentiful supply of critics, and numerous present or potential rivals. He begins to make enemies as soon as he appoints his cabinet. There are always men who think they are entitled to a place in the Cabinet because of the great services they have rendered to the President either in bringing about his nomination or securing his election; and when their claims are passed over they accuse him of base ingratitude, denounce him as selfish or foolish, and from having been his warm friends become his vigorous opponents. Every politician knows that a president is anxious to serve a second term; every man who was a candidate at the last convention as well as those who aspire to be candidates in the future, hope the President may do something to make his candidacy impossible and leave the way open to them. They have a curious belief that they can destroy the leader without destroying the party. The mind of the American politician defies the understanding. The President is the party chief, he is held responsible for everything the party does or does not do, and it must be obvious to the simplest intelligence that if the President is discredited the party will suffer, yet the politician will deliberately seek to embarrass the President and weaken him in the estimation of the public, and then he is surprised when the party is defeated.

Mr. Wilson is not popular with the active politicians of his party as represented by Members of Congress, no matter how high the regard the country may have for him. Mr. Wilson is more feared than loved by Congress. He has been neither pliant nor accommodating. Congress always likes to believe it is master. Mr. Wilson has encouraged no foolish delusions. He has ruled Congress with a firm hand; the legislation enacted in the first year of Mr. Wilson's administration was framed in the White House and not in the Capitol.

The Baltimore Convention put a plank in the platform, declaring that the candidate should not be eligible for re-election. The platform is, in theory, a contract entered into between the

candidate and the people, and he is supposed to accept its various "planks" and must in honour observe them. In view of the declaration Mr. Wilson, his opponents say, cannot be a candidate for a second term, so that the field is open for the nomination two years hence, and as Mr. Clark, by virtue of the Speakership, is the most prominent man in the party after Mr. Wilson and undoubtedly has a large following, Mr. Wilson's opponents are looking with favour upon Mr. Clark as his successor. The Speaker has the support of Mr. Hearst and his numerous newspapers and other men who are opposed to the President.

Repeal of free tolls gave Mr. Wilson's enemies an opportunity to come out from under cover and fight in the open. Every Democrat was compelled to vote for the Tariff Bill; the Currency Bill must be supported because the country demanded it, but free tolls was not a party question and the country was divided. The Baltimore platform, similar to the Republican and Progressive platforms, had declared in favour of exempting American vessels, and Democrats could well say that as men of honour they must not repudiate their pledges; that as between the President and the platform their highest duty was to the platform. They were even able to find a speech made by Mr. Wilson before election in which he gave his approval to free tolls. Democrats, therefore, could part ways with the President and hold themselves blameless.

Mr. Hearst and his newspaper allies seized upon this as the "issue" they had been searching for, and the Republicans were not reluctant to join them. It has been easier to attack Mr. Wilson than to defend his position. The sentiment of the country, I believe, is in favour of discrimination being granted to American vessels, because that appeals to national prejudice. The rights of the matter naturally are not understood. Not one person in ten thousand has read the treaty or knows what it provides, or if they had read it would be competent to pass judgment. The country has been told that the United States has built the canal at an expenditure of some £80,000,000. It is on territory that to all intents and purposes is American. It is an American work built by Americans with American money. It was constructed for the profit and convenience of the United States and not for the benefit of any other country. Under these circumstances

or Great Britain to claim equal rights in the canal with the United States is "insolence," it is an impertinence in keeping with the usual tactics of Great Britain, and any American who would "surrender" to Great Britain is a craven and a traitor and unworthy of the respect of his fellow citizens.

But the treaty makes it obligatory upon the United States not to show discrimination, the supporters of the President say, and his opponents answer in effect: "What difference that does make? The British thought they were making one kind of a treaty and we were sure we were making another, and anyway we are not going to ask Great Britain what we may do with our own property."

The merits of the controversy have been lost sight of. When the Repeal Bill was under consideration in the House of Representatives, scarcely a member discussed the legal or political questions involved, but rested his case on the unwarranted attempt on the part of Great Britain to interfere with purely American matters. Mr. Clark, whose speech attracted the most attention, said:

> Now, being the richest and most powerful nation on the globe, with a population of 100,000,000 souls—the very flower of the human race—we are asked to grant to Great Britain, whom we defied and defeated in our infancy, and whom we defied again and defeated again in our early youth in the War of 1812—properly called "Our Second War of Independence"—concessions grounded on injustice and humiliating in character—claims for which concessions had been abandoned by Great Britain until Senator Elihu Root made a speech upholding the contentions of that foreign Power—contentions which had been flatly rejected by a president of the United States and his Secretary of State. . . .
>
> Now may the God of our fathers who nerved 3,000,000 backwoods Americans to fling their gage of battle into the face of the mightiest monarch in the world, who guided the hand of Jefferson in writing the charter of liberty, who sustained Washington and his ragged and starving army amid the awful horrors of Valley Forge, and who gave them complete victory on the bloodstained heights of Yorktown, may He lead members to vote so as to prevent this stupendous folly—this unspeakable humiliation of the American Republic.

These extracts are typical.

Mr. Wilson was able to carry the Repeal Bill through the House, but in England a Bill carried under similar circumstances would have compelled the Prime Minister either to resign or go to the country. The Democrats have a majority over all of 145, the ... had a majority of 85, and 23 Republicans, 3 Pro

gressives and 1 Independent joined with the Democrats, whil 52 Democrats, among whom were the Speaker, Mr. Underwood the leader of the House, and many other prominent members joined with the minority in their efforts to defeat the measure.

This is the first check Mr. Wilson has met, and politician naturally ask if it means that Mr. Wilson's short mastery is over and the Democrats will once more throw away their advantag or whether he will be able to regain his control, and carry out th legislative programme to which he is committed. The Republican have found new courage, and face the general election of nex winter with hope. "Tolls and the Tariff" is to be their battle cry, and they believe the country will be with them on both Certainly, to-day, that would make a very seductive issue, and even the staunch newspaper supporters of the Administratio recognise this and warn the Democrats of their danger. Th first by-election since the House passed the Repeal Bill was hel in New Jersey, the President's State, earlier in the week, an a district represented by a Democrat was captured by th Republicans. Commenting on the result the New York *Times* one of Mr. Wilson's strongest advocates, says:

> The sins of this Congress, its incapacity, its countless follies, its lack of guidin principle, and of authoritative leaders, and its marked disposition to embark upo Radical ventures have, it now seems probable, cost the Democratic party the confidenc of the country. We believe that Mr. Wilson, on the other hand, is regarded as a chec upon the vagaries of the Democratic House and Senate. Trade is dull, there is a wid depression in business, the people of the country are not making as much money a they ought to make, or are accustomed to make, and naturally and according to age long habit they are holding the party in power responsible. The Seventh is a Repub lican District, it is a Protectionist district. Probably a great many of the voters blam the tariff for the bad times. Anyhow, they blame Congress and the Democrats, an they have taken the first means to supply the corrective. . . .
>
> It is not improbable that a majority of the people of the country now desire an intend the election of a Republican House next November. There is no great probabilit that the present Democratic House will take warning. It will continue to mess and muddle in its characteristically incompetent way with the anti trust Bills, for which there is not the slightest reason or excuse, and which are one of the causes of the with drawal of confidence from the Democratic Party, and, of course, defeat in a singl district and the prospect of defeat in the country next Fall cannot possibly put brain and steadiness and principle into the Democratic majority. But the result in the Seventh New Jersey District is a portent.

Other newspapers are equally outspoken. Unless somethin

more important comes to the front, there is no doubt that England will again be the chief factor in an American political campaign, and stump speakers will outdo each other in frightening the voter with the bogy of English "domination" and the danger to the country of a party that "abjectly surrenders" to the British Foreign Office.

In view of the feeling at present existing and the increasing bitterness that may be confidently anticipated in the autumn, does it not seem a trifle ridiculous that well-meaning but misguided persons should be expending a good deal of energy and some money in promoting the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Ghent, which has been followed by a century of unbroken peace between Great Britain and the United States? To give the celebration an official status Commissioners must be appointed on behalf of the United States and Congress must appropriate for their expenses, but the Democratic members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate made a report objecting to Governmental participation in the celebration, and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House in the last Congress refused to take action. Now a Bill for the appointment of Commissioners and carrying an appropriation has been reported to the House, and it will be interesting to watch the reception it meets. Meanwhile, the machinery has been set in motion to create hostile public sentiment and members of Congress are receiving petitions protesting against the celebration. Most of these petitions come from the Continental League of America, which has apparently been organised for this specific purpose, and is supposed to be composed of Irish-Americans; but other Irish societies and some German organisations have been induced to join in the movement. The petition of the Continental League says the proposed celebration would excite the ill-feeling of many nations that were friendly to the United States when Great Britain was hostile, and goes on:

> The hundred years of peace have not been years of friendship on the part of England. Up to the settlement of the Venezuela question, after President Cleveland's historic message, England lost no opportunity of showing her enmity to this country. During the civil war her government, the great majority of her people and practically her whole Press were most inimical to the North, not from real sympathy with the South,

but in the hope of breaking up the great republic which had grown up from the thirteen colonies which had thrown off the tyrannical yoke.

For two years the British Government conspired with the Emperor Napoleon to bring about armed intervention, and the fitting out, arming and manning of the swift cruisers which swept American commerce from the seas was the most shameful evasion of international obligations in all modern history. It was dictated by commercial greed, and the destruction of American commerce which it accomplished was its deliberate purpose and its effects are still visible.

The American people want peace with England and the whole world, but it is notorious that England wants the celebration as a demonstration of American friendship which will be useful to her in international quarrels, not for the promotion of peace, but to benefit her in war, and that is aimed at Germany.

She hopes to make it prepare the way for an Anglo-American alliance which would involve danger to American interests and could by no possibility promote them. All the advantages would be on England's side, and no other alliance between any of the Great Powers would involve such grave danger to the peace of the world or such injury to human liberty.

A peace celebration that begins with a row rather appeals to one's sense of humour.

When, last year, the Tammany candidate for Mayor of New York was defeated, I wrote in this Review:

To judge from what has been written on both sides of the ocean since the election of last Tuesday put the Tammany regime in eclipse, one might imagine the political millennium had dawned and the righteous had at last come into their own. But what has happened is not without precedent, and rejoicing over the downfall of the wicked may be withheld until it is seen whether Tammany is really dead or is sleeping with one eye open.

Tammany, if the New York papers are to be believed, is very much alive and as tireless as ever. The great source of corruption in New York is the police force; an honest police force efficiently administered could rid the city of its criminals and law-breakers, murder would be less frequent, "blackhanders" and "white slavers" would go elsewhere, the city generally would be a safer and pleasanter place in which to live. The laws governing the police force and other departments are made by the legislature, and the Tammany members, nothing daunted by their defeat, are as usual preventing the proper passage of proper legislation and carefully protecting their criminal allies. One reason why the police of New York are corrupt and inefficient is that the Commissioner cannot enforce proper discipline. A constable can be

fined or suspended for neglect of duty, but when his offence is so grave that he is unfit longer to be in the force, and is dismissed he can appeal to the courts, and they have frequently ordered his reinstatement on some petty technicality; and there is nothing an American judge loves better than to make the law ridiculous by defeating justice with a hair-splitting technicality.

Mr. Mitchell, the recently elected Mayor, with a view to bringing the force to a proper state of efficiency, offered the Commisionership to Colonel Goethals, the chief engineer of the Panama Canal, who conditionally accepted the post provided that the legislature amended the existing laws so that the Commissioner would be actually in command of his force, and a man given a fair trial and found guilty and ordered dismissal, could not destroy discipline because a venal or incompetent Tammany judge ordered his reinstatement. Colonel Goethals is not only one of the world's leading engineers, but he is also one of its foremost administrators and organisers, and New York might consider itself extremely fortunate in obtaining his services, but that, of course, is the kind of man Tammany does not want, for the day the police force is no longer part of the machinery of Tammany Hall that day will mark the beginning of the end of Tammany domination. Tammany, of course, looks after its own and itself. It prevented the passage of the desired legislation, and Colonel Goethals gave renewed proof of his ability and good judgment by declining the Commissionership.

"It is probably hopeless to look ever again to Albany (the seat of the legislature) for relief from the tyranny which corruption has fastened upon the city," the New York *Tribune* mournfully cries. "It is plain that no real relief can be expected from Albany. The police lobby is strong," the New York *World* joins in chorus. It is reported, says the same newspaper, that a powerful lobby is at work to defeat the Bill to prevent the traffic in morphine and derivatives of opium. No one questions the truth of these statements; no one is surprised when he reads that legislation is defeated or enacted as the lobby or the bosses direct. If New York were a conquered city and Tammany a Tartar invasion, and the Boss of Tammany Hall another scourge of God, one might understand this weak submission, but New York boasts of its freedom and courage and enterprise. Why

patriot does not arise and sweep out Tammany, if necessary placing himself at the head of an army of a hundred thousand outraged citizens and by force compelling the legislation needed, is incomprehensible. That is the amazing thing about New York, its press and people. The newspapers cry out their wrongs. The public folds its hands. And Tammany debauches the second city in the world and insolently continues to plunder.

As a rule the American millionaire is not unduly modest, nor does he shun publicity. He enjoys having his wealth paraded, to be written and talked about, to give great sums to charity, to endow hospitals or colleges, to do spectacular things. There have died recently two men of great fortune who were marked exceptions of their kind, but while both amassed their wealth in America neither was American. For years Altman's, in New York, has been known as one of the leading shops in that city much beloved of women, but of its proprietor no one knew anything. When he died the public were surprised to learn that he left an estate valued at nearly ten millions sterling and an unsurpassed art collection, which he devised to the Metropolitan Museum. Mr. Altman was not only a man of great business capacity, but he had a profound and instinctive knowledge of art. He bought the things that he liked and knew were good and not on the advice of dealers, and it is said that in his collection, whether painting, bronze or porcelain, were only the finest examples of their art. He was so little known that when he died not a single paper was able to publish his portrait, and yet he was neither morose nor without feeling. Those persons who were brought in contact with him in business say he was considerate and just, and he showed these traits by leaving the bulk of his fortune to endow a foundation for the benefit of his employees.

An even more unusual millionaire was Frederick Weyerhaeuser, who died a few days ago at the age of seventy-nine and was said to be the richest man in the United States, John D. Rockefeller alone excepted. Like Altman, Weyerhaeuser came to the United States from Germany when a youth, worked here and there for a time, and then went to Illinois, where he found employment in a saw mill, saved his money, met a fellow countryman of the name of Denkman and each began courting the sister of the other.

After their marriage the brothers-in-law bought the mill in which they had formerly worked and went in for the purchase of tracts of standing timber, Weyerhaeuser having the genius to see the great profits that were to be made out of forest lands.

Altman, because his shop was a conspicuous landmark and his business compelled him to advertise extensively was known at least by name all over the country, but it was not until 1906 that the general public had any knowledge of Weyerhaeuser. In that year Congress investigated the "lumber trust," and the country learned of Weyerhaeuser's great wealth and his practical control of the timber resources of the country. The papers had to tell something about this unknown millionaire, but there was little to tell. The Lumber King was not picturesque. He had no amusements or recreations except work. He took no active part in politics or charity, or the various movements for the benefit of the human race or the improvement of Society; when he wasn't working he spent his evenings quietly with his family. He read little and never pretended to wide culture, but as one of the newspapers said in the scant biography published after his death, he knew lumber and men. He was taciturn and secretive. He was never interviewed, and the only quotable remark attributed to him was, "I have two eyes and two ears, but only one mouth and that is to eat with."

A. MAURICE LOW

A PRINT DEALER'S LEDGER

The Ledgers of a business house are not usually regarded as books endowed with much human interest. Once filled and balanced, and the unsettled accounts carried over to the new Ledger, the old one is relegated to a shelf, then to a cellar or attic, and thence to the paper mill, to be reduced to pulp, and to reappear again perhaps in the form of novels and scientific treatises. A Ledger which has done its work of recording debit and credit accounts has, when finished, no more value to its owner or to its generation. But the despised and rejected of one century often becomes the priceless treasure of the next; and many of the commonplace, matter-of-fact Ledgers of the eighteenth century would, if they existed, be found to contain for us to-day details of the highest historical value. By an extraordinary piece of good fortune the Ledgers of both George Romney and Sir Joshua Reynolds have been preserved, and their importance to students of the works of these two great artists cannot be overestimated.

What would not now be given for the Ledgers which registered Mr. William Shakespeare's purchases at his tailor's, his shoemaker's, or even his shirtmaker's, or for the memoranda of the indebtedness of the wits to Mine Host of the Mermaid Tavern in Bread Street? The bills, paid and unpaid, of a fifth-rate poet like Robert Burns are now the objects of animated rivalry in the sale-room, and of veneration when placed on view in a public museum. Only a few months ago all the world was represented at the public sale of the Browning relics. A few tradesmen's account books of the Elizabethan period would possess more human interest to-day than a whole library of illuminated manuscripts of mediæval times. The Royal Household Books of Tudor and other periods have preserved for us the cost of many of the commodities of those

days, but it would be much more interesting to know something of the daily cash or credit—more often probably the latter than the former—accounts of the poets and witlings of the Elizabethan Grub Street. We know that Gabriel Harvey, the friend of Edmund Spenser, borrowed "a blue coat" from one of his publisher's employees so that he might appear respectable on a visit to some friends in the country. We know also—it is true from an enemy—that Robert Greene, the poet, borrowed his landlord's shirt whilst his own was in the wash; and that another poet of the same cycle fed on "sheep's trotters, porknells and buttered roots," but these things would not be found recorded in the Ledgers of the period, even if such existed.

As we shall presently see, very many curious and surprising entries are to be found in Ledgers of a much later date than that of Queen Elizabeth. The Ledger with which we are now more particularly concerned escaped destruction more by accident than design. It is one which came to light in the removal of the old-established firm of print and picture dealers of Colnaghi and Co. from Pall Mall East to New Bond Street. The founder of that firm was Paul Colnaghi, who was born near Milan in 1751, and who, after many ups and downs, became Paris agent of Torre, the London print dealer; eventually he settled in London, became a partner of his former employer, succeeded to the business, and died on August 26, 1833. He married in 1788 a Miss Baker, whose sister was the wife of Torre, another sister having married the Comte de Montleart. The last descendant in the male line of Paul Colnaghi is believed to have been Martin Henry Colnaghi the picture dealer and benefactor of the National Gallery, who died in 1908, and of whom an account will be found in th Second Supplement of the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

During the time of the first Colnaghi—who, in spite of his lon residence in England, remained to the end in dress, habits, ar manners essentially Italian—the Pall Mall Gallery became rendezvous for all interested in pictures and prints, and was one the few "art" places in London at which foreign notabilit as well as native connoisseurs found a cordial welcome. I Mr. Colnaghi's Gallery was not only a meeting-place for collect and connoisseurs; for it seems, from his recently discove Ledger, which was started in January 1800, to have been a k

of Home for exiled Italians, some of whom were apparently set up in the print business by Colnaghi himself. Italian exiles poured into England by the thousand during the political upheavals on the Continent of the latter part of the eighteenth century. Many of these were educated men, and as print selling in those times was a pleasant trade requiring very little skill or apprenticeship, some of the exiles tried it as a temporary source of livelihood. Colnaghi had a fellow feeling for the distress of his compatriots, for he too had known the bitterness of exile and poverty.

The amazing number of Italian names to be found in the Colnaghi Ledger would alone form the subject of an interesting essay on Italian refugees, not only in London but in other parts of England. So far as can be discovered from the entries, Mr. Colnaghi's efforts on behalf of his fellow countrymen appear to have left the accounts chiefly on the debit side. For instance, a Mr. Pusterla paid only £5 12s. cash on an account of £35 4s., the balance being partly made up of goods returned. Giovanni Cova was another Italian who returned most of the prints which he had on credit; Signor Tasana was more fortunate, and was able in time to square his big account in instalments of £10 and upwards. Piatti and Mazzotelli constituted a firm of print dealers largely backed by Colnaghi, who supplied them with 460 prints at half-price, *i.e.* 6s. prints being reckoned at 3s. each. John Colmegna was another customer (more particularly for landscape prints), and in connection with this name it may be pointed out some of the Italian refugees made a concession to English prejudices by turning their Christian names into English while retaining the original form of their surnames. P. Salmoni (with whom a big business was done and whose accounts run into seven double-page entries), Maspro and Discaciati; Porri, Vechio and Co.; Testolini; Galli of Holborn and Poggi (who for the most part liquidated his accounts by portraits of General Washington at 16s. each plain, and at £1 11s. 6d. for proofs, and by pairs of views of Bunker's Hill at £6 per pair)—these are a few of Mr. Colnaghi's Italian trade customers who appear to have been domiciled in London. Another name may be mentioned in this connection; that of P. Cantolupi, who in the course of a year ran up a little bill of £188 for prints and

Wheatley apparently being reckoned of greater value than Gainsborough, for a painting by whom S. W. Reynolds was debited with ten guineas. Still more noteworthy is a Mr. Cartwright's purchase in October 1801 of six sketches by Wheatley and one picture by Morland for twelve guineas. Remarkable also is the record of purchases by Messrs. Thompson and Simpson for ten guineas of a painting of a farmer's stable by Morland, and fifteen guineas for two other pictures by the same artist.

The Ledger is what is known as a Trade Ledger, and very few private buyers—Sir William Beechey appears as a Creditor—are registered in it. Every engraver and print dealer had dealings with Paul Colnaghi, the largest accounts being those of Bartolozzi and Vendramini, whose account takes up twelve pages, Boydell takes sixteen, Zanetti fourteen, and J. R. Smith six pages. In nearly every instance there is a large Credit account to balance that on the debit side. It seems fairly clear from the entries that many of the engravers scraped—as it was technically termed—their plates of portraits or fancy subjects, and then retailed the prints to the various dealers. Later on the custom became—as it is now—for a dealer or print publisher to commission an engraving and to take all risks as well as all profits. A few instances of plates commissioned are to be found in the Ledger. On April 27, 1801, S. W. Reynolds received £10 on account of his engraving of *The Battle of Bears and Frogs*, after J. Eckstein. In January of the same year we have the record of an agreement entered into between Freschi the engraver and Colnaghi, by which the former agreed to engrave a *Venus Bathing* after "Vatteau," the "size of the *Adam and Eve*," for £18, half in cash and half in prints. This engraving of *Adam and Eve* was an extremely popular one for it occurs times out of number in the Ledger. It was engraved after Pellegrini by F. Vendramini, who sold the copperplate to Colnaghi on August 23, 1802, for £130. In December of that year Bartolozzi was paid £10 "for altering a portrait of Mr. Pitt." Soon afterwards Colnaghi sold to Mrs. Macklin, of the famous "Poets' Gallery" in Fleet Street, the copperplate of *The Dogs* by Morland for £21, and sixteen copperplates of *The Lakes* by Laporte for £90. These sales of copperplates from one dealer to another will account for the various "states" which are often so confusing to the collector. Occasionally there

is a record of a picture lent for engraving. S. W. Reynolds, for instance, borrowed a portrait of General Stewart (valued at twelve guineas) and one of Bonaparte for which Colnaghi was to receive respectively twenty and twenty-five proofs for the loans.

One of the most interesting series of entries in the Ledger occurs under the heading of "——Cobbett Esqr." Generally speaking the great men of the day considered that they had condescended far enough by sitting for their portraits, and took no risks in the matter of engraving; but William Cobbett, the Radical reformer, was not of that sort. His portrait was painted by J. R. Smith, engraved by Bartolozzi, and published by Colnaghi, but evidently it was not Colnaghi's speculation as the following entries show:

1801, *Nov.* 19. To printing and French paper for 318 prints and proofs of Mr. Cobbett's portrait in plain . .	£7 7s. 0d.
Nov. 21. Twenty-two portraits of Mr. Cobbett, for tinting and paper and printing . . . . . *Dec.* 9. Thirty-eight ditto.	£9 0s. 0d.
For advertisements of Mr. Cobbett's portrait, *December* 2, in the *Morning Chronicle*, the *Morning Post*, the *Porcupine*, etc.	£1 10s. 0d.

The *Porcupine*, it may be mentioned, was Cobbett's own paper. The account was paid for on March 14, 1804, by a bill at nine months.

Each of the many entries in the Ledger has its own special interest. Generally speaking the prints in colours were double the price of those in black; and in the matter of portraits the demand for those of men would seem to have been far greater than for those of women, and greatest of all for fancy subjects, which were more costly than portraits. Bishops and ordinary notabilities appear to have been fairly cheap. In Ackermann's account, portraits of Robert Lowth Bishop of London, Thomas Newton Bishop of Bristol, and "Joseph Bishop of Tuam" (*i.e.* the Hon. Joseph Deane Bourke, Archbishop of Tuam) were 5s. and 6s. each, whilst, in the same account, and by way of extreme contrast, a large number of *Cupid unveiling Venus* changed hands at £1 each in colours and 12s. plain. In another entry we have prints of Prince William at 4s., of Sir Sydney Smith at 8s., and David Scott, M.P., at 17s.

In the way of portraits Mr. Colnaghi's biggest "selling line" would seem to have been the hated Bonaparte. Every account of any length contains his name. There is no record of J. R. Smith having engraved a portrait of the great French commander, but during the summer of 1800 he supplied Colnaghi with many portraits of him, the plain being 16s. each and the coloured £1 12s. During 1802 another firm supplied Colnaghi with thirty-five prints of *Buonaparte's Review* at £1 6s., and there are innumerable proofs that Bonaparte, in spite of the fear and hatred with which he was regarded in England, was a small gold mine to the print sellers. There are everywhere evidences that the engravers and print sellers were alive to the commercial actualities of the times. There are many entries of prints celebrating the victories of Duncan, St. Vincent and Nelson: sets of *The Battle of the Nile* sold freely at £2 12s. plain and five guineas in colours; many sets of *The Soldier's Widow* and *The Sailor's Widow* were bought by Colnaghi from W. R. Bigg the artist, who apparently shared in the engraving rights of his popular domestic scenes inspired by the wars in which England was engaged on land and sea. The best selling item of events in India were the engravings of the several pictures by H. Singleton, *The Storming of Seringapatam*, and the two plates, also after Singleton, by Grozer, of *The Death of Tippoo Sahib* and *The Surrender of Tippoo's Sons as Hostages*, both dedicated to Lord Hawkesbury; although published in 1793 (in colours at £2 12s. the pair) the demand for them was still keen in 1800.

There is not an undue preponderance of portraits of women in the Ledger. Until half a century or so ago engraved portraits were collected and placed away in portfolios, the demand being rather for men who were famous than for women who happened to be beautiful or more than usually wicked. During the last decade or so fine mezzotint and stipple portraits have been collected for their decorative qualities, framed and hung on walls, instead of pictures in oils, and so it comes about that those of men have taken somewhat of a back seat and those of women are everywhere in evidence. Many of Mr. Colnaghi's entries are enough to excite the envy of the most philosophical collector. *Mrs. Crewe* after Sir Joshua Reynolds (presumably by Watson) at 8s.; *Mrs. Bouverie* after Hoppner by J. R. Smith in colours at 12s. or plain at 6s.; *The Snake in the Grass* after Reynolds,

ılso by J. R. Smith, at 12s.; three of Condé's most charming ›rints after Cosway, Mrs. Tickell, Hon. Mrs. E. Bouverie, and Irs. Jackson, all in colours at 9s. each! The print of the Lambton 'amily, after Hoppner by Young, sold in 1800 at a guinea is worth ıbout 300 guineas; in 1803, Wilkin sold to Colnaghi four of his ›eautiful engravings after Hoppner's portrait of Mrs. Parkyns Lady Rancliffe) for 24s., any one of which would be now worth nore than as many guineas. Another provocative entry is that vhich registers the purchase from Young the engraver of "7 *for* *Mrs. Orby Hunter*" (painted by Hoppner and engraved by Young) ıt £5 12s.; it was published in colours at two guineas each and is ıow worth about 200 guineas; and one would be very glad indeed o buy, at a much higher price, any of the very large number ›f sporting prints and caricatures which Colnaghi bought of Fores ıt about 2s. each. Then again of Madame Récamier's portrait, luring 1802 Colnaghi bought of Bartolozzi, at various times, about hundred examples, plain at 4s. and in colours at rather more. t would now probably be impossible to get half a dozen of each ıt any price in a twelve-months search.

Another of the thousand and one points revealed by Mr. Colnaghi's Ledger may be mentioned in conclusion, though it has ıothing to do with prints or pictures. In his accounts with Mr. Ioldicutt, the coal merchant, there was always a charge for 'meeting and shooting" over and above the cost of the coals— custom which still prevails in some provincial towns, but which s obsolete so far as London is concerned. Coal was at that time old by the sack or by the chaldron—a chaldron of coals in 1800 ›eing priced at £2 17s.; whilst a few months later Mr. Colnaghi ›ought 12 sacks of coals for £2 13s., the "meeting and shooting" f which cost him an extra 9s.

W. Roberts

THE TROUBLES OF OUR ALLY

CRISIS follows crisis in the land where, the globe-trotter assures us, "it is always afternoon." In February last year a Ministry fell, to the accompaniment of riot and upheaval. In March of this year the same phenomenon recurred. The world is beginning to ask whether, in Japan, Cabinet crises partake of the nature of hardy annuals—whether, in the spring, Young Japan's fancy lightly turns to thoughts of war. And yet the explanation is simple enough. It is in the early months of the year that the Diet sits. And, for one reason or another, when this new institution bestowed on Old Japan by the beneficent West addresses itself to the task of government, the political temperature rises, dormant passions spring to life, and "the band begins to play."

Directly or indirectly, the crisis of 1913 and that of this year are both the result of influences imported from the West. Representative institutions are hard to reconcile with the divinity of kings, or with the sturdy remnants of a mediæval feudalism. The task of adapting them to new and strange surroundings is dangerous enough even in the case of a people so proverbially assimilative as the Japanese. But in the crisis of 1914 forces more sinister and more subversive of national discipline have asserted themselves; and the hand of the West has been in evidence to an extent keenly appreciated—and no less resented—by the Japanese "man in the street." As a consequence the Empire of the Rising Sun is at this moment without a Diet and without a Government; its administration rests in the hands of the bureaucracy and the police; while its people—their confidence in their rulers rudely shaken—are, like Diogenes with his candle, looking for an honest man.

In the upheaval of which the late Prince Katsura was the

central figure, the struggle lay between the Diet on the one hand, and the allied forces of militarism and the bureaucracy on the other. The crisis of 1914 found the Diet divided against itself. As behoved the successor to the Ministry of the Marquis Saionji—who, though himself driven from office, had left the militarists a Pyrrhic victory—the Yamamoto Cabinet marked the nearest approach to a Party Cabinet Japan had yet seen. It enjoyed the support of the Seiyukai, the largest of Japanese political parties, commanding of itself a substantial majority in the Diet; and, in virtue of this fact, half of the members of this Cabinet were Seiyukai men. But, unhappily for itself, it was also a "Clan Cabinet." Its leading members belong to the House of Satsuma, which has always been associated with the Japanese Navy—just as its great rival, the Choshu clan, has dominated the sister service; and the Prime Minister himself held the rank of an Admiral. Wherefore the principal exponents of the Party system in Japan, the Seiyukai, in supporting the Yamamoto Cabinet, were at the same time supporting that bugbear of the Japanese politician, Clan Government. Herein lay the irony of the situation—and, as appeared later, the source of all the trouble. Had the Navy been like Cæsar's wife, above suspicion, nothing could have shaken the position of the Yamamoto Ministry. The popular feeling aginst taxation remained, indeed, as strong as ever; but this was a difficulty with which every Japanese Cabinet of modern times has had to contend; and the Yamamoto Cabinet had pledged itself to retrenchment. Unfortunately, all was not well with the Navy. Since the "crowning mercy" of Tsushima, that service had been, in a special sense, the pride and glory of the people; but they awoke, one winter's morning, to find that the idol had feet of clay. They were not told so by their rulers; they learned it from the sentence of a German Criminal Court.

The Crisis of 1914 will always be associated, in the mind of Japanese, with the foreigner in their midst. The typist of the Tokyo office of a well-known German firm—to cut a long and sordid story short—had possessed himself of letters which went to show that large sums had been paid by the firm in question to Japanese naval officers of high rank by way of "commission," in return for orders secured for the said firm through the influence

of the said officers. For the surrender of the incriminating letters —so runs the official statement made publicly in the Diet— the typist demanded from his employers a considerable sum in cash. Failing in this attempt, he is said to have disposed of the documents to the representative of a well-known foreign News Agency, and then to have left the country. What exactly happened next is not as yet definitely known. The following facts are beyond dispute: that, as long ago as last November, when the clerk Richter made his attempt at blackmail, the Minister for the Navy, Baron Saito, was informed of the circumstances, in a private interview, by the head of the German firm; that, nevertheless, no proceedings were taken against the offending clerk, who was allowed to leave the country; that, at the end of January, the services of the foreign correspondent were dispensed with; and that, in the interval between these two events, nothing was done towards investigating the rumours of corruption which were already current. But with the news of the Berlin Court's sentence on Richter of two years imprisonment for theft of documents and "unconsummated blackmail," a change came over the scene. The foreign correspondent and the head of the German firm in Tokyo were both arrested and, while kept in close confinement, were subjected to a prolonged "preliminary examination" extending over seven weeks. As a result, presumably, of this inquisition, the Procurator-General felt justified in ordering the arrest of numerous officials connected with the naval dockyards, amongst them several admirals of distinction. What the result of these drastic if belated measures will be for the persons most nearly concerned, the world will not know for some time to come —the processes of Japanese justice are painfully like those of "the mills of God"; but the political effects are already plainly to be seen.

Attention was drawn to what are now known as "the naval scandals," at the first sitting of the Diet after the New Year recess. Mr. Shimada Saburo, a prominent figure on the Opposition side who may be called the Lloyd George of Japanese politics, asked the Minister for the Navy, in a very pointed manner, what light he could throw on the Richter case in its bearing on Japanese officialdom. Thus did the Doshikai—the party bequeathed by

Prince Katsura to his country—draw first blood. The replies of Baron Saito, of the Premier and of the Minister for Home Affairs—Mr. Hara, a leading light of the Seiyukai—were of the kind with which recent events in this country have familiarised us. "There was nothing in it—or at most, perhaps, a misunderstanding. The fullest enquiries would be made, and the result communicated to the House in due course." This characteristically official pose could not, however, be maintained in the face of the known facts and of the arrests which followed. The Opposition saw their opportunity, and took it. Against them was a majority of fifty in the House of Representatives, but on their side an outraged public opinion had already ranged itself. Only one thought remained present to the mind of the man in the street—that his hard-earned *yen* —his humble ill-spared contribution to the crushing burden of taxation—which he had fondly believed to have passed from his pocket to the upkeep of the glorious fleet, had passed into the pockets of corrupt and greedy officials. This was the spark which fired the magazine of the Tokyo mob—that mob which a year before had brought Katsura to his knees. Relying on it the Opposition parties made common cause, and decided on a vote of censure in the following terms: "Resolved that the Government be held responsible for having made the Imperial Navy an object of popular suspicion, and for having damaged the prestige of the country at home and abroad; and that the Government should take such steps as are appropriate to the circumstances."

The day of the battle was astutely fixed for February 10, the eve of the annual holiday celebrating the granting of the Constitution in 1889, and the anniversary of the so-called Constitutional riots of 1913. It marked a subtle appeal to the populace which did not fall on deaf ears. Immense crowds thronged the approaches to the Diet. The members of the Opposition drove to the House amid the salvos of the multitude. Each of them wore three flowers on his breast—a white rose, a pink cherry and a scarlet plum blossom, as the respective badges of the Confederated Parties, the Naval Purification Association and the Bad Tax Abolition Society. As for the Ministerialists, in order to make sure of getting into the House at all, they had taken the precaution of rising, like the patriarchs of old, a great while before day, so

as to be spared the ordeal of passing through the mob. Belated arrivals had the disagreeable experience of having their *jinriksha* overturned and themselves rudely hustled before reaching the haven of the police-guarded gate; while the motor-car of an admiral was held up and speedily reduced to matchwood and scrap iron.

Within the walls of the House, the Government relied upon the mechanical force of their majority. The main defence put forward by the Ministerial speakers was that of "wait and see." The motion of censure, they averred, was premature; when the Naval Committee of Enquiry, appointed by the Premier, had presented its report, it would be time enough to criticise the Government. Mr. Shimada responded by reading what purported to be one of the blackmailing letters, in which the amount demanded for the return of the incriminating documents was put as high as Yen 250,000—a striking indication, he added, of their value. This set the House in an uproar, and Mr. Shimada was assaulted by a Seiyukai member whom he had accused of being too much interested in the Muroran Iron Works to be able to discuss the matter impartially. Finally, amid a babel of conflicting cries and scuffles, the Premier moved the closure, and the motion of censure was lost by 205 votes to 164. The Opposition, on leaving the House, were frantically cheered by the assembled populace; but the supporters of the Government did not venture forth till a regiment of infantry and 2000 police with drawn swords had mustered for their escort.

The struggle was now transferred to the halls and streets: it was the turn of the mob. Each day the open spaces before the Diet buildings were packed by an angry throng, while huge demonstrations in Hibiya—the Japanese Hyde Park—had their counterpart in enthusiastic assemblies in Osaka and other populous centres. But for all this the authorities were prepared. In the disturbances of the previous year the attitude of the police had been one of non-interference. This time the *mot d'ordre* was, evidently, to take the offensive. Parading the streets in parties of two or three hundred with sabres drawn, they broke up every assemblage of any sort. Even in such indoor meetings as were allowed, the more violent of the orators were arrested before they had progressed very far with their speeches. One journalist,

addressing a gathering of 5000 people in Osaka, referred to the blackmailer Richter, amid the plaudits of the audience, as "the Saviour of the Constitution," because, but for him, the naval scandals might never have come to light; while at the same time a member of the staff of the same paper was being scalped in a Tokyo street by a policeman's sword. Both sides enlisted the services of *soshi* * to supplement those of the police for the protection of their leading men; and a deputation of three Naval Purification men who called on the Minister for Home Affairs to urge the resignation of the Premier, found themselves ushered into the presence of thirty stalwart "braves" who soon found occasion to belabour them soundly and cast them forth unheard.

The net result of a week's "demonstrating" and disorder was the arrest of some five hundred persons in Tokyo. The position of the Government remained, to all appearances, unshaken. Discussing it, the moderate journal, *Nippon*, used language which to a reader of the Opposition papers in this country could not but have a familiar ring.

> The existing House of Representatives [remarked this journal] was elected two years ago, when the question of the naval scandals had not arisen. It is impossible at this juncture to say whether the opinion of the majority in the Diet represents the popular opinion on this question. Their attitude, to say the least, is presumptuous, because the demonstrations of popular indignation are unmistakable. Ministerialists may be content to tide over their difficulties for the moment by the arts of sophistry, perversion and assumed indifference; but the public gives no credit to the opinion of the present majority in the Diet.

One of the Opposition speakers warned his hearers that the present degraded position of the Chinese people was due to the corruption which prevailed among them, and recommended that the members of the Seiyukai should be deported to China, where they would find a congenial atmosphere, or failing that, to England—a neat allusion to the Marconi scandals in this country which was greeted, by his fellow partisans at least, with hilarious applause.

But the fight was not over. At the very moment when the Ministerialists were congratulating themselves that they had weathered the storm, a new danger arose. The Peers took a hand

* Professional ruffians.

in the game. It was a flank attack—as subtle and effective as it was unexpected. A grievance probably nearer to the popular heart than even corruption in the Navy, was that of the "Three Bad Taxes"—to wit, the business tax, the transit tax and that on textile goods. Originally war taxes, these imposts were still in force, and the agitation for their reduction or abolition was incessant. As a concession to this sentiment, the Seiyukai had reduced by Yen 30,000,000 an extraordinary naval Estimate for Yen 160,000,000 which the Navy Department had introduced in amplification of the Saito programme of forty millions sterling, spread over eight years, which had been approved two years previously. It was merely a tactical move, not affecting the disbursements for the current year; but even so, it was deemed good policy. When, however, the Budget reached the Peers, they went one better. They cut down the proposed expenditure by no less than Yen 70,000,000—and left the Ministerialists gasping at their audacity.

The House of Peers in Japan is not a hereditary Chamber. One-third of its membership is nominated by the Emperor, and a substantial proportion consists of publicists who do not belong to any order of nobility. Though occupying a strong position not associated with any one party more than another, they have not hitherto taken a very active part in Japanese politics; but this passive rôle is evidently now to be abandoned. When asked, at the conference between the two Houses, what construction exactly was to be placed upon their action, the Peers made answer that it was to be regarded as a vote of no confidence in the Yamamoto Ministry, on account of the naval scandals. To leave no doubt of their determination to pick a quarrel, however, they went out of their way to reject two Bills which had been sent up from the Lower House—one dealing with the prohibition of the sale of *saké* to minors, and the other with the restriction of massage, as a profession, to the blind—on the ground that the Commons were too engrossed in party strife to give sufficient deliberation to legislative proposals! No doubt the action of the Peers was inspired, in part, by the Choshu men; but it is equally certain that the Japanese Second Chamber intends to be no longer a sleeping partner in the Constitutional firm. Nor is there the slightest justification for the analogy which Liberal critics in this

country have sought to draw between the action of the Japanese Upper Chamber and that of the British House of Lords in 1909. The Japanese Peers were on the Radical side. They fought the Government on a popular issue—and they won.

All that now remained was, if possible, to save the face of the Yamamoto Cabinet. Hopelessly discredited, it stood between the devil of party enmity and the deep sea of popular indignation. Not a friend was left it but the Seiyukai—and that party, formed by Ito to be "Friends of the Constitution," already occupied a painfully false position. An Imperial Decree, proroguing the Diet for the remainder of the year, gave the necessary respite. This done, the admiral whose very name has passed into the Japanese vernacular as a synonym for "commission," placed his resignation in the hands of the Emperor. The Yamamoto Cabinet had fallen because its head, as the veteran Count Okuma put it, "had made too much of a family affair of the Navy." Not only this. When confronted with the popular "*J'accuse!*" it had affected the indifference of ignorance. Faced with a demand for the cleansing of the Augean stables it had denied that any dirt existed! Here, indeed, was the God-sent madness which precedes destruction.

Party government in Japan has not hitherto been a success, because it has not been permitted to attain its full development. Chief among the restraining influences is that which emanates from what is popularly known as "the privileged caste"—the representatives, that is to say, of the old *samurai* class, which comprises the bulk of the official world. A widespread feeling also exists that politics is not quite "respectable." This sentiment was illustrated only a few weeks ago by the refusal of Prince Tokugawa, the descendant of the Shoguns, to form a Cabinet, on the ground that to engage in politics was inconsistent with the dignity of his House. But these opposing influences are rapidly losing their force. An impediment less easily overcome is the rivalry of the great Daimyates, or clans, controlling the Services. In 1913 there was too much Army; in 1914 there was more than enough of the Navy: and each did its best to hold up the Government in its own interests. There can be no stable government in Japan so long as the Cabinet is identified with Choshu or with Satsuma. But the most urgent need of all is for a vigorous and united Opposition in the Diet. Only when the

Doshikai, the Chuseikai and the Kokumin-to sink their differences in favour of a common platform which can intelligibly be presented to the electorate, will the party system in Japan become a reliable instrument of government. With the advent of that day, there will come some hope of mitigating the colossal burden of armaments—increased by 100 per cent. since the time of the Russian War—which hangs like a millstone round the Island Empire's neck. With stable government within her borders, peace secured by the Alliance for years to come, and a commerce helped to expansion by relief from "bad" taxation, Japan would find a happy and a speedy issue out of her distresses.

E. Bruce Mitford

GREATER BRITAIN AND INDIA

CANADIAN AFFAIRS

1

RADICAL papers and papier mâché politicians in the Mother Country are always asserting that the Dominions are a unit in favour of Home Rule for Ireland. It is certainly not so in Canada for several reasons. In the first place, the Orange Order is very strong in Ontario and the English-speaking provinces generally, and, during the pending controversy, has done much to awaken the Canadian to a sense of the actualities of the Irish situation. In Toronto, which has been called the Belfast of Canada, there are at least 30,000 people who are members of the Orange Association or are in sympathy with its objects, which include, of course, an uncompromising opposition to all forms of political Catholicism. On July 12 every year from 5000 to 7000 citizens of Toronto—among them a great number of influential business men—parade in memory of the Battle of the Boyne, and that day of days is also enthusiastically celebrated in many country districts all over Canada, the most successful farmers in Ontario and the New Prairie Provinces being very often Ulstermen or their descendants. The political influence of the Orange lodges is altogether out of proportion to their numerical strength, large as it is. It is invariably exerted in favour of the Imperial connection, and that is why the Canadian Orangeman is generally—though not at all times and in all places—a staunch supporter of the Conservative Party, whose Imperialism cannot be questioned. In comparison with the Orangemen, the Irish settlers from Roman Catholic Ireland are weak and unorganised. In Canada, as in the United States, these men are seldom settled on the land; the great

majority are wage-earners, navvies, and so forth, and saloon-keeping is the only industry of which the more intelligent can be said to have a grip. There are, of course, brilliant exceptions. Yet the rule is, all over Canada, that the emigrant from the south and west of Ireland prefers the cities to the country-side, and occupies a lower position in the body economic than the Ulsterman, who works harder and has a keener and wider sense of business possibilities. For many years past, again, the Nationalist Party in Ireland, the politicians and the priests, have actively discouraged emigration to Canada. It has seemed more profitable to their propaganda that the Catholic Irishman should resort to the great American cities (where he and his dollar or two of a subsidy are not lost to the cause) rather than indulge his "land hunger" by settling in a loyal British Dominion, where he can make a free homestead into a free home, and so escape the importunities of the talking and walking delegates of Separatism. In Quebec the Irish Catholic is unpopular, and his clerics distrusted, and it follows that the French-Canadian support of Home Rule for Ireland is of an academic nature. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's endorsement of the idea, which is based on general principles and expressed with moderation, is typical of the more intelligent opinion of Quebec in regard to a question which has never stirred the soul of the French-Canadian elector. He and those who agree with him, having little or no knowledge of the problems of sea-power, ignore the military aspect of the question. They do not see that an independent Ireland would be a source of danger to England and the Empire.

Secondly, the political methods of the American Irishmen have not escaped the observation of thoughtful Canadians of both Parties. Tammany Hall is Celtic and Catholic to the core, and every Canadian knows what the "Tiger" stands for in New York. There is not, and never has been a "ring" of rival politicians, subsisting on public plunder, in any American city from New York to San Francisco, which is not indebted to Irishmen of the Devlin type for its motive-power and plan of campaign. Once the Canadian is convinced that the Irish Nationalist Party exists by virtue of an alliance between the vendor of porter in a shebeen and an Ultramontane priest of the pattern familiar a generation ago in Quebec, he will soon cease to give even a qualified

support to the Separatist policy of that hungry Cerberus of a government which is misgoverning the Mother Country.

There can be no doubt that the recent crisis in Ireland stirred English-speaking Canada to its depths. News of the beginning of civil war in Ulster was expected at any moment; there were prayers for peace in the Protestant Churches of Toronto and other towns in Ontario. Liberal journals throughout Canada, making use of snippings from the Radical organs of London, had scoffed at the Ulster volunteers. The plot to start hostilities in Ulster, which was engineered by Mr. Winston Churchill (who is disliked and distrusted by Canadians), has changed the attitude of the whole Canadian people. The following leader from the *Toronto Telegram* is probably a fair expression of the newer and truer view of intelligent Canadians:

Ulster is the home of a Unionist democracy not less true and genuine than the progressive democracy that forms the best element in the Asquith Government. Ulster is the home of no Unionist aristocracy more selfish and reactionary than the worst element of the Asquith Government and following, made up as that element is of title-seeking plutocrats, sham democrats, and aristocratic exploiters of class hatred.

Democracy in Canada is dominantly in sympathy with democracy in Ulster. The democracy of Ulster battles for the elementary human rights of nearly 1,000,000 Britishers. These rights in Canada, Australia, the United States, or any other democracy would be surrounded with effective safeguards. The rights of the Ulster democracy are left with no safeguards other than those supplied by the Asquith Government and the Asquith majority, both the puppets of John Redmond's parliamentary power.

Democracy in Canada does not believe that the throne or Army of Britain is the ally or servant of aristocratic privilege. Democracy in Canada does believe that the Asquith Government in its warfare upon the democracy of Ulster is misrepresenting British officers. The outcry of "Down with the Army" may be the ditch in which the Asquith Government shelters itself from the moral duty of fighting out an election on the Home Rule issue. The Asquith Government is admired by democratic Canadians for its services to humanity. Civil war in Ulster would injure humanity by shooting more holes in the British Empire in a day than the Asquith Government could patch up in a lifetime.

Now that it is clear that Ulster can only be coerced by a process of civil war, Canadian common sense sees that the Bill forced on English Liberalism by Messrs. Redmond and Devlin can never become law.

2

The Canadian Budget, which was brought in by the Minister of Finance on April 6, is a satisfactory document. In introducing

it Mr. White referred to the previous fiscal year (ending March 31, 1913) which had been characterised by the greatest expansion in the history of the Dominion, the revenue exceeded that of 1912 by no less than £6,400,000. As a result the Government had been able to pay all current expenditure and all capital and special outlays and at the same time reduced the net indebtedness of Canada by £5,000,000. The revenue for the fiscal year 1914 would, Mr. White said, show a surplus of £7,800,000 over the amount required to defray ordinary expenditure. Capital and special outlays, including £3,800,000 for the Canadian Northern and other railway subsidies, would amount to £11,400,000, leaving a debit balance of £4,100,000. Deducting £300,000 invested in the Sinking Funds, the increase in the net indebtedness would be £3,800,000. It followed that the increase in indebtedness was solely due to the railway subsidies, without which there would have been a year's interruption in the constructive work of two great systems in the making. Had any such interruption occurred the consequences to the Dominion as a whole would have been disastrous. The revenue for the coming fiscal year (1915) would be sufficient to provide fully for current expenditure (which would be kept within bounds as far as possible) and to pay a large proportion of the outlay on capital account and for special purposes.

Mr. White announced that the Liberal agitation for free wheat and flour, to correspond with the change in the American Tariff, would not be made the basis of any revision of the existing duties. The objections to the suggested course raised by the milling industry seemed conclusive. It was better to await the results of Canadian railway development and the benefits accruing to the western grain-growers of the opening of the competitive ranks of (1) the Hudson Bay Railway and (2) the Panama Canal, than to take steps which might seriously injure the important milling and live-stock industries, and would also prejudicially affect the transportation systems working on east-to-west lines through the lake-and-river route to blue water. It follows that Reciprocity, in its newer and more plausible form, is not to be countenanced. Nobody, except two or three wild Liberals, ever imagined that it would as long as Mr. R. L. Borden is Prime Minister (say for the next fifteen years).

8

Other topics are of minor interest. An influential senator, Sir Melvin Jones, has seceded from the Liberal ranks, and his patriotic course, which was dictated by a feeling that Canada must contribute without delay to the Empire's stock of sea-power, may be followed by others. On April 7, at 12.45 P.M., the last mile of steel linking up the Grand Trunk Pacific main line was laid at the Nechaco River Crossing. The connection was made at a point 372 miles east of Prince Rupert and 1375 miles west of Winnipeg in very rough country. It will be some months before the road is open throughout for commercial traffic. There was no elaborate ceremony when the last span of rail was spiked to the "ties" or sleepers, as they are called in England. The formal ceremony of driving a *golden spike* will take place later. It will not be so long now before Canada's all-red trans-continental road of easy curves and low gradients is all ready, and Prince Rupert—a seaport in the making, which I visited in 1908—is a great entrepôt for round-the-world commerce.

E. B. O.

INDIA

THE PERSISTENCE OF INDIAN ANARCHISM

THE Anglo-Indian press, of which I have some knowledge, is a rather prickly institution. It likes to hold forth about India, which is its special function, but is a little inclined to sniff when anybody else does so. Just now it keeps a vial of extra-powerful wrath ready to be uncorked in an instant if any rash individual murmurs anything about Indian Anarchism. If you breathe the word "Anarchist" you are mown down at once by batteries of heavy literary artillery. It is almost as dangerous as talking about snow in Canada, or dry heat in Australia. I suppose there *is* Anarchism in India. Lord Hardinge's scars, and the murder of a whole row of Bengal policemen one after another, seem to suggest that the Anarchist conspirators have not entirely forsaken bombs and revolvers for marbles. I gather, however, that nowadays the correct thing is to say as little as possible about these unpleasant topics. "Never mind Anarchism," we are

told. "Look at India's trade! Look at her expanding revenue! Look at her new capital! [I have looked for it in vain so far.] Look at this and look at that, but never look at her wretched Anarchists!" And if you do happen to look at her Anarchists, and make a few harmless observations about them, and perhaps meekly observe that they remain a very serious symptom, rest assured that the Anglo-Indian newspapers will explode one after another like a row of minor popguns, and tell you in a somewhat inconsequent manner that there may still be Anarchism in India, but nevertheless you are a knave, or a fool, or a doddering old Rip Van Winkle, for saying so.

Let me hasten to add that these wounding and disrespectful observations have never been addressed to me. I can, as it were, plead an alibi. The last time I devoted these notes to the subject of Indian Anarchism was in January 1911, since when I have only made two passing allusions to the question, one being when Lord Hardinge was nearly killed at Delhi. I am thinking rather of such unhappy victims as the anonymous gentleman who recently wrote several articles on "The Indian Peril" in the *Times*. So far as I can make out, this unfortunate writer made not a single statement the accuracy of which was ever called in question. Everything he said was strictly true, and most of his facts were common knowledge. He was attacked, not because he said what was wrong, but because he said anything at all. The *Pioneer* opened fire at him at long range on the strength of a telegram or two, weeks before his extremely moderate articles reached India. This kind of attitude seems to be a mistake. We shall not extirpate Anarchism in India by pretending that it is not there. The proper method is to recognise its existence quite frankly, and to try to see it in a right perspective when occasion arises. Such an occasion is presented by the recent sensational trial of Nirmal Kanta Roy, the young Bengali student who was released at Calcutta on April 8, after having been twice tried on charges arising out of the murder of Police-Inspector Ghose on January 19.

We are often told that in the matter of Anarchism India is far quieter than it was. I have had the curiosity to look through the records, and have compiled the following list of people killed by Anarchists in India since I last wrote upon the

subject more than three years ago. The list, be it noted, is of murders only. I doubt whether it is complete, for my search was only superficial. In any case it takes no account of the numerous attempts at train-wrecking, the conspiracies which have been revealed, the frequent discoveries of illicit collections of arms, and the many "political dacoities." A political dacoity is a robbery committed for the purpose of obtaining funds for the Anarchist organisation. It is generally the work of a gang, is nearly always accompanied by violence, and sometimes ends in murder. There were ten such robberies in Bengal in a single fortnight in December. The list of Anarchist murders in the last three years is as follows:

1911

Feb. 21. Head Constable Chakravarty shot while on duty at Calcutta in connection with political crime.

April 19. Monmohan Dé, an important witness in the Munshiganj bomb case, shot while asleep.

June 16. Mr. R. D. Ashe, Collector of Tinnevelly, Madras, shot at a railway junction.

June 18. Sub-Inspector Raj Kumar, of the Criminal Investigation Department, shot at Mymensingh, Bengal.

July 12. Two Mahomedan policemen brutally murdered at Netrabati; and one Chakravarti, who had withdrawn from the organisation, murdered at Purapura.

Nov. 27. Bomb thrown at Tuticorin, Madras; one killed, three injured.

Dec. 11. Police inspector shot at Barisal, Bengal.

1912

Sept. 23. Head Constable Radhilal Roy shot at Dacca, Bengal.

Dec. 23. Lord Hardinge grievously injured by a bomb at Delhi. One attendant killed, several persons injured.

1913

Jan. 14. Dhebendra Kumar Ghose shot at Comilla, Bengal. Believed to have given information of revolutionary plots.

March 28. Anarchist agent blew himself up with a bomb while lurking in the garden of a Government officer at Moulvi Bazaar, Assam.

Aug. 17. Political dacoity in the Mymensingh district. One villager killed, several injured.

Sept. 28. Head Constable Saripada Bey shot in College Square, Calcutta.

Sept. 29. Police-Inspector Bankim Chandra Chowdhury killed by a bomb at Mymensingh.

1914

Jan. 19. Police-Inspector Ghosh shot at Calcutta.

The curious lull during the first nine months of 1912 requires explanation. In that mysterious manner in which things get

bruited about in India, it became known that the Anarchists had decided to keep quiet during the visit of the King-Emperor. I well remember how, on the morrow of the great Durbar at Delhi, we heard in the Durbar camp that a police-inspector had been killed in distant Barisal. A good deal of alarm was expressed, but an eminent authority said to me: "They only did that just to remind us that they are still alive, and they chose a place as far away as possible. I don't think there will be any more." He was quite right; but a very great many suspicious characters in Calcutta found themselves unaccountably detained in the lock-up until their Majesties had embarked again at Bombay. The lull lasted until the following September, when Anarchist murders recommenced with their almost rhythmical regularity. As if to make amends for their inactivity, the Anarchists very nearly destroyed the Viceroy. It is believed that Lord Hardinge owes his life to one small error on the part of the would-be assassin. The bomb was thrown with perfect aim, but the thrower forgot to make allowance for the forward movement of the elephant.

Inspector Ghosh, whose murder has aroused such widespread interest, was shot last January as he alighted from a tramcar in a crowded thoroughfare in Calcutta. Some bystanders and several constables chased the supposed assassin through a network of lanes. During the chase the assassin turned and fired on his pursuers. He missed them, but killed a youth named Ananta. The story of the pursuit is confused and contradictory, and one suggestion is that two men were being followed. At any rate only one was caught, and he proved to be a young Bengali student named Nirmal Kanto Roy. The police evidence was that he still had a revolver in his hand. The defence afterwards submitted was that the police put the revolver into his grasp, but there was no evidence to support this suggestion.

On January 26, a week after the murder, rewards were publicly distributed to the constables and other persons who seized Nirmal Kanto Roy. Lord Carmichael, the Governor of Bengal, attended the ceremony. Sir Frederick Halliday, Commissioner of Police, made a speech in which he said: "It has often been stated in the Press that such a thing as criminal conspiracy amongst the better classes does not exist. *It does exist*, and the recent

admissions of the accused in the Barisal case show that it is *a very real, living, and dreadful evil.*" Early in March Nirmal Kanto Roy was tried at the Calcutta High Court before Mr. Justice Stephen for the murder of Inspector Ghose and the lad Ananta. There were alternative charges of abetment of murder and of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The accused was powerfully defended by an English barrister, Mr. Eardley Norton, who in criminal cases is perhaps the ablest advocate now practising at the Indian Bar. Mr. Norton's line of defence was to cast doubt upon the evidence of the Crown witnesses. The jury consisted of three Europeans and six Bengalis. They unanimously returned a verdict of not guilty on the charges of murder, and disagreed on the minor counts in the proportion of 5 to 4. The Judge therefore ordered a fresh trial on the minor counts, which began on March 16 before a fresh jury of three Europeans and six Bengalis. On April 3 the accused was acquitted on the minor counts. The Judge disagreed with the verdict of the jury, and took the unusual step of ordering yet another trial. Nirmal Kanto Roy was therefore detained in custody, and again appeared in the High Court on April 8. The Crown then entered a petition of *nolle prosequi*, and Mr. Justice Stephen therefore ordered Roy's release. Mr. Norton asked the Court to say that the release amounted to an acquittal, and the Judge replied: "I will pass no such order." When Roy was released he entered the Bar Library, where he was "surrounded by lawyers, who congratulated him." The Bar libraries of Bengal have a very peculiar atmosphere, and it is not surprising that Roy at once found himself at home in such an environment.

It is quite evident that there was more in this case than appears in the published reports. I may quote the following from a very inadequate report of Mr. Justice Stephen's summing-up at the first trial, in which he said:

There was no doubt that two murders had occurred. If the accused was arrested with a revolver, it was very difficult to avoid the conclusion that he was the man who shot Ananta. If he was the man who shot Ananta that raised a strong presumption that he was a party to the shooting of the Inspector. There was no evidence that the police had put the pistol into the accused's hand.

There we may leave Nirmal Kanto Roy, surrounded by the applauding gentlemen of the Calcutta Bar. Two points

connected with this remarkable case require comment. The first relates to the ceremony at which rewards were distributed. The rewards were not given for capturing a murderer, but for capturing a person believed at the time to be guilty of murder. The decision of the Court did not affect the distribution of rewards, and casts no reflection upon Sir Frederick Halliday or the Bengal Government. The second point, however, very seriously affects the Bengal Government and their legal advisers. A telegram from Calcutta says: "Every one sees that in cases of this kind Bengali jurors will not convict." But why was the case submitted to a jury at all? In 1908 an Act was passed permitting the constitution of a special tribunal of three judges, sitting without a jury, to try cases of political crime. What is the use of creating powers if they are left in abeyance? The Bengal Government deserve the strongest criticism for having failed to send the case to the special tribunal. For the original desire of the Bengal Government to arraign the accused Roy a third time there is an Irish precedent. Timothy Kelly was tried three times for his share in the Phœnix Park murders. Twice the jury disagreed. Kelly was tried a third time on precisely the same evidence, found guilty, and hanged. There was, however, a special reason for Kelly's third trial, which does not apply to Roy's case. Kelly had privately confessed his guilt to the police, but the confession could not be used as evidence.

The *Pioneer* on January 16 committed itself to the statement that there was no particular disquietude in India, that "on the surface at any rate things appeared to be smooth enough," and that though no doubt there were "certain things amiss," this would "always be the case in any large country at whatever moment one may take stock of its conditions." Within a week Inspector Ghosh was shot; and I fancy most "large countries" would be sorry to be the scene of such activities as were recounted in the *Pioneer* only a fortnight later, in its report of the judgment in the Barisal Conspiracy case.

In this case twelve accused pleaded guilty to a charge of "conspiracy to wage war against the King-Emperor." They were all young men, their ages ranging from nineteen to twenty-nine. They were stated to be "for the most part instruments in the hands of persons whom the police have failed to arrest or whose identity

is not known." The movement in which they participated had been carried on for nearly a decade, chiefly among young men and boys. [It is interesting to note that the delegates at the Anarchist Conference at Newcastle-on-Tyne in Easter Week were described as consisting "for the most part of youths, while one is a girl of the type known as a 'flapper.'"] The conspiracy was "intended to be exceedingly widespread, having branches in all districts of Eastern Bengal." It was an anarchical movement, whose followers "bind themselves to obey implicitly the orders of the leaders." Its organisation "provided for the spreading of the propaganda among schoolboys by the introduction of masters imbued with the idea into schools all over the country, and by the initiation of selected students in all schools." The organisers declared that "it is unmarried youths who are the depositors of enthusiastic zeal, capability of doing work, and self-sacrifice." A wholesale massacre, "presumably of Europeans," was part of the conspirators' programme. Young men were drawn into the conspiracy by "the glamour of the prospect of a fight for independence," but their actual deeds turned in the direction of secret murder and dacoities committed on helpless village folk. The youngest of the prisoners was said to have taken part in two serious dacoities, to have made his house a rendezvous, and to have been an accessory to the murder of a police-inspector. The Judge said they were all "puffed up with their own importance," and sought to be a law unto themselves. Two were sentenced to twelve years transportation, three to ten years, two to seven years, three to four years, and two to two years.

The Barisal case is typical of several such conspiracies, all of which are more or less linked together. In the Raja Bazar trial now in progress at Calcutta, six men are charged with being in illegal possession of explosives. In the remarkable trial for sedition now proceeding at Delhi, ten Punjabi Hindus and two Bengalis are being prosecuted. It is suggested that their organisation touched the Punjab, the United Provinces, and Bengal. They are accused of projecting attacks on the Viceroy and on Sir J. S. Meston, the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, on the ground that "murders were necessary to arouse the masses to prepare the path for revolution." The exhibits in the case

include "an elaborate poison book which contains diabolical suggestions for poisoning Europeans." Is it right or wise, in view of these and similar revelations, to continue sedulously to propagate the contention that in India there is "no particular disquietude"? And if things appear "smooth enough" on the surface, may it not be well sometimes to look a little below the surface?

At the same time the *Pioneer* is perfectly right when it contends, in effect, that we must try to see these things in their proper perspective. Let me endeavour to state briefly how they appear to one who has a certain amount of intimate knowledge of the Indian revolutionary movement. I think the first thing which strikes the enquirer who examines the movement at close quarters is the squalor of its environment and the ludicrous disproportion of its means to its aims. In this respect it bears a strong family resemblance to all modern conspiracies of the kind. The Cato Street Conspiracy in London was finally hatched by Thistlewood and his allies in an empty three-horse stable, "three stalls and a coach-house below, a large loft and two small living-rooms above." The Phœnix Park murders were decided on in a public-house in Dame Street, Dublin. I recall looking with much surprise at the dilapidated pavilion in a garden near Calcutta in which the "Manicktollah conspirators" were accustomed to foregather. The impecuniosity of conspirators is another common characteristic. Mr. Oman says that among the Thistlewood gang the only man who ever had any money in his pocket was one Brunt, a shoemaker, who often made £2 a week. The Irish Invincibles had ample funds, though most of them were poor enough. The Indian Anarchists resort to robbery to finance themselves. It is noticeable that they always seem to deal in very small sums. In the Delhi case now proceeding it has been stated in evidence that the Punjab organisation was asked to pay its Bengal allies £3 odd per month, and was promised "bombs, revolvers, and literature" in return. There is not in these minute transactions much evidence of the sort of strength which could upset an Empire. In all the Anarchist trials in India during the last few years one has generally gained the impression that so far there is very little money behind the movement.

It is, then, squalid, and it is impecunious. On the other hand it has very nearly killed a Viceroy, it has slain two brave men in the heart of London, it has destroyed several English civilians and a number of faithful Indian police-officers. Many of its devotees are now languishing in the Andaman Islands, conspiracy after conspiracy has been broken up, but the movement still goes on, and the tale of assassinations slowly but surely increases. Clearly the organisation is still alive, and is not to be despised. Compared with the solidity of the British Raj it is ridiculously feeble, but it survives and periodically startles the public, because no amount of precaution can avert occasional murders when bands of obscure and desperate men are determined to kill. What does it really amount to? At present, perhaps, not very much, but its potentialities are considerable. The movement is spreading, largely because its chief method of achieving its aims is the corruption of youth. It is permeating the schools and colleges of the country, just as the advocates of women's suffrage are entrenching themselves in the female schools and colleges in Great Britain to a degree to which the unsuspicious British public is not yet aware. The psychology of the boy conspirators of Bengal and of the girl "militants" of England has many points of resemblance. The difference in the sex of the "instruments," and in the objects for which they are trained, do not prevent the production of the same kind of callous immovable resolution when boys and girls are captured at the plastic ages of sixteen or seventeen. Next to the movement in schools and colleges, the revolutionaries aim at influencing the Native Army. They have fortunately had little success with the older generation of sepoys, but they are now attacking the younger men, and their efforts are persistent. The utmost endeavours of the police have failed to discern the brains at the back of the movement, perhaps because the real directors work from safe shelters in Paris, in Switzerland, in Japan, and in America. The greatest safeguard of the Government is that on the whole the revolutionaries work very badly and incompetently, that many of their minor tools turn approvers, and that they have not yet succeeded in influencing the bulk of the people of India; but they have had a few successes, and they are rapidly learning the lessons indicated by their many failures.

I should say that the revolutionary movement in India—it is a mistake to call it Anarchist, though I must plead guilty to first christening it thus in the *National Review* in 1906—is still comparatively small, but is widespread enough to require the utmost vigilance and the most serious attention. The police need more support than they receive, but the police force as a whole has not met the crisis well, owing to defects for which the Government of past days is chiefly responsible. It may be doubted whether a revival of the old Thagi and Dacoity Department in another form would meet the difficulty, unless such a Department was invested with powers which Parliament would not at present sanction, and unless the Indian Civil Service produced another Sleeman, which it has not yet done. I do not favour wholesale deportations or indiscriminate arrests, though no measure of the kind should be shrunk from if the occasion seems to require it. My belief is that the legal powers at present at the disposal of the Government should suffice to meet the situation, but that much of the blame for recent events rests upon the Courts. In every case of political crime in India, the accused persons should be instantly brought before a special tribunal of three judges, sitting without a jury; and in such cases there should be no public preliminary investigation. What the revolutionaries need is swift trial, and if that expedient was inexorably adopted in all political cases the result would probably be good. Such a method would not kill the movement, but it would soon weaken it.

ASIATICUS

CORRESPONDENCE

MEMORIAL TO THE LATE ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR FREDERICK RICHARDS

The Executive Committee of the above Memorial beg to give notice that a General Meeting of Subscribers, to which the public are also invited, will be held in the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, at noon on Thursday, the 7th of May, when the report and recommendations of the Executive Committee will be laid before the subscribers.

The Executive Committee gratefully acknowledge the following additional donations. Further donations, which will be duly acknowledged, may be sent to: The Rt. Hon. the Viscount Goschen, 21 Lombard Street, London, E.C., Admiral the Rt. Hon. Lord Charles Beresford, 1 Great Cumberland Place, London, W.; Admiral Sir John Durnford, Catisfield, Fareham, Hants; Paymaster-in-Chief F. Harrison-Smith, Admiralty House, Portsmouth.

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"THE RACE PROBLEM IN CANADA"

To the Editor of the NATIONAL REVIEW

SIR,—At page 1042 of the February number of the NATIONAL REVIEW, of which I have been a reader for a number of years, I find an article entitled "The Racial Problem in Canada." It is signed by a Mrs. Donald Shaw, and reads in part as follows:

"Take, for instance, the Province of Quebec—here the population is entirely French (the term 'French Canadian' is never used by Canadians). The French hold the balance of power and the Roman Catholic Church is predominant. One would not like to say that the people present in any way a menace to the life of the Dominion, but it is a fact that they are, as a general rule, antagonistic to Imperial ideals, and in some districts they are still in such a state of ignorance as to be classed as 'scarcely human' by people who have come in contact with them, and there is no doubt that before Canada can become really Imperial, by some means or other the French must be moulded more completely into the actual Imperial life of the country than they are at present.

"In the extreme south of Ontario there is another large French settlement; here, however, the French blood is largely intermingled with Indian blood, and in some cases there is a distinct dash of the negro. Altogether an undesirable combination of races."

I have not the honour of knowing Mrs. Shaw, or of ever having heard of her, but, with all due respect, I may be permitted to say that she is totally ignorant of the conditions which prevail in Canada, outside of Toronto, where she seems to reside. Her article contains many obvious errors in relation to the Jews, Mormons, and Doukhobors, and to the racial problem in general. My purpose in writing you is to protest most emphatically against what Mrs. Shaw writes about my compatriots, the French Canadians. Having been in public life for the last thirty years, and coming from *the extreme south of Ontario*, I am probably in as good a position as any one in Canada to judge of the soundness and accuracy of the opinion enunciated by Mrs. Shaw.

In the first place, the term "French Canadian" is constantly used by Canadians, so much so that at a farewell banquet given to Lord Grey, in the city of Montreal, just before his departure from Canada, he advised his hearers to drop the expression "French Canadian," and to substitute therefor, when it was necessary, "Canadian of French extraction."

As for the French Canadians being antagonistic to Imperial ideals, it would be well to know what Mrs. Shaw means by these words. If she wishes to imply that the Canadians of French extraction are against that kind of Imperialism which would make Canadian interests always and in every instance subservient to the immediate needs of Great Britain, then I may say that, in common with a great many other Canadians, the French Canadians are antagonistic to such an Imperial ideal; but if by "Imperial ideal" is meant an unswerving loyalty to the British Crown, a determination whenever occasion arises to defend against any aggressor the flag which floats over Canada, a desire to shoulder the burden of the defence of the Empire as a whole, then I assert, without fear of contradiction, that the French Canadians are animated by the same sentiments as their fellow citizens of other origins. The two parties in Canada are at one on the question of sharing in the defence of the Empire, the only difference of

opinion being as to how or by what means the end can be attained, and both parties count an almost equal number of electors of French descent.

As to the maliciously untrue statement that the French Canadians are, in certain parts, "scarcely human," I say that such a statement can only be the outcome, to put it as charitably as possible, of crass ignorance of the conditions existing among the French population of Canada.

As before stated, I come from the extreme south of Ontaria, where, as Mrs. Shaw says, there is another large French settlement. The prosperous, well-bred, and jovial French Canadian farmer of the counties of Essex and Kent will be more than amused to read that the French blood in these parts is largely intermingled with Indian blood, and in some cases with a distinct dash of the negro. Here, again, Mrs. Shaw has drawn on her imagination—no such conditions have ever existed.

To state my views very frankly, I may say that Canadians in general will be surprised to find, in the *National Review*, such utter nonsense, statements so far removed from the truth, assertions which cannot bear for an instant the light of investigation, and that, travelling on the credit of your important periodical, they should be spread broadcast throughout the Empire. The French Canadian Press has taken grave offence at the article written by Mrs. Donald Shaw, and the opinion has been expressed that such writings, unjust, untrue, and libellous, are not calculated to encourage, among a large class of the Canadian community, that brotherly love, mutual respect, and confidence which are the foundation of true Imperial sentiment.

Yours truly,

Montreal. TH. CHASE-CASGRAIN

THE DEAD HAND OF FEDERALISM

To the Editor of THE NATIONAL REVIEW

SIR,—Dr. Grey—if I may venture to paraphrase his letter—opposes the virtues of Canadian Federalism to what I have described as the vices of Federalism in Australia and the United States; but he does not propose that the Canadian system should be applied to the United Kingdom. On the contrary, he says: "Federal Home Rulers hope to build the foundations (of Imperial Federalism) by giving to Ireland the status of Canada, and to the Irish provinces the autonomy of Ontario and Quebec." In other words under Federal Home Rule the relations between Ireland and the Imperial Parliament are not to be as the relations between say Ontario and the Dominion, but as the relations between Canada and England. It is only when we come to consider the relations between Ulster and the other provinces of Ireland that the parallel of Canadian Federalism is to be applied.

But my article was not concerned with the relations between the Irish provinces—a question to me of minor importance; but with the relations between England and Ireland. If Ireland, as Dr. Grey suggests, is to have the status of Canada, then she will not only have her own Post Office, and limited powers as to Customs—as in the Home Rule Bill—but full powers over Customs and the power to create her own Army and Navy like the Dominion. How then can Dr. Grey say that the danger of "fiscal

discrimination" would not exist in the Irish case because it does not exist as between province and province of Canada, when the true parallel is between Canada and the United Kingdom where it has actually existed ?

If, however, Dr. Grey really means that the relations between Ireland and the Imperial Parliament should be as the relations between a Canadian province and the Dominion, then the powers given to Ireland under the Home Rule Bill are far too wide. Dr. Grey admires Sir John Macdonald—greatest indeed of Canadian statesmen. Let me quote what Macdonald said on February 3, 1865, in the Legislative Assembly :

"I have again and again stated in the House that, if practicable, I thought a Legislative Union would be preferable. I have always contended that if we could agree to have one Government and one Parliament legislating for the whole of these peoples, it would be the best, the cheapest and most vigorous, and the strongest system of government we could adopt."

Union being impracticable owing to provincial prejudices, Sir John Macdonald secured something as near Union as he could get :

"For the sake of securing peace to ourselves and our posterity," he said at the Quebec Conference in 1864, "we must make ourselves powerful. The great security for peace is to convince the world of our strength by being united in framing the Constitution, care should be taken to avoid the mistakes and weaknesses of the United States system, the primary error of which was the reservation to the different States of all powers not delegated to the general government. We must reverse this process by establishing a strong central government, to which shall belong all powers not specially conferred on the provinces. Canada, in my opinion is better off as she stands than she would be as a member of a confederacy composed of five sovereign states, which would be the result if the powers of the local governments were not defined. A strong central government is indispensable to the success of the experiment we are trying." (See Pope's *Life*, vol. ii, pp. 269–76.)

Macdonald was, in fact, like Hamilton, a Unionist. And with good reason, for even the limited powers conferred upon the Canadian provinces have been, and are certain to be again, a source of weakness and friction to the Dominion. That there are compensating advantages may be argued, the chief being the vast size and unwieldy nature of Canadian territory, and the obstacle of traditional separation as between States. But these are conditions applying to Canada, not to the United Kingdom. Another point : Canadian Federalism was not, as Dr. Grey suggests, merely an alternative to Canadian Union. It was an extension of the powers of a central government over new states which had formerly been separate. I may also add that Sir John Macdonald was opposed to Home Rule for Ireland, and favoured as an alternative the formation of local Committees of the Imperial Parliament. That opens a big question which I cannot discuss here ; but it seems to me a much sounder idea than Federalism for the United Kingdom.

I remain, &c.,

IAN D. COLVIN

SOME PRESS COMMENTS ON THE APRIL NATIONAL REVIEW (*continued*)

WRITING of our preparations for defending the country against sudden attack, Earl Percy fears the nation has so long enjoyed peace that it is unable to comprehend the meaning of war.

War when it comes will, under modern conditions be so dangerous and costly that the victor will be compelled to make it decisive. DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 2.

EARL Percy has a long and exhaustive article in this number upon "The True Doctrine of National Defence," in which he deals with the fallacy that the Navy is all-sufficient from a defensive point of view. In every war, he points out, between an island Power and a Continental enemy it has been found necessary for the islanders to defeat the enemy on his own ground.—PALL MALL GAZETTE, Apr. 2.

CAPTAIN Tryon, M.P., in an article on "The Free Traders in 1914," which appears in the current issue of the *National Review*, says: "A number of eminent Liberal Free Traders were recently discovered enjoying protection for themselves, and the cocoa duties were therefore altered to bring them into accord with the principles of 'Free Trade.' The result is that we are now importing a smaller proportion than before of unmanufactured cocoa, and a larger proportion of manufactured cocoa; so that a return to 'Free Trade' principles has reduced the demand for labour in this country."—YORKSHIRE HERALD, Apr. 11.

CAPTAIN Tryon shows that, while Free Traders keep up their shouting, their cause is steadily losing ground as a practical policy.

PALL MALL GAZETTE, Apr. 2.

UNDER the heading "The Eclipse of Ananias," "A Simple Tory" compiles a useful anthology of Mr. Lloyd George's deviations from the exactness of statement which he urged the Welsh Sunday-school children to adopt as one of their mottoes in life.——Mr. Maurice Low in his monthly review of "American Affairs" criticizes the inefficacy of Mr. Wilson's non-recognition policy in Mexico, while admitting that on the Panama question he has shown courage, statesmanship, and shrewd political leadership. As regards Mexico, Mr. Low declares that the murder of Mr. Benton has done more than anything else to convince the American public of the unfitness of the revolutionists to assume charge of the Government of Mexico, and of the impossibility of peace being restored to the country unless the United States intervenes and takes control. Mr. Aubrey Bell has an excellent article on "Portugal and the Republic," welcoming the amnesty and other conciliatory acts of the Government, and appealing to the Royalists and foreign opinion to do the right thing in their turn by giving the Republic a fair chance to pursue the moderate policy thus initiated. The next few years will show whether the Republic is capable of continued moderation, or, by relapsing into Jacobinism, will "lose its second great opportunity of obtaining the confidence, not only of Europe, but of the Portuguese provinces." Mr. Bell frankly admits his belief that the more rope the Republic is given the sooner it is likely to hang itself with its own hands. None the less, he is firmly convinced that a great responsibility will rest on those, either Royalist or Radical, who, by Jacobinism or conspiracy, hamper the quiet ordering of affairs.

SPECTATOR, Apr. 4.

SIR E. T. Cook shares with Lord Morley the honour of being the greatest biographer of the day. His lives of Ruskin and Florence Nightingale need alone be mentioned. No one is so well fitted, therefore, to talk on "The Art of Biography," and everyone interested in it should read the paper on this subject which he gave to the New College Essay Society at Oxford. It is published in full in the April *National Review*.

PUBLIC OPINION, Apr. 10.

MR. Maurice Low, one of the best-informed writers on American affairs, sends from Washington an important survey of politics on the other side of the Atlantic, laying stress upon the earnest desire of President Wilson to improve the relations between the United States and the European Powers, and explaining that desire by a reference to the widespread apprehension of future complications with Japan. If an American army were to be despatched to Mexico and to meet with tremendous difficulties in that country—as would certainly be the case—there are thousands of Americans who believe that Japan would take the opportunities of "settling a long score."

ABERDEEN JOURNAL, Apr. 6.

THE Hon. Robert Palmer gives an interesting account in the *National Review* of the proposed new High Court Rules for cheapening the suits of poor people.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Apr. 4.

SOME PRESS COMMENTS ON THE APRIL NATIONAL REVIEW (*continued*)

ONE expects political events to be briskly treated in the *National Review*, and in this respect the April issue is certainly not disappointing. The whole story of the Ulster episode and its various sequels, as far as they can be known outside of the inner Cabinet ring, is unfolded on the most dramatic fashion. If it were only for its candid treatment of home politics the *National Review* should take foremost rank among the more solid reviews.

NORTH DEVON HERALD, Apr. 9.

THE *National Review* for April is again replete with articles touching on the burning questions of the day.

SHREWSBURY CHRONICLE, Apr. 10.

AFTER perusing a violent attack upon the Government, especially the Prime Minister, and a critical comparison of the Chancellor of the Exchequer with a certain famous Biblical character, we turn with anticipation to a contribution in less responsible vein entitled "Some Little Known Facts About Bugs." The contrast may be held to illustrate Cowper's remark that "variety is the very spice of life."

FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 6.

ALL the world loves a game fighter, and none—not even the objurgatory Mr. L.-G. himself—puts up a finer show than Mr. L. J. Maxse, whose rostrum is this review. The notes that he wrote a week or less ago are already being endorsed by events; and this shows political acumen. But it is not only the Ulster crisis which holds him. He is a fair-minded critic, and while conceding to Mr. Snowden that the international character of the great contracting combinations requires watching, he explodes the nonsensical "Armament Ring" myth of Mr. Snowden's fevered imagination.

There is much good literary, general, Colonial, and Imperial matter in this clearly printed monthly. Nothing kills more absurd canards and bigotries than Earl Percy's well-informed outline of "The True Doctrine of National Defence." The only way to avoid being utterly convinced by it is not to read it.—HULL DAILY MAIL, Apr. 8.

EARL Percy, who writes in this month's *National Review* under the title "The True Doctrine of National Defence," insists on the necessity for this country of an army capable of affecting the issue of war on the Continent.

MORNING POST, Apr. 1.

"IT is the general opinion," remarks Mr. L. J. Maxse, confidently, in his "Episodes of the Month," "that the Asquith Government will eat any amount of dirt before risking their salaries at a General Election," but even Mr. Maxse must feel astonished to-day at the swift fulfilment of a prophecy indulged in before recent events had developed with such appalling rapidity. The Ulster crisis, however, *is not* the only matter with which Mr. Maxse deals. He has much that is both pertinent and forcible to say concerning the nonsensical "Armament Ring" of Mr. Snowden's fevered imagination, though he agrees that the international character of the great contracting combinations requires watching.

GLOBE, Apr. 1.

IN the *National Review* Mr. L. J. Maxse deals with the political situation in caustic terms. He pays a high tribute to Mr. Bonar Law for his trenchant exposure of Radical trickery, his gallant support of Ulster, and his bold and eminently equitable offer to consult the people and abide by their decision. He quotes the momentous document in which Brigadier-General Gough wrote when asking for a clear definition of the terms "duty as ordered" and "active operations" in Ulster, and this paragraph is worth remembering.

"If such duty consists of the maintenance of order and the preservation of property, all the officers in this brigade, including myself, would be prepared to carry out that duty, but if the duty involves the initiation of active military operations against Ulster the following officers would respectfully and under protest prefer to be dismissed."

Mr. Maxse contends that though no one should say a word calculated to impair the sense of duty and discipline of a soldier carrying out lawful orders, "the soldier is also a citizen, and he does not surrender his right of private judgment when he is asked to commit a great crime in order to save the bacon of a group of transient politicians who for the time being have captured the government of the country."

LEICESTER MAIL, Apr. 9.

CAPTAIN Tryon, M.P., discusses the tariff question in an able article. He maintains that Social Reform and Imperialism should go hand in hand.

INVERNESS COURIER, Apr. 3.

THE

NATIONAL REVIEW

No. 376. JUNE 1914

EPISODES OF THE MONTH

Mr. Kipling's Searchlight

It required the rare combination of genius and courage to make an appalling political situation plain to the plain man. That service was rendered to the nation and the Empire by Mr. Rudyard Kipling on May 16, in the course of a speech to a vast concourse of Unionists at Tunbridge Wells, who had met to protest against the dismemberment of the United Kingdom, and the betrayal of their fellow loyalists in Ireland. All the Yahoos and guttersnipes of the Coalition, who live on the Billingsgate which ceaselessly flows from the lips of the Artful Dodger of Carnarvon Boroughs, are up in arms against Mr. Kipling for committing the unpardonable sin of calling a spade a spade, while the Mugs and Mugwumps of the Opposition, who derive their inspiration from the Harmsworth press, are scarcely less shocked that anybody should say out loud what every "white man" is thinking. Mr. Kipling knows his own public. He caters neither for traitors nor scuttlers, and his public know him, and deep and widespread s the gratitude for the ruthless manner in which he stripped the nask off the sordid mountebanks who are endeavouring to un the State on the rocks. We have reached a stage of the risis at which it is a crime to say anything less than the whole ruth. Mr. Kipling realises this and acted accordingly. He ost no time in conventional preliminaries.

When I was a young man in India I used to report criminal cases for the newspaper

and irretrievably compromised the unity of Great Britain or the safety of the Empire, or made existence unendurable to any large section of the King's subjects.

Denunciation and Terrorism

But the Home Rule Bill had broken the faith of generations by officially recognising sedition, privy conspiracy and rebellion and subsidising the secret forces of boycott, intimidation, outrage, and murder. "And it created an independent stronghold, in which all these forces could work together, as they have always and openly boasted that they would, for the destruction of Great Britain." The speaker did not for one instant blame the Nationalists. "They are what they are—what their particular type of their race has always been since the beginning of recorded history. They have done nothing, and, so far as in them lies, they have suffered nothing to be done for the peace or the material advancement of their land." They had imposed their own ancient form of tribal administration, the despotism of secret societies, "a government of denunciation by day and terrorism by night. You can see the fruits of their work within a few hours of where we stand, if you choose to visit the cities or the country-sides that they control by their peculiar methods—by the only methods they have ever understood—by the methods of fear, oppression, and hate." One must be fair even to the Molly Maguires, and Mr. Kipling was fair, for he pointed out that "To do them justice, they have never faltered in their passionate and persistent hatred of England. They have preached it and practised it by every means in their power. They have prayed for the success of England's enemies in every quarter of the world; they have assisted those enemies with men and arms; they have jeered at England's defeat; they have befouled the honour of England's Army, and they have mocked England's dead." And it was to these men with this record that the Cabinet proposed to hand over a portion of the United Kingdom "for no other reason than that they might continue in enjoyment of their office. They were warned from the first of the certain consequences of their action, they were entreated—abjectly entreated as I think—to refer the matter to the electors, they were even offered the lives and fortunes of the loyalists in the south and west of Ireland, if they would leave the north and east out of their Bill

of Sale. You know their answer. You know Ulster's answer." With devotion and self-sacrifice Ulster had set her house in order to avert this crime. She was the first community in the realm to realise that the Home Rule Bill meant life or death, "and better death than the life it will impose upon her sons. But the Home Rule Bill is equally one of life or death to every free man in the kingdom. Ireland is sold to-day. To-morrow it may be the turn of the southern counties to be weighed off as make-weight in some secret bargain. Why not? Three years ago you would have said that the Marconi scandal, and the appointment of the present Lord Chief Justice were impossible. Three months ago you would have said that the plot against Ulster was impossible. Nothing is impossible in a land without a Constitution—nothing except peace."

The Bill of Sale

THEY might believe that President Huerta would not sell the province of Mexico to the United States, but we have no right to believe this as regards our own country. "Else why are we here to-day? A province and a people of Great Britain are to be sold to their and our enemies. We are forbidden to have any voice in this sale of our own flesh and blood. We have no tribunal under Heaven to appeal to, except the corrupt parties to that sale and their paid followers. And what has happened within the last two months? One thing led to another, till the Cabinet found themselves in such a position that they had to put some one out of the way to get straight again. So they proposed to put Ulster out of the way. With this object they secretly prepared the largest combined expedition of both arms that has been launched since the Crimea—a force of horse, foot, field-guns, howitzers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. If these Ulster cattle could not be sold on the hoof, they could be delivered as carcases." Then Ministers made a slip. It requires nerve to organise cattle slaughter on a large scale. "They gave the officers told off for the business their choice—whether they would first provoke collision with, and then loose death and destruction on, the one loyal, the one prosperous, the one law-abiding portion of Ireland, at the order of a secret Cabinet Committee, or whether they would face the ruin of their careers as officers in the Army

of the King." Mr. Kipling does well to remind us "The choice was not so easy as it sounds." For although the Constitution had ceased to exist, and all methods of civilised government had been discarded,

> yet the old trappings of constitutionalism, the old form and conventions of civilised government, still remained. They were a valuable asset to the Cabinet. They were the cloak under which the conspirators could operate, behind which they could threaten. These men who met to arrange massacre, these men who would bombard an open town of loyal subjects sooner than risk the loss of thirteen guineas a day while they asked the electors for leave to do so, these outlaws were still his Majesty's Ministers, powerful heads of great Departments of State. They could make or break the careers of honourable men. The officers took their choice of the alternative so brutally presented to them. They elected to forfeit their pay and position rather than do this work to save the pay and position of his Majesty's Ministers. By their choice—to their eternal honour and glory be it recorded—the Army saved the Empire.

"Blackguards"

WHAT had happened since? The Cabinet and the House of Commons had drawn eight weeks more salary, but if they did not go forward with the Home Rule Bill they would cease to draw any, so they had no option.

> We know, all mankind know, they did not shrink from attempted murder to overcome beforehand the opposition which they knew their act would incite. Through no fault of the Cabinet that attempt failed. But do not be under any delusion. Do not be deceived by any talk of arrangements or accommodations in the House of Commons. If the Cabinet think that murder will serve the Cabinet's turn again they will attempt it again. And they will go further. In the light of their record two months ago we are justified in believing that if by any lie, by any falsification of fact, speech, document, or telegram, by any bribe of money, title, or promotion, by subornation of evidence or prearranged provocation—if by these things the blame of causing bloodshed can be laid upon Ulster the Cabinet will openly or secretly lend itself to that work. (A voice: "Blackguards.")

Mr. Kipling concluded his stirring speech—a searchlight in the midst of the prevailing fog—by pointing out that Ulster, "and as much of Ireland as dares to express itself," wished to remain within the Union and under the flag of the Union. The Cabinet for the reasons given intended to drive them out. The electors have never sanctioned this. "Ulster has made every sacrifice, save one, to make effective her intention to remain in the Union. She stands ready to make that last sacrifice. How do we stand in this matter? (A voice: 'With Ulster'.) Our forefathers, who were no strangers to tyranny, would have set their house in

order long ere this—but we, who encounter it for the first time in generations, are slow to realise that civil war is possible. But civil war is possible. Civil war is inevitable, unless our rulers can be brought to realise that, even now, they must submit these grave matters to the judgment of a free people. If they do not, all the history of our land shows there is but one end for us—destruction from within or destruction from without."

"Bradford and Bloodshed"

THE situation so brilliantly described by Mr. Rudyard Kipling amid the transports of the Coalition, who hate the truth with an ungovernable hatred, is no new thing. It has developed steadily and inexorably. All who cared and dared to exercise their faculties have long seen that events must reach their present impasse, though even Unionists most suspicious of the Government might have hesitated to believe that a peace-at-any-price Party would deliberately adopt a policy of civil war at any price. Mr. Churchill's notorious Bradford speech—the only noteworthy speech he has ever delivered or is ever likely to deliver—in which he preached the naked gospel of bloodshed and adumbrated the Pogrom to which the Cabinet had already given its sanction by approving orders for the movements of a battle squadron and by appointing a Pogrom Committee, caused a tremendous shock throughout the non-political world, as also to many amiable, simple-minded Unionists, who fondly imagined that just as the leopard changes its spots and the Ethiopian his skin, Mr. Churchill had turned his back on a lurid past and was about to emerge as the Heaven-born leader of a new patriotic National Party, which in the cant of its promoters "would combine the best elements of the old parties." These innocents are somewhat hard on their quondam hero, who needless to say remains the hero of the Harmsworth press. If a man of the character and public record of Mr. Churchill deceives any one it is not he but they who are to blame and we have no sympathy with emotional journalists and artless politicians who wilfully refuse to recognise a mountebank when they see him. But we are none the less grateful to the mountebank for assisting some of our political friends to recover their lost perspective. "Bradford and Bloodshed" is not a mere landmark in "my career"; if it were it would not be worth